Opinion
SPEAR, J.
The defendant appeals from the judgments1 of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of six counts of risk of injury to a child in violation of General Statutes [606] § 53-21, five counts of sexual assault in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-71, burglary in the third degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-103 and larceny in the sixth degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-125b. She claims that the trial court (1) improperly failed to address defense counsel’s motion to withdraw, or, alternatively, abused its discretion by, sub silentio, denying the motion and (2) deprived the defendant of a fair trial by (a) threatening defense counsel with contempt in the presence of the jury, (b) chastising and disparaging defense counsel to such a degree that he could not effectively represent the defendant and (c) improperly instructing the jury during the trial in a way that bolstered the testimony of the victim. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.
The jury reasonably could have found the following facts. The defendant, a school bus driver, was twenty-six years old at the time of these offenses. The victim was fifteen years old and regularly rode the bus that the defendant operated. Between February and June of 1995, the defendant engaged in sexual activity with the victim and gave the victim beer and crack cocaine. In addition, the defendant entered the victim’s home without permission and took certain items from the victim’s room. This appeal follows the defendant’s conviction on all of the charges.
I
A
The defendant first claims that the trial court failed to address her counsel’s motion to withdraw. During a lengthy colloquy between the defense counsel and the trial court, defense counsel complained that he did not feel that he could effectively represent the defendant because the trial court had threatened to hold him in contempt. After the state’s attorney mentioned that the trial court should address defense counsel's statement [607] that he could not be an effective attorney, defense counsel orally moved to withdraw. The trial court’s response was, “Move on. Bring the jury out.”
Our Supreme Court has stated that when a trial court decides not to consider motions filed with it, it is “the functional equivalent of a denial of those motions.” Ahneman v. Ahneman, 243 Conn. 471, 480, 706 A.2d 960 (1998). Pursuant to the rationale of Ahneman, we conclude that the trial court’s failure to act was in fact a denial of the oral motion to withdraw.
B
The defendant next asserts that the denial of the motion to withdraw was an abuse of the trial court’s discretion. We disagree.2
“ ‘The standard when reviewing a denial of a request for alternate counsel [and of a motion to withdraw] is whether the trial court abused its discretion in determining that a factual basis did not exist for granting the request.’ ” State v. Morico, 14 Conn. App. 140, 144, 539 A.2d 1033, cert. denied, 208 Conn. 812, 546 A.2d 281 (1988). Practice Book § 3-103 requires that a trial court must find good cause in order to grant a motion to withdraw. The cause claimed here is that the trial court intimidated defense counsel into ineffectiveness by threatening him with contempt. Counsel also stated that he felt that he was not being allowed [608] to state his reasons for asserting objections and was afraid to object because he might be held in contempt and placed in custody. In support of this claim, the defendant provides a lengthy excerpt of a colloquy between defense counsel and the court in which the defense counsel expresses his fear of being held in contempt and his belief that the trial court had improperly rendered him ineffective.
The defendant offers not a single example of a failure to object or a failure to do anything because of the claimed intimidation. We have said, in the context of a claim of ineffective assistance, that simply mouthing the words “ineffective assistance” of counsel is not sufficient to establish the claim. Blakeney v. Commissioner of Correction, 47 Conn. App. 568, 584, 706 A.2d 989, cert. denied, 244 Conn. 913, 713 A.2d 830 (1998). We know of no authority that supports the defendant’s assertion that a mere claim by counsel that he felt intimidated by the trial court is sufficient to warrant a new trial.
We have reviewed the transcript and conclude that the trial court properly admonished defense counsel about his improper and gratuitous comments during jury selection and during evidence. Defense counsel repeatedly disregarded those admonitions and the trial court acted within its discretion in warning him that, if he continued to conduct himself improperly, the trial court would hold him in contempt. Despite that warning, the trial court repeatedly told defense counsel that he had a right to object to questions and that the court was concerned only with his improper comments on the evidence.
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Opinion
SPEAR, J.
The defendant appeals from the judgments1 of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of six counts of risk of injury to a child in violation of General Statutes [606] § 53-21, five counts of sexual assault in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-71, burglary in the third degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-103 and larceny in the sixth degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-125b. She claims that the trial court (1) improperly failed to address defense counsel’s motion to withdraw, or, alternatively, abused its discretion by, sub silentio, denying the motion and (2) deprived the defendant of a fair trial by (a) threatening defense counsel with contempt in the presence of the jury, (b) chastising and disparaging defense counsel to such a degree that he could not effectively represent the defendant and (c) improperly instructing the jury during the trial in a way that bolstered the testimony of the victim. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.
The jury reasonably could have found the following facts. The defendant, a school bus driver, was twenty-six years old at the time of these offenses. The victim was fifteen years old and regularly rode the bus that the defendant operated. Between February and June of 1995, the defendant engaged in sexual activity with the victim and gave the victim beer and crack cocaine. In addition, the defendant entered the victim’s home without permission and took certain items from the victim’s room. This appeal follows the defendant’s conviction on all of the charges.
I
A
The defendant first claims that the trial court failed to address her counsel’s motion to withdraw. During a lengthy colloquy between the defense counsel and the trial court, defense counsel complained that he did not feel that he could effectively represent the defendant because the trial court had threatened to hold him in contempt. After the state’s attorney mentioned that the trial court should address defense counsel's statement [607] that he could not be an effective attorney, defense counsel orally moved to withdraw. The trial court’s response was, “Move on. Bring the jury out.”
Our Supreme Court has stated that when a trial court decides not to consider motions filed with it, it is “the functional equivalent of a denial of those motions.” Ahneman v. Ahneman, 243 Conn. 471, 480, 706 A.2d 960 (1998). Pursuant to the rationale of Ahneman, we conclude that the trial court’s failure to act was in fact a denial of the oral motion to withdraw.
B
The defendant next asserts that the denial of the motion to withdraw was an abuse of the trial court’s discretion. We disagree.2
“ ‘The standard when reviewing a denial of a request for alternate counsel [and of a motion to withdraw] is whether the trial court abused its discretion in determining that a factual basis did not exist for granting the request.’ ” State v. Morico, 14 Conn. App. 140, 144, 539 A.2d 1033, cert. denied, 208 Conn. 812, 546 A.2d 281 (1988). Practice Book § 3-103 requires that a trial court must find good cause in order to grant a motion to withdraw. The cause claimed here is that the trial court intimidated defense counsel into ineffectiveness by threatening him with contempt. Counsel also stated that he felt that he was not being allowed [608] to state his reasons for asserting objections and was afraid to object because he might be held in contempt and placed in custody. In support of this claim, the defendant provides a lengthy excerpt of a colloquy between defense counsel and the court in which the defense counsel expresses his fear of being held in contempt and his belief that the trial court had improperly rendered him ineffective.
The defendant offers not a single example of a failure to object or a failure to do anything because of the claimed intimidation. We have said, in the context of a claim of ineffective assistance, that simply mouthing the words “ineffective assistance” of counsel is not sufficient to establish the claim. Blakeney v. Commissioner of Correction, 47 Conn. App. 568, 584, 706 A.2d 989, cert. denied, 244 Conn. 913, 713 A.2d 830 (1998). We know of no authority that supports the defendant’s assertion that a mere claim by counsel that he felt intimidated by the trial court is sufficient to warrant a new trial.
We have reviewed the transcript and conclude that the trial court properly admonished defense counsel about his improper and gratuitous comments during jury selection and during evidence. Defense counsel repeatedly disregarded those admonitions and the trial court acted within its discretion in warning him that, if he continued to conduct himself improperly, the trial court would hold him in contempt. Despite that warning, the trial court repeatedly told defense counsel that he had a right to object to questions and that the court was concerned only with his improper comments on the evidence.
Moreover, motions to withdraw as counsel that are made on the eve of or during trial are not favored. Although our cases typically address situations in which the motion to withdraw was precipitated by a party’s [609] expressed dissatisfaction with counsel, we believe that the rationale of those cases also applies where counsel, without any client dissatisfaction, moves to withdraw during trial because of claimed ineffectiveness. “There can be no dispute that a criminal defendant has a constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel; McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14, 90 S. Ct. 1441, 25 L. Ed. 2d 763 (1970); Levine v. Manson, 195 Conn. 636, 639, 490 A.2d 82 (1985); that right, however, is not without limitation. For example, the right to counsel does not include the unbridled right to discharge counsel on the eve of trial .... State v. Drakeford, [202 Conn. 75, 83, 519 A.2d 1194 (1987)], quoting United States v. Grow, 394 F.2d 182, 209 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 840, 89 S. Ct. 118, 21 L. Ed. 2d 111 (1968). This limitation applies to both private counsel retained by an individual defendant as well as court-appointed counsel. See State v. Gethers, 193 Conn. 526, 543, 480 A.2d 435 (1984), and cases cited therein. Furthermore, it is clear that the right to effective assistance of counsel does not include an unlimited opportunity to obtain alternate counsel. State v. Watson, 198 Conn. 598, 610, 504 A.2d 497 (1986). Inherent in these limitations is a concern for unwarranted interruptions in the administration of justice. While courts must be assiduous in their defense of an accused’s right to counsel, that right may not be manipulated so as to obstruct the orderly procedure in the courts or to interfere with the fair administration of justice. United States v. Calabro, 467 F.2d 973, 986 (2d Cir. 1972), quoting United States v. Bentvena, 319 F.2d 916, 936 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Ormento v. United States, 375 U.S. 940, 84 S. Ct. 345, 11 L. Ed. 2d 271 (1963) . . . .” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Morico, supra, 14 Conn. App. 143-44.
Our Supreme Court has held that “to work a delay by a last minute discharge of counsel there must exist [610] exceptional circumstances.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Robinson, 227 Conn. 711, 726, 631 A.2d 288 (1993). “We must distinguish between a substantial and timely request for new counsel pursued in good faith, and one made for insufficient cause on the eve or in the middle of trial.” State v. Drakeford, supra, 202 Conn. 82.
We find no exceptional circumstances or good cause here, where counsel simply declared himself intimidated and ineffective with no basis therefor. We are satisfied that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant’s motion to withdraw.
II
The defendant next claims that the actions of the trial court deprived her of a fair trial. We will discuss each action in turn.
A
The defendant first claims that the trial court improperly threatened defense counsel with contempt before the jury and she is therefore entitled to a reversal of her convictions and a new trial. In State v. Conroy, 194 Conn. 623, 632-33, 484 A.2d 448 (1984), our Supreme Court addressed a situation in which defense counsel was threatened with contempt of court in the presence of the jury during closing argument. The Supreme Court noted that although the defendant did not object to the trial court’s warning or request a curative instruction, it would nevertheless consider the claim “[b]ecause of the understandable reluctance of an attorney to object to a threat of contempt . . . .” Id., 633. For the same reason, we will consider the unpreserved claim here.
The trial court did, in fact, threaten to hold defense counsel in contempt in the presence of the jury.4 In [611] Conroy, our Supreme Court stated: “While the better practice would have been for the trial court to have issued its warning in the absence of the jury or to have given a curative instruction . . . the trial court’s action in the circumstances here was not erroneous.” (Citation omitted.) Id. Here, the trial court did give a curative instruction as suggested in Conroy, telling the jurors that they must decide the case on the evidence and that his threat of sanctions against defense counsel should in no way affect their consideration of the evidence or of whether the state has established its burden of proof.5
We conclude that the curative instruction sufficiently eliminated any possible prejudice to the defendant that might have arisen because of the trial court’s threat of contempt in the presence of the juiy.
B
As part of her claim that she was deprived of a fair trial by the trial court’s conduct, the defendant claims [612] that the court’s threats, made outside the presence of the jury, to hold defense counsel in contempt and the court’s chastising and disparaging of defense counsel rendered counsel ineffective in representing her.
Again, in support of this claim, the defendant offers excerpts from the colloquies with the trial court in her brief. The defendant, however, fails to quote defense counsel’s improper remarks that caused the court to threaten to hold counsel in contempt and to warn counsel to cease his improper comments on the evidence.6
We have reviewed the transcripts and we conclude that the trial court acted properly. The trial court was [613] confronted by a trial attorney who, despite warnings, persisted in improperly commenting on the evidence and proceedings starting at jury selection and continu[614] ing through the trial. As previously discussed, the defendant points to nothing that counsel was prevented from asking or introducing into evidence because of the alleged intimidation by the court. Again, the court repeatedly made it clear that counsel had the right to object and to represent his client zealously as long as he did it within the parameters of the rules.
C
The defendant’s last claim is that the trial court improperly gave an instruction, sua sponte, during the direct examination of a defense witness. That instruction was to the effect that claimed drug use by the victim was a matter of impeachment of the victim’s credibility.* *****7
[615] The defendant did not object to the instruction with respect to either its timing or its correctness. The defendant offers no analysis as to why this is an issue of constitutional magnitude and we do not conclude that it is. Therefore, this claim is not entitled to review pursuant to State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 567 A.2d 823 (1989).8 Nor is the defendant entitled to plain error review. Plain error review “ ‘is reserved for those truly extraordinary situations where the existence of the error is so obvious that it affects the fairness and integrity of and public confidence in the judicial proceedings.’ ” State v. Austin, 244 Conn. 226, 241, 710 A.2d 732 (1998). The circumstances here do not rise to the level of plain error.
The judgments are affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.