State v. Paschke Mason

• Court: Montana Supreme Court
• Decided: October 22, 1974
• Docket: 12688
• Status: Published

Opinion

No. 12688

I N T E SUPRENE C U T O T E STATE O M N A A H OR F H F OTN

THE STATE O M N A A F OTN,

P l a i n t i f f and Respondent,

-vs - J O H N A N L MASON, R OD

Defendant and A p p e l l a n t .

Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e T h i r t e e n t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable E. Gardner Brownlee, Judge p r e s i d i n g .

Counsel of Record :

For A p p e l l a n t :

S a n d a l l , Moses, Cavan and Kampfe, B i l l i n g s , Montana D. Frank Kampfe argued, and A . C l i f f o r d Edwards argued, B i l l i n g s , Montana

For Respondent :

Hon. Robert L. Woodahl, Attorney General, Helena, Montana Thomas A. Budewitz, A s s i s t a n t A t t o r n e y General, a r g u e d , Helena, Montana Harold F. Hanser, County A t t o r n e y , B i l l i n g s , Montana Doris M. P o p p l e r , Deputy County A t t o r n e y , appeared, B i l l i n g s , Montana

Submitted: September 1 3 , 1974

Decided :

Filed : No. 12687

I N T E SUPREME C U T O THE STATE O M N A A H OR F F OTN

THE STATE O M N A A F O T N ,

-vs - JON WILLIAM PASCHKE,

Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e T h i r t e e n t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable E. Gardner Brownlee, Judge p r e s i d i n g .

Counsel of Record:

S a n d a l l , Moses, Cavan and Kampfe, B i l l i n g s , Montana D. Frank Kampfe argued, A. C l i f f o r d Edwards argued, B i l l i n g s , Montana

F o r Respondent:

Hon. Robert L. Woodahl, A t t o r n e y General, Helena, Montana Thomas A. Budewitz, A s s i s t a n t A t t o r n e y General, argued, Helena, Montana Harold F. Hanser, County A t t o r n e y , B i l l i n g s , Montana Doris M. P o p p l e r , Deputy County A t t o r n e y , appeared, B i l l i n g s , Montana

Submitted: September 13, 1974

Decided : OCJ 28 1 s Filed : DCT 2 2 1974 J u s t i c e Frank I. Haswell d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court.

These a r e combined a p p e a l s from t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t of Yellowstone County wherein Jon William Paschke and John Arnold Mason were convicted of c r i m i n a l possession of dangerous drugs. Pursuant t o s t i p u l a t i o n of t h e p a r t i e s a s i n g l e h e a r i n g was h e l d b e f o r e Judge Brownlee t o p r e s e n t a l l evidence a p p l i c a b l e t o d e f e n d a n t s f motions t o suppress evidence o r t h e u l t i m a t e q u e s t i o n of g u i l t o r innocence. Defendants a p p e a l , c h a l l e n g i n g Judge ~ r o w n l e e ' ssubsequent d s n i a l of t h e i r motions t o suppress. Defendants a l l e g e t h e warrant under which c e r t a i n drugs were s e i z e d was i n v a l i d ; t h e r e f o r e t h a t evidence must be suppressed. Both Paschke and Mason c l a i m t h e i s s u i n g m a g i s t r a t e was n o t shown s u f f i c i e n t probable cause f o r t h e i s s u a n c e of t h e w a r r a n t , They f u r t h e r a l l e g e t h e w a r r a n t does n o t d e s c r i b e t h e premises t o b e

searched w i t h s u f f i c i e n t p a r t i c u l a r i t y . Mason a l s o a l l e g e d t h a t s i n c e he was n o t named i n t h e w a r r a n t , t h e s e a r c h of h i s room w a s n o t warranted. On February 25, 1973, an a p p l i c a t i o n f o r a s e a r c h w a r r a n t was

executed by Richard Brennan, a deputy s h e r i f f of Yellowstone County. T h i s a p p l i c a t i o n c o n t a i n e d t h e following sworn statement of f a c t s : " ~ n f o r m a t i o n shows t h a t Jon Paschke l i v e s a t 1930 Mullowney Lane B i l l i n g s , Montana which i s t h e r e s i - dence of one S a l l y Johnson. Your a f f i a n t has had r e p o r t s over t h e p a s t n i n e months t h a t Jon Paschke and S a l l y Johnson have been d e a l i n g drugs h e r e i n B i l l i n g s and on t h e high l i n e . Both of t h e s e i n d i v i d u a l s and t h e r e s i d e n c e a t 1930 Mullowney Lane have been under i n v e s t i g a t i o n f o r t h e p a s t seven months by t h e c i t y - county drug squad. Known drug u s e r s and d e a l e r s have been observed a t t h e house. A informant who has f u r - n n i s h e d r e l i a b l e information i n t h e p a s t t h a t h a s l e d t o drug a r r e s t s , a d v i s e d w i t h i n t h e l a s t 48 hours t h a t he had been c o n t a c t e d by a known drug u s e r who o f f e r e d t o s e l l h i m d r u s t h a t he had obtained from Jon Paschke. This person to18 t h e informant t h a t Paschke would be b r i n g i n g more drugs i n t o town (Amphetimines, Mescaline, P s i l o c y b i n ) and he was t o g e t i n t o town on t h e evening of February 24, 1973. Paschke d r i v e s a 1970 Ford Van 3-27650. T h i s u n i t was n o t a t t h e house on l a s t evening. The Van was observed a t t h e house (1930 Mullowney Lane) about noon today Feb. 25, 1973. The r e s i d e n c e h a s been checked d u r i n g t h e evening and morning. This same i n - formation was a l s o r e c e i v e d d u r i n g t h e l a s t 48 hours from two o t h e r sources. I t The a p p l i c a t i o n was f i l e d w i t h R. J. Williams, a j u s t i c e o f t h e peace, on t h e same day. Although Deputy Brennan appeared p e r s o n a l l y b e f o r e Judge Williams, he c o n t r i b u t e d no information toward t h e determination of probable cause o t h e r than t h a t c o n t a i n e d i n t h e quoted statement o f f a c t s . A warrant b e a r i n g t h e c a p t i o n , "THE STATE O MONTANA, F Plaintiff, - vs - J O N PASCHKE and SALLY JOHNSON, ~ e f e n d a n t " was i s s u e d t h e same day. The premises t o be searched were d e s c r i b e d a s "1930 Mullowney Lane, B i l l i n g s , Montana. II

The warrant was executed s h o r t l y a f t e r i t s issuance. When t h e o f f i c e r s a r r i v e d a t t h e r e s i d e n c e they observed defendant Mason w i t h 8 112 grams of h a s h i s h i n h i s p o s s e s s i o n . Drugs were found a t v a r i o u s l o c a t i o n s throughout t h e house, i n c l u d i n g a room shared by Mason and a n o t h e r . Paschke and Mason were among a number of persons a r r e s t e d on t h e premises a s a r e s u l t of t h e search. On appeal a p p e l l a n t s f i r s t argue t h a t Judge Williams was n o t presented w i t h s u f f i c i e n t probable cause t o s a t i s f y con- s t i t u t i o n a l and s t a t u t o r y requirements f o r t h e i s s u a n c e of a s e a r c h warrant. The r e c o r d c l e a r l y e s t a b l i s h e s t h a t t h e o n l y information b e f o r e Judge Williams was t h a t contained i n t h e statement of f a c t s h e r e t o f o r e quoted. Our i n q u i r y must t h e r e f o r e be l i m i t e d t o t h e f o u r c o r n e r s of t h a t document. P e t i t i o n of Gray, 155 Mont. 510, 473 P.2d 532; S t a t e v. Bentley, 156 Mont. 129, 477 P.2d 345. Appellants would exclude from t h a t statement of f a c t s t h e information c o n t r i b u t e d by t h e anonymous "known drug user". T h e i r o b j e c t i o n i s n o t t h a t such information i s h e a r s a y , o r even t h a t i t i s double h e a r s a y , but t h a t t h e t r u s t w o r t h i n e s s o f t h e known drug u s e r and t h e information he provided have n o t been adequately established. It i s c l e a r t h a t probable cause can be based on t h e hearsay s t a t e m e n t s of an anonymous informer. Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 12 L ed 2d 723; S t a t e v. T r o g l i a , 157 Mont. 22, 482 P.2d 143. However, A g u i l a r r e q u i r e s t h a t underlying circum- s t a n c e s which support e i t h e r t h e c r e d i b i l i t y of t h e hearsay source o r t h e r e l i a b i l i t y of h i s information must be provided. I n t h e a f f i d a v i t under c o n s i d e r a t i o n h e r e , two hearsay s o u r c e s a r e involved- - t h e "informant" and t h e "known drug user". Since t h e a f f i d a v i t i d e n t i f i e s t h e informant a s a source of r e l i a b l e information l e a d i n g t o drug a r r e s t s i n t h e p a s t , i t i s a p p a r e n t t h a t t h i s source s a t i s f i e s t h e f i r s t of A g u i l a r ' s a l t e r n a t i v e requirements. Appellants concede a s much b u t c h a l - lenge t h e " c r e d e n t i a l s " of t h e known drug u s e r s i n c e t h e r e i s no a l l e g a t i o n t h a t he had p r e v i o u s l y proven t o be r e l i a b l e . The information provided by t h e known drug u s e r was t h a t :

) The known drug u s e r had obtained drugs from Jon Paschke; (2) Paschke would be b r i n g i n g more drugs i n t o town; and, ( 3 ) Paschke would a r r i v e on t h e evening of February 24, 1973. This information was t r a n s m i t t e d t o t h e informant by t h e known drug u s e r a l o n g w i t h t h e l a t t e r ' s o f f e r t o s e l l drugs. Since t h e a f f i d a v i t f a i l s t o e s t a b l i s h t h e known drug u s e r ' s c r e d i b i l i t y under t h e f i r s t of A g u i l a r ' s t e s t s , i t must neces- s a r i l y meet t h e second t e s t by demonstrating t h e r e l i a b i l i t y of t h e i n f o r m a t i o n , independent of i t s source. W find i t s r e l i a b i l i t y t o e be amply supported by t h e f a c t s found i n t h e statement o f f a c t s :

(1) t h e information was provided d u r i n g an o f f e r t o s e l l drugs

t o t h e informer; (2) Paschke's van appeared a t t h e t i m e i t was r e p o r t e d t h a t Paschke would r e t u r n ; ( 3 ) Paschke had been r e p o r t e d t o be d e a l i n g i n drugs i n B i l l i n g s over t h e p a s t n i n e months, and (4) t h e same information was v e r i f i e d by two o t h e r s o u r c e s . The circumstances under which information i s s u p p l i e d can support i t s r e l i a b i l i t y . For example: J u s t i c e White's c o n c u r r i n g opinion i n S p i n e l l i v. United S t a t e s , 393 U . S . 410, 89 S.Ct. 584, 3, 21 L ed 2d 637, pointed o u t t h a t admissions a g l n s t i n t e r e s t a r e s u f f i c i e n t t o e s t a b l i s h probable c a u s e , even though r e l a t e d through a hearsay source. United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 91 S.Ct. 2075, 29 L ed 2d 723. In Thompson v. State, 16 Md.App. 560, 298 A.2d 458, the court held under circumstances similar to those here that since the seller had no cause to mislead his customer, the very circumstances gave reasonable assurances of trustworthi- ness of the information. On that basis alone the court in Thompscn found that information given by an anonymous seller concerning his source was sufficient to establish probable cause. Here, we have much more. The evidence that the van returned at the time the known drug user said Paschke would arrive tended to verify that information. Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 79 S.Ct. 329, 3 L ed 2d 327. The receipt of similar information from two other sources also supported the informations' reliability. As the Court said in Jones v United States, 362 U.S. 257, 271, 80 S . . Ct. 725, 4 L ed 2d 697: "* * * Corroboration through other sources of information reduced the chances of a reckless or prevaricating tale * * *." The reports that Paschke had been dealing in drugs in Billings over the past nine months provided further corroboration. We hold that sufficient probable cause was established for the issuance of the search warrant. The warrant issued described the premises to be searched as "1930 Mullowney Lane, Billings, Montana." Appellants urge that this description is insufficient to satisfy the particularity re- quirement of the Fourth Amendment to the constitution of the United States, as well as the requirements of section 95-704(b), R.C.M. 1947. They argue that a mere street address permits too much discretion in the executing officers as to the area to be searched. In Steele v United States, 267 U.S. 498, 503, 45 S.Ct. 414, . 69 L ed 757, the Court said: "* * * It is enough if the description is such that the officer with a search warrant can with reasonable effort ascertain and identify the place intended. II I n S t e e l e t h e Court d i d n o t l i m i t t h e "reasonable e f f o r t " t o a r e a d i n g of t h e f a c e of t h e w a r r a n t only. Here, t h e o f f i c e r making a p p l i c a t i o n f o r t h e warrant had p a r t i c i p a t e d i n p a s t s u r - v e i l l a n c e of t h e premises t o be searched, and h i s a p p l i c a t i o n spoke only of a c t i v i t i e s i n t h e "house". He knew t h e detached garage was n o t t o be searched under t h e i n i t i a l warrant-- a knowledge borne o u t by h i s subsequent a p p l i c a t i o n f o r a warrant t o s e a r c h t h a t garage. Under such circumstances, when t h e s e a r c h a c t u a l l y conducted was l i m i t e d t o t h e a r e a f o r which probable cause had been demon- s t r a t e d , t h e r e i s no t h r e a t t o Fourth Amendment values. S t a t e v. B i s a c c i a , 58 N . J . 586, 279 A.2d 675. Furthermore, i t has been held t h a t a s t r e e t address within a c i t y i s s u f f i c i e n t l y p a r t i c u l a r . I n Re Hollywood Cabaret, 5 F.2d 651 (2nd C i r . 1925); Owens v. S c a f a t i , 273 F.Supp. 428 (D. Mass., 1967), c e r t . den. 391 U.S. 969, 88 S.Ct. 2043, 20 L ed 2d 883. W f i n d no reason t o hold e o t h e r w i s e here. F i n a l l y , Mason urges t h a t t h e s e a r c h of h i s room was i n v a l i d s i n c e no probable cause was demonstrated, n o r was he even men- t i o n e d i n t h e a p p l i c a t i o n o r warrant.He s u g g e s t s S t a t e ex r e l . G a r r i s v. Wilson, , 1 6 2 Mont. 256- -,511 P.2d 15, 30 St.Rep. 605, i s controlling. I n G a r r i s we h e l d ~ a r r i s 'c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t of p r i v a c y i n v a l i d a t e d t h e s e a r c h w a r r a n t a s t o him. The c a s e s a r e s i m i l a r i n t h a t a p p e l l a n t s i n both were n o t mentioned i n t h e warrants o r i n the applications. However t h e s i m i l a r i t y between t h e c a s e s ends t h e r e . Here, u n l i k e G a r r i s , t h e r e i s no evidence t h a t Mason paid r e n t f o r h i s room, o r t h a t he had t h e u s e of t h e room t o t h e e x c l u s i o n of a l l o t h e r s . The r e c o r d c l e a r l y shows t h a t he shared t h e room w i t h a n o t h e r . I t f u r t h e r shows t h e o f f i c e r s had been unable t o p o s i t i v e l y a s c e r t a i n whether Mason was l i v i n g t h e r e and whether he occupied a s p e c i f i c room. Undersuch circumstances we must be guided by t h e c o n s i d e r a - t i o n s which prompted t h e United S t a t e s Supreme Court t o say i n United S t a t e s v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102,108, 85 S.Ct. 741, 1 3 L ed 2d 684: "* * * the Fourth Amendment's commands, like all constitutional requirements, are practical and not abstract. * * * A grudging or negative attitude by reviewing courts toward warrants will tend to discourage police officers from submitting their evidence to a judicial officer before acting. 1I Here, the police had probable cause to believe that drugs were present in a house they knew to be occupied by Paschke and Johnson. Although they knew that Mason had been an occasional guest, their information stopped short of establishing him as an occupant. Under such circumstances the practicality required by the Fourth Amendment has been satisfied. Furthermore, Mason was arrested with drugs in his immediate possession. The search of his room produced more drugs, but he was tried only on a single count of possession of dangerous drugs. Thus the record demonstrates sufficient evidence to uphold the conviction without considering the drugs seized from his room. The district court's denial of all motions to suppress is affirmed.

-------------------------------- Justice

We Concur:

Chief Justice