State v. Peters, Unpublished Decision (11-6-2002)

CourtOhio Court of Appeals
DecidedNovember 6, 2002
DocketNo. 01-BA-57.
StatusUnpublished

This text of State v. Peters, Unpublished Decision (11-6-2002) (State v. Peters, Unpublished Decision (11-6-2002)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Ohio Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State v. Peters, Unpublished Decision (11-6-2002), (Ohio Ct. App. 2002).

Opinion

OPINION
{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, Heather Peters, appeals her conviction in the Belmont County Court, Western Division for cruelty to an animal following a bench trial.

{¶ 2} On or about July 16, 2001, Verna Painter, a volunteer for the Belmont County Animal Shelter, received a call notifying her of an animal that was in possible distress. As a result of the call Ms. Painter, along with Cheryl Demetrakis, the vice president of the Belmont County Animal Rescue League, went to the home of the allegedly distressed animal to see if a valid complaint existed. There they found an emaciated dog lying on his side with his head down. The two women received permission from appellant, the dog's owner, to take the dog, Noah, with them. They took Noah to Animal Urgent Care where the veterinarian determined that Noah had end-stage heartworm disease and was near death. Therefore, the veterinarian euthanized Noah.

{¶ 3} As a result, on July 23, 2001, an abuse officer from the Belmont County Animal Rescue League filed a complaint against appellant alleging that she abused Noah in violation of R.C. 959.13(A)(1), a second-degree misdemeanor. Appellant proceeded to a bench trial on October 9, 2001. The trial court found appellant guilty. It sentenced appellant to 90 days in jail, 60 days suspended; ordered her to pay a $250.00 fine; ordered that she pay restitution in the amount of $101.00; and placed her on supervised probation for two years. Appellant filed her timely notice of appeal on October 29, 2001. The trial court granted appellant a stay of execution pending this appeal.

{¶ 4} Appellant raises one assignment of error, which states:

{¶ 5} "DEFENDANT-APPELLANT'S GUILTY VERDICT IS AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE AND CONTRARY TO LAW."

{¶ 6} Appellant argues that the evidence presented at trial does not support her conviction. She points out that Dr. Mike Sparling, the veterinarian who treated Noah, testified dogs that live in areas infested with heartworms should be on heartworm prevention medication. Appellant contends she was not aware that her geographic area was infested with heartworms; thus, her failure to give Noah heartworm prevention medication was not unreasonable. Appellant also notes she testified that she gave Noah an over-the-counter worm medication. She further notes that Dr. Sparling testified that it is a common misconception among lay people to think that an over-the-counter worm medication can help a heartworm problem. Finally, appellant calls our attention to her testimony that Noah always lost weight in the summer and regained the weight in the fall.

{¶ 7} In determining whether a verdict is against the manifest weight of the evidence, an appellate court must review the entire record, weigh the evidence and all reasonable inferences and determine whether, in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the jury clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered. State v. Thompkins (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387. "Weight of the evidence concerns `the inclination of the greater amount of credible evidence, offered in a trial, to support one side of the issue rather than the other.'" Id. (Emphasis sic.) In making its determination, a reviewing court is not required to view the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution but may consider and weigh all of the evidence produced at trial. Id. at 390.

{¶ 8} Still, determinations of witness credibility, conflicting testimony, and evidence weight are primarily for the trier of the facts.State v. DeHass (1967), 10 Ohio St.2d 230, paragraph one of the syllabus.

{¶ 9} Appellant was convicted of violating R.C. 959.13(A)(1). This statute provides:

{¶ 10} "(A) No person shall:

{¶ 11} "(1) Torture an animal, deprive one of necessary sustenance, unnecessarily or cruelly beat, needlessly mutilate or kill, or impound or confine an animal without supplying it during such confinement with a sufficient quantity of good wholesome food and water." R.C. 959.13(A)(1).

{¶ 12} In order to sustain a conviction under R.C. 959.13(A), the State must prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, the appellant acted recklessly. State v. Dresbach (1997), 122 Ohio App.3d 647, 652. R.C.2901.22(C) defines the term "recklessly" as follows:

{¶ 13} "A person acts recklessly when, with heedless indifference to the consequences, he perversely disregards a known risk that his conduct is likely to cause a certain result or is likely to be of a certain nature. A person is reckless with respect to circumstances when, with heedless indifference to the consequences, he perversely disregards a known risk that such circumstances are likely to exist." Id.

{¶ 14} The trial court found that appellant tortured Noah. The trial court, utilizing the reasoning of Dresbach, supra, applied the definition of "torture," found in R.C. 1717.01. R.C. 1717.01 provides in pertinent part:

{¶ 15} "As used in sections 1717.01 to 1717.14, inclusive, of the Revised Code, and in every law relating to animals:

{¶ 16} "* * *

{¶ 17} "(B) `Cruelty,' `torment,' and `torture' include every act, omission, or neglect by which unnecessary or unjustifiable pain or suffering is caused, permitted, or allowed to continue, when there is a reasonable remedy or relief."

{¶ 18} The Dresbach court also found the definition of torture, as set forth in R.C. 1717.01(B), "is broad enough to include situations where an animal suffers needlessly because of the owner's failure to seek critically necessary veterinary care, if such care represents a reasonable remedy." Id. at 651. Therefore, in order to sustain the conviction, the evidence must support a finding that appellant acted with heedless indifference or disregarded a known risk which resulted in Noah suffering unnecessarily when a reasonable remedy was available.

{¶ 19} The parties elicited the following testimony at trial.

{¶ 20} Ms. Painter, one of the first women to see Noah, testified she learned of Noah when she received a call about an animal that was in possible distress. (Tr. 8). Ms. Painter called Ms. Demetrakis to accompany her to investigate the complaint. (Tr. 9). The two traveled to Flushing Township in Belmont County, Ohio where they found Noah. (Tr. 9). They also spoke with appellant, Noah's owner. (Tr. 9). When asked to describe Noah's condition Ms. Painter explained, "Very, very thin. Emaciated. Laying at the end of his chain on his side, all four legs out and his head was down." (Tr. 10). Ms. Painter testified that Noah was not able to stand up and she had to carry him to her vehicle. (Tr. 11). Ms. Painter testified that she has been involved with the Animal Rescue League for approximately 28 years. (Tr.

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Related

State v. Myers
621 N.E.2d 881 (Ohio Court of Appeals, 1993)
State v. Dresbach
702 N.E.2d 513 (Ohio Court of Appeals, 1997)
State v. Dehass
227 N.E.2d 212 (Ohio Supreme Court, 1967)
State v. Thompkins
678 N.E.2d 541 (Ohio Supreme Court, 1997)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
State v. Peters, Unpublished Decision (11-6-2002), Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-v-peters-unpublished-decision-11-6-2002-ohioctapp-2002.