1 This memorandum opinion was not selected for publication in the New Mexico Reports. Please see 2 Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of unpublished memorandum opinions. Please 3 also note that this electronic memorandum opinion may contain computer-generated errors or other 4 deviations from the official paper version filed by the Court of Appeals and does not include the 5 filing date. 6 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO
7 STATE OF NEW MEXICO, 8 Plaintiff-Appellee, 9 v. NO. 30,071 10 LARRY PEREA, 11 Defendant-Appellant.
12 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF BERNALILLO COUNTY 13 Robert M. “Bob” Schwartz, District Judge
14 Gary K. King, Attorney General 15 Santa Fe, NM
16 for Appellee
17 Hugh W. Dangler, Chief Public Defender 18 Kathleen T. Baldridge, Assistant Appellate Defender 19 Santa Fe, NM
20 for Appellant 21 MEMORANDUM OPINION 22 FRY, Chief Judge. 23 Defendant appeals his conviction for one count of trafficking controlled 24 substances pursuant to his conditional plea which reserves the right to appeal the 25 denial of his motion to suppress. We proposed to affirm in a notice of proposed
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1 summary disposition, and Defendant has filed a timely memorandum in opposition. 2 Remaining unpersuaded by Defendant’s memorandum, we affirm. 3 Defendant contends that the district court erred in denying his motion to 4 suppress because the stop was pretextual and Officer Miller did not have reasonable 5 suspicion to stop the vehicle based on information provided by Officer Simballa. 6 [MIO 1; DS 5] We review the denial of a motion to suppress as a mixed question of 7 fact and law. State v. Gutierrez, 2004-NMCA-081, ¶ 4, 136 N.M. 18, 94 P.3d 18. We 8 determine whether the law was correctly applied to the facts and view “the facts in the 9 light most favorable to the prevailing party.” State v. Cline, 1998-NMCA-154, ¶ 6, 10 126 N.M. 77, 966 P.2d 785; see State v. Jason L., 2000-NMSC-018, ¶ 10, 129 N.M. 11 119, 2 P.3d 856. We will employ all reasonable presumptions in support of the 12 district court’s ruling. See id. ¶ 11. 13 A stop must be supported by reasonable suspicion developed before making the 14 stop. State v. Williams, 2006-NMCA-062, ¶ 22, 139 N.M. 578, 136 P.3d 579. A 15 reasonable suspicion is a particularized suspicion based on the totality of the 16 circumstances that the individual is breaking or has broken the law. See Jason L., 17 2000-NMSC-018, ¶ 20. 18 We briefly review the testimony introduced at the suppression hearing. Officers 19 appeared at a motel room to arrest James Walker (JW), and in exchange for not being
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1 arrested, JW offered to set up a narcotics buy. [MIO 1-2; RP 114-115] JW told 2 Officer Simballa he would set up the buy from Defendant and a female named 3 Darlene. [MIO 2; RP 115] JW made a phone call to a man later identified as 4 Defendant, while Simballa listened in on the phone conversation. [MIO 2; RP 116] 5 JW told Defendant that he needed a “bill fifty” meaning $150 worth of cocaine. [RP 6 116] The man agreed to meet with JW after he “[woke] up his old lady.” [MIO 2; RP 7 116] Defendant asked JW to call him back and during the second call, JW spoke with 8 a woman identified as Darlene. [MIO 2; RP 116] Darlene told JW to meet her at the 9 McDonalds located at Tramway and Central, and he agreed. [MIO 2; RP 116] 10 Simballa learned from JW that the two persons would be in a white older model full 11 size van, possibly a Ford. [MIO 2; RP 102, 115] 12 In continuing the investigation, Officer Simballa spoke with Officer Miller and 13 told Officer Miller to look for an older model white Ford van registered to Darlene 14 with a possible last name of Castillo [MIO 2-3; RP 116] The van would be traveling 15 east on Central Avenue between Burma and Juan Tabo. [RP 101, 116] Officer Miller 16 then began patrolling Central between Juan Tabo and Tramway and spotted a white 17 Ford van traveling east on Central. [MIO 3; RP 102] Officer Miller got behind the 18 van and ran the license plate which came back registered to Darlene Castillo. [MIO 19 3; RP 102; 117] He followed the van into the McDonald’s parking lot on Central at
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1 Tramway after observing the driver change lanes without signaling and noting that the 2 license plate lamp was not lit. [MIO 3; RP 102, 117] 3 After stopping the vehicle, Officer Miller approached and learned that the driver 4 was Darlene Castillo and the passenger, Defendant, identified himself to Officer 5 Miller as Larry. [RP 102] Defendant was fumbling with his hands and bending over 6 at the waist. [MIO 3] Officer Miller ordered him out of the vehicle, and Castillo 7 consented to a search of the vehicle. [MIO 3] A drug pipe was found in the van, and 8 drugs were found on Defendant’s person. [MIO 3] Defendant was charged with 9 trafficking cocaine, conspiracy to traffic, tampering with evidence and unlawful 10 carrying of a deadly weapon. [MIO 4; RP 2-4] 11 At the hearing, Officer Miller testified that the only reason he stopped the 12 vehicle was because Simballa told him to keep an eye out. [MIO 8] He testified that 13 he would have stopped the van even without the traffic violation because he believed 14 he had reasonable suspicion of drug trafficking. [MIO 8; RP 117] 15 Defendant contends that the stop was illegal because it was pretextual pursuant 16 to State v. Ochoa, 2009-NMCA-002, 146 N.M. 32, 206 P.3d 143 (filed 2008), cert 17 quashed, 2009-NMCERT-011, 147 N.M. 464, 225 P.2d 794. [MIO 8-10] “A 18 pretextual traffic stop is a detention supportable by reasonable suspicion or probable 19 cause to believe that a traffic offense has occurred, but is executed as a pretense to
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1 pursue a ‘hunch,’ a different more serious investigative agenda for which there is no 2 reasonable suspicion or probable cause.” Ochoa, 2009-NMCA-002, ¶ 25. 3 In our notice of proposed summary disposition, we proposed to affirm because, 4 even though Officer Miller had reason to believe that a traffic offense occurred, the 5 stop was executed to pursue a “more serious investigative agenda.” Id. Officer Miller 6 testified that he stopped the van to pursue an investigation, or to assist in the 7 investigation, of possible drug trafficking. Therefore, we disagree that the stop was 8 improperly based on the pretextual reason that Officer Miller observed the driver 9 committing a traffic violation. [MIO 8-9] 10 In our notice, we also proposed to hold that Officer Miller’s decision to stop 11 and investigate Defendant was justified because the information provided by JW and 12 relayed to Officer Miller by Officer Simballa was sufficiently reliable to warrant 13 Officer Miller’s reasonable suspicion that a drug crime “was being or was about to be 14 committed.” State v. Contreras, 2003-NMCA-129, ¶ 7, 134 N.M. 503, 79 P.3d 1111. 15 We noted that JW identified the make and model of the car involved in the alleged 16 narcotics buy, identified the location of the drug buy, identified the driver of the van, 17 and informed officers that the van was registered to Darlene Castillo. To corroborate 18 that tip, Officer Miller followed the car to the specified location and ran a license 19 check to determine that the van was indeed registered to Darlene Castillo. We
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1 propose to hold that this is sufficient to provide Officer Miller with a reasonable 2 suspicion to stop the van for suspected drug activity. See State v. Ochoa, 3 2008-NMSC-023, ¶ 20, 143 N.M. 749, 182 P.3d 130 (stating that “where the officer 4 independently confirms the third-party’s information about a defendant—including 5 the defendant’s description or actions—the officer may reasonably rely on that 6 information”); State v. Pallor, 1996-NMCA-083, ¶ 12 , 122 N.M. 232, 923 P.2d 599 7 (rejecting the defendant’s claim of pretext and holding that the officers “were aware 8 of articulable facts which would lead to a reasonable suspicion that [the d]efendant 9 was in possession of illegal narcotics and could have made the stop on that basis”). 10 In his memorandum in opposition, Defendant has failed to persuade us that our 11 analysis or proposed disposition is in error. Moreover, he has failed to make any new 12 arguments warranting a reconsideration of whether the motion to suppress should 13 have been granted. [MIO 6-10] 14 CONCLUSION 15 For the foregoing reasons as well as those set forth in our notice of proposed 16 disposition, we affirm the district court’s decision to deny Defendant’s motion to 17 suppress and affirm Defendant’s conviction. 18 IT IS SO ORDERED.
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2 CYNTHIA A. FRY, Chief Judge
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1 WE CONCUR:
2 3 JAMES J. WECHSLER, Judge
4 5 ROBERT E. ROBLES, Judge