State v. Philip Dubord

Court of Appeals of Texas·Decided December 17, 2015·No. 03-15-00553-CR·Published

Opinion

ACCEPTED 03-15-00553-CR 8282088 THIRD COURT OF APPEALS AUSTIN, TEXAS 12/17/2015 11:42:38 AM JEFFREY D. KYLE No. 03-15-00553-CR CLERK

FILED IN In the Third Court of Appeals 3rd COURT OF APPEALS AUSTIN, TEXAS Austin, Texas 12/17/2015 11:42:38 AM JEFFREY D. KYLE Clerk

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellant,

v.

PHILIP DUBORD, Appellee.

On appeal from the County Court-at-Law Number Three, Travis County, Texas Trial Cause No. C-1-CR-12-204755

STATE’S REPLY BRIEF

DAVID A. ESCAMILLA TRAVIS COUNTY ATTORNEY

GISELLE HORTON ASSISTANT TRAVIS COUNTY ATTORNEY State Bar Number 10018000 Post Office Box 1748 Austin, Texas 78767 Telephone: (512)854-9415 TCAppellate@traviscountytx.gov

December 17, 2015 ATTORNEYS FOR THE STATE OF TEXAS

ORAL ARGUMENT IS NOT REQUESTED STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT

Resolution of the reasonableness-of-the-detention issue that this

enhanced DWI case presents depends on what the Third Court determines

from the trial court’s findings. Either the trial court misapplied the law, or

its findings are insufficient and ambiguous. Either way, the issues may be

fully and fairly argued on briefs.

i TABLE OF CONTENTS

STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii

STATEMENT OF THE CASE.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

BACKGROUND. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

ISSUE PRESENTED. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

SUMMARY OF THE STATE’S ARGUMENT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

ARGUMENT

Reply Point: Alternatively, the State asks the Third Court to abate and remand for supplemental findings... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

PRAYER. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

ii INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

Cases Page State v. Elias, 339 S.W.3d 667 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

State v. Mendoza, 365 S.W.3d 666 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

State v. Saenz, 411 S.W.3d 488 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

iii STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The State appeals an order suppressing its evidence in an enhanced

1 DWI case. CR 15. The trial court entered the suppression order on August

5, 2015. CR 81. The State gave notice of appeal on August 25, 2015. CR

90–91. The State’s original brief was filed on November 10, 2015. Dubord

tendered a brief for filing on December 11, 2015.

BACKGROUND

Although Dubord insists on page 3 of his brief that the pre-trial issue

was “objective probable cause for the arrest,” the suppression hearing’s

only issue was the initial detention’s legality. RR 21–71. Only Sergeant

Johnson, the detaining officer testified at the pre-trial hearing; the arresting

officer did not testify.

The trial court found:

1. In the early morning hours of 3-23-12 Officer Johnson observed the Defendant traveling west in the 1600 block of West Sixth Street.

1 The enhancement paragraph alleged that Dubord had a blood-alcohol concentration greater than .15. CR 15. 1 2. The Defendant moved across two lanes of traffic and headed onto MoPac Boulevard, and Officer Johnson followed.

3. Officer Johnson testified he followed the Defendant for approximately six more miles before stopping him, testifying that the defendant crossed from his lane of travel on more than one occasion.

CR 89.

The court concluded:

Defendant argues his stop and arrest were without probable cause.

The fact the officer waited six miles to stop the defendant diminishes the credibility of his claim that he stopped the defendant for lane change violations on Sixth Street.

ISSUE PRESENTED

Dubord contends that the findings do not state that Judge

McCormick actually believed that Johnson saw Dubord commit lane-

change violations on Sixth Street. He further contends that the trial court

made no credibility finding as to any of the erratic or offensive driving that

Johnson witnessed while he followed Dubord for about six miles. What

facts did the trial court find?

2 SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

As the State’s original brief argued, if the Third Court determines

from the findings that the trial court (1) believed that Sergeant Johnson saw

Dubord commit traffic violations on Sixth Street, but (2) disbelieved his

claim that he stopped Dubord for those violations, then the suppression

order was an abuse of the trial court’s discretion.

In reply to Dubord’s contentions, the State argues that, if the Third

Court determines from the findings that the trial court did not believe that

Sergeant Johnson saw Sixth Street violations, the findings are insufficient to

resolve the issue of the initial detention’s legality. Johnson testified to a

great many other facts in support of the detention, and the current findings

do not address that testimony.

Moreover, the Third Court could reasonably determine that the

“diminished credibility” finding is ambiguous.

When the trial court’s findings are ambiguous and insufficient to

resolve the legal issue, the reviewing court may not imply findings but

must remand to the trial court to make findings with greater clarity and 3 specificity. The State therefore alternatively renews a former request to

abate and remand for supplemental findings.

Reply Point: Alternatively, the State asks the Third Court to abate and remand for supplemental findings.

What does the finding of “diminished” credibility mean? Credible,

but only somewhat? Not credible? Whatever it means, what does it apply

to? Does it apply to Johnson’s observation of traffic violations on Sixth

Street, or only to the claim to have stopped Dubord for those violations?

Even if the trial court did not believe that Sergeant Johnson saw Sixth

Street violations, what of the great many other facts that made up the

totality of circumstances upon which Johnson relied before initiating a

2 detention? The current findings are silent on this matter. Indeed, it could

2 For instance, Sergeant Johnson testified that he had sixteen years’ experience and was the supervising officer on the DWI enforcement unit. RR 5. While following Dubord on MoPac, he saw him traveling 72 miles per hour in a 65-mile-per-hour zone. RR 21. Dubord’s car drifted out of its lane five to six times on MoPac. RR 24. Johnson decided to initiate a detention when Dubord nearly hit another car. RR 28, 60. After Johnson activated his overhead lights, Dubord ran a red light. RR 40. 4 reasonably be argued that the findings are ambiguous in that they do not

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Related

State v. Mendoza
365 S.W.3d 666 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 2012)
State v. Elias
339 S.W.3d 667 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 2011)
State of Texas v. Saenz, Clint
411 S.W.3d 488 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 2013)