State v. Peals, Unpublished Decision (2-10-2006)

2006 Ohio 591
CourtOhio Court of Appeals
DecidedFebruary 10, 2006
DocketCourt of Appeals No. L-03-1355, Trial Court No. CR-2002-3437.
StatusUnpublished

This text of 2006 Ohio 591 (State v. Peals, Unpublished Decision (2-10-2006)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Ohio Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State v. Peals, Unpublished Decision (2-10-2006), 2006 Ohio 591 (Ohio Ct. App. 2006).

Opinion

DECISION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY
{¶ 1} This case is before the court on appeal from the November 25, 2003 judgment entry of the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas wherein, defendant-appellant, Earnest L. Peals, was found guilty by the court of aggravated murder and kidnapping. For the following reasons, we affirm the trial court's decision.

{¶ 2} On December 1, 2002, at approximately 5:00 a.m., the victim, L.C. Pittman, was found lying on the sidewalk on Vance Street in Toledo, Lucas County, Ohio; Pittman had been shot several times and was deceased. That same day, appellant, Kevin Jordan, and Dario Williamson were arrested in connection with the murder. One month later, appellant's brother, Michael Peals, was arrested in Arkansas as a murder suspect.

{¶ 3} On December 6, 2002, appellant and Michael Peals were indicted on one count of aggravated murder, in violation of R.C.2903.01(B), and one count of kidnapping, in violation of R.C.2905.01(A)(3). Each count included a gun specification. Co-defendants Williamson and Jordan were each indicted on one count of kidnapping, in violation of R.C. 2905.01(A)(3). On January 10, 2003, appellant entered a not guilty plea. Appellant's co-defendants entered into plea agreements with the state in exchange for their testimony against appellant. Williamson and Jordan entered pleas to kidnapping and Michael Peals entered a plea to murder and kidnapping with gun specifications.

{¶ 4} Appellant's bench trial commenced on November 17, 2003, and he was found guilty of both charges on November 19, 2003. For the aggravated murder conviction, appellant was given a life sentence with the possibility of parole after 20 years. As to kidnapping, appellant was sentenced to nine years of imprisonment to be served concurrently with the murder sentence. The two firearms specifications merged for a total of three years. Thus, appellant was sentenced to life imprisonment with the possibility of parole after 23 years. This appeal followed.

{¶ 5} Appellant raises the following assignment of error:

{¶ 6} "Assignment of error number one:

{¶ 7} "The verdict was unsupported by and against the manifest weight of the evidence adduced at trial."

{¶ 8} In his sole assignment of error, appellant maintains that his convictions for aggravated murder and kidnapping were against the manifest weight of the evidence. We agree with the state's observation that although appellant's stated assignment of error is a manifest weight of the evidence claim, he also appears to be arguing that the convictions were insufficient as a matter of law. In fact, appellant cites language from State v.Issa, 93 Ohio St.3d 49, 2001-Ohio-240, which quotes the sufficiency test language in State v. Jenks (1991),61 Ohio St.3d 259, paragraph two of the syllabus. Accordingly, following the state's example we, too, will analyze appellant's arguments under the manifest weight and sufficiency standards.

{¶ 9} The Ohio Supreme Court has ruled that "[t]he legal concepts of sufficiency of the evidence and weight of the evidence are both quantitatively and qualitatively different."State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 386, 1997-Ohio-52. "Sufficiency" pertains to a question of law as to whether the evidence is legally adequate, as to all the elements of the crime, to support a jury verdict. Id. Reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction, an appellate court must examine "the evidence admitted at trial to determine whether such evidence, if believed, would convince the average mind of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d at paragraph two of the syllabus. However, under a manifest weight standard, an appellate court sits as the "thirteenth juror" and may disagree with the factfinder's resolution of the conflicting testimony. Thompkins at 387. The appellate court, "`reviewing the entire record, weighs the evidence and all reasonable inferences, considers the credibility of witnesses and determines whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the jury clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered.'" Id., quoting State v. Martin (1983), 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175. While an appellate court may determine that a judgment is sustained by sufficient evidence, it may still conclude that the judgment is against the weight of the evidence. (Citations omitted.) Id.

{¶ 10} Appellant was convicted of aggravated murder, in violation of R.C. 2903.01(B). To support this conviction the state had to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that appellant purposely caused the death of Pittman "while committing or attempting to commit, or while fleeing immediately after committing or attempting to commit, kidnapping * * *."

{¶ 11} The offense of kidnapping, in violation of R.C.2905.01(A)(3), provides that "[n]o person, by force, threat, or deception * * * shall remove another from the place where the other person is found or restrain the liberty of the other person * * * [t]o terrorize, or to inflict serious physical harm on the victim or another[.]"

{¶ 12} At the November 17, 2003 trial in this matter, the basic facts regarding the events of November 30 to December 1, 2002, were as follows. At approximately 10:00 or 11:00 p.m. on November 30, 2002, appellant, Michael Peals, Dario Williamson, Kevin Jordan and the Peals' brothers' girlfriends and young children (presumably asleep) were in an apartment at 508 Hawley Street in Toledo, Lucas County, Ohio, where they were drinking alcohol, smoking marijuana, and taking ecstasy tablets. At around 2:00-2:30 a.m., the four men decided to go to an after-hours nightclub. After being at the nightclub a little over one hour, Michael Peals received a call from his girlfriend indicating that they had just been robbed at the apartment. Michael and the three other men immediately left the club and returned to the apartment.

{¶ 13} Following their return to 508 Hawley, they discovered that the individuals responsible for the theft of crack cocaine had left the location. The scene then became chaotic. Appellant and his brother each acquired a firearm; appellant, a .380 caliber semiautomatic handgun, Michael, a .22 caliber revolver. Appellant, in a display of anger, fired his weapon in the apartment. The four then learned that the victim, L.C. Pittman, either knew the whereabouts of the individuals or was involved in the robbery.

{¶ 14} Just as the four were outside preparing to leave in search of the robbers, they discovered L.C. Pittman walking up the alley toward the apartment building.

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Related

State v. Martin
485 N.E.2d 717 (Ohio Court of Appeals, 1983)
State v. Jenks
574 N.E.2d 492 (Ohio Supreme Court, 1991)
State v. Thompkins
678 N.E.2d 541 (Ohio Supreme Court, 1997)
State v. Thompkins
1997 Ohio 52 (Ohio Supreme Court, 1997)
State ex rel. Sharif v. McDonnell
2001 Ohio 240 (Ohio Supreme Court, 2001)

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Bluebook (online)
2006 Ohio 591, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-v-peals-unpublished-decision-2-10-2006-ohioctapp-2006.