State v. Piper
This text of State v. Piper (State v. Piper) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Superior Court of Delaware primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
State of Delaware ) ) ) v. ) C.A. No. 2301008437 ) 2301007516 Robert J. Piper, ) 2301005855 ) Petitioner. ) ) ) )
ORDER
Submitted: November 21, 2024 Decided: January 14, 2025
Upon Petitioner’s Motion for Postconviction Relief, SUMMARILY DISMISSED.
CONNER, J. This 14th day of January, 2025, upon consideration of the Petitioner’s timely
first motion for postconviction relief and the record on this matter, it appears to the
Court that:
1. Robert J. Piper (“Petitioner”) is an habitual criminal and a recidivist.
His criminal history includes fifty Title 11 felony arrests, one-hundred-eighty-nine
Title 11 misdemeanor arrests, and twenty-one Title 11 arrests for violations. Of
these arrests Petitioner has been convicted or adjudicated delinquent eighty-eight
times. Forty-four of these eighty-eight convictions are for either Shoplifting,
Attempted Shoplifting, or Possession of Shoplifter’s Tools.
2. On July 26, 2023, Petitioner “resolved multiple charges in three
criminal cases by pleading guilty to third-degree criminal trespassing, three counts
of possession of shoplifter's tools, three counts of shoplifting property worth less
than $1500, and noncompliance with conditions of release.”1 In addition to fines and
restitution, the Court “imposed an aggregate sentence of thirteen years of
imprisonment, suspended after the 169 days that [Petitioner] had already served for
one year of probation, with GPS monitoring for the first six months.”2 Despite his
lengthy criminal history, this sentence released Petitioner from level V incarceration.
1 Piper v. State, 315 A.3d 498, 2024 WL 1574469, at *1 (Del. 2024). 2 Id. 3. Twenty days later, on August 15, 2023, his probation officer filed a
Violation of Probation (“VOP”) report alleging Petitioner had violated the terms of
his probation. Petitioner admitted that he had violated probation at a hearing on
September 22, 2023. At the hearing, Officer Hopkin’s informed the Court that
Petitioner had absconded to Maryland. During his investigation Officer Hopkin’s
was informed that Petitioner was once again stealing and shoplifting. 3 Based on
Petitioner’s repetitive criminal conduct, previous violations of probation, and the
incredibly short twenty-day period between his guilty plea and admitted VOP, the
Court imposed a sentence of “twelve years and five months of imprisonment,
suspended after one year and completion of a program at DOC discretion for
decreasing levels of supervision.”4 The Supreme Court of Delaware affirmed the
September 22, 2023, VOP sentence.
4. On August 16, 2024, Petitioner filed a motion for postconviction relief
under Delaware Superior Court Civil Rule 61. The motion seeks postconviction
relief from his representation leading up to the July 26, 2023, guilty plea and
sentencing, a proceeding that ended with his release from Level V incarceration.
3 This information was provided to officer Hopkin’s by the mother of Petitioner’s children; Petitioner’s “ex” according to his counsel at the hearing. The Court was and is cognizant of the potential bias that may color those statements. 4 Piper, 2024 WL 1574469, at *1. The motion does not seek postconviction relief from the September 22, 2023, VOP
hearing and sentencing.
5. Before the Court can address the merit of Petitioner’s motion for
postconviction relief the Court must first address the four procedural bars of Rule
61(i).5 “Under the Delaware Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure, a motion
for postconviction relief can be barred for time limitations, successive motions,
procedural default, or former adjudication.”6 Petitioner’s motion was timely filed,
it is his first motion for postconviction relief on these charges, and the claims
asserted are neither procedurally defaulted nor have they been formally adjudicated.
Therefore, none of the procedural bars apply to Petitioner’s motion.
6. “Rule 61 allows prisoners to attack their sentence collaterally in the
Court where they were originally tried.”7 The Defendant must set forth “a sufficient
factual and legal basis for a collateral attack upon a criminal conviction…. 8” The
Defendant must establish that his “counsel’s representation fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness and that, but for his counsel’s unprofessional errors, there
is reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceedings would have been
different.”9 Lastly, “[i]f it plainly appears from the motion for postconviction relief
5 Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del. 1990). 6 State v. Smith, 2024 WL 1434184, at *1 (Del. Super. Ct., Apr. 2, 2024). 7 Luby v. State, 1998 WL 665054, at *1 (Del. 1998). 8 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(a)(1). 9 Bialach v. State, 773 A.2d 383, 387 (Del. 2001). and the record of the prior proceedings in the case that the movant is not entitled to
relief, the judge may enter an order for its summary dismissal….”10 In other words,
the Court is permitted to weed out claims that lack colorable merit to strike a balance
between fair consideration of postconviction claims and the presentation of scarce
defense resources.11
7. Although Petitioner lists four distinct grounds for relief, a closer
reading reveals that each claim is unsubstantiated both legally and factually. “Self-
serving assertions are no substitute for facts and evidence.”12 The best reading of
Petitioner’s complaints is that he believes the charges should have been dropped or
he receive a lesser sentence for his cooperation. Petitioner also claims he was bullied
into taking the plea and therefore it was not made knowingly. As to his argument
that the charges should have been dropped or reduced this is entirely conclusory and
unsubstantiated based on the record. Further, according to the State’s response, the
Petitioner received a benefit based on his cooperation with the assistance of his
counsel. Therefore, this claim has no merit.
8. As to the Petitioner’s claim that he was intimidated into taking the plea,
a review of the record tells a different story. It is hard to imagine that a person with
eighty-eight convictions and adjudications could be coerced into taking this “get out
10 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(d)(5). 11 Baldwin v. State, 166 A.3d 938, 939 (Del. 2017). 12 State v. Smith, 2024 WL 1434184, at *2 (Del. Super. Ct., Apr. 2, 2024). of jail” plea. During the plea colloquy, the Petitioner acknowledged that based on
his criminal history he was familiar with the plea process.13 The Petitioner further
stated he had enough time to talk with his attorney, he was satisfied with his attorney
and that no one was forcing him to enter the plea.14 This is consistent with his
answers on the TRUTH-IN-SENTENCING Guilty Plea Form. It is also telling that
the Petitioner only complained about his plea, again, a plea that despite his horrible
criminal record recommended his release from prison, after he chose to violate his
terms of probation twenty days after his release from prison. It is abundantly clear
that his counsel’s representation did not fall below an objective standard of
reasonableness.
9. Based on the foregoing, the Petitioner’s Motion for Postconviction
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
Related
Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
State v. Piper, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-v-piper-delsuperct-2025.