State v. Perrin

Opinion

FILE THIS OPINION WAS FILED FOR RECORD AT 8 A.M. ON JULY 30, 2026 IN CLERK’S OFFICE SUPREME COURT, STATE OF WASHINGTON JULY 30, 2026 SARAH R. PENDLETON SUPREME COURT CLERK

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

STATE OF WASHINGTON ) No. 104816-5 ) Petitioner, ) ) v. ) En Banc ) SCOTT JOSEPH PERRIN, ) ) Filed: July 30, 2026 Respondent. ) _______________________________)

GONZÁLEZ, J.— Felony sentencing in Washington is largely governed by the

Sentencing Reform Act of 1981 (SRA), ch. 9.94A RCW. Under the SRA,

sentences are generally dictated by the seriousness of the offense, the criminal

history of the person sentenced, and the presence of statutory enhancements. See

RCW 9.94A.010, .510, .530, .535. Under certain circumstances, the sentencing

judge may depart from that standard range or impose a variety of sentencing

alternatives. RCW 9.94A.533, .650-.695. This case concerns one of those

sentencing alternatives.

On the recommendation of the 2019 Criminal Sentencing Task Force, the

Washington Legislature recently created a mental health sentencing alternative. State v. Perrin, No. 104816-5

RCW 9.94A.695. This alternative is available when, among other things, the

person being sentenced has been diagnosed with a serious mental illness, agrees to

get mental health treatment, and proposes an adequate treatment plan with willing

providers. Those convicted of serious violent offenses or sex offenses are not

eligible. Once a judge concludes a mental health sentencing alternative is

appropriate, “the court shall waive imposition of the sentence within the standard

range.” RCW 9.94A.695(4).

Decades ago, the legislature adopted the Hard Time for Armed Crime

initiative. This initiative imposes sentencing enhancements for most crimes that

involved a deadly weapon. These sentencing enhancements are generally

mandatory and generally add time to a person’s standard range sentence. RCW

9.94A.533(4).

We must decide whether a judge who imposes a mental health sentencing

alternative on a person found to have committed a felony with a deadly weapon is

required to impose confinement time on a deadly weapon sentencing enhancement.

We conclude they are not. Accordingly, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

Scott Perrin left harassing messages for a woman, destroyed Troy Brisby’s

bicycle, and assaulted Brisby with a sword. Perrin was charged with and tried for

first degree assault, malicious mischief, felony harassment, and second degree

2 State v. Perrin, No. 104816-5

theft. The jury found Perrin guilty of second degree assault with a deadly weapon,

felony harassment, and third degree theft.

Perrin moved for a mental health sentencing alternative on his felony

charges. The sentencing judge granted the motion and, consistent with that

motion, imposed 36 months of community custody. The sentencing judge did not

order any confinement time on the deadly weapon enhancement. Id.

The State appealed on several grounds, some of which are not before us.

Relevantly, the State argued that the trial court was obligated to impose

confinement time on the deadly weapon enhancement. The Court of Appeals

concluded that the SRA was ambiguous, applied the rule of lenity, and affirmed the

trial court’s decision not to impose confinement time on the deadly weapon

enhancement. State v. Perrin, 35 Wn. App. 2d 754, 768, 578 P.3d 356 (2025).

The State successfully sought review on whether the sentencing court erred

by not imposing confinement time on the deadly weapon enhancement. The

American Civil Liberties Union of Washington Foundation, Disability Rights

Washington, and the Washington Defender Association (ACLU-WA) have filed an

amicus brief in support of Perrin.

ANALYSIS

Determining whether the sentencing court was obligated to impose

confinement time on the deadly weapon finding requires us to interpret the SRA.

3 State v. Perrin, No. 104816-5

Our review of the SRA is de novo. See State v. Williams, 171 Wn.2d 474, 476, 251

P.3d 877 (2011) (citing State v. Wentz, 149 Wn.2d 342, 346, 68 P.3d 282 (2003)).

Our primary duty in interpreting statutes is to discern and implement the

legislature’s intent. Id. (citing State v. J.P., 149 Wn.2d 444, 450, 69 P.3d 318

(2003)). We begin with the plain language and the plain meaning of the statute.

J.P., 149 Wn.2d at 450. To do so, we consider all that the legislature has said in

both the particular statute and related statutes. Dep’t of Ecology v. Campbell &

Gwinn, LLC, 146 Wn.2d 1, 9, 43 P.3d 4 (2002).

We harmonize statutes whenever possible, beginning with the assumption

that the legislature does not intend to create inconsistencies. State ex rel. Peninsula

Neigh. Ass’n v. Dep’t of Transp., 142 Wn.2d 328, 342, 12 P.3d 134 (2000) (citing

State v. Bash, 130 Wn.2d 594, 602, 925 P.2d 978 (1996)). When the legislature’s

meaning and intent is unclear, we may resort to the canons of statutory

construction. See J.P., 149 Wn.2d at 451-52. Generally, when two statutory

provisions conflict, the most recently enacted prevails unless the earlier is clearer

and more specific than the latter. Id. at 452. When the statutory language is

ambiguous, we may apply the rule of lenity. State v. Lewis, 5 Wn.3d 114, 121, 571

P.3d 1245 (2025). “Under the rule of lenity, ambiguous criminal laws are strictly

construed in favor of the defendant.” Id. (citing State v. Evans, 177 Wn.2d 186,

193, 298 P.3d 724 (2013)).

4 State v. Perrin, No. 104816-5

The SRA has required weapons enhancements in some circumstances since

1983 and in almost all circumstances since 1995. LAWS OF 1983, ch. 115, § 2;

LAWS OF 1995, ch. 129, § 2(3). Most relevantly, it currently provides:

The following additional times shall be added to the standard sentence range for felony crimes . . . :

(b) One year for any felony defined under any law as a class B felony or with a statutory maximum sentence of ten years, or both, and not covered under (f) of this subsection; .... (e) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, all deadly weapon enhancements under this section are mandatory, shall be served in total confinement, and shall run consecutively to all other sentencing provisions, including other firearm or deadly weapon enhancements, for all offenses sentenced under this chapter.

RCW 9.94A.533(4). The State argues that this statute unambiguously requires the

trial court judge to impose confinement time on a deadly weapon enhancement.

Under the mental health sentencing alternative statute:

If the sentencing court determines that a sentence under this section is appropriate, the court shall waive imposition of the sentence within the standard range.

RCW 9.94A.695(4) (emphasis added).

The State contends that we should harmonize these two statutes by requiring

the defendant to serve time in confinement for the deadly weapon enhancement

followed by community custody under the mental health sentencing alternative.

Perrin essentially contends that once determined, a deadly weapon enhancement is

part of a standard range sentence and thus must be waived when a mental health 5 State v. Perrin, No. 104816-5

sentencing alternative is imposed. In the alternative, he argues that to the extent

the SRA is ambiguous on this point, we should apply the rule of lenity in his favor.

We recognize our case law has inconsistently described a deadly weapon

enhancement as both part and not part of a standard range sentence. Compare In

re Post Sentencing Rev. of Charles, 135 Wn.2d 239, 242, 955 P.2d 798 (1998) (“On

the assault in the third degree count, the court imposed a 12-month standard range

sentence plus an 18-month deadly weapon enhancement, for a total of 30

months.”), with State v. Silva-Baltazar, 125 Wn.2d 472, 475, 886 P.2d 138 (1994)

(“An enhancement increases the presumptive or standard sentence.”). However,

recent cases that have examined the question have concluded that a statutory

enhancement is part of a standard range sentence.

Our opinion in Yancey makes that clear. State v. Yancey, 193 Wn.2d 26, 34,

434 P.3d 518 (2019). Yancey concerned eligibility for a residential drug offender

sentencing alternative (DOSA). Whether a person is eligible for a residential or

prison-based DOSA turns on the midpoint of their standard range sentence. Id. at

29 (citing former RCW 9.94A.660(3) (2016)). 1 Without enhancements, the

midpoint of Yancey’s standard range sentence was low enough to qualify him for a

residential DOSA. Id. But because the “enhancement was subsumed into

1 At the time of Yancey, a DOSA was available if the midpoint was 24 months or fewer. Since then, the legislature has expanded eligibility to those whose midpoint is 26 months or fewer. LAWS OF 2020, ch. 252, § 1(3). 6 State v. Perrin, No. 104816-5

Yancey’s standard range,” Yancey’s standard range sentence was too long and he

was not eligible. Id. at 34.

Simply put, once determined, an enhancement becomes part of a person’s

standard range sentence. Id. Thus, this deadly weapon enhancement was part of

Perrin’s standard range sentence and was properly waived by the trial court.

We will briefly consider the remaining arguments. First, the State calls our

attention to cases that have described the deadly weapon enhancement as

mandatory. Suppl. Br. of Appellant at 14-16 (citing State v. Brown, 139 Wn.2d 20,

29, 983 P.2d 608 (1999), overruled in part by State v. Houston-Sconiers, 188

Wn.2d 1, 391 P.3d 409 (2017)). But none of these cases examined whether an

enhancement remained mandatory when it is part of a standard range sentence that

has been waived by the sentencing court under a sentencing alternative. These

cases do not resolve the question before us.

Second, the State emphasizes that the deadly weapon enhancement

specifically says, “Notwithstanding any other provision of law, all deadly weapon

enhancements under this section are mandatory.” RCW 9.94A.533(4)(e). It

suggests that this “notwithstanding” language clearly indicates the legislature

intended the deadly weapon enhancement to always be imposed regardless of other

statutes. We disagree.

7 State v. Perrin, No. 104816-5

We consider all that the legislature has said in the relevant and related

statutes when determining the legislature’s intent. See Campbell & Gwinn, 146

Wn.2d at 9. “Notwithstanding” is a word, like any other, that must be read in the

context of all the legislature has said on the subject. See id. We have implicitly

rejected the argument that the deadly weapon enhancement must be applied

consecutively in every case when to do so would undermine other provisions of the

SRA. For example, we found the “notwithstanding” language did not prevent a

sentencing judge from ordering firearm offenses be served concurrently under

RCW 9.94A.535 as part of an exceptional downward departure from the standard

range when the presumptive sentence was clearly excessive in light of the purpose

of the SRA. State v. McFarland, 189 Wn.2d 47, 53, 399 P.3d 1106 (2017)

(quoting In re Pers. Restraint of Mulholland, 161 Wn.2d 322, 327-28 166 P.3d 677

(2007)).

Third, the State contends the legislature is concerned about both public

safety and rehabilitation, and that these goals are best met by imposing

confinement time on the deadly weapon enhancement. It calls this provision of the

statute to our attention:

(6) For a defendant participating in this sentencing alternative, the court and correctional facility may delay the defendant’s release from total confinement in order to facilitate adherence to the defendant's treatment plan. This may include delaying release in order to: (a) Allow a defendant to transfer directly to an inpatient treatment facility or supportive housing provider; 8 State v. Perrin, No. 104816-5

(b) Ensure appropriate transportation is established and available; or (c) Release the defendant during business hours on a weekday when services are available.

RCW 9.94A.695.

While .695(6) is not directly before us (as Perrin’s sentencing judge did not

apply it), plainly read, it applies when a person is going to be transferred directly

from confinement to an inpatient treatment facility. It does not suggest that the

legislature contemplated a person receiving a mental health sentencing alternative

would generally spend time in confinement.

Fourth, the State suggests the mental health sentencing alternative is the

more general statute and the deadly weapon enhancement statute is the more

specific one. We find these statutes are so different that we cannot discern which

one is more general and which one is more specific. But even if there is a conflict

between these two provisions, we find they can be harmonized by treating the

deadly weapon enhancement, once determined, as part of the standard range

sentence that is waived once a mental health sentencing alternative is imposed.

Amicus argues that empowering a judge to waive prison time accords with

the legislative history and factual context of the mental health sentencing

alternative. We agree. Creating the mental health sentencing alternative was one

of 47 consensus recommendations of the 2019 Criminal Sentencing Task Force

established by the legislature. FINAL B. REP. ON SECOND SUBSTITUTE S.B. 5293, at 9 State v. Perrin, No. 104816-5

2, 67th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2021). The task force recommended the alternative

as an important step toward “implement[ing] public health options for addressing

conduct that endangers public safety to which mental health or cognitive

conditions or brain injuries are a factor.” WASH. STATE CRIM. SENT’G TASK FORCE,

DECEMBER 2020 REPORT 17 [https://perma.cc/7Z9L-5TDS].

The mental health sentencing alternative statute was enacted against the

backdrop of the Trueblood litigation, which the legislature has been briefed on and

regularly legislates about. See LAWS OF 2019, ch. 326, § 1 (implementing portions

of the Trueblood settlement); LAWS OF 2021, ch. 334, § 202(h) (appropriation to

partially fund Trueblood settlement); Trueblood v. Wash. State Dep’t of Soc. &

Health Servs., 101 F. Supp. 3d 1010, (W.D. Wash. 2015), vacated and remanded,

822 F.3d 1037 (9th Cir. 2016). While Trueblood directly concerned pretrial

competency and restoration services, the court observed that jails and prisons were

unsuitable places to house people with serious mental illnesses generally:

Jails are inherently punitive institutions, and are not designed or administered so as to provide for the needs of the mentally ill. A correctional environment, calibrated to provide safety and order, is incongruous with the particular needs of the mentally ill, and results in people with confirmed or suspected mental illness spending more time in solitary confinement, where their mental health further deteriorates.

101 F. Supp. 3d at 1017.

Similarly, the Office of the Corrections Ombuds has also recently observed

that mental health services in prison are overwhelmed and frequently delayed. Br. 10 State v. Perrin, No. 104816-5

of Amici Curiae ACLU-WA at 6-7 (quoting ELISABETH KINGSBURY, OFF. OF CORR.

OMBUDS, SYSTEMIC REPORT: MENTAL HEALTH ACCESS & SERVICES, 6 (June

2021)). The ACLU-WA amici brief also cites sources that suggest psychiatric

medications are difficult to obtain in prison even with an existing prescription. Id.

at 8 (citing KINGBURY, supra, at 7 n.5; KIMBERLY MOSOLF, DISABILITY RTS.

WASH., PRESCRIPTION FOR CHANGE: ACCESS TO MEDICATION FOR PEOPLE WITH

DISABILITIES IN WASHINGTON’S JAILS 11-12 (Oct. 2016)). The amici brief also

suggests that less than one-third of jails offer any form of therapeutic treatment.

Id. at 9-10 (citing KAYLEY BEBBER & KIMBERLY MOSOLF, DISABILITY RTS. WASH.

WASTED TIME: LACK OF ACCESS TO PROGRAMMING FOR INMATES WITH

DISABILITIES IN WASHINGTON’S COUNTY JAILS 13 (Feb. 2017)). Disability Rights

Washington reports that frequently, mentally ill prisoners will be placed in what

amounts to solitary confinement, exacerbating mental illness. Id. at 13 (quoting

RACHAEL SEEVERS, DISABILITY RTS. WASH., THE MANY FACES OF SOLITARY

CONFINEMENT IN WASHINGTON PRISONS 3 (Dec. 2022)). Taken together, these

sources suggest that mental health treatment is often not available in prison.

The purpose of the SRA is to

(1) Ensure that the punishment for a criminal offense is proportionate to the seriousness of the offense and the offender’s criminal history; (2) Promote respect for the law by providing punishment which is just; (3) Be commensurate with the punishment imposed on others committing similar offenses; (4) Protect the public; 11 State v. Perrin, No. 104816-5

(5) Offer the offender an opportunity to improve himself or herself; (6) Make frugal use of the state’s and local governments’ resources; and (7) Reduce the risk of reoffending by offenders in the community.

RCW 9.94A.010. Given the factual background recited above, none of these

legislative purposes are served by imposing prison time on a person who is

seriously mentally ill. This also supports our conclusion that the legislature

intended to waive prison time.

To the extent the SRA is ambiguous, the rule of lenity would lead us to the

same result. “Under the rule of lenity, ambiguous criminal laws are strictly

construed in favor of the defendant” and “we will interpret an ambiguous penal

statute adversely to the defendant only if statutory construction ‘clearly

establishes’ that the legislature intended such an interpretation.” Lewis, 5 Wn.3d at

121 (citing Evans, 177 Wn.2d at 193); Evans, 177 Wn.2d at 193 (quoting City of

Seattle v. Winebrenner, 167 Wn.2d 451, 456, 219 P.3d 686 (2009)). To the extent

there is any ambiguity here, the Court of Appeals did not err in resolving the

ambiguity in Perrin’s favor.

CONCLUSION

Under the SRA, a deadly weapon enhancement, once determined, becomes

part of the standard range sentence. The sentencing court properly waived Perrin’s

12 State v. Perrin, No. 104816-5

standard range sentence when it imposed the mental health sentencing alternative.

Accordingly, we affirm.

WE CONCUR:

_____________________________ ____________________________

_____________________________ ____________________________ Melody, J.

_____________________________ ____________________________ Angelis, J.