[Cite as State v. Perry, 2019-Ohio-2699.]
COURT OF APPEALS MUSKINGUM COUNTY, OHIO FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
STATE OF OHIO : JUDGES: : Hon. John W. Wise, P.J. Plaintiff - Appellee : Hon. Craig R. Baldwin, J. : Hon. Earle E. Wise, J. -vs- : : WENROSS S. PERRY : Case No. CT2018-0045 : Defendant - Appellant : OPINION
CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Appeal from the Muskingum County Court of Common Pleas, Case No. CR2017-0179
JUDGMENT: Reversed and Remanded
DATE OF JUDGMENT: July 1, 2019
APPEARANCES:
For Plaintiff-Appellee For Defendant-Appellee
D. MICHAEL HADDOX JOSEPH N. PHILLIPS Prosecuting Attorney Amato Law Office, L.P. A. Muskingum County, Ohio 420 Broadway Avenue Wellsville, Ohio 43968 By: GERALD V. ANDERSON II Assistant Prosecuting Attorney Muskingum County, Ohio 27 North Fifth St., P.O. Box 189 Zanesville, Ohio 43702-0189 Muskingum County, Case No. CT2018-0045 2
Baldwin, J.
{¶1} Wenross S. Perry appeals the decision of the Muskingum County Court of
Common Pleas denying his request to withdraw his guilty plea. Appellee is the State of
Ohio.
STATEMENT OF FACTS AND THE CASE
{¶2} The facts leading to Appellants arrest are unnecessary for the consideration
and resolution of the issues before this court and are therefore omitted.
{¶3} Appellant was charged with possession of drugs with a forfeiture
specification, a third degree felony in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A) as well as trafficking in
drugs with a forfeiture specification, also a third degree felony in violation of R.C.
2925.03(A)(2).
{¶4} Appellant entered a plea of not guilty on May 17, 2017, then changed his
plea to guilty to one count of violating 2925.03(A)(2), trafficking in drugs, on June 19,
2017. (The violation of R.C. 2925.11(A) was dismissed by the state.) During the plea
hearing, the following exchange occurred:
THE COURT: And you understand that you are a resident of the United
States but you're not a United States citizen to the point that by entering this
plea you could be deported?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: You also understand you have a right to contact your
consulate and that type of thing, if you need to. You understand that?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. Muskingum County, Case No. CT2018-0045 3
THE COURT: And that could also be a possible consequence to you
entering the plea. You understand that?
***
THE COURT: I normally would as at this point in time, are you a U.S.
citizen?
THE DEFENDANT: I'm a resident of the United States.
Plea Hearing, June 19, 2017, pp. 8-10.
{¶5} Appellant’s guilty plea was accepted and he was sentenced to a twelve
month prison term, given eighty-three days credit for time served and ordered to forfeit
$5,055.00 that was on his person when he was arrested.
{¶6} On November 20, 2017, Appellant received a Notice to Appear in
Immigration Court. Removal proceedings were initiated as a result of his conviction in this
case pursuant to Sections 2327(a)(2)(A)(iii) and 237(a)(2)(B)(i) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act.
{¶7} Appellant filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea as a result of the initiation
of the deportation proceedings. He attached his affidavit containing the following
statements:
2. Affiant states that he is a lawful permanent resident of the United States;
he is not a United States Citizen.
3. Affiant states that he is a citizen of Jamaica.
4. Affiant states that he pled guilty to one count of Trafficking in Drugs —
Marijuana, with a forfeiture specification, in violation of R.C. § Muskingum County, Case No. CT2018-0045 4
2925.03(A)(2), a third degree felony, in Muskingum County Court of
Common Pleas case number CR2017-0179 on June 19, 2017.
5. Affiant states that he was not given any explanation of his rights or the
consequences of entering his plea, and further, that he did not understand
the consequences of his plea and was not aware that a conviction for the
charged offense would affect his immigration status.
6. Affiant states that his defense counsel did not advise him of any adverse
immigration consequences from entering his plea.
7. Affiant further states that had he known pleading guilty to the charged
offense would have consequences on his immigration status, he would not
have entered the plea and would have exercised his rights and fought the
case in court.
8. Affiant states that as a result of his conviction for Trafficking in Drugs —
Marijuana, with a forfeiture specification, in violation of R.C. §
2925.03(A)(2), a third degree felony, in Muskingum County Court of
Common Pleas case number CR2017-0179, he is removable from and
inadmissible to the United States.
{¶8} Appellant also attached the affidavit of Kathleen S. Fish. Ms. Fish identified
herself as an immigration attorney. She reviewed Appellant’s conviction and concluded
that it made Appellant removable from United States, ineligible for admission to the United
States and ineligible for U.S. citizenship.
{¶9} Appellant argued that the trial court failed to comply with the requirements
of R.C. 2943.031(A) when he was sentenced. That section requires that: Muskingum County, Case No. CT2018-0045 5
(A) Except as provided in division (B) of this section, prior to
accepting a plea of guilty or a plea of no contest to an indictment,
information, or complaint charging a felony or a misdemeanor other
than a minor misdemeanor if the defendant previously has not been
convicted of or pleaded guilty to a minor misdemeanor, the court
shall address the defendant personally, provide the following
advisement to the defendant that shall be entered in the record of the
court, and determine that the defendant understands the
advisement:
(B) “If you are not a citizen of the United States, you
are hereby advised that conviction of the offense to
which you are pleading guilty (or no contest, when
applicable) may have the consequences of
deportation, exclusion from admission to the United
States, or denial of naturalization pursuant to the laws
of the United States.”
Upon request of the defendant, the court shall allow
him additional time to consider the appropriateness of
the plea in light of the advisement described in this
division.”
{¶10} Revised Code 2943.031(D) describes the remedy for failure to comply with
the requirements of Subsection (A): Muskingum County, Case No. CT2018-0045 6
Upon motion of the defendant, the court shall set aside the
judgment and permit the defendant to withdraw a plea of guilty or no
contest and enter a plea of not guilty or not guilty by reason of
insanity, if, after the effective date of this section, the court fails to
provide the defendant the advisement described in division (A) of this
section, the advisement is required by that division, and the
defendant shows that he is not a citizen of the United States and that
the conviction of the offense to which he pleaded guilty or no contest
may result in his being subject to deportation, exclusion from
admission to the United States, or denial of naturalization pursuant
to the laws of the United States.
{¶11} The trial court considered the motion and the state’s response and denied
Appellant’s request without a hearing finding:
*** the Defendant was advised of the risk of deportation and opportunity to
contact the Jamaican consulate regarding the legal ramifications of his plea.
The Court finds that the advisements provided substantially comply with
R.C. §2943.031. Furthermore, the Defendant argues that his defense
attorney failed to inform him that deportation is mandated in his case;
however, he fails to provide any support for such a claim and only the
Department of Homeland Security has authority to deport a non-U.S.
citizen, and only after a hearing pursuant to Immigration and Nationality Act
§240(3) has been held; the Defendant has not had such a hearing. Muskingum County, Case No. CT2018-0045 7
Therefore, after due consideration of the same, the Defendant's motion is
Denied, and his request for an oral hearing is Denied.
{¶12} Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal from the trial court’s decision and
submitted three assignments of error:
{¶13} “I. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING
APPELLANT'S MOTION TO WITHDRAW AND VACATE HIS GUILTY PLEA BECAUSE
THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO SUBSTANTIALLY COMPLY WITH THE STATUTORILY
REQUIRED ADVISEMENTS TO NONCITIZENS CONTAINED IN R.C. § 2943.031(A).”
{¶14} “II. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING
APPELLANT'S MOTION TO WITHDRAW AND VACATE HIS GUILTY PLEA BECAUSE
APPELLANT'S PLEA WAS NOT KNOWINGLY, INTELLIGENTLY, OR VOLUNTARILY
MADE DUE TO THE TRIAL COURT'S FAILURE TO SUBSTANTIALLY COMPLY WITH
THE STATUTORILY REQUIRED ADVISEMENTS TO NONCITIZENS CONTAINED IN
R.C. § 2943.03L(A).”
{¶15} “III. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT DENIED
APPELLANT'S MOTION TO WITHDRAW HIS GUILTY PLEA ON THE BASIS OF
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL BECAUSE HIS FORMER ATTORNEY
FAILED TO PROPERLY ADVISE HIM OF THE IMMIGRATION CONSEQUENCES AS A
RESULT OF PLEADING GUILTY PURSUANT TO PADILLA V. KENTUCKY, 559 U.S.
356, 364, 130 S.CT. 1473, 176 L.ED.2D 284 (2010).”
STANDARD OF REVIEW
{¶16} Appellant asked to withdraw his guilty plea pursuant to Crim.R. 32.1 and
R.C. 2943.031. While post-sentence motions filed under Crim.R. 32.1 are subject to the Muskingum County, Case No. CT2018-0045 8
manifest injustice standard, that requirement is not applicable when the Appellant claims
a violation of R.C. 2943.031. State v. Oluoch, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 07AP-45, 2007-
Ohio-5560, ¶ 9. “R.C. 2943.031(D)'s explicit language mandates that a trial court set aside
a judgment of conviction and allow a defendant to withdraw his guilty plea if the defendant
satisfies four requirements. Showing manifest injustice is not included as one of the
requirements.” State v. Weber, 125 Ohio App.3d 120, 129, 707 N.E.2d 1178 (10th
Dist.1997).
{¶17} Appellant must instead show that “(1) the court failed to provide the
defendant with the advisement contained in R.C. 2943.031(A); (2) the advisement was
required; (3) the defendant is not a United States citizen; and (4) the offense to which the
defendant pled guilty may result in deportation under the immigration laws of the federal
government.” Id. at 126, 707 N.E.2d 1178.
{¶18} The trial court’s decision regarding whether the elements have been
established is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Francis at ¶ 32.
To clarify, the exercise of discretion “applies to the trial court's
decision on whether the R.C. 2943.031(D) elements have been established
(along with the factors of timeliness and prejudice * * *), not generally to the
trial court's discretion once the statutory provisions have been met.” Id. at ¶
34, 820 N.E.2d 355. “[A] defendant seeking relief under R.C. 2943.031(D)
must make his or her case before the trial court under the terms of that
statute, * * * the trial court must exercise its discretion in determining
whether the statutory conditions are met, and * * * an appellate court Muskingum County, Case No. CT2018-0045 9
reviews a trial court's decision on the motion under an abuse-of-discretion
standard in light of R.C. 2943.031(D). Id. at ¶ 36, 820 N.E.2d 355.
State v. Muhumed, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 11AP-1001, 2012-Ohio-6155, ¶¶ 8-10.
{¶19} Appellee contends that substantial compliance with the statute is sufficient
and a verbatim reading of the statutory warning is not mandatory. State v. Francis, 104
Ohio St.3d 490, 2004-0hio-6894.
{¶20} The Appellant also contends that his trial counsel rendered ineffective
assistance by failing to inform him of the consequences of a finding of guilt. The Supreme
Court of Ohio recently issued an opinion regarding an analogous fact pattern and
addressed the appropriate standard to apply to a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel in this context:
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees
a defendant the effective assistance of counsel at “‘critical stages of a
criminal proceeding,’ including when he enters a guilty plea.” Lee v. United
States, ––– U.S. ––––, 137 S.Ct. 1958, 1964, 198 L.Ed.2d 476 (2017),
quoting Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 165, 132 S.Ct. 1376, 182 L.Ed.2d
398 (2012); Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58, 106 S.Ct. 366, 88 L.Ed.2d 203
(1985). When a defendant alleges ineffective assistance of counsel arising
from the plea process, the defendant must meet the two-prong test set out
in Strickland, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674. See Hill at 58,
106 S.Ct. 366 (applying Strickland to guilty pleas); State v. Xie, 62 Ohio
St.3d 521, 524, 584 N.E.2d 715 (1992) (same). Muskingum County, Case No. CT2018-0045 10
First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was
deficient. Strickland at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052; Xie at 524, 584 N.E.2d 715.
When an attorney's noncitizen client is considering a plea, the United States
Supreme Court has held that “counsel must inform her client whether his
plea carries a risk of deportation.” Padilla, 559 U.S. at 374, 130 S.Ct. 1473,
176 L.Ed.2d 284. Given the grave consequences of deportation, an
ineffective-assistance claim is not limited to affirmative misadvice or false
information. Id. at 369-371, 130 S.Ct. 1473. The failure to give any advice
at all about possible deportation consequences satisfies the first prong of
Strickland. Id. “The severity of deportation * * * only underscores how critical
it is for counsel to inform her noncitizen client that he faces a risk of
deportation.” Id. at 373-374, 130 S.Ct. 1473.
Second, the defendant must demonstrate prejudice resulting from
counsel's deficient performance. Strickland at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052. The
defendant can show prejudice by demonstrating a “reasonable probability
that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would
have insisted on going to trial.” Hill at 59, 106 S.Ct. 366; Xie at 524, 584
N.E.2d 715.
State v. Romero, 2019-Ohio-1839, ¶¶15-16.
{¶21} Appellee claims that Appellant is contending his counsel failed to advise
him of the certainty and imminence of deportation, but that relevant precedent does not
obligate trial counsel to do any more than provide accurate advice. Appellee also implies Muskingum County, Case No. CT2018-0045 11
the uncertainty of immigration consequences as of the date of the motion prevents relief
to the Appellant.
ANALYSIS
{¶22} Appellant’s first and second assignments of error focus upon the question
of whether the trial court substantially complied with the requirements of R.C. 2943.031,
so we will begin with an analysis of that issue.
{¶23} The Supreme Court of Ohio requires that any motion seeking relief under
R.C. 2943.031 be timely. State v. Khan, 2nd Dist. Montgomery No. 21718, 2007-Ohio-
4208, ¶ 31. In the case before us, the issue of timeliness is not addressed by the trial
court, nor is it asserted as a fault by Appellee in its brief, so we consider that issue waived.
{¶24} Revised Code R.C. 2943.031(A) describes the duty of the trial court to
provide the warning therein as a mandatory obligation by the use of the word “shall” most
often used to designate a clear requirement. The Code requires that “the court shall
address the defendant personally, provide the following advisement to the defendant that
shall be entered in the record of the court, and determine that the defendant understands
the advisement.” Id. (Emphasis added.) Further, the language of the advisement is
separately set out, in quotation marks, suggesting that the Legislature intended the trial
courts to provide a verbatim recitation of that language, but that section of the Code does
not expressly include that requirement.
{¶25} The Supreme Court of Ohio resolved this issue in State v. Francis, 104 Ohio
St.3d 490, 2004-Ohio-6894, 820 N.E.2d 355. In the first paragraph of the syllabus, the
Court held that a verbatim recital is required: Muskingum County, Case No. CT2018-0045 12
A trial court accepting a guilty or no-contest plea from a defendant
who is not a citizen of the United States must give verbatim the warning set
forth in R.C. 2943.031(A), informing the defendant that conviction of the
offense for which the plea is entered “may have the consequences of
deportation, exclusion from admission to the United States, or denial of
naturalization pursuant to the laws of the United States.”
{¶26} A failure to provide a verbatim recitation of the warning need not be fatal,
as the Supreme Court of Ohio noted in the second paragraph of the syllabus:
If some warning of immigration-related consequences was given at
the time a noncitizen defendant's plea was accepted, but the warning was
not a verbatim recital of the language in R.C. 2943.031(A), a trial court
considering the defendant's motion to withdraw the plea under R.C.
2943.031(D) must exercise its discretion in determining whether the trial
court that accepted the plea substantially complied with R.C. 2943.031(A).
{¶27} The Court defined “substantial compliance” as meaning “that under the
totality of the circumstances the defendant subjectively understands the implications of
his plea and the rights he is waiving. * * * The test is whether the plea would have
otherwise been made.” State v. Nero, 56 Ohio St.3d at 108, 564 N.E.2d 474; see, also,
Griggs, 103 Ohio St.3d 85, 2004-Ohio-4415, 814 N.E.2d 51, at ¶ 12. Francis at ¶ 48
(2004). The Supreme Court of Ohio referenced State v. Malcolm (2001), 257 Conn. 653,
778 A.2d 134, in support of its holding that substantial compliance is sufficient to satisfy
the requirement of the Revised Code. While that Court did find that substantial
compliance was sufficient, the statute at issue in that case is worded differently than R.C. Muskingum County, Case No. CT2018-0045 13
2943.031 and does not contain a mandatory advisement but only requires that the trial
court “shall not accept a plea of guilty or nolo contendere from any defendant in any
criminal proceeding unless the court first addresses the defendant personally and
determines that the defendant fully understands” the potential consequences of his plea.
Conn.Gen.Stat.Ann. 54-1j. Chief Justice Moyer and Justice Pfeiffer dissented in Francis
and noted that the unambiguous requirement of the statute was a verbatim recitation of
the advisement. Nevertheless, we are bound to comply with the holding in Francis and
determine whether the trial court complied with the Code.
{¶28} The trial court did not comply with the first paragraph of the syllabus of
Francis, supra, because it failed to “give verbatim the warning set forth in R.C.
2943.031(A), informing the defendant that conviction of the offense for which the plea is
entered “may have the consequences of deportation, exclusion from admission to the
United States, or denial of naturalization pursuant to the laws of the United States.” We
must next review whether the trial court abused its discretion by “determining whether [it]
*** substantially complied with R.C. 2943.031(A).” As noted above, substantial
compliance means “that under the totality of the circumstances the defendant subjectively
understands the implications of his plea and the rights he is waiving. * * * The test is
whether the plea would have otherwise been made.” Francis at ¶ 48 (2004).
{¶29} Appellant was arrested and charged on May 5, 2017, and changed his plea
to guilty on June 19, 2017, approximately six weeks after his arrest. During the plea
hearing, the trial court warned that “by entering this plea you could be deported” but did
not warn of the possibility of “exclusion from admission to the United States, or denial of
naturalization pursuant to the laws of the United States.” R.C. 2943.031(A).” The Muskingum County, Case No. CT2018-0045 14
conviction made Appellant subject to deportation and his removal was virtually inevitable.
State v. Romero, 5th Dist. Stark No. 2016CA00201, 2017-Ohio-2950, ¶ 19, appeal
allowed, 151 Ohio St.3d 1502, 2018-Ohio-365, 90 N.E.3d 945, (2018), and aff'd and
remanded, 2019-Ohio-1839. Appellant stated in his affidavit that he is not a United States
citizen and “was and is inadmissible to the United States.” He also contended that had he
known of the immigration consequences of a guilty plea, he would have fought the
charges. Appellant also offered the supplemental affidavit of an immigration attorney
confirming that the conviction rendered Appellant removable, inadmissible, and
prevented him from becoming a United States citizen.
{¶30} The immigration consequences alleged by Appellant were a certainty
regardless of whether the conviction was the result of a plea or a trial, so it is reasonable
to conclude that had Appellant subjectively understood all of the consequences of his
plea, including inadmissibility, it is likely that he would not have entered his plea of guilty.
In the context of this case, Appellant now faces permanent separation from his wife and
step-daughter as it appears he has been deported and cannot return to the United States.
{¶31} As for the trial court’s performance, we must conclude that substantial
compliance did not occur. We agree with the Second District Court of Appeals when it
determined that:
The trial court failed to advise Defendant that his guilty plea might
result in exclusion from admission to the United States, or denial of
naturalization. Thus, in advising Defendant about the possible adverse
immigration consequences of his guilty plea the trial court failed to even
mention two out of the three separate, distinct consequences set forth in Muskingum County, Case No. CT2018-0045 15
R.C. 2943.031(A). In our view, that does not constitute substantial
compliance with R.C. 2943.031(A). See: State v. Zuniga, Lake App.
Nos.2003-P-0082, 2004-P-0002, 2005-Ohio-2078.
State v. Hernandez-Medina, 2nd Dist. Clark No. 06CA0131, 2008-Ohio-418, ¶ 30.
{¶32} We find that the Appellant could not subjectively understand the rights he
was waiving when he was not fully advised of the rights that may be impacted by a finding
of guilty. Our conclusion is buttressed by the first paragraph in the syllabus in Francis
mandating a verbatim recitation of the advisement in R.C. 2943.031 which leads us to
conclude that the second paragraph, which permits substantial compliance, requires
advisement of all three consequences described in the advisement. The trial court in the
case below failed to substantially comply because it did not address the consequences
of denial of naturalization or potential inadmissibility. The Legislature determined all three
issues were of such significant import that it included specific language for the trial court’s
use when advising defendants. Concluding that a trial court substantially complied with
the requirement of the Code without any mention of two of the consequences is
tantamount to changing the language of the statute and we are not willing to adopt such
an interpretation. Our conclusion is indirectly supported by the decision in State v. Sow,
10th Dist. Franklin No. 17AP-772, 2018-Ohio-4186, ¶ 17 where the Tenth District Court
of Appeals held that the trial court substantially complied with statutory requirements by
informing defendant of the three possible consequences of deportation, exclusion from
the admission and denial of naturalization, but did not provide a verbatim recital of the
advisement. Muskingum County, Case No. CT2018-0045 16
{¶33} We hold that the trial court abused its discretion by finding that it
substantially complied with the requirements of R.C. 2943.031. The trial court did not
provide a verbatim recitation and failed to include two of the potential consequences of a
guilty finding. Because there was not substantial compliance with the statutory
requirements, the first and second assignment of errors are sustained.
{¶34} In his third assignment of error, Appellant contends he received ineffective
assistance of counsel when his trial attorney failed to advise him of any potential
immigration consequences of pleading guilty. Appellant provided an affidavit asserting
that “his defense counsel did not advise him of any adverse immigration consequences
from entering his plea” and “that had he known pleading guilty to the charged offense
would have consequences on his immigration status, he would not have entered the plea
and would have exercised his rights and fought the case in court.” (Affidavit, ¶¶ 6-7). The
trial court responded to this issue by concluding that Appellant failed “to provide any
support for such a claim and only the Department of Homeland Security has authority to
deport a non-U.S. citizen, and only after a hearing pursuant to Immigration and Nationality
Act §240(3) has been held; the Defendant has not had such a hearing.”
{¶35} We addressed a very similar fact pattern in State v. Romero, supra and the
Supreme Court of Ohio recently issued a decision affirming our holding with some
modification. State v. Romero, 2019-Ohio-1839, --- N.E.3d ----, 2019 WL 2111666.
{¶36} The Appellant in Romero was convicted of charges of drug trafficking and
possession. The trial court advised Romero “that a conviction of the offense to which you
are pleading guilty may have the consequence of deportation, exclusion from admission
to the United States, or denial of naturalization pursuant to the laws of the United States.” Muskingum County, Case No. CT2018-0045 17
Romero agreed that he understood, acknowledged that he was satisfied with his
representation and he was given the opportunity to ask questions. He had no questions,
entered a guilty plea and was sentenced.
{¶37} In the month following his sentencing, he was detained by United States
Immigration and Customs Enforcement and served with a notice to appear in federal court
for removal proceedings. “The notice informed Romero that he was subject to deportation
from the United States under sections 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) and 237(a)(2)(B)(i) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended, codified in 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) and
8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(B)(i). Romero's convictions were for an aggravated felony and a
violation of law related to a controlled substance, which made him subject to deportation.”
Romero, at ¶ 9.
{¶38} Romero filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea and vacate the conviction
claiming ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial court noted that it had read the R.C.
2943.031(A) advisement and that he had indicated that he understood the consequences
and agreed to enter a guilty plea. We reversed and concluded the trial court failed to
conduct the two prong analysis required by Strickland to determine an allegation of
ineffective assistance of counsel.
{¶39} The Supreme Court of Ohio accepted jurisdiction and described the
appropriate analysis as follows:
First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was
deficient. Strickland at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052; Xie at 524, 584 N.E.2d 715.
When an attorney's noncitizen client is considering a plea, the United States
Supreme Court has held that “counsel must inform her client whether his Muskingum County, Case No. CT2018-0045 18
plea carries a risk of deportation.” Padilla, 559 U.S. at 374. Given the grave
consequences of deportation, an ineffective-assistance claim is not limited
to affirmative misadvice or false information. Id. at 369-371, 130 S.Ct. 1473.
The failure to give any advice at all about possible deportation
consequences satisfies the first prong of Strickland. Id. “The severity of
deportation * * * only underscores how critical it is for counsel to inform her
noncitizen client that he faces a risk of deportation.” Id. at 373-374, 130
S.Ct. 1473.
Second, the defendant must demonstrate prejudice resulting from
counsel's deficient performance. Strickland at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052. The
defendant can show prejudice by demonstrating a “reasonable probability
that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would
have insisted on going to trial.” Hill at 59, 106 S.Ct. 366; Xie at 524, 584
Romero, at ¶¶ 15-16.
{¶40} In Romero, the trial court did not consider Romero’s ineffective assistance
of counsel claim, but instead relied upon its R.C. 2943.031 advisement to dismiss the
motion. In the case at bar, the trial court concludes Appellant failed to provide any support
for his claim and only the Department of Homeland Security may deport him after a
hearing that had not yet occurred.
{¶41} The trial court’s finding Appellant failed to provide support for his claim is
contradicted by the record. Appellant supplied an affidavit and a motion in which he
asserted his trial counsel provided no advice regarding immigration consequences arising Muskingum County, Case No. CT2018-0045 19
from a conviction. Trial counsel filed a sentencing memorandum that made no reference
to deportation or any immigration penalty, lending further support to Appellant’s
contention that he was not advised by his counsel. The failure to give any advice satisfies
the first prong of the Strickland analysis. State v. Taveras, 12th Dist. No. CA2016-06-
054, 2017-Ohio-1496, 89 N.E.3d 6, ¶ 19.
{¶42} Appellant demonstrated from facts in the record and his affidavit that he
suffered prejudice as a result of ineffective assistance of counsel. He offered his affidavit,
copy of the notice of deportation hearing, as well as affidavit of an immigration attorney
confirming Appellant was deportable, removable, and inadmissible to the United States
and would not be eligible to become a United States citizen as a proximate result of the
conviction. State v. Muhumed, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 11AP-1001, 2012-Ohio-6155, ¶ 28.
The trial court’s conclusion that Appellant may be deported only after hearing disregards
the finding of the United States Supreme Court that deportation, in the circumstances, is
“practically inevitable,” “virtually automatic” and “certain.” The identity of the agency
pursuing deportation and the conduct of the hearing prior to deportation does not alter the
“unavoidable” consequence of deportation. State v. Ayesta, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No.
101383, 2015-Ohio-1695, ¶ 7.
{¶43} Appellant has provided unrebutted evidence that he received no advice
from his counsel regarding immigration consequences as a result of pleading guilty and
that had he received that advice he would not have entered a guilty plea and, as a result
of the guilty plea faces deportation and may have been deported. The trial court’s
conclusion that Appellant failed to provide evidence in support of his assertions is not
supported by competent, credible, evidence. Muskingum County, Case No. CT2018-0045 20
{¶44} The totality of the circumstances of this case lead to a conclusion that
Appellant has suffered prejudice as a result of his trial counsel’s ineffectiveness, fulfilling
the second prong of the Strickland analysis. As noted above, once begun, deportation is
“virtually automatic” and “certain” and may have already occurred in this case. The
Supreme Court of the United States noted in Padilla “[p] reserving the client’s right to stay
in the United States may be more important to the client and any potential jail sentence.”
Padilla, supra at 1483. This right was particularly important to Appellant, because his wife
and stepdaughter remain in this country.
{¶45} The inevitability of deportation after a plea of guilty or conviction, Appellant’s
connections to the United States, the importance of avoiding deportation to remain with
his wife and stepdaughter and the lack of substantial compliance by the trial court are
factors that, when viewed from the Appellant’s perspective, are all factors supporting the
rationality of Appellant’s assertion that he would have gone to trial rather than entering a
guilty plea. Romero, 2019-Ohio-1839, ¶¶ 28-34. State v. Bozso, 8th Dist. No. 106149,
2018-Ohio-1750, 111 N.E.3d 786, ¶ 24, appeal allowed, 153 Ohio St.3d 1494, 2018-Ohio-
4092, 108 N.E.3d 1103, ¶ 24.
{¶46} We find that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to conduct a
hearing on Appellant’s motion to withdraw his plea due to ineffective assistance to
determine whether Appellant’s claims fulfilled the requirements of Strickland. Appellant’s
third assignment of error is granted. Muskingum County, Case No. CT2018-0045 21
{¶47} Appellant’s conviction is vacated and this matter is remanded to the
Muskingum County Court of Common Pleas for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
By: Baldwin, J.
Wise, John, P.J. and
Wise, Earle, J. concur.