State v. Peters

• Court: Court of Appeals of North Carolina
• Decided: April 16, 2025
• Docket: 24-475
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA

No. COA24-475

Filed 16 April 2025

McDowell County, No. 22CRS050912-580

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA

v.

SOSHA NICOLE PETERS, Defendant.

Appeal by defendant from judgment entered 13 November 2023 by Judge Steve

R. Warren in McDowell County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 14

January 2025.

Attorney General Joshua H. Stein, by Assistant Attorney General Christine Wright, for the State.

Appellate Defender Glenn Gerding, by Assistant Appellate Defender John F. Carella, for defendant-appellant.

DILLON, Chief Judge.

Defendant Sosha Nicole Peters was convicted of possession of

methamphetamine discovered in her wallet by wildlife officers during a warrantless

search. During the encounter, officers were in the process of searching Defendant’s

vehicle and retrieved and searched the inside of Defendant’s wallet that she had

placed on top of the vehicle, whereupon the officers found the methamphetamine

inside the wallet. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying STATE V. PETERS

Opinion of the Court

her motion to suppress the evidence found in her wallet during the search. We vacate

and remand for further consideration.

I. Background

This matter involves an encounter between officers and Defendant during

which the officers searched Defendant’s vehicle and her wallet which was on top of

her vehicle. Defendant was not charged for possession of anything found by the

officers inside her vehicle, but only for the methamphetamine found inside her wallet.

The uncontradicted evidence and findings made by the trial court at

Defendant’s suppression hearing tended to show as follows: On 1 July 2022, two

officers with the State of North Carolina Wildlife Resource Commission came in

contact with Defendant and Tyrone Thomas, who were residing in a camp in the

vicinity of Pisgah National Forest in McDowell County. During the encounter, one of

the officers requested to see proof of identity and proof of ownership of the vehicle

parked next to the tent where Defendant and Mr. Thomas were residing. Much of

the encounter was caught on an officer’s body camera.

Defendant walked to the car, opened the passenger door, retrieved both her

wallet and the vehicle title, retrieved her identification from her wallet, and handed

her identification and vehicle title showing her as the vehicle owner to the officer.

The officers acknowledged Defendant as the owner of the vehicle. There were several

needles in the vehicle. Defendant provided the officer with a card that allowed her

access to the needles that she received from a medical center. Mr. Thomas explained

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to the officer that they had only had the vehicle for two days and he had been driving

it, as Defendant did not have a current license.

After checking the identity of both Defendant and Mr. Thomas, the officer went

back to speak with them. The officer asked them if there was “anything in the car

[he] might need to know about.” Defendant responded, “No sir.

The officer then asked if he could “check [the car] out,”, to which Mr. Thomas

responded, “Yeah, go ahead.” While the officer was preparing to search the vehicle,

Defendant was cleaning the passenger side of the car and grabbing her pill bottles off

the floor. The officer informed her to leave everything in the car. She apologized,

stating she was just trying to clean it up for him because it was messy.

At some point, before the officer began his search of the car’s interior,

Defendant’s wallet came to be on top of the vehicle. Neither the video of the encounter

nor the testimony from the suppression hearing definitively establishes how

Defendant’s wallet came to be on top of Defendant’s vehicle. The trial court, though,

made a finding that it was Defendant who placed her wallet on top of the car at some

point during the encounter. And Defendant in this present appeal does not challenge

this finding. Therefore, for purposes of our review, the trial court’s finding is binding.

See, e.g., Brackett v. Thomas, 371 N.C. 121, 127 (2018) (holding unchallenged findings

are binding on appeal). (We express no opinion as to whether this finding remains

binding on Defendant on remand or in any subsequent appeal.)

In any event, at some point, the officer retrieved Defendant’s wallet from the

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top of the vehicle and searched inside of it, whereupon he discovered a bag of

methamphetamine inside the wallet. It is unclear based on testimony and body

camera footage when, by whom, and under what circumstances Defendant’s wallet

was placed on top of the car.

Defendant was only charged for the methamphetamine found in her wallet.

Prior to her trial, she moved to suppress the evidence found in her wallet on the

grounds that the evidence was found during an unconstitutional search.

The trial court entered an order denying Defendant’s motion to suppress. The

court determined that Defendant’s companion, Mr. Thomas, had validly consented to

the search of her vehicle, based on his “apparent control” of the vehicle, and that

Defendant, otherwise, also implied consented to the search of her vehicle (presumably

based on her actions and inactions). The trial court, however, made no findings or

conclusions concerning whether consent was given to search the wallet itself.

Defendant pleaded guilty to possession of methamphetamine, reserving her

right to appeal the trial court’s denial of her motion to suppress. Defendant appealed.

II. Analysis

We review a trial court’s order denying a defendant’s motion to suppress by

“determining whether the trial court’s underlying findings of fact are supported by

competent evidence and whether those factual findings in turn support the trial

court’s ultimate conclusions of law.” State v. Parisi, 372 N.C. 639, 649 (2019)

(citations and internal quotations omitted). A trial court’s findings of fact are

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“conclusive on appeal if supported by competent evidence, even if the evidence is

conflicting.” State v. Eason, 336 N.C. 730, 745 (1994). “We will review conclusions of

law de novo regardless of the label applied by the trial court.” State v. Jackson, 220

N.C. App. 1, 8 (2012).

The relevant findings of facts and conclusions of law are as follows:

[Finding 5]: At each time Ms. Peters accessed the car she did so from the driver’s side. The court concludes that Ms. Peter[s] had her belongings stored in the passenger area of the car and she did not access the driver’s area as she had not been in control of its operations and contents in the driving area.

[Finding 7]: In the presence of both Mr. Thomas and Ms. Peters, [the officer], in requesting consent to search the car, asked “care if we check it out?” Mr. Thomas said “Yeah, go ahead.” The Court finds from this evidence that Ms. Peters did not object and at no time voiced opposition to the search, or the impending search, thereafter.

[Finding 8]: As a result of the search [the officer] discovered methamphetamine inside a pink [wallet] which had been removed from the interior of the car by Ms. Peters who placed it on the roof of the car in view [of the officer] after he had received consent to search.

[Conclusion 1]: Mr. Thomas was in apparent control of the vehicle’s operation and contents at the time the consent by him was given and had valid authority to consent to said search.

[Conclusion 2]: Ms. Peters did not object to Mr. Thomas’[s] authorization given to [the officer] to search the vehicle and impliedly consented to the same.

Consent of a search is analyzed by looking at the totality of the circumstances.

Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227 (1973). A person who is not the lawful

owner of a vehicle may consent to the search of a vehicle. See, e.g., N.C.G.S. § 15A-

222(2) (providing that one in apparent control of a vehicle may consent to its search).

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Also, our Court has held that consent of an owner to search her vehicle may be

inferred from her silence when consent is given by a third party who is in apparent

control of the car. See State v. Foster, 33 N.C. App. 145, 148 (1977).

Here, we conclude there is evidence from which the trial court could find that

Defendant impliedly consented to the search of her vehicle, aside from her failure to

object when Mr. Thomas consented. Specifically, there was uncontradicted evidence

that Defendant cleaned an area of the interior to facilitate the officer’s search and

that she responded, “okay,” when the officer told her to “just leave everything in it.”

From this and other behavior, the officer reasonably believed that Defendant was

consenting to the search that had been previously verbally given by Mr. Thomas,

specifically, to search the vehicle.

Notwithstanding, the trial court failed to make any finding concerning whether

Defendant consented to the search of her wallet outside the vehicle. That is, the trial

court found that the officer “request[ed] consent to search the car,” that consent was

given “to search the vehicle,” and that the methamphetamine was discovered “inside

a pink [wallet] which had been removed from the interior of the car by [Defendant]

who placed it on the roof of the car in view of [the officer] after he had received consent

to search.” The wallet was neither inside nor otherwise attached to the vehicle. See,

e.g., United States v. Clayton, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87639 (W.D. Tenn. 2024)

(holding that the automobile exception did not authorize officers to search a plastic

bag on top of the vehicle, reasoning that “[c]ontainers that can serve as a natural

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extension of a vehicle possess the same potential mobility as does the car, but

containers placed on a vehicle that are neither attached nor tethered do not”).

Since the trial court made no determination concerning whether consent was

validly given for the search of the wallet where the methamphetamine was found, the

trial court’s findings cannot support its order denying Defendant’s motion to

suppress. And such denial was necessarily prejudicial as the methamphetamine

found in the wallet was the basis of the charge against Defendant.

We, however, must next consider whether the proper mandate is to vacate and

remand for further findings or whether the proper mandate is to reverse the order

denying Defendant’s suppression motion. For the reasoning below, we believe the

best course in this case is to vacate the trial court’s order and subsequent judgment

and remand the matter to the trial court for further findings.

In so considering the appropriate mandate, we are mindful that the burden

rests with the State to show that consent to search a particular area was validly given.

See State v. Hardy, 339 N.C. 207, 226 (1994). We are also mindful that the consent

must be “clear and unequivocal” for the consent to be valid. State v. Pearson, 348

N.C. 272, 277 (1998).

Here, the trial court did find that the wallet “had been removed from the

interior of the car by [Defendant] who placed it on the roof of the car in view of [the

officer] after he had received consent to search [the car].” There was evidence that

she was in possession of the wallet earlier when she was providing her identification

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and title information to the officer, that she went towards the car to clean it out to

facilitate the officer’s search of the car (after Mr. Thomas gave verbal consent to the

search), and that she did not possess the wallet when she stepped away from the car

as the officer began his search. However, there is no direct evidence in the record for

this finding. Defendant, though, has not challenged the finding. Therefore, this

finding is binding on appeal. In re A.A.M., 379 N.C. 167, 176 (2021).

However, it is unclear why Defendant placed her wallet on the car. She may

have left it there inadvertently while cleaning out her car and simply forgot that the

wallet was there when the officer told her to stop cleaning. Or it may be that she

placed the wallet on the car as a gesture of consent to the search since she carried

other personal items away from the car prior to the search.

Further, Defendant’s silence while the officer searched her wallet cannot

constitute consent. Specifically, our Supreme Court has held that where a defendant

has consented to the search of his vehicle, the officer’s search of a defendant’s person

(and finding drugs on his person) based on a defendant’s silence/acquiescence is

unlawful:

The superior court relied on the consent to search the vehicle . . . and the fact that [the defendant] did not object when he was [personally] searched to conclude the defendant consented to the search. This was error. The consent signed by the defendant applied only to the vehicle. We cannot broaden the consent to include the defendant’s person. We also cannot hold that the acquiescence of the defendant when the officer told him he would frisk him was consent, considering all the circumstances. There must be

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clear and unequivocal consent before a defendant can waive his constitutional rights.

Pearson, 348 N.C. at 277. We have held, though, that nonverbal behavior by a

defendant may constitute a sufficient expression of consent. See State v. Harper, 158

N.C. App. 595, 603 (2003).

The United States Supreme Court has held the test concerning the scope of

consent to be “that of ‘objective’ reasonableness – what would the typical reasonable

person have understood by the exchange between the officer and the suspect?” See

Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251 (1991).

On remand, the trial court may again deny Defendant’s motion, but only if it

makes findings based on the evidence that the officer objectively believed that

Defendant was giving her clear and unequivocal consent to the officer’s search of her

wallet. Otherwise, it is the trial court’s duty to grant Defendant’s motion.

We express no opinion as to the appropriateness of the trial court’s

consideration of new evidence on remand, as neither party has briefed this issue.

VACATED AND REMANDED.

Judges WOOD and MURRY concur.

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