[Cite as State v. Pfeifer, 2022-Ohio-3184.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT CRAWFORD COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO,
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, CASE NO. 3-22-12
v.
HEATHER PFEIFER, OPINION
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
Appeal from Crawford County Common Pleas Court Trial Court No. 18-CR-0380
Judgment Reversed and Cause Remanded
Date of Decision: September 12, 2022
APPEARANCES:
Howard A. Elliott for Appellant
Daniel J. Stanley for Appellee Case No. 3-22-12
SHAW, J.
{¶1} Defendant-Appellant, Heather Pfeifer (“Pfeifer”), appeals from the
March 21, 2022 judgment entry of the Crawford County Court of Common Pleas.
Facts and Procedural History
{¶2} On November 27, 2018, Pfeifer was indicted on one count of
aggravated burglary, a first-degree felony. Pfeifer entered into a negotiated plea
agreement, pled guilty to an amended count of burglary, a second-degree felony,
and was sentenced to an agreed sentence recommendation of five years of
community control. Both the written plea agreement and the January 29, 2019
sentencing entry specify that Pfeifer would be subject to a three-year prison term
for violation of community control.
{¶3} Subsequently, on August 31, 2020, Pfeifer appeared before the trial
court for a hearing on community control violations. The trial court revoked
Pfeifer’s community control and sentenced her to an agreed sentence
recommendation of three years in prison with eligibility for judicial release after six
months. The trial court granted her 70 days of jail-time credit including the date of
sentence of August 31, 2020.
{¶4} On January 12, 2021, Pfeifer filed a motion for judicial release in the
trial court. The trial court granted the motion and placed Pfeifer on community
-2- Case No. 3-22-12
control for a period of five years. The trial court’s March 3, 2021 judgment entry
stated:
Defendant’s Motion is granted and the remainder of the prison sentence imposed in the above-captioned case(s) be and hereby is suspended. The Court hereby reserves jurisdiction to reimpose the remaining prison time, and the Defendant is hereby placed on Community Control for a period of five (5) years under the standard conditions and terms of the Crawford County Probation Department.
(Emphasis added.) (Doc. No. 32).
{¶5} Thereafter, on Pfeifer’s community control violations, the trial court
revoked her judicial release community control. At the March 21, 2022 sentencing
hearing, the trial court judge stated: “[T]he Court’s going to reimpose the three
year prison sentence in this particular matter, the Defendant will get credit for
everything that she’s done in this case any prison, any jail that she’s done.”
(Emphasis added.) (Mar. 21, 2022 Tr. at 15). The trial court’s judgment entry then
states the Court “sentences the Defendant to 3 years in prison on Count 1, with jail
time credit, in the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction. The
Defendant is granted jail time credit in the amount of 101 days, as of March 21,
2022.” (Doc. No. 44). It is from this judgment entry that Pfeifer appeals, asserting
the following assignment of error for our review.
Assignment of Error
The trial court is obligated to determine at the sentencing hearing how many days of credit the Defendant is entitled to for time
-3- Case No. 3-22-12
served with respect to the offense at hand. The failure to do so is error requiring the matter be reversed for an appropriate determination by the trial court at a sentencing hearing.
{¶6} In her sole assignment of error, Pfeifer contends that the trial court erred
when it failed to determine her jail-time credit at her sentencing hearing. Pfeifer
asserts that the trial court failed to comply with its statutory obligation under R.C.
2929.19(B)(2)(g)(i) by not announcing the number of days of jail-time credit that
she was entitled to for time served at this hearing and has not afforded her a correct
credit for time served. (Appellant’s Brief at 8).
Legal Standard
{¶7} R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(g)(i) states that:
(B)(2) * * * [I]f the sentencing court determines at the sentencing hearing that a prison term is necessary or required, the court shall do all of the following:
***
(g)(i) Determine, notify the offender of, and include in the sentencing entry the total number of days, including the sentencing date but excluding conveyance time, that the offender has been confined for any reason arising out of the offense for which the offender is being sentenced and by which the department of rehabilitation and correction must reduce the definite prison term imposed on the offender as the offender’s stated prison term * * * . The court’s calculation shall not include the number of days, if any, that the offender served in the custody of the department of rehabilitation and correction arising out of any prior offense for which the prisoner was convicted and sentenced.
-4- Case No. 3-22-12
{¶8} Next, R.C. 2929.20, which governs judicial release, provides in
pertinent part:
If the court grants a motion for judicial release under this section, the court shall order the release of the eligible offender, shall place the eligible offender under an appropriate community control sanction, under appropriate conditions, and under the supervision of the department of probation serving the court and shall reserve the right to reimpose the sentence that it reduced if the offender violates the sanction.
R.C. 2929.20(K). Thus, an offender, like Pfeifer, who has been granted judicial
release “ ‘has already served a period of incarceration, and the remainder of that
prison sentence is suspended pending either the successful completion of a period
of community control or the [offender’s] violation of a community control
sanction.’ ˮ (Emphasis added.) State v. Davis, 3d Dist. Defiance No. 4-21-03, 2021-
Ohio-3790, ¶ 5, quoting State v. Alexander, 3d Dist. Union No. 14-07-45, 2008-
Ohio-1485, ¶ 7.
Legal Analysis
{¶9} A review of the record clearly indicates that the trial court, after
revoking judicial release at the hearing, committed to Pfeifer receiving credit for
any days that she had spent in jail and prison. (Mar. 21, 2022 Tr. at 15). However,
in its judgment entry of sentence, the trial court only noted the prior “jail time” with
no reference to prior “prison time.” Moreover, the record shows that following
Pfeifer’s violation of judicial release, the trial court imposed the entire original
-5- Case No. 3-22-12
prison term for her offense, rather than reimposing the balance of her prison term
as required by R.C. 2929.20(K).
{¶10} As noted earlier, the record shows that in its judgment granting judicial
release, the trial court specifically suspended the remaining portion of Pfeifer’s
prison sentence and specifically reserved jurisdiction to allow it to reimpose the
remaining prison time. In sum, it is our view that requiring the trial court to
reimpose only the balance of the previously imposed prison sentence, as opposed to
reimposing the entire original sentence and then purporting to deduct credit for both
prior “prison time” served as well as prior “jail time” served, not only avoids
unnecessary issues as to the calculation of prison time by the trial court instead of
the Department of Rehabilitation and Correction, but is also more consistent with
the language of R.C.
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[Cite as State v. Pfeifer, 2022-Ohio-3184.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT CRAWFORD COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO,
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, CASE NO. 3-22-12
v.
HEATHER PFEIFER, OPINION
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
Appeal from Crawford County Common Pleas Court Trial Court No. 18-CR-0380
Judgment Reversed and Cause Remanded
Date of Decision: September 12, 2022
APPEARANCES:
Howard A. Elliott for Appellant
Daniel J. Stanley for Appellee Case No. 3-22-12
SHAW, J.
{¶1} Defendant-Appellant, Heather Pfeifer (“Pfeifer”), appeals from the
March 21, 2022 judgment entry of the Crawford County Court of Common Pleas.
Facts and Procedural History
{¶2} On November 27, 2018, Pfeifer was indicted on one count of
aggravated burglary, a first-degree felony. Pfeifer entered into a negotiated plea
agreement, pled guilty to an amended count of burglary, a second-degree felony,
and was sentenced to an agreed sentence recommendation of five years of
community control. Both the written plea agreement and the January 29, 2019
sentencing entry specify that Pfeifer would be subject to a three-year prison term
for violation of community control.
{¶3} Subsequently, on August 31, 2020, Pfeifer appeared before the trial
court for a hearing on community control violations. The trial court revoked
Pfeifer’s community control and sentenced her to an agreed sentence
recommendation of three years in prison with eligibility for judicial release after six
months. The trial court granted her 70 days of jail-time credit including the date of
sentence of August 31, 2020.
{¶4} On January 12, 2021, Pfeifer filed a motion for judicial release in the
trial court. The trial court granted the motion and placed Pfeifer on community
-2- Case No. 3-22-12
control for a period of five years. The trial court’s March 3, 2021 judgment entry
stated:
Defendant’s Motion is granted and the remainder of the prison sentence imposed in the above-captioned case(s) be and hereby is suspended. The Court hereby reserves jurisdiction to reimpose the remaining prison time, and the Defendant is hereby placed on Community Control for a period of five (5) years under the standard conditions and terms of the Crawford County Probation Department.
(Emphasis added.) (Doc. No. 32).
{¶5} Thereafter, on Pfeifer’s community control violations, the trial court
revoked her judicial release community control. At the March 21, 2022 sentencing
hearing, the trial court judge stated: “[T]he Court’s going to reimpose the three
year prison sentence in this particular matter, the Defendant will get credit for
everything that she’s done in this case any prison, any jail that she’s done.”
(Emphasis added.) (Mar. 21, 2022 Tr. at 15). The trial court’s judgment entry then
states the Court “sentences the Defendant to 3 years in prison on Count 1, with jail
time credit, in the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction. The
Defendant is granted jail time credit in the amount of 101 days, as of March 21,
2022.” (Doc. No. 44). It is from this judgment entry that Pfeifer appeals, asserting
the following assignment of error for our review.
Assignment of Error
The trial court is obligated to determine at the sentencing hearing how many days of credit the Defendant is entitled to for time
-3- Case No. 3-22-12
served with respect to the offense at hand. The failure to do so is error requiring the matter be reversed for an appropriate determination by the trial court at a sentencing hearing.
{¶6} In her sole assignment of error, Pfeifer contends that the trial court erred
when it failed to determine her jail-time credit at her sentencing hearing. Pfeifer
asserts that the trial court failed to comply with its statutory obligation under R.C.
2929.19(B)(2)(g)(i) by not announcing the number of days of jail-time credit that
she was entitled to for time served at this hearing and has not afforded her a correct
credit for time served. (Appellant’s Brief at 8).
Legal Standard
{¶7} R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(g)(i) states that:
(B)(2) * * * [I]f the sentencing court determines at the sentencing hearing that a prison term is necessary or required, the court shall do all of the following:
***
(g)(i) Determine, notify the offender of, and include in the sentencing entry the total number of days, including the sentencing date but excluding conveyance time, that the offender has been confined for any reason arising out of the offense for which the offender is being sentenced and by which the department of rehabilitation and correction must reduce the definite prison term imposed on the offender as the offender’s stated prison term * * * . The court’s calculation shall not include the number of days, if any, that the offender served in the custody of the department of rehabilitation and correction arising out of any prior offense for which the prisoner was convicted and sentenced.
-4- Case No. 3-22-12
{¶8} Next, R.C. 2929.20, which governs judicial release, provides in
pertinent part:
If the court grants a motion for judicial release under this section, the court shall order the release of the eligible offender, shall place the eligible offender under an appropriate community control sanction, under appropriate conditions, and under the supervision of the department of probation serving the court and shall reserve the right to reimpose the sentence that it reduced if the offender violates the sanction.
R.C. 2929.20(K). Thus, an offender, like Pfeifer, who has been granted judicial
release “ ‘has already served a period of incarceration, and the remainder of that
prison sentence is suspended pending either the successful completion of a period
of community control or the [offender’s] violation of a community control
sanction.’ ˮ (Emphasis added.) State v. Davis, 3d Dist. Defiance No. 4-21-03, 2021-
Ohio-3790, ¶ 5, quoting State v. Alexander, 3d Dist. Union No. 14-07-45, 2008-
Ohio-1485, ¶ 7.
Legal Analysis
{¶9} A review of the record clearly indicates that the trial court, after
revoking judicial release at the hearing, committed to Pfeifer receiving credit for
any days that she had spent in jail and prison. (Mar. 21, 2022 Tr. at 15). However,
in its judgment entry of sentence, the trial court only noted the prior “jail time” with
no reference to prior “prison time.” Moreover, the record shows that following
Pfeifer’s violation of judicial release, the trial court imposed the entire original
-5- Case No. 3-22-12
prison term for her offense, rather than reimposing the balance of her prison term
as required by R.C. 2929.20(K).
{¶10} As noted earlier, the record shows that in its judgment granting judicial
release, the trial court specifically suspended the remaining portion of Pfeifer’s
prison sentence and specifically reserved jurisdiction to allow it to reimpose the
remaining prison time. In sum, it is our view that requiring the trial court to
reimpose only the balance of the previously imposed prison sentence, as opposed to
reimposing the entire original sentence and then purporting to deduct credit for both
prior “prison time” served as well as prior “jail time” served, not only avoids
unnecessary issues as to the calculation of prison time by the trial court instead of
the Department of Rehabilitation and Correction, but is also more consistent with
the language of R.C. 2929.20(K), and our prior case law, as well as the language of
the trial court’s own judgment entry granting judicial release in this case.
{¶11} As for jail-time credit, the number of days of jail-time credit that the
trial court credited Pfeifer when it sentenced her in this case, specifically 101 days,
is reflected in its judgment entry of March 21, 2022. We have recognized that the
Department of Rehabilitation and Correction has the duty to apply jail-time credit,
however, the trial court has the responsibility of determining the number of days to
be credited. State v. Mills, 3d Dist. Auglaize Nos. 2-22-09 and 2-22-10, 2022-Ohio-
2821, ¶ 8. It is then consistent for the trial court to determine the number of days of
-6- Case No. 3-22-12
jail-time credit that Pfeifer is entitled to have credited toward the remaining balance
of her original sentence pursuant to R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(g)(i), which the trial court
clearly did in this case. To this extent, Pfeifer’s assignment of error is overruled.
{¶12} However, based on the foregoing analysis regarding the trial court’s
reimposition of Pfeifer’s entire original sentence instead of the balance of the
previously imposed sentence, Pfeifer’s sole assignment of error is sustained.
Accordingly, we reverse the sentence imposed by the trial court and remand this
case for the trial court to properly reimpose the balance remaining on Pfeifer’s
original prison term consistent with its own judgment entry granting judicial release
subject only to the amount of “jail-time” credit in accordance with R.C.
2929.19(B)(2)(g)(i).
Conclusion
{¶13} Having found error prejudicial to the Appellant in the particulars
assigned and argued, the judgment of the Crawford County Court of Common Pleas
is reversed. This cause is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
ZIMMERMAN, P.J. and MILLER, J., concur.
/jlr
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