State v. Pitts

2024 Ohio 603

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: February 16, 2024
• Docket: 29649
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as State v. Pitts, 2024-Ohio-603.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT MONTGOMERY COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO : : Appellee : C.A. No. 29649 : v. : Trial Court Case No. 2022 CR 00546 : RONALD W. PITTS : (Criminal Appeal from Common Pleas : Court) Appellant : :

...........

OPINION

Rendered on February 16, 2024

THERESA G. HAIRE, Attorney for Appellant

MATHIAS H. HECK, JR., by NATHAN B. VANDERHORST, Attorney for Appellee

.............

EPLEY, P.J.

{¶ 1} Defendant-Appellant Ronald Pitts appeals from his conviction in the

Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas after he pleaded guilty to aggravated arson

and was sentenced to community control. Additionally, pursuant to R.C. 2909.15(D)(2),

Pitts was ordered to register as an arson offender for the rest of his life. For the reasons

that follow, the judgment of the trial court will be affirmed. -2-

I. Facts and Procedural History

{¶ 2} In February 2022, Pitts set fire to the house at 919 Wellmeier Avenue in

Dayton. This action not only damaged the property but violated a protection order against

him. In early March 2022, Pitts was indicted on one count of aggravated arson and one

count of violation of a protection order.

{¶ 3} In June 2022, Pitts entered into a plea agreement with the State. He agreed

to plead guilty to the single count of aggravated arson and, in exchange, the State

dismissed the violation of a protection order charge. Prior to the sentencing, Pitts filed a

motion to have the court find R.C.2909.15(D)(2)(b) – a portion of the arson offender

registry statute – unconstitutional. At the disposition, Pitts was sentenced to up to five

years of community control. The trial court acknowledged his motion but informed Pitts

that unless the Supreme Court were to find that section unconstitutional, he would be

required to register as an arson offender for the rest of his life.

{¶ 4} Pitts has filed a timely appeal with a single assignment of error.

II. Arson Registry

{¶ 5} In his initial brief, Pitts argued that the trial court erred by denying his motion

to declare R.C. 2909.15 – which requires a person convicted of arson to register with the

sheriff of the county in which he or she resides – an unconstitutional violation of the

separation of powers doctrine. Pitts alleged that R.C. 2909.15(D)(2)(b) infringes upon the

judicial power to sentence because it requires a recommendation from executive branch

officials to potentially shorten the registration period. That section states: “The judge may -3-

limit an arson offender’s duty to reregister at an arson offender’s sentencing hearing to

not less than ten years if the judge receives a request from the prosecutor and the

investigating law enforcement agency to consider limiting the arson offender’s registration

period.”

{¶ 6} Although this was an undecided question of law when Pitts submitted his

appellate brief, shortly thereafter, the Ohio Supreme released its opinion in State v.

Daniel, Ohio Slip Opinion No. 2023-Ohio-4035, __ N.E.3d __, which held that the

separation of powers doctrine is not unconstitutionally implicated by the statute.

{¶ 7} The Daniel court noted that “the decision whether to recommend a reduced

registration period is not judicial in nature. The judiciary exercises the power of

adjudication and imposition of sentence when it enters final judgment of conviction, but

not before. The prosecution exercises its prosecution power before entry of final

judgment, but not after. In this respect, a prosecutor’s decision whether an offender

should be considered for a reduced registration period fits comfortably within the scope

of discretionary decisions that prosecutors are authorized to make in every criminal case.”

(Internal citations omitted.) Id. at ¶ 44.

{¶ 8} It further opined that the fact an executive-branch decision is not subject to

appellate review does not create a separation of powers issue. Id. at ¶ 45. “As the United

States Supreme Court has explained, such decisions are ‘particularly ill-suited to judicial

review’ and ‘generally rest[ ] entirely in [the officer’s] discretion,’ subject of course to

statutory and constitutional constraints.” Id., quoting Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S.

598, 607, 105 S.Ct. 1524, 84 L.Ed.2d 547 (1985) and Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. -4-

357, 98 S.Ct. 663, 54 L.Ed.2d 604 (1978).

{¶ 9} Recognizing the impact of the Daniel decision on his case, Pitts has filed a

brief conceding that his assignment of error must be resolved in the State’s favor. We

agree. Daniel makes clear that the reduced-registration provision of the statute does not

violate the separation of powers doctrine. Therefore, Pitts’ assignment of error is

overruled.

III. Conclusion

{¶ 10} The judgment of the trial court will be affirmed.

TUCKER, J. and LEWIS, J., concur.