State v. Peterson

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: April 30, 2026
• Docket: 115313
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as State v. Peterson, 2026-Ohio-1553.]

COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

STATE OF OHIO, :

Plaintiff-Appellee, : No. 115313 v. :

DE’ANE PETERSON, :

Defendant-Appellant. :

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: April 30, 2026

Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Case Nos. CR-23-686728-C, CR-24-697043-B, and CR-25-700501-A

Appearances:

Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Daniel Schrembeck, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.

Dunham Law, LLC, and Michael P. Dunham, for appellant.

KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, J.:

De’Ane Peterson filed the instant appeal seeking to appeal his guilty

pleas as not knowingly, intelligently, or voluntarily entered and his sentence as both

contrary to law and violative of his constitutional protections against cruel and unusual punishment in Cuyahoga C.P. Nos. CR-23-686728-C (“2023 Case”), CR-

24-697043-B (“2024 Case”) and CR-25-700501-A (“2025 Case”). After a thorough

review of the law and record, this court affirms.

I. Facts and Procedural History

The 2023 Case charged Peterson and two codefendants with 15

counts. Eight counts named Peterson: two counts of drug trafficking, two counts of

drug possession, one count each of possessing criminal tools, having weapons while

under disability, carrying a concealed weapon, and improperly handling firearms in

a motor vehicle. Nearly all counts contained forfeiture specifications for various

guns, cell phones, and scales.

The 2024 Case charged Peterson and one codefendant with five

counts: trafficking in heroin, possession of heroin, trafficking in cocaine, possession

of cocaine, and tampering with evidence. Most counts contained forfeiture

specifications for cell phones and money.

He entered into a packaged plea agreement in these cases. In the

2023 Case, he pleaded guilty to drug trafficking with the attendant forfeiture

specifications and having weapons while under disability with the attendant

forfeiture specifications. In the 2024 Case, he pleaded guilty to trafficking in heroin

with the attendant forfeiture specifications. All counts were third-degree felonies.

Each respective journal entry provided that there were four plea conditions: (1) the

pleas are packaged, (2) the offenses are not allied offenses of similar import, (3) defendant understands that there is a mandatory prison sentence, and (4) Peterson

will forfeit all items seized.

Sentencing was scheduled for February 24, 2025, and Peterson did

not appear. The trial court issued a capias, and he was arrested about a month later;

the circumstances of the arrest forming the basis for the 2025 Case indictment. As

described by the court during sentencing, Peterson “crashed a car while the police

[were] chasing you, got out, ran, and left [four] kids in the car.” (Tr. 55.)

The 2025 Case charged Peterson with six counts: failure to comply

with an order or signal of a police officer, obstructing official business, and four

counts of endangering children. In May 2025, Peterson entered into a plea

agreement, entering guilty pleas for failure to comply with an order or signal of a

police officer, attempted obstructing official business, and one count of endangering

children.

The trial court sentenced Peterson on all three cases in June 2025.

On the 2023 Case, he received 60 months (30 months on each count, run

consecutively). On the 2024 Case, he received 30 months. On the 2025 Case, he

received 30 months and 90 days in jail on the remaining two offenses, run

concurrently. Each sentence was ordered to run consecutively for a total prison term

of 120 months (10 years).

Peterson appeals his pleas and sentence, assigning three errors for

our review. I. The trial court abused its discretion in accepting Mr. Peterson’s guilty plea because it was not made in a knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligent matter, in violation of his rights to due process of law and a fair trial under the U.S. Constitution. Amend V, U.S. Con. Amend. VI, U.S. Con. Amend XIV, and Ohio Con. Art. I. Tr. Passim.

II. Counsel was ineffective for failing to describe on the record the possibility of consecutive sentences on all counts, thereby violating the defendant’s right to a fair trial and the right to effective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment. Amend. VI, U.S. Con. Amend. XIV, and Ohio Con. Art I. Tr. Passim.

III. The trial court erred in sentencing Mr. Peterson to 10 years (120 months) in prison in violation of Mr. Peterson’s right to due process of law, and to be free from cruel and unusual punishment under the U.S. Con. Amend. V, U.S. Con. Amend. VIII, U.S. Con. Amend. XIV, and Ohio Con. Art. I. Tr. Passim.

II. Law and Analysis

A. Crim.R. 11 and Knowing, Intelligent, Voluntary Pleas

In his first assignment of error, Peterson contends that the trial court

abused its discretion in accepting his guilty pleas because they were not made

knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. He argues that his pleas were “not made

knowingly because he believed that only failure to comply with statutory

requirements necessitated consecutive sentencing.” He also argues that “he was also

told that, given the presumption against a maximum sentence and against

consecutive sentencing, the worst he could receive was five years in prison.”

Crim.R. 11 “‘ensures an adequate record on review by requiring the

trial court to personally inform the defendant of his rights and the consequences of

his plea and determine if the plea is understandingly and voluntarily made.’” State v. Dangler, 2020-Ohio-2765, ¶ 11, quoting State v. Stone, 43 Ohio St.2d 163, 168

(1975). In reviewing pleas, we determine “whether the dialogue between the court

and the defendant demonstrates that the defendant understood the consequences

of his plea.” Id. at ¶ 12, citing State v. Veney, 2008-Ohio-5200, ¶ 15-16; State v.

Clark, 2008-Ohio-3748, ¶ 26; State v. Miller, 2020-Ohio-1420, ¶ 19.

With limited exceptions, “a defendant is not entitled to have his plea

vacated unless he demonstrates he was prejudiced by a failure of the trial court to

comply with the provisions of Crim.R. 11(C).” Id. at ¶ 16, citing State v. Nero, 56

Ohio St.3d 106, 108 (1990). “The test for prejudice is ‘whether the plea would have

otherwise been made.’” Id., quoting Nero at id. When reviewing a colloquy for

compliance with Crim.R. 11, we ask “(1) has the trial court complied with the relevant

provisions of the rule? (2) if the court has not complied fully with the rule, is the

purported failure of a type that excuses a defendant from the burden of

demonstrating prejudice? and (3) if a showing of prejudice is required, has the

defendant met that burden?” Id. at ¶ 17.

We begin by reviewing the Crim.R. 11 colloquy associated with the

2023 and 2024 Cases. Peterson has not pointed to any specific portion of the

colloquy for us to examine but alleges instead that he was not sufficiently informed

about the potential of receiving consecutive sentences.

Upon review, we find that the record contradicts Peterson’s assertion.

Four pages of the transcript reflect the trial court’s informing Peterson that he was

not required to enter a plea deal and could instead take the case to trial if that was his choice, after which the trial court asked Peterson if he had any questions. He

answered “No, Your Honor. I’m ready to go forward.” (Tr. 11.) Several more times

throughout the hearing, the trial court paused to ask Peterson if he understood, had

questions, or needed to speak with his attorney. Peterson affirmed his

understanding and declined the trial court’s numerous invitations to ask questions.

Before proceeding to the colloquy, the trial court advised Peterson

that “if you don’t come back for sentencing, when we do catch up with you, and we

will, then you’ll be in a much worse position than maybe if you came back for

sentencing.” (Tr. 12.) During the colloquy, the trial court advised Peterson that

“felonies of the third degree are punishable by a potential term of incarceration in

monthly increments of nine, 12, 18, 24, 30, or 36 months.” (Tr. 21.) The trial court

noted that it was “not inclined” to max out consecutive sentences but clarified that

it could “give [Peterson] 36 months on each count,” to which Peterson verbalized

understanding. (Tr. 22.) At the close of the hearing, the trial court again warned

Peterson that “if you don’t come back for sentencing on the 18th, we’ll get you

eventually. When we do, you’re going to be spending a whole lot of time in prison.”

(Tr. 28.)

We now review the Crim.R. 11 colloquy associated with the 2025 Case.

The change-of-plea hearing occurred on May 29, 2025, and once again, the trial

court engaged in an active dialogue with Peterson, pausing the proceedings

numerous times to ensure that Peterson understood the advisements, and invited

him to ask questions or speak with counsel. On the failure-to-comply charge, a third-degree felony, the trial court advised Peterson that it was punishable “by a

potential term of incarceration in monthly increments of 9, 12, 18, 24, 30 or 36

months” and Peterson verbalized that he understood. (Tr. 38.) The trial court also

advised Peterson that “if there would be a prison sentence imposed on this count,

any other prison sentence that you would receive on any of the other two cases would

have to be run consecutive,” and again Peterson verbalized his understanding. (Tr.

39.) The trial court repeated these advisements for the attempted obstructing

official business charge and one of the endangering children charges, both of which

were punishable by up to 180 days.

We have thoroughly reviewed both colloquies between the court and

Peterson. We find that the court complied with the relevant provisions of Crim.R.

11, and we find that Peterson has not met his burden to demonstrate prejudice, i.e.,

that he would not have entered the plea. We accordingly overrule Peterson’s first

assignment of error.

B. Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel

Peterson’s second assignment of error posits that he received

ineffective assistance of trial counsel because “he thought that, on the counts,

conse[cutive] sentencing was not mandatory; the presumption of conse[cutive] was

conclusive . . . [and] that the presumption against a maximum sentence was

conclusive and not presumptive.” According to Peterson, he believed that the

maximum sentence he could have received was five years. He argues that he was prejudiced by counsel’s alleged deficiencies because he received “five additional

years of prison.”

U.S. Const., amend. VI and Ohio Const., art. I, § 10 provide that

defendants in all criminal proceedings shall have the assistance of counsel for their

defense. The Supreme Court of the United States has recognized that “the right to

counsel is the right to effective assistance of counsel.” Strickland v. Washington,

466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984). To prevail on an ineffective-assistance claim, Peterson

bears the burden of demonstrating that counsel’s representation fell below an

objective standard of reasonableness and that counsel’s deficient performance

prejudiced him. State v. Bates, 2020-Ohio-634, ¶ 24, citing Strickland at 687- 688.

Courts considering whether counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard

of reasonableness “must indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls

within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” Id. at 689. When, as

here, a defendant enters a guilty plea, they waive ineffective assistance of counsel

“except to the extent that the ineffective assistance of counsel caused the defendant’s

plea to be less than knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.” State v. Parham, 2018-

Ohio-1631, ¶ 32 (8th Dist.), citing State v. Williams, 2014-Ohio-3415, ¶ 11 (8th

Dist.).

Peterson’s argument is identical to his argument in the first

assignment of error. Since we found that the trial court fully complied with Crim.R.

11 in the first assignment of error, we cannot now find that Peterson’s plea was not

knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently entered. Additionally, Peterson’s contention that the prejudice he suffered — serving five more years than expected —

is without merit. First, this is speculative and cannot be discerned from the record.

Second, during the change-of-plea hearing for the 2023 and 2024 Cases, the trial

court indicated that it was inclined to give Peterson a shorter sentence but twice

cautioned him that absconding could result in a longer sentence. By the time

sentencing occurred in June 2025, Peterson had (1) failed to appear for sentencing,

(2) evaded arrest, and (3) been charged with new crimes in the 2025 Case. It is more

likely that Peterson’s own behavior resulted in five more years than expected. Based

on the foregoing, we do not find that Peterson has demonstrated either of the

necessary elements for an ineffective-assistance claim and accordingly overrule his

second assignment of error.

C. Peterson’s Sentence

In his final assignment of error, Peterson contends the trial court

committed an error of law in sentencing him to 120 months. He argues that the

court’s sentence was contrary to law because (1) it imposed consecutive sentences

without the State “overcome[ing] the presumption against consecutive sentencing”

and that (2) the sentence violated Peterson’s U.S. and Ohio Constitutional

protections against cruel and unusual punishment.

Ohio courts presume that a defendant’s multiple prison sentences will

be served concurrently unless the trial court makes the required findings to support

consecutive sentences under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4). R.C. 2929.41(A); State v. Jones,

2024-Ohio-1083, ¶ 11. This court “may increase, reduce, or otherwise modify a sentence . . . or may vacate the sentence and remand the matter to the sentencing

court for resentencing” if “it clearly and convincingly finds . . . that the record does

not support the sentencing court’s findings under . . . (C)(4) of section 2929.14.”

State v. Gwynne, 2023-Ohio-3851, ¶ 12.

Peterson argues that “no evidence was presented at sentencing to

deter the commission of the offense or to rehabilitate [him]” and that “the facts are

not the worst possible facts for the charges he faced.” Under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4), the

court must find that consecutive sentences are “necessary to protect the public from

future crime or to punish the offender”; “not disproportionate to the seriousness of

the offender’s conduct and to the danger the offender poses to the public”; and at

least one of the following three factors:

(a) The offender committed one or more of the multiple offenses while the offender was awaiting trial or sentencing, was under a sanction . . . or was under post-release control for a prior offense.

(b) At least two of the multiple offenses were committed as part of one or more courses of conduct, and the harm caused by two or more of the multiple offenses so committed was so great or unusual that no single prison term for any of the offenses committed as part of any of the courses of conduct adequately reflects the seriousness of the offender’s conduct.

(c) The offender’s history of criminal conduct demonstrates that consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the public from future crime by the offender.

Here, Peterson contests the court’s findings that consecutive

sentences were necessary to protect the public from future crime and findings under

R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(b), relating to Peterson’s multiple indictments and the severity

of the facts associated with each charge. After careful review of the record, we do not clearly and convincingly

find that the record does not support the court’s consecutive-sentence findings. As

explained in the preceding paragraphs, the record demonstrates that Peterson: (1)

against the trial court’s warnings, failed to show up for sentencing; (2) avoided

taking responsibility for his actions; and (3) became the subject of another

indictment while the 2023 and 2024 Cases were pending. As the trial court

explained:

The failure to comply does require that the prison sentence be run consecutive, but I also find that consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the public from future crimes or to punish you, and that consecutive sentences are not disproportionate to the seriousness of your conduct and the harm that you pose to the public. Again, you committed multiple offenses while you were awaiting sentencing and you went out, committed this last offense.

Certainly you have a criminal history of conduct that demonstrates consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the public from future crimes by you, and so each of those 30 [months] that I’ve articulated in each of these cases will run consecutive to each other for an aggregate sentence of 120 months.

(Tr. 57-58.) Additionally, Peterson has a prior juvenile and adult record as well as

previous convictions for failure to comply and having weapons while under

disability. On this record, we do not find that Peterson’s consecutive sentences were

imposed contrary to law.

Peterson also contends that his sentence is violative of his U.S. and

Ohio Constitutional protections against cruel and unusual punishment because “30

months in prison for each count was erroneous because the record does not support it, was an abuse of discretion, and was contrary to law because . . . a ‘package

sentence’ where all counts are considered together is not allowed.”

However, Peterson does not highlight nor do we independently find

any evidence in the record to suggest that the court sentenced this as a “package

sentence.” This is especially true where the record unequivocally demonstrates that

the trial court separately sentenced Peterson on every count.

For the reasons articulated above, we overrule Peterson’s final

III. Conclusion

We do not find merit to Peterson’s assignments of error and affirm

the judgment of the trial court.

It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the

common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant’s

conviction having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case

remanded to the trial court for execution of sentence.

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, JUDGE

LISA B. FORBES, P.J., and TIMOTHY W. CLARY, J., CONCUR