State v. Pitts

241 So. 2d 399
CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida
DecidedDecember 3, 1970
DocketL-462
StatusPublished
Cited by11 cases

This text of 241 So. 2d 399 (State v. Pitts) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court of Appeal of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State v. Pitts, 241 So. 2d 399 (Fla. Ct. App. 1970).

Opinion

241 So.2d 399 (1970)

STATE of Florida, Appellant,
v.
Freddie Lee PITTS and Wilbert Lee, Appellees.

No. L-462.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

December 3, 1970.

*400 J. Frank Adams, State's Atty., and Leo C. Jones, Asst. State's Atty., for appellant.

Phillip A. Hubbart, Asst. Public Defender; Irwin J. Block, Barry N. Semet, Miami, and Maurice Rosen, North Miami Beach, for appellees.

RAWLS, Judge.

The State has appealed an order on a Criminal Rule 1.850 33 F.S.A. motion vacating the judgments and death sentences of Freddie Lee Pitts and Wilbert Lee for first degree murder of two attendants (Floyd and Burkett) of the Mo Jo Service Station in Gulf County.

Pitts and Lee in 1963, after being assured they would get a jury trial on the issue of mercy and that the State would not use pictures of the murdered victims, pleaded guilty to indictments charging first degree murder. Subsequent to accepting their guilty pleas, the trial judge empaneled a jury and conducted a jury trial upon the issue of mercy. At this trial Willie Mae Lee, an unwilling eyewitness to the robbery and abduction, after being sworn, took the stand and testified as to how she, the two defendants, Wilbert Lee's wife and Roland Lee Jones were together about midnight at the Mo Jo Station where they had a dispute about the use of the restroom. The six then went to Wilbert Lee's home where they were joined by three soldiers and one woman for a few drinks. About 2:00 a.m. she left with Freddie Lee Pitts in his car to get some vodka. After she got in the car she discovered that Wilbert Lee was lying down in the back seat. Over her protest the two men returned to the Mo Jo Station where Pitts took the money from the cash register, abducted the two attendants whom they took down the White City road to a secluded spot near the canal. There Pitts and Lee forced the attendants to climb through an iron gate and walk into the woods. Willie Mae heard shots from the car. She was returned to her home about daylight under the threat that if she told anyone she would never see her daughter again. Willie Mae Lee was not related to Wilbert Lee but they were close friends, and she often called him "Brother" and he called her "Sister."

Following the State's presentation of its case at the mercy trial, Pitts and Lee both freely testified admitting their actions and the truth of the preceding testimony. Their testimony corroborated that of Willie Mae Lee, and they further testified to facts that were unknown to Willie Mae such as the fact that Pitts took the gun from the Mo Jo Station on their first visit there about midnight. The jury refused to recommend mercy. On appeal, the *401 Florida Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and death sentences, Lee v. State, 166 So.2d 131 (1964). The Supreme Court of the United States denied certiorari, 380 U.S. 917, 85 S.Ct. 905, 13 L.Ed.2d 802 (1965).

In 1965 Pitts and Lee filed a motion to vacate on the grounds that the composition of the grand and petit juries was unconstitutional. The denial of this motion was affirmed by this Court in 1966, 188 So.2d 872. Certiorari was again denied by the Supreme Court of the United States, 386 U.S. 983, 87 S.Ct. 1292, 18 L.Ed.2d 234.

On December 19, 1967, Pitts and Lee filed the instant motion to vacate, represented by three attorneys from New York, one from Washington, D.C., and four from Miami. This motion and its two amendments alleged the following grounds:

1. One lawyer represented two defendants (no adverse interest was alleged).

2. The systematic exclusion from the mercy trial jury of persons opposed to the death penalty and death sentence is cruel and unusual punishment.

3. Pleas of guilty were based upon confessions coerced by the police.

4. Ineffective assistance of court-appointed counsel.

5. The State knowingly withheld evidence favorable to the petitioners.

6. Innocence, on the basis that one Curtis Adams had confessed and that the mercy trial testimony of Willie Mae Lee and of the two petitioners was perjured.

The allegations and proofs were totally insufficient on grounds 1 and 2. As to ground 1, no adverse interest was alleged or proven. As to ground 2, there was no voir dire transcript in the record but counsel gave an oral "stipulation" accompanied by an oral explanation and exceptions. From the explanation it appears that the court, possibly without motion of counsel, excused five veniremen after examining them with respect to their opposition to the death penalty, and the State had in excess of five peremptory challenges left at the time the jury was accepted. There is no clear showing that the court in its voir dire examination departed from the requirements of Section 932.20, Florida Statutes, F.S.A.,[1] which has been the law of Florida for over 100 years. That part of the judgment which denied relief on these grounds is affirmed.

At the conclusion of the lengthy hearing held on the motion to vacate, the trial judge found that the quantum of proof required of the petitioners was that which is sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt as to the validity of the prior proceedings. Using this standard he found for the petitioners on the issues of (1) innocence, and (2) the State knowingly or negligently withholding evidence favorable to defendants. On all other issues he found for the State. However, the trial judge found that the confessions were not coerced but the guilty pleas "may" have been.

The State appealed and the appellees filed cross assignments of error so that virtually all possible issues are now before this Court.

The State's first point was whether the trial judge erred as a matter of law with respect to the burden of proof applicable in a collateral proceeding pursuant to Criminal Procedure Rule 1.850. We find that he did.

The trial judge in determining the test of the burden of proof cited two cases involving writs of error coram nobis. Criminal Procedure Rule 1.850 is now used to test the validity of proceedings which prior to the adoption of the rule could only be questioned by coram nobis. In both proceedings the procedure is somewhat similar. The petition for the writ of error coram nobis is first examined by a court, and *402 if the same alleges facts which, if true, constitute sufficient grounds for granting the writ, the lower court will be authorized to hold a hearing to inquire into the issues, and if the petitioner proves the truth of his allegations, the judgment should be set aside and the proceedings in the cause be taken up again at the point where the error in fact occurred.[2] Under rule 1.850 the trial court first examines the motion to vacate and if same alleges proper grounds cognizable by this method of review and if the motion, files and record in the cause do not conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief it shall grant a hearing for the purpose of determining the truth of the allegations. If the court determines that the grounds have been proven, it shall vacate the judgment, discharge the prisoner, resentence him or grant a new trial. Judgments of a court of law are presumed to be valid; the burden on the movant is a heavy one to overcome this presumption. The judgment of conviction will not be reversed except upon a clear showing of a departure from the essential requirements of the law.[3] It is incumbent upon one collaterally attacking a judgment to prove his allegations.[4]

We hold that the test used by the trial judge for determining the quantum of proof was error.

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Related

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390 So. 2d 397 (District Court of Appeal of Florida, 1980)
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363 So. 2d 624 (District Court of Appeal of Florida, 1978)
Sundell v. State
354 So. 2d 409 (District Court of Appeal of Florida, 1978)
Pitts v. State
307 So. 2d 473 (District Court of Appeal of Florida, 1975)
Resnick v. State
287 So. 2d 24 (Supreme Court of Florida, 1973)
Johnson v. State
268 So. 2d 170 (District Court of Appeal of Florida, 1972)
State v. Matera
266 So. 2d 661 (Supreme Court of Florida, 1972)
Cunningham v. State
254 So. 2d 391 (District Court of Appeal of Florida, 1971)
State v. Pitts
249 So. 2d 47 (District Court of Appeal of Florida, 1971)
Pitts v. State
247 So. 2d 53 (Supreme Court of Florida, 1971)

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Bluebook (online)
241 So. 2d 399, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-v-pitts-fladistctapp-1970.