[Cite as State v. Peters, 2019-Ohio-4461.]
COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
STATE OF OHIO, :
Plaintiff-Appellee, : No. 108068 v. :
DALE PETERS, :
Defendant-Appellant. :
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: October 31, 2019
Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Case No. CR-17-622890-A
Appearances:
Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Brian Radigan and Kerry A. Sowul, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for appellee.
Dworken & Bernstein Co., L.P.A., and Jerome M. Emoff, for appellant. MARY J. BOYLE, J.:
Defendant-appellant, Dale Peters, appeals his sentence. He raises
two assignments of error for our review:
1. When an indigent [defendant] is sentenced to die in prison, a maximum fine is excessive.
2. The trial court failed to comply with R.C. 2929.14(C)(4).
Finding no merit to his assignments of error, we affirm.
Procedural History and Factual Background
On November 14, 2017, a Cuyahoga County Grand Jury indicted
Peters on 11 counts: one count of aggravated murder in violation of R.C. 2903.01(A)
(an unclassified felony (“UF”)); one count of aggravated murder in violation of R.C.
2903.01(B) (UF); one count of aggravated burglary in violation of R.C. 2911.11(A)(1),
a first-degree felony; one count of aggravated robbery in violation of R.C.
2911.01(A)(3), a first-degree felony; one count of kidnapping in violation of R.C.
2905.01(A)(2), a first-degree felony; one count of murder in violation of R.C.
2903.02(B) (UF); one count of felonious assault in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(1), a
second-degree felony; one count of violating a protection order in violation of R.C.
2919.27(A)(1), a third-degree felony; one count of grand theft in violation of R.C.
2913.02(A)(1), a fourth-degree felony; one count of tampering with evidence in
violation of R.C. 2921.12(A)(1), a third-degree felony; and one count of inducing
panic in violation of R.C. 2917.31(A)(3), a fourth-degree felony. Peters pleaded not guilty to the indictment, and the case proceeded to
a bench trial in December 2018, after Peters executed a written jury trial waiver.
The trial court found Peters not guilty of aggravated murder in
violation of R.C. 2903.01(A), and the state dismissed the count for inducing panic.
The trial court found Peters guilty of the remaining counts.
At sentencing, the trial court found that the counts for aggravated
murder, aggravated burglary, aggravated robbery, kidnapping, and murder were
allied offenses and merged for sentencing purposes. The state elected to have the
trial court sentence Peters for the aggravated murder count. The trial court
sentenced Peters as follows:
Aggravated Murder: Life term of imprisonment without the possibility of parole; $20,000 fine
Felonious Assault: 8 years; $15,000 fine
Violating a Protection Order: 36 months; $10,000 fine
Grand Theft: 18 months; $5,000 fine
Tampering with Evidence: 36 months; $10,000 fine
The trial court ordered that all of the sentences (including the fines)
run consecutive to one another and advised Peters of postrelease control. It also
ordered Peters to pay for the costs of prosecution. Peters did not file an affidavit of
indigency prior to sentencing.
At sentencing, Peters’s counsel orally moved the court to declare
Peters indigent, which the trial court did in its sentencing journal entry.
It is from this judgment that Peters now appeals. Law and Analysis
A. Fines
In his first assignment of error, Peters argues that the trial court’s
imposition of $60,000 in fines was unconstitutionally excessive because he was
indigent and is serving a life sentence without the possibility of parole.
The language in the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and
the Ohio Constitution are identical and state, “[e]xcessive bail shall not be required,
nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” The U.S.
Supreme Court recently held that the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution’s
protection against excessive fines is also incorporated by and applicable to the states
under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. See Timbs v. Indiana, 586
U.S. __, 139 S.Ct. 682, 203 L.Ed.2d 11 (2019).
A trial court may impose a fine upon a defendant even if it finds the
defendant is indigent. See State v. Price, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 100981, 2015-
Ohio-411, ¶ 63 (“[T]he fact that Price was found indigent for purposes of court-
appointed counsel, and the trial court expressly found him indigent at sentencing,
does not preclude the trial court from imposing the fine upon defendant.”).
Under R.C. 2929.18(A)(3), a trial court may sentence a defendant to
the following financial sanctions:
(a) For a felony of the first degree, not more than twenty thousand dollars;
(b) For a felony of the second degree, not more than fifteen thousand dollars; (c) For a felony of the third degree, not more than ten thousand dollars;
(d) For a felony of the fourth degree, not more than five thousand dollars[.]
Under R.C. 2929.19(B)(6), a trial court must consider a defendant’s
present and future ability to pay a sanction or fine before imposing a financial
sanction under R.C. 2929.18. “‘[T]here are no express factors that must be taken
into consideration or findings regarding the offender’s ability to pay that must be
made on the record.’” State v. Lumpkin, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 102591, 2015-Ohio-
3887, ¶ 12, quoting State v. Martin, 140 Ohio App.3d 326, 747 N.E.2d 318 (4th
Dist.2000). Further, “[u]nder appropriate circumstances, a reviewing court may
infer that a trial court considered” a defendant’s present and future ability to pay a
fine. Id., citing State v. Parker, 2d Dist. Champaign No. 03CA0017, 2004-Ohio-
1313.1 However, “some evidence must be present in the record to indicate that the
trial court considered an offender’s present and future ability to pay.” State v.
Sampson, 11th Dist. Lake No. 2007-L-075, 2007-Ohio-7126, ¶ 14.
We review a trial court’s imposition of fines under an abuse of
discretion standard. State v. Allen, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 96952, 2012-Ohio-1193,
¶ 9; State v. Sekic, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 95633, 2011-Ohio-3978, ¶ 30. An abuse
of discretion means that the trial court’s decision was arbitrary, capricious, or
unreasonable. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219, 450 N.E.2d 1140
1 But see State v. Burns, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 95465, 2011-Ohio-4230, ¶ 43 (finding the trial court committed plain error because it “did not indicate at the sentencing hearing whether it considered Burns’s present or future ability to pay the fine.”). (1983). “A trial court abuses its discretion when it ‘fails to inquire into a defendant’s
ability to pay a financial sanction.’” State v. Pate, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 103077,
2016-Ohio-399, ¶ 8, quoting State v. Schneider, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 96953,
2012-Ohio-1740.
However, because Peters did not object to the fines, he waived all but
plain error. State v. Hall, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 90366, 2009-Ohio-462, ¶ 56.
“Plain error exists only if ‘but for the error, the outcome of the trial clearly would
have been otherwise, and is applied under exceptional circumstances and only to
prevent a manifest miscarriage of justice.’” State v. Harrison, 122 Ohio St.3d 512,
2009-Ohio-3547, 912 N.E.2d 1106, ¶ 61, quoting State v. Long, 53 Ohio St.2d 91, 97,
372 N.E.2d 804 (1978).
Foremost, we are unable to review the $20,000 fine imposed for
Peters’s aggravated murder conviction. “There is no constitutional right to appellate
review of a criminal sentence, so ‘the only right to appeal is the one provided by
statute.’” State v. Campbell, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 103982, 2016-Ohio-7613, ¶ 14,
quoting State v. Akins, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 99478, 2013-Ohio-5023. R.C.
2953.08(D)(3), which provides the statutory right to appellate review of a criminal
sentence, states in relevant part, “[a] sentence imposed for aggravated murder or
murder pursuant to sections 2929.02 to 2929.06 of the Revised Code is not subject
to review under this section.” As a result, we have “consistently recognized that R.C.
2953.08(D)(3) expressly excludes sentences imposed for aggravated murder from
appellate review.” State v. Lawson, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 103699, 2016-Ohio- 7607, ¶ 5, citing State v. Nitsche, 2016-Ohio-3170, 66 N.E.3d 135 (8th Dist.).
Accordingly, under R.C. 2953.08(D)(3), we lack statutory authority to review
Peters’s $20,000 fine for aggravated murder and overrule his assignment of error
to that extent.
Turning to the remaining $40,000 in fines, we have examined
whether a trial court considered a defendant’s present and future ability to pay a fine
on a number of occasions. See State v. Barker, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 93574, 2010-
Ohio-4480, ¶ 13 (affirming the trial court’s imposition of a fine because the
defendant was sentenced to three years in prison and the trial court reviewed the
defendant’s presentence-investigation report); State v. Andera, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga
No. 92306, 2010-Ohio-3304, ¶ 53 (affirming the trial court’s imposition of a fine
because the defendant was sentenced to 15 years in prison and had 10 years of
employment experience).
Similarly, in State v. Bernadine, 11th Dist. Portage No. 2010-P-0056,
2011-Ohio-4023, the court upheld the trial court’s imposition of a mandatory fine,
stating:
[T]here is no specific indication in either the transcript of the sentencing hearing or in the sentencing Judgment Entry that the trial court considered Bernadine’s present and future ability to pay the fines and restitution ordered by the court. However, the trial court did indicate in its Judgment Entry that it reviewed the PSI. The PSI included information regarding Bernadine’s age and physical health. In addition, it included information about her current employment and the amount of money she makes monthly. The PSI also included information about her educational background, which would show her ability to obtain future employment. All of these factors were relevant and sufficient for the court to consider Bernadine’s present and future ability to pay the fine and restitution, especially when reviewing the court’s judgment under the plain error standard.
Id. at ¶ 29.
Based upon our review of the record, we can infer that the trial court
considered Peters’s present and future ability to pay the $40,000 in fines before
imposing them. Like Bernadine and Barker, the record shows that the trial court
reviewed Peters’s presentence-investigation report, which contained Peters’s
education information (he graduated from high school) and work history (he
worked for American Livery Services “pick[ing] up the deceased” from July 2010
until October 2017, which was one month before he was arrested for the charges in
the instant case, making $55,000 per year). While Peters was sentenced to life in
prison without the possibility of parole, the presentence-investigation report
documented his seven-year work history, during which he made a significant salary
and from which he can possibly pay the fines imposed.
Additionally, Peters did not file an affidavit of indigency or object to
the trial court’s imposition of fines. Peters had retained counsel for trial, and it was
only after sentencing that his trial counsel asked the court to declare him indigent
for purposes of appeal. He also did not provide any evidence or argument that he
was unable to pay the fines imposed by the trial court.
Further, none of the fines that the trial court imposed were contrary
to law because they all were the maximum allowed under R.C. 2929.18(A)(3), and
even though the trial court subsequently declared Peters indigent, the trial court was still permitted to impose a fine. Price, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 100981, 2015-Ohio-
411, ¶ 63. Instead, “[t]he Revised Code simply requires the sentencing court to
‘consider the offender’s ability to pay[,]’” which we find that the trial court did in this
case. State v. Ramos, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 92357, 2009-Ohio-3064, ¶ 7, quoting
R.C. 2929.19(B)(6). Like Bernadine, we find the record contains “relevant and
sufficient” evidence concerning Peters’s present and future ability to pay the fines
that the trial court considered.
As a result, while the fines are substantial, we find that the trial court
did not abuse its discretion or commit plain error, and we find the trial court
considered Peters’s present and future ability to pay the $40,000 in fines connected
to Peters’s convictions for felonious assault, violating a protection order, grand theft,
and tampering with evidence and overrule Peters’s first assignment of error to that
extent.
Peters also argues, albeit in a single sentence within his assignment
of error, that the trial court’s imposition of costs of the prosecution was also
constitutionally excessive. “R.C. 2947.23 requires a trial court to assess costs against
all criminal defendants, even if the defendant is indigent.” State v. Dean, 146 Ohio
St.3d 106, 2015-Ohio-4347, 54 N.E.3d 80, ¶ 231, citing State v. White, 103 Ohio
St.3d 580, 2004-Ohio-5989, 817 N.E.2d 393. Unlike fines, a trial court is not
required to consider a defendant’s ability to pay before imposing costs. Id.2
2 The Ohio Supreme Court recently accepted review of State v. Sibrian, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 27964, 2019-Ohio-1262, on the following proposition of law: Under R.C. 2947.23(C), a trial court need not consider an inmate’s present or future ability to Prior to 2013, “[a] motion by an indigent defendant for waiver of the
payment of costs [had to] be made at the time of sentencing.” State v. Threatt, 108
Ohio St.3d 277, 2006-Ohio-905, 843 N.E.2d 164, paragraph two of the syllabus. If
the defendant failed to move for waiver of costs at sentencing, appellate courts
considered the issue waived and the costs as res judicata. Dean at ¶ 231, citing
Threatt.
However, the General Assembly enacted Am.Sub.H.B. No. 247,
effective March 22, 2013, amending R.C. 2947.23, which governed the imposition of
court costs. The newly added subdivision (c) states, “The court retains jurisdiction
to waive, suspend, or modify the payment of the costs of prosecution * * * at the time
of sentencing or at any time thereafter.” Therefore, Peters was not required to move
to waive costs at sentencing and may move for such a waiver at any time. Further,
we need not remand the case for Peters to move for waiver of costs. State v. Reed,
8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 106796, 2018-Ohio-3187, ¶ 12.
Turning to whether the trial court’s imposition of costs was
constitutionally excessive, the Ohio Supreme Court has previously rejected an
argument that imposing costs violates a defendant’s Eighth Amendment’s right
against cruel and unusual punishment. In State v. Clinton, 153 Ohio St.3d 422,
pay court costs, nor must it explain its decision, when ruling on a post-conviction motion to vacate, stay, or remit court costs. The Ohio Supreme Court stayed its proceedings on Sibrian, awaiting its decision in State v. Taylor, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 27539, 2018- Ohio-1649, which was accepted for review on the following proposition of law: A trial court need not consider an inmate’s present or future ability to pay court costs, or determine whether any exemption statutes prohibit collection from an inmate’s account, when ruling on a post-conviction motion to vacate, stay, or remit court costs. 2017-Ohio-9423, 108 N.E.3d 1, the court stated, “‘Costs are not punishment, but are
more akin to a civil judgment for money.’” Id. at ¶ 240, quoting Threatt. Therefore,
Peters’s argument lacks merit.
Accordingly, we overrule Peters’s first assignment of error.
B. R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)
In his second assignment of error, Peters argues that the trial court
failed to comply with R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) when ordering that he serve consecutive
sentences.
An appellate court must conduct a meaningful review of the trial
court’s sentencing decision. State v. Johnson, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 97579, 2012-
Ohio-2508, ¶ 6, citing State v. Hites, 3d Dist. Hardin No. 6-11-07, 2012-Ohio-1892.
R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) provides that our review of consecutive sentences is not an
abuse of discretion. Instead, an appellate court must “review the record, including
the findings underlying the sentence or modification given by the sentencing court.”
Id. If an appellate court clearly and convincingly finds either that (1) “the record
does not support the sentencing court’s findings under [R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)],” or (2)
“the sentence is otherwise contrary to law,” then “the appellate court may increase,
reduce, or otherwise modify a sentence * * * or may vacate the sentence and remand
the matter to the sentencing court for resentencing.” Id.
A defendant can challenge consecutive sentences on appeal by
arguing that the consecutive sentences are contrary to law because the court failed
to make the necessary findings under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) or that the record does not support the trial court’s findings under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4). State v. Johnson, 8th
Dist. Cuyahoga No. 102449, 2016-Ohio-1536, ¶ 7.
In Ohio, sentences are presumed to run concurrent to one another
unless the trial court makes the required findings under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4). State
v. Wells, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 99305, 99306, and 99307, 2013-Ohio-3809, ¶ 13.
As such, trial courts must engage in R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)’s three-tier analysis before
imposing consecutive sentences. First, the trial court must find that “consecutive
service is necessary to protect the public from future crime or to punish the
offender[.]” R.C. 2929.14(C)(4). Second, the trial court must find that “consecutive
sentences are not disproportionate to the seriousness of the offender’s conduct and
to the danger the offender poses to the public.” Id. Third, the trial court must find
that one of the following applies:
(a) The offender committed one or more of the multiple offenses while the offender was awaiting trial or sentencing, was under a sanction * * *, or was under post-release control for a prior offense.
(b) At least two of the multiple offenses were committed as part of one or more courses of conduct, and the harm caused by two or more of the multiple offenses so committed was so great or unusual that no single prison term for any of the offenses committed as part of any of the courses of conduct adequately reflects the seriousness of the offender’s conduct.
(c) The offender’s history of criminal conduct demonstrates that consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the public from future crime by the offender.
Id. The failure to make the above findings renders the imposition of consecutive
sentences contrary to law. State v. Lawson, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 105038, 2017- Ohio-4189, ¶ 9, citing State v. Balbi, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 102321, 2015-Ohio-
4075.
When making the above findings, however, a trial court is not
required to engage in “a word-for-word recitation” of R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)’s language.
State v. Bonnell, 140 Ohio St.3d 209, 2014-Ohio-3177, 16 N.E.3d 659, ¶ 29. In fact,
“as long as the reviewing court can discern that the trial court engaged in the correct
analysis and can determine that the record contains evidence to support the
findings, consecutive sentences should be upheld.” Id.
We have previously held that an appellant’s assignment of error
contesting the imposition of consecutive sentences is moot when that appellant has
been sentenced to death or a prison term of life without the possibility of parole and
does not challenge his conviction or that portion of his sentence for that conviction
on appeal. See Campbell, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 103982, 2016-Ohio-7613, at ¶ 11
(“[T]he sentence of life without the possibility of parole imposed on Campbell does
foreclose the possibility of parole — his life sentence will be completed only upon
death. When that occurs, the sentences that were ordered to be served consecutive
to the life sentence will terminate.”). Therefore, because Peters was sentenced to life
imprisonment without the possibility of parole and does not challenge his
aggravated murder conviction or that portion of his sentence, his second assignment
of error is moot.
Even assuming his assignment of error is not moot, we would still
overrule Peters’s second assignment of error. Peters argues that it is “arguable” as to whether the trial court made the proportionality finding under R.C.
2929.14(C)(4). He also argues that the trial court failed to find “a necessity to protect
the public from future crime or punish [him]” or that he “had engaged in a course of
conduct that resulted in great or unusual harm.” We disagree.
At the sentencing hearing, the trial court stated:
I don’t know why you chose to waive your right to a jury trial in this case, but by doing so you spared 14 members of our community the horror of having to look at the photos of your handiwork.
This Court has for 42 years looked at many awful photos, none as awful as what I saw in this case. From babies to adults, I haven’t seen anything this awful in my career. I am glad that 14 people were spared because I know that the common citizen is not prepared to see such carnage, such willful, such intentional carnage to another human being.
I remember the testimony that you told the police officer * * * [t]hat you had no remorse while you were doing that to her. And then you left, you stole her car, you dumped the TV, made it look like a burglary, left her on the front lawn of her home for the world to see. * * *
There are times I wish I wouldn’t remember what I hear in this room. Your trial is certainly the one I will most try to forget.
And I will sentence you on each count to the maximum and to the consecutive. [The prosecutor] is absolutely right, you don’t deserve any hope of getting out of prison alive nor would I want you to do this to some other wonderful, kind-hearted person who extends a hand to help you as [the victim] did.
After setting forth the sentences for each count, the trial court also
stated, “And all of these will run consecutive because the crime was so heinous that
no one particular sentence would be sufficient, and consecutive sentences will not
demean the seriousness of the offense.” Foremost, as noted above, the trial court did not have to engage in “a
word-for-word recitation” of R.C. 2929.14. Bonnell, 140 Ohio St.3d 209, 2014-Ohio-
3177, 16 N.E.3d 659, at ¶ 29. Therefore, we will uphold the trial court’s sentence as
long as we can discern that the trial court engaged in the correct analysis and the
record supports the trial court’s findings.
Second, we can discern from the record that the trial court made the
requisite findings. The trial court found that concurrent sentences were not
appropriate based on Peters’s severe and appalling acts.
Additionally, the trial court’s statements at sentencing clearly
demonstrate that it found that consecutive sentences were necessary to protect the
public and that Peters’s crimes resulted in great or unusual harm. The trial court
stated that it imposed consecutive sentences because it did not “want [him] to do
this to some other wonderful, kind-hearted person[.]” The trial court also
thoroughly remarked on the gruesome nature of Peters’s crimes and how it had
never seen such an awful crime.
Finally, the trial court also properly incorporated the necessary
findings into its sentencing journal entry as required. See Bonnell, 140 Ohio St.3d
209, 2014-Ohio-3177, 16 N.E.3d 659, at syllabus.
Therefore, contrary to Peters’s assertions, we find that the trial court
made the necessary findings under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4), and we overrule Peters’s
second assignment of error.
Judgment affirmed. It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the
common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant’s
conviction having been affirmed, any bail pending is terminated. Case remanded to
the trial court for execution of sentence.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule
27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
MARY J. BOYLE, JUDGE
MICHELLE J. SHEEHAN, J., CONCURS; MARY EILEEN KILBANE, A.J., DISSENTS IN PART WITH SEPARATE OPINION
MARY EILEEN KILBANE, A.J., DISSENTING IN PART:
I respectfully dissent in part. I agree with the majority that we lack
statutory authority to review Peters’s $20,000 fine for aggravated murder. I
disagree, however, with the majority’s finding that the trial court’s imposition of the
remaining $40,000 in fines was proper.
The majority infers from the record that the trial court considered
Peters’s present and future ability to pay the $40,000 in fines before imposing them
because the trial court reviewed his presentence investigation report. The report
documented Peters’s work history, which indicated that at one time he made
$55,000 per year. Based on this limited work history, the majority then infers the trial court considered this salary significant and concluded that he could possibly
pay the imposed $40,000 in fines from his past earnings.
While there are no express factors that must be taken into
consideration regarding the offender’s ability to pay that must be made on the
record, the record still must contain some evidence that the court considered the
offender’s ability to pay such a sanction. Sampson, 11th Dist. Lake No. 2007-Ohio-
7126, at ¶ 14, State v. Jobe, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-07-1413, 2009-Ohio-4066, ¶ 79,
citing State v. Phillips, 6th Dist. Fulton No. F-05-032, 2006-Ohio-4135, citing State
v. Lamonds, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-03-1100, 2005-Ohio-1219 (where the trial court’s
imposition of costs was vacated when there was no evidence in the record supporting
the trial court’s finding that appellant had, or could reasonably in the future be
expected to have, the ability to pay the costs). Indeed, this court has stated that
“[f]ines should be imposed as punishment upon those with the ability to pay.” State
v. McCauley, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 80630, 2003-Ohio-3211, ¶ 17, rev’d on other
grounds, 104 Ohio St.3d 158, 2004-Ohio-5772, 798 N.E.2d 405 (where this court
found the fine was improper under R.C. 2929.19(B)(6) because defendant, who was
indigent, was unable to pay it. Appellant was employed at a rate of $ 7.50 per hour
prior to his offenses and was sentenced to nine years in prison. This court noted
that “[i]mposing a fine as an extra burden upon one earning this little virtually
assures an overpowering temptation to earn more money unlawfully, substantially
decreasing any chance the offender might have of avoiding recidivism.”) Id. The horrific facts of this case cannot be ignored. Peters committed a
heinous crime against the victim, savagely taking her life and was sentenced to life
in prison, without parole, as a result of his conduct. In addition to his life sentence,
the trial court assessed Peters $40,000 in fines. Fines, however, “should be imposed
as punishment upon those with the ability to pay.” McCauley at ¶ 17. Here, Peters’s
presentence-investigation report indicated that he made $55,000 per year at one
time. At the time of sentencing, Peters had been unemployed for more than one
year. With Peters unemployed, indigent, and spending the rest of his life in prison,
there is no evidence in the record indicating that he could pay the fines from the
salary he made during his previous job. Under these circumstances, I would find
the record demonstrates that Peters does not have the present or future ability to
pay the financial sanctions.
Accordingly, I would sustain the first assignment of error as to the
$40,000 in fines.