[Cite as State v. Perenkovich, 2026-Ohio-1344.]
IN THE FIFTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS STARK COUNTY, OHIO
STATE OF OHIO Case No. 2025CA00108
Plaintiff - Appellee Opinion and Judgment Entry
-vs- Appeal from the Stark County Court of Common Pleas, Case No. 2023CR2195 NICOLE PERENKOVICH Judgment: Affirmed Defendant - Appellant Date of Judgment Entry: April 7, 2026
BEFORE: Andrew J. King; William B. Hoffman; Craig R. Baldwin, Judges
APPEARANCES: Kyle L. Stone, Stark County Prosecuting Attorney, Kameisha J. Johnson, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Appellate Division, for Plaintiff-Appellee; Mary Catherine Corrigan, for Defendant-Appellant.
Hoffman, J.
{¶1} Defendant-appellant Nicole Perenkovich appeals the judgment entered by
the Stark County Common Pleas Court dismissing her petition for post-conviction relief
without a hearing. Plaintiff-appellee is the State of Ohio.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND CASE
{¶2} Appellant’s probation officer paid a visit to her home on September 18,
2023. Appellant was on probation as a result of 2019 convictions of aggravated trafficking
in drugs and aggravated possession of drugs. During the visit, the probation officer asked
Appellant if she had used any illegal narcotics. Appellant admitted to using methamphetamine, and she confessed she had a pipe in her purse. Because her admitted
use of methamphetamine was in violation of the conditions of her probation, a search of
her residence was triggered. The officer radioed to other officers for assistance. When
asked by the officers if anyone else was staying there, Appellant responded no. Tr. (I)
220.
{¶3} During the search of Appellant’s bedroom, police found a digital scale with
trace amounts of a crystal-like substance consistent with methamphetamine. They also
found a cellphone in the living room. After searching the home, officers searched the car
in which Appellant arrived. They found a bag containing two baggies of what was
ultimately confirmed to be 231 grams of methamphetamine, roughly 77 times the bulk
amount of 3 grams, the amount defined by statute as indicative of more than an amount
for personal use.
{¶4} Officer Jordan Shank transported Appellant to the jail. Appellant asked to
make a phone call. The officer heard Appellant say to the person on the phone, “Yeah,
they found it,” and, “Yeah, in my Malibu.” Tr. (I)179-180. In a recording of a subsequent
phone call from jail, Appellant stated she told her probation officer she needed rehab,
admitted to ownership of the methamphetamine, and said she gives it to people, “like
friends and stuff for cutting grass and stuff.” Tr. (I) 180-181. In another recorded call,
Appellant discussed multiple cellphones, and instructed an individual to delete and erase
phones and lock up accounts.
{¶5} Upon review of a cellphone found during the search, officers found
messages from Appellant directing the recipient as to where they should leave the drugs
in her vehicle, and how to secure the vehicle after making the drop. She indicated this
arrangement was preferable to hand-to-hand drug transactions or to in-person dealing. {¶6} Appellant was indicted by the Stark County Grand Jury with one count of
aggravated trafficking in drugs and aggravated possession of drugs. The case proceeded
to jury trial in the Stark County Common Pleas Court.
{¶7} Diedre Patterson, Appellant’s mother, testified at trial. She testified like
Appellant, her daughter Cecelia also had issues with drug use. She testified both Appellant
and Cecelia had access to the Chevy Malibu in September of 2023, during which time
Patterson was the registered owner of the vehicle. She testified Cecelia was living with
Appellant at the time the drugs were found. On cross-examination, Patterson admitted
she never contacted either the police or the FBI with any of the information she testified
to at trial. She testified she had not spoken to Cecelia since the search leading to the
charges against Appellant, and did not know where Cecelia was at the time of trial.
{¶8} Appellant testified her sister Cecelia lived with her in September of 2023.
Appellant stated although she was driving the Chevy Malibu on September 18, she had
not previously used it that weekend. Appellant testified she told officers the drugs
belonged to Cecelia or to Cecelia’s boyfriend, and the exhibits introduced by the State did
not come from her phone. Appellant admitted the scale and the shards of
methamphetamine found on the pipe in her purse were her drugs, but testified she was
not selling drugs. She also testified her daughter occupied the second bedroom of the
home, and Officer Shank lied when he testified the bedroom was not occupied.
{¶9} The jury found Appellant guilty of both charges, and the trial court
convicted Appellant upon the jury’s verdict. The trial court sentenced Appellant to a term
of incarceration of eight to twelve years. Appellant’s conviction and sentence were
affirmed by this Court on appeal. State v. Perenkovich, 2025-Ohio-521 (5th District). {¶10} Appellant filed a petition for post-conviction relief in the trial court
pursuant to R.C. 2953.21, alleging three grounds for relief: (1) trial counsel was ineffective
for failing to subpoena her stepsister Cecelia to testify, (2) trial counsel was ineffective for
failing to impeach Officer Swank’s testimony he found the second bedroom of Appellant’s
bedroom to be unoccupied with photographs indicating the bedroom was occupied by
Appellant’s daughter, and (3) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to impeach Officer
Swank with a cellphone bill indicating Appellant called her daughter from the back of the
police cruiser. Attached to the petition was an affidavit of Appellant’s mother; a
photocopy of an unsigned, handwritten note; screenshots of photographs from what
appears to be the Snapchat app; and a cell phone call ledger with “[Appellant’s
Daughter’s] cell” and Appellant’s cell phone number handwritten at the top. The trial
court dismissed the petition without holding an evidentiary hearing. It is from the July
22, 2025, judgment of the trial court Appellant prosecutes her appeal, assigning as error:
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERROR [SIC] BY FAILING TO GRANT THE
PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF AS TO CLAIM NUMBER ON
[SIC] WITHOUT A HEARING.
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO GRANT THE
PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF AS TO CLAIM NUMBER
TWO WITHOUT A HEARING.
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO GRANT THE
THREE WITHOUT A HEARING. Post-Conviction Relief Standard of Review
{¶11} Each of Appellant’s assignments of error alleges the trial court erred in
overruling her petition for post-conviction relief, which alleged ineffective assistance of
trial counsel, without holding a hearing, and are all therefore governed by the same
standard of review.
{¶12} A petition for post-conviction relief is a collateral civil attack on a criminal
judgment, not an appeal of the judgment. State v. Lenard, 2020-Ohio-1502, ¶ 8 (8th
Dist.), citing State v. Steffen, 1994-Ohio-111. To prevail on a petition for post-conviction
relief, a defendant must establish a violation of his constitutional rights which renders the
judgment of conviction void or voidable. R.C. 2953.21. A petition for post-conviction relief
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[Cite as State v. Perenkovich, 2026-Ohio-1344.]
IN THE FIFTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS STARK COUNTY, OHIO
STATE OF OHIO Case No. 2025CA00108
Plaintiff - Appellee Opinion and Judgment Entry
-vs- Appeal from the Stark County Court of Common Pleas, Case No. 2023CR2195 NICOLE PERENKOVICH Judgment: Affirmed Defendant - Appellant Date of Judgment Entry: April 7, 2026
BEFORE: Andrew J. King; William B. Hoffman; Craig R. Baldwin, Judges
APPEARANCES: Kyle L. Stone, Stark County Prosecuting Attorney, Kameisha J. Johnson, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Appellate Division, for Plaintiff-Appellee; Mary Catherine Corrigan, for Defendant-Appellant.
Hoffman, J.
{¶1} Defendant-appellant Nicole Perenkovich appeals the judgment entered by
the Stark County Common Pleas Court dismissing her petition for post-conviction relief
without a hearing. Plaintiff-appellee is the State of Ohio.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND CASE
{¶2} Appellant’s probation officer paid a visit to her home on September 18,
2023. Appellant was on probation as a result of 2019 convictions of aggravated trafficking
in drugs and aggravated possession of drugs. During the visit, the probation officer asked
Appellant if she had used any illegal narcotics. Appellant admitted to using methamphetamine, and she confessed she had a pipe in her purse. Because her admitted
use of methamphetamine was in violation of the conditions of her probation, a search of
her residence was triggered. The officer radioed to other officers for assistance. When
asked by the officers if anyone else was staying there, Appellant responded no. Tr. (I)
220.
{¶3} During the search of Appellant’s bedroom, police found a digital scale with
trace amounts of a crystal-like substance consistent with methamphetamine. They also
found a cellphone in the living room. After searching the home, officers searched the car
in which Appellant arrived. They found a bag containing two baggies of what was
ultimately confirmed to be 231 grams of methamphetamine, roughly 77 times the bulk
amount of 3 grams, the amount defined by statute as indicative of more than an amount
for personal use.
{¶4} Officer Jordan Shank transported Appellant to the jail. Appellant asked to
make a phone call. The officer heard Appellant say to the person on the phone, “Yeah,
they found it,” and, “Yeah, in my Malibu.” Tr. (I)179-180. In a recording of a subsequent
phone call from jail, Appellant stated she told her probation officer she needed rehab,
admitted to ownership of the methamphetamine, and said she gives it to people, “like
friends and stuff for cutting grass and stuff.” Tr. (I) 180-181. In another recorded call,
Appellant discussed multiple cellphones, and instructed an individual to delete and erase
phones and lock up accounts.
{¶5} Upon review of a cellphone found during the search, officers found
messages from Appellant directing the recipient as to where they should leave the drugs
in her vehicle, and how to secure the vehicle after making the drop. She indicated this
arrangement was preferable to hand-to-hand drug transactions or to in-person dealing. {¶6} Appellant was indicted by the Stark County Grand Jury with one count of
aggravated trafficking in drugs and aggravated possession of drugs. The case proceeded
to jury trial in the Stark County Common Pleas Court.
{¶7} Diedre Patterson, Appellant’s mother, testified at trial. She testified like
Appellant, her daughter Cecelia also had issues with drug use. She testified both Appellant
and Cecelia had access to the Chevy Malibu in September of 2023, during which time
Patterson was the registered owner of the vehicle. She testified Cecelia was living with
Appellant at the time the drugs were found. On cross-examination, Patterson admitted
she never contacted either the police or the FBI with any of the information she testified
to at trial. She testified she had not spoken to Cecelia since the search leading to the
charges against Appellant, and did not know where Cecelia was at the time of trial.
{¶8} Appellant testified her sister Cecelia lived with her in September of 2023.
Appellant stated although she was driving the Chevy Malibu on September 18, she had
not previously used it that weekend. Appellant testified she told officers the drugs
belonged to Cecelia or to Cecelia’s boyfriend, and the exhibits introduced by the State did
not come from her phone. Appellant admitted the scale and the shards of
methamphetamine found on the pipe in her purse were her drugs, but testified she was
not selling drugs. She also testified her daughter occupied the second bedroom of the
home, and Officer Shank lied when he testified the bedroom was not occupied.
{¶9} The jury found Appellant guilty of both charges, and the trial court
convicted Appellant upon the jury’s verdict. The trial court sentenced Appellant to a term
of incarceration of eight to twelve years. Appellant’s conviction and sentence were
affirmed by this Court on appeal. State v. Perenkovich, 2025-Ohio-521 (5th District). {¶10} Appellant filed a petition for post-conviction relief in the trial court
pursuant to R.C. 2953.21, alleging three grounds for relief: (1) trial counsel was ineffective
for failing to subpoena her stepsister Cecelia to testify, (2) trial counsel was ineffective for
failing to impeach Officer Swank’s testimony he found the second bedroom of Appellant’s
bedroom to be unoccupied with photographs indicating the bedroom was occupied by
Appellant’s daughter, and (3) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to impeach Officer
Swank with a cellphone bill indicating Appellant called her daughter from the back of the
police cruiser. Attached to the petition was an affidavit of Appellant’s mother; a
photocopy of an unsigned, handwritten note; screenshots of photographs from what
appears to be the Snapchat app; and a cell phone call ledger with “[Appellant’s
Daughter’s] cell” and Appellant’s cell phone number handwritten at the top. The trial
court dismissed the petition without holding an evidentiary hearing. It is from the July
22, 2025, judgment of the trial court Appellant prosecutes her appeal, assigning as error:
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERROR [SIC] BY FAILING TO GRANT THE
PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF AS TO CLAIM NUMBER ON
[SIC] WITHOUT A HEARING.
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO GRANT THE
PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF AS TO CLAIM NUMBER
TWO WITHOUT A HEARING.
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO GRANT THE
THREE WITHOUT A HEARING. Post-Conviction Relief Standard of Review
{¶11} Each of Appellant’s assignments of error alleges the trial court erred in
overruling her petition for post-conviction relief, which alleged ineffective assistance of
trial counsel, without holding a hearing, and are all therefore governed by the same
standard of review.
{¶12} A petition for post-conviction relief is a collateral civil attack on a criminal
judgment, not an appeal of the judgment. State v. Lenard, 2020-Ohio-1502, ¶ 8 (8th
Dist.), citing State v. Steffen, 1994-Ohio-111. To prevail on a petition for post-conviction
relief, a defendant must establish a violation of his constitutional rights which renders the
judgment of conviction void or voidable. R.C. 2953.21. A petition for post-conviction relief
is a means to reach constitutional issues which would otherwise be impossible to reach
because the evidence supporting those issues is outside the record of the petitioner's
criminal conviction. State v. Brown, 2025-Ohio-274, ¶ 37 (8th Dist.).
{¶13} R.C. 2953.21, which governs post-conviction relief, does "not expressly
mandate a hearing for every post-conviction relief petition and, therefore, a hearing is not
automatically required." State v. Jackson, 64 Ohio St.2d 107, 110 (1980). Rather, in
addressing a petition for post-conviction relief, a trial court plays a gatekeeping role as
to whether a defendant will receive a hearing. State v. Gondor, 2006-Ohio-6679, ¶ 51.
"Pursuant to R.C. 2953.21(C), a trial court properly denies a defendant's petition for
postconviction relief without holding an evidentiary hearing where the petition, the
supporting affidavits, the documentary evidence, the files, and the records do not
demonstrate that petitioner set forth sufficient operative facts to establish substantive
grounds for relief." State v. Calhoun, 1999-Ohio-102, paragraph two of the syllabus;
Gondor at ¶ 51. The decision to deny a petition for post-conviction relief without holding an evidentiary hearing is left to the sound discretion of the trial court. State v.
Lichtenwalter, 2021-Ohio-1394 (5th Dist.). An abuse of discretion means a decision is
unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217
(1983).
{¶14} In each of her claims for post-conviction relief, Appellant alleged her trial
counsel was ineffective. A properly licensed attorney is presumed competent. State v.
Hamblin, 37 Ohio St.3d 153 (1988). Therefore, in order to prevail on a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel, Appellant must show counsel's performance fell below an objective
standard of reasonable representation and but for counsel’s error, the result of the
proceedings would have been different. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984);
State v. Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d 136 (1989). In other words, Appellant must show
counsel’s conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that
the trial cannot be relied upon as having produced a just result. Id.
{¶15} It is pursuant to these standards we review Appellant’s three assignments
of error.
I.
{¶16} In her first assignment of error, Appellant argues the trial court erred in
denying her an evidentiary hearing on her claim trial counsel was ineffective for failing to
subpoena her stepsister, Cecelia, to testify at trial. We disagree.
{¶17} Attached to Appellant’s petition for post-conviction relief was an affidavit of
Appellant’s mother, Deidre Patterson. In her affidavit, Patterson averred she received a
letter from Cecelia after Appellant was charged in this case. Patterson stated the letter
indicated the drugs belonged to Kevin, Cecelia’s boyfriend. She averred she gave the letter
to Appellant’s trial counsel, but Cecelia was not called as a witness even though Appellant wanted Cecelia to be called to testify. Patterson stated since Appellant was convicted,
Cecelia had gotten sober and cut ties with the family. Patterson stated in the past Cecelia
told her the drugs belonged to Kevin; however, now Cecelia has refused to admit her part
in this matter.
{¶18} A photocopy of a letter is also attached to the petition. Patterson’s affidavit
does not identify this letter as the letter Patterson claimed she received from Cecelia and
gave to trial counsel. In the first line, the letter purports to be from Cecelia, although the
letter is not signed at the end, and is not a sworn affidavit from Cecelia. Further, the letter
does not state definitively the drugs belonged to Kevin, but rather states it is a possibility
the drugs were left in the car by Kevin.
{¶19} We find Appellant has not demonstrated a reasonable probability of a
chance in the outcome had counsel called Cecelia to testify. The petition did not include
a sworn affidavit from Cecelia stating if called to testify, she would have testified the drugs
belonged to Kevin. Patterson’s affidavit does not identify the letter attached to the
petition as the letter she received from Cecelia. Even assuming arguendo the letter was
properly authenticated, the letter states “possibly” Kevin left the drugs in the car, and does
not affirmatively state the drugs belonged to Kevin. Both Patterson and Appellant
testified at trial that Appellant and Cecelia were both using the car. Appellant testified
she told the police the drugs belonged to either Cecelia or Kevin. Appellant has not
demonstrated a reasonable probability of a change in the outcome had Cecelia also been
called to testify there is a possibility the drugs belong to Kevin. We find Appellant has not
demonstrated ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failing to subpoena Cecelia as a
witness, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying her an evidentiary
hearing on this claim. {¶20} The first assignment of error is overruled.
II.
{¶21} In her second assignment of error, Appellant argues the trial court erred in
denying her an evidentiary hearing on her claim counsel was ineffective for failing to
impeach Officer Shank’s testimony the second bedroom in Appellant’s home was
unoccupied with photographs from Snapchat of Appellant’s daughter occupying the
room. We disagree.
{¶22} In her affidavit, Patterson stated Appellant’s daughter had her own room in
Appellant’s home and would send Patterson Snapchat photos of herself in the room.
Photocopies of screenshots of what appear to be Snapchat photos are attached to the
petition, but again are not identified in Patterson’s affidavit as the photographs she
received from Appellant’s daughter.
{¶23} Assuming arguendo the photographs were properly authenticated, the
photographs do not demonstrate the room was occupied. The photographs are too dark
to determine what is depicted, with the exception of several photographs in which a dog
is clearly visible. Further, Patterson does not state in her affidavit that she provided these
photographs to trial counsel to use as impeachment of Officer Shank’s testimony.
{¶24} Even if the photographs were of sufficient quality to demonstrate the second
bedroom was occupied, we find no prejudice from counsel’s failure to impeach Officer
Shank’s testimony concerning the occupation of the bedroom. Appellant argues the State
was permitted to paint Appellant’s home as a “trap house” by virtue of the unoccupied
second bedroom. Appellant points to no place in the record where the State argued the
home was a trap house, and Officer Shank did not testify he believed the home to be a trap house. Rather, he merely testified he did not search the second bedroom because it was
unoccupied.
{¶25} We find Appellant did not demonstrate counsel was ineffective, and the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in denying her an evidentiary hearing on this issue.
{¶26} The second assignment of error is overruled.
III.
{¶27} In her third assignment of error, Appellant argues the trial court erred in
failing to grant her an evidentiary hearing on her claim trial counsel was ineffective for
failing to impeach Officer Shank’s testimony concerning the phone call Appellant made
while he transported her to the jail. We disagree.
{¶28} In her affidavit, Patterson stated she is the account holder for Appellant’s
daughter’s cellphone. She stated the cellphone records showed Appellant called her
daughter from the back of the cruiser. Attached to the petition is what appears to be an
account of a cellphone, with handwritten notations indicating this account is for
Appellant’s daughter’s phone, and listing Appellant’s cellphone number, with an arrow
pointing to a call. Again, Patterson’s affidavit does not identify this exhibit, and does not
demonstrate counsel was aware of the cellphone bill.
{¶29} The trial court made the following findings regarding the cellphone bill:
Finally, Perenkovich accuses counsel of being ineffective because he
did not impeach “Officer Shank’s testimony about statements he heard
Perenkovich make while he was transporting her to jail.” Perenkovich
seems to be making the case that the illegible phone bill would show that
Perenkovich made a call to her daughter’s cell phone while she was in the police cruiser. Shank acknowledged that the individual answering the call
was an unknown subject. Even if counsel had competent evidence to show
that she called her daughter’s phone number, and even if counsel had been
made aware of the evidence, it still could not have been used to impeach
Office [sic] Shank’s testimony. Officer Shank could not have contradicted
himself because he referred to the person on the other end of the call as an
“unknown caller.”
{¶30} Judgment entry, July 22, 2025, p. 4.
{¶31} We agree with the reasoning of the trial court. Appellant argues the
cellphone bill would demonstrate the call was made to Appellant’s daughter, and not to
“any ancillary drug acquaintances.” Brief of Appellant, p. 13. However, Officer Shank did
not testify the call was made to ancillary drug acquaintances. The officer testified as to
what he heard on the call, which he stated was made to an unknown caller. We find
Appellant has not demonstrated ineffective assistance of counsel, and the trial court did
not abuse its discretion in denying Appellant an evidentiary hearing on this claim.
{¶32} The third assignment of error is overruled. {¶33} For the reasons stated in our accompanying Opinion, the judgment of the
Stark County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
{¶34} Costs to Appellant.
By: Hoffman, J.
King, P.J. and
Baldwin, J. concur.