State v. Pratt
This text of 40 Iowa 631 (State v. Pratt) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Iowa primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
The defendant’s counsel insist that, upon several grounds, the judgment ought to be reversed. ~We will notice the objections relied upon in the order of their presentation by counsel.
I. It is first urged that the verdict wants the support of the evidence. The evidence is conflicting and is lacking that jn-eponderanee in favor of plaintiff which would give entire satisfaction to our minds with the verdict. Indeed, we may say that some of us would, were we charged with the duty of deciding the case upon the evidence, reach a conclusion differ[632]*632ent from that announced in the verdict of the jury. But we are unable to say that the verdict is so in want of support from the proof that we are wai'ranted in concluding that it was the result of j>assion or prejudice. The jnry had the witnesses before them, and doubtless were materially aided by their appearance and manner, in reaching a conclusion. We are deprived of these most efficient tests of credibility of witnesses. It may be that, had we these advantages for weighing the evidence, we would not differ, as we do, from the jury’s conclusion.
II. The defendant was an unmarried man engaged in farming. The mother of the child lived with him for several
III. Certain evidence, tending to show the lewdness of the woman, was excluded. It is insisted that this evidence was
IY. Yerbal criticisms are made upon these instructions,' the first, sixth and seventh, given to the jury, wherein it is attempted to be shown that they mean what the court evidently did not intend. In this way it is insisted that they had a prejudicial influence against defendant. The meaning of the instructions is obvious, and could not have been misunderstood by the jury. The point demands no farther attention.
V. The court directed the jury, if they found that at or about the time the child was begotten, the woman had inter-
• YI. The jury were informed in an instruction that the object of the action was to protect the county from the expense of keeping an illegitimate child. It is insisted that this instruction was calculated to prejudice the jury against defendant’s rights. That the instruction is correct is not denied. We are incapable of surmising any possible prejudice which might result to defendant by the court correctly informing the jury of the object and character of the action.' Indeed, it appears to us, that to the end the jury might intelligently and j ustly discharge their duty, the information imparted to them by the instruction wás’propérly given. It is certainly not in accord !with'the spirit of the law to conceal - from juries matters which pertain to the rights and liabilities of the parties to actions wherein they are required to render verdicts. The instruction informed the jury that 'the action,was not a criminal proceeding. This information certainly was correctly given them.
’ The foregoing discussion disposes of all questions raised in the case. We find no error in it.
AfEIRMED.
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40 Iowa 631, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-v-pratt-iowa-1875.