[Cite as State v. Parsons, 2025-Ohio-1324.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT MARION COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO, CASE NO. 9-24-16 PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,
v.
JEREMY KEITH PARSONS, OPINION
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
Appeal from Marion County Common Pleas Court General Division Trial Court No. 23-CR-356
Judgment Affirmed
Date of Decision: April 14, 2025
APPEARANCES:
Donald Regensburger and Samuel H. Shamansky for Appellant
Allison M. Kesler for Appellee Case No. 9-24-16
MILLER, J.
{¶1} Defendant-Appellant, Jeremy Keith Parsons (“Parsons”), appeals from
the April 1, 2024 judgment of the Marion County Court of Common Pleas,
following a jury trial and sentencing. Parsons argues his conviction for sexual
battery was against the manifest weight of the evidence and that the trial court’s
imposition of a fine at sentencing violated his constitutional rights. For the reasons
that follow, we affirm.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
{¶2} Parsons was charged with committing two offenses against his
stepdaughter, J.B. Count 1 charged sexual battery, in violation of R.C.
2907.03(A)(5), a third-degree felony. Count 2 charged rape, in violation of R.C.
2907.02(A)(2), a first-degree felony. The alleged victim of the offenses was J.B.,
who was 16 years old at the time of the incident. The case proceeded to a jury trial
on February 27 and 28, 2024.
A. Trial
{¶3} Four witnesses testified during the trial: J.B., the alleged victim; Stacy
Ison (“Nurse Ison”), a sexual assault nurse examiner who met with J.B.; John
Endicott (“Deputy Endicott”), a deputy for the Marion County Sheriff’s Office; and
Kaitlyn Barber (“Detective Barber”), a detective for the Marion County Sheriff’s
Office.
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{¶4} J.B. testified she was living with Parsons, her mother, and her two
younger sisters on the day of the alleged incident: July 28, 2023. They were
preparing to host an upcoming birthday party for one of J.B.’s sisters. Late that
night, J.B. was in the kitchen with her mother and Parsons when her mother went
upstairs to go to sleep. Parsons was drinking high-alcohol-content beer and offered
J.B. some. J.B. testified that Parsons drank around three beers that night and she
did not have her own beer—she just took some sips from Parsons’ beer and could
not remember how much she drank.
{¶5} J.B. started feeling very tired, so she laid her head down on the kitchen
counter. Parsons then started rubbing her back and shoulders, which she
acknowledged he had done a few times before but it made her feel uncomfortable.
She told Parsons that she was going to go to bed and tried to walk to her room, but
she ran into the doorframe while exiting the kitchen. Parsons came over to her and
said he was going to help her into bed, which he did despite J.B. telling him that she
did not need any help. After helping J.B. into bed, Parsons asked if she needed
anything and she responded by telling him to leave. Parsons laughed, said that was
not very nice, did not leave, and closed the doors to her room.
{¶6} According to J.B., Parsons then came over to her bed, started rubbing
J.B.’s back and shoulders underneath her shirt, and then his hand went down her
pants, but not underneath her underwear. J.B. testified that she was scared. Parsons
then put his hand down the front of her pants and underneath her underwear before
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putting his fingers inside of her vagina. After he removed his fingers, Parsons
grabbed J.B.’s hand and put it at the front of his pants. She moved her hand back,
and then Parsons put his hand down the front of her pants again. J.B. sat up, grabbed
his wrist, and told him to get out. Parsons paused, she told him once again to get
out, she heard him zip up his pants, and then he left.
{¶7} J.B. testified that, after Parsons left her room, she grabbed her
pocketknife and “slit” her wrist. (Trial Tr. at 287). She explained that cutting her
wrist was something she had done before and, in fact, she had been doing it since
the sixth grade. Later, she went for a walk outside to calm down. According to
J.B., the next morning Parsons “made a comment like, what even happened last
night? And [she] looked at him and said that [she] was drunk, and he took advantage
of [her] and then he didn’t argue or anything.” (Id. at 299).
{¶8} J.B. explained that she did not tell anyone about the incident right away
because she was scared of hurting her mother and sister and did not think her mother
would believe her. She wrote about the incident in her journal four days after it
happened, and she told her uncle about it approximately a week after it happened.
J.B. acknowledged on cross-examination that her journal did not reference cutting
her wrist. She also acknowledged that she was able to go for a walk after the
incident despite being so intoxicated prior to the incident that she was unable to
walk. J.B. explained that the walk outside “would have been a couple of hours”
after the incident. (Id. at 303). She also acknowledged on cross-examination that
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she had previously had some conflict with Parsons, that one of her sisters hated
Parsons, that she knew “that being touched was wrong and [she] had people to
whom [she] could report,” and that she chose to go back to the home where Parsons
resided even after telling her uncle about the incident. (Id. at 308). J.B. explained
that she went back to the home because she did not want her mother finding out
about the incident.
{¶9} Next, Nurse Ison testified that she is a specially-trained nurse who treats
patients who report being survivors of sexual assault, domestic violence, or human
trafficking. She met with J.B. on August 11, 2023. J.B.’s recitation of the incident
to Nurse Ison was generally consistent with her recitation at trial, set forth above.
However, J.B. did not mention cutting her wrist, and Nurse Ison testified that she
did not see any injuries on J.B.’s body and did not document any injuries. According
to Nurse Ison, J.B. declined to have a physical examination because it had been two
weeks since the incident by that time; Nurse Ison did not find this to be out of the
ordinary. Additionally, J.B. did not tell Nurse Ison that she took a walk outside to
calm down after the incident.
{¶10} Deputy Endicott testified that he received a call on August 10, 2023
for a reported sexual assault. He went to Parsons’ residence and separately spoke
with J.B., her mother, her youth pastor, and Parsons. Parsons gave Deputy Endicott
his version of what occurred on the night of the incident, which Deputy Endicott
relayed during his testimony. Parsons said that they had been drinking in the
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kitchen, specifically three higher-alcohol beers. J.B. was not feeling well and leaned
over the kitchen counter. Parsons rubbed her back and told her she needed to go to
bed. In her bedroom, Parsons was rubbing her back again, “trying to make sure she
wasn’t going to get sick.” (Trial Tr. at 351). J.B. then slid onto her back, which
caused Parsons’ hand to go to her stomach, and she then “grabbed his hand and
shoved it down her pants” underneath her underwear. (Id. at 351-352). “[T]hen he
had started to pull his hand out of her pants and, when he started to pull his hand out
of her pants, she shoved it back down there farther in her pants and then he was able
to then get his hand out of her pants.” (Id. at 352). The next thing he remembered
was going outside and crying on the back porch because he was upset with the whole
situation.
{¶11} Detective Barber testified that Parsons gave her a statement at the
Sheriff’s office after Deputy Endicott had spoken with him. During the trial,
Detective Barber provided a summary of Parsons’ version of the incident similar to
that provided by Deputy Endicott. She testified that Parsons told her J.B. had a few
sips from his first beer and that she drank less than half of his third beer. Detective
Barber arrested Parsons at the conclusion of their discussion.
B. Verdict and Sentencing
{¶12} The jury returned a guilty verdict on the sexual battery count and a not
guilty verdict on the rape count. The trial court subsequently held a sentencing
hearing. After hearing from J.B. and some family members, the trial court sentenced
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Parsons to a term of 60 months in prison. The trial court also imposed a $10,000
fine and explained that Parsons would be subject to a mandatory five-year period of
post-release control.
{¶13} As part of the sentencing hearing, one of J.B.’s family members
suggested to the court a concern for the safety of Parsons’ daughter and other step-
daughter. The judge acknowledged during the sentencing hearing that he did not
have the authority to restrict Parsons’ behavior after Parsons is released from prison;
the Adult Parole Authority would have that authority. The judge explained that
Parsons’ relationship with J.B. facilitated the offense and the reason for imposing
the fine was to make it more difficult for Parsons “to have contact with minor
children by being able to use money put on his books to call them or write him – or
write letters or anything that might lead him to be able to have access to minor
children during this period of incarceration.” (Mar. 28, 2024 Tr. at 29). The judge
expressed hope that imposing the fine would prevent future grooming and
victimization. This appeal followed.
II. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
{¶14} Parsons raises two assignments of error for our review:
First Assignment of Error
Appellant’s convictions were against the manifest weight of the evidence in violation of his right to due process as guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and comparable provisions of the Ohio Constitution.
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Second Assignment of Error
The trial court’s imposition of a $10,000.00 fine was, by its own admission, an attempt to impose and enforce an unlawful, cruel and unusual punishment in the form of a no-contact order in violation of Appellant’s rights as guaranteed under the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and comparable provisions of the Ohio Constitution.
III. DISCUSSION
A. First Assignment of Error
{¶15} In the first assignment of error, Parsons argues that his conviction was
against the manifest weight of the evidence.
1. Standard of Review
{¶16} The “manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standard of review applies to
the state’s burden of persuasion.” State v. Messenger, 2022-Ohio-4562, ¶ 26. “[W]e
review the entire record, weigh the evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider
the credibility of witnesses, and determine whether in resolving conflicts in the
evidence, the [trier of fact] clearly lost its way and created such a manifest
miscarriage of justice that we must reverse the conviction and order a new trial.”
State v. Wilks, 2018-Ohio-1562, ¶ 168. “When a court of appeals reverses a
judgment of a trial court on the basis that the verdict is against the weight of the
evidence, the appellate court sits as a ‘thirteenth juror’ and disagrees with the
factfinder’s resolution of the conflicting” evidence. State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio
St.3d 380, 387, 1997-Ohio-52 (1997), quoting Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 42
(1982). Yet, “[o]nly in exceptional cases, where the evidence ‘weighs heavily -8- Case No. 9-24-16
against the conviction,’ should an appellate court overturn the trial court’s
judgment.” State v. Haller, 2012-Ohio-5233, ¶ 9 (3d Dist.), quoting State v. Hunter,
2011-Ohio-6524, ¶ 119. To reverse a judgment from a jury trial on the weight of
the evidence, all three appellate judges must concur. Ohio Const., art. IV, § 3(B)(3).
2. Applicable Law
{¶17} Parsons was convicted of sexual battery in violation of R.C.
2907.03(A)(5). That statute prohibited a person from engaging in “sexual conduct”
with another person when the offender is the other person’s stepparent. R.C.
2907.03(A)(5). As used in the statute, the term “sexual conduct” was defined as
including, “without privilege to do so, the insertion, however slight, of any part of
the body or any instrument, apparatus, or other object into the vaginal or anal
opening of another.” R.C. 2907.01(A).
3. Analysis
{¶18} Parsons “readily acknowledges” that the State provided evidence at
trial that “would satisfy a sufficiency analysis.” (Appellant’s Brief at 11). However,
according to Parsons, J.B.’s credibility was called into question and resulted in his
conviction being against the manifest weight of the evidence. Specifically, he
highlights: (1) J.B. testified she was so intoxicated on the night in question that she
could not walk, but J.B. also testified she went for a walk outside after the alleged
incident and told Nurse Ison that she was merely tired and drowsy; (2) J.B. testified
she “slit” her wrist after the alleged incident, but Nurse Ison did not locate any such
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injury and J.B. did not describe any such injury in her journal; (3) J.B.’s intoxication
during the time of the alleged incident generally calls into question her ability to
correctly recall the events of the evening in question; and (4) J.B. and her sister had
prior conflicts with Parsons, allegedly creating a motive for J.B. to lie about his
conduct.
{¶19} Having reviewed the record, we do not find the jury clearly lost its
way and created a manifest miscarriage of justice when it found Parsons guilty of
sexual battery. First, there was not necessarily any inconsistency in J.B.’s testimony
regarding her ability to walk. She explained on cross-examination that a couple of
hours passed between the incident and when she took a walk outside. (See Trial Tr.
at 302-303). Additionally, the reference to being tired and drowsy related to how
she felt in the kitchen prior to the incident. We also do not find it necessarily
inconsistent that J.B. cut her wrist with a pocket knife after the alleged incident yet
Nurse Ison did not locate any such injury and J.B. did not describe such an injury in
her journal. There was no evidence concerning the extent of any injury, Nurse Ison
saw J.B. two weeks after the incident, and J.B. testified she had previously sliced
her wrist and had been doing so since the sixth grade. Although Nurse Ison testified
that, if J.B. had cut her wrist she would have seen the resulting injury, Nurse Ison
had no knowledge of the extent of the alleged cut and also testified that she did not
conduct a physical exam of J.B. (Id. at 335-336). Concerning the journal, it is not
surprising J.B. might leave that detail out of her own journal, and it is not incredible
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for the fact-finder to accept the version of events the alleged victim gave under oath
instead of in a journal. State v. Goller, 2024-Ohio-5983, ¶ 56 (3d Dist.). More
importantly, J.B. was always consistent in claiming how Parsons put his hand down
the front of her pants and digitally penetrated her vagina. E.g., State v. Harris, 2011-
Ohio-4066, ¶ 31 (9th Dist.) (conviction for sexual battery was not against the
manifest weight of the evidence where, although “the victim changed some parts of
her story, she consistently maintained that [defendant] digitally penetrated her
vagina without consent”).
{¶20} Regarding J.B.’s intoxication, we note that Parsons had also been
drinking alcohol prior to the incident, and all of the testimony indicated J.B. drank
considerably less than him. Although we recognize there were two conflicting
versions presented at trial regarding who initiated the sexual activity, a conviction
is not against the manifest weight of the evidence simply because the fact-finder
chose to believe one version of events over another. State v. Smerglia, 2023-Ohio-
1610, ¶ 18, 25-27 (9th Dist.) (conviction was not against the manifest weight of the
evidence despite defendant’s argument that he never touched the victim
inappropriately, the victim fabricated the allegations for potential financial gain, and
the victim’s version of events—including that she scooted away from the defendant
and crossed her legs while driving—“strain[ed] credulity” and contained
inconsistencies); State v. Peacock, 2017-Ohio-2592, ¶ 41 (3d Dist.). The jury was
free to discount Parsons’ version of events—where a 16-year-old girl twice
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overpowered a much larger man and forced his hand into her undergarments. We
do not disagree with the factfinder’s resolution of the conflicting evidence. In
resolving conflicts in the evidence, the jury did not clearly lose its way and create a
manifest miscarriage of justice.
{¶21} Parsons’s first assignment of error is overruled.
B. Second Assignment of Error
{¶22} In the second assignment of error, Parsons attacks the fine imposed as
part of his sentence. In his brief, Parsons “submits that any sentence beyond that
provided by statute violates a defendant’s right to due process . . . and his right to
be free from cruel and unusual punishments . . . .” (Appellant’s Brief at 12).
However, he also “acknowledges that a fine of $10,000.00 is generally within the
permissive scope of sanctions available for a felony of the third degree under Ohio
law.” (Id. at 14, citing R.C. 2929.18(A)(3)(c)). Thus, he concedes the trial court
was allowed to impose the fine under the relevant sentencing statute.
{¶23} Delving deeper, Parsons argues that the trial court imposed the fine
“to effectuate a no-contact order,” which is a community control sanction. (Id. at
14). According to Parsons, because the trial court was prohibited from imposing
any community control sanction, the fine was imposed for an unlawful purpose and
was a clear and obvious error that deprived him of his right to due process and
constituted a cruel and unusual punishment.
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1. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
{¶24} The statute governing appeals based on felony sentencing guidelines,
R.C. 2953.08, “defines the parameters and standards—including the standard of
review—for felony-sentencing appeals.” State v. Marcum, 2016-Ohio-1002, ¶ 21.
“[A]n appellate court may vacate or modify a felony sentence on appeal only if it
determines by clear and convincing evidence that the record does not support the
trial court’s findings under relevant statues [identified in R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(A)] or
that the sentence is otherwise contrary to law.” Id. at ¶ 1; see also R.C. 2953.08(G).
‘Clear and convincing evidence is that measure or degree of proof which is more than a mere ‘preponderance of the evidence,’ but not to the extent of such certainty as is required ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ in criminal cases, and which will produce in the mind of the trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to the facts sought to be established.’
Marcum at ¶ 22, quoting Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469 (1954), paragraph three
of the syllabus.
{¶25} The phrase “otherwise contrary to law” in R.C.
2953.08(G)(2)(b) means “in violation of statute or legal regulations at a given time.”
State v. Bryant, 2022-Ohio-1878, ¶ 22. Courts are limited to imposing sentences
that are authorized by statute, rather than only being limited to sentences that are
not prohibited by statute. State v. Anderson, 2015-Ohio-2089, ¶ 13. If a trial court
imposes a fine beyond the statutory maximum fine, then the sentence is contrary to
law. E.g., State v. Litteral, 2012-Ohio-5335, ¶ 33 (3d Dist.) (vacating sentence, and
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remanding for resentencing, where the trial court imposed a $400 fine but the statute
for sentencing misdemeanors of the fourth degree established a maximum fine of
$250); State v. Forte, 2013-Ohio-4707, ¶ 3 (8th Dist.). Generally, a court imposing
a sentence for a third-degree felony may impose a financial sanction in the form of
a fine in the amount of not more than ten thousand dollars. R.C. 2929.18(A)(3)(c).
{¶26} “[A]s a general rule, when a prison term and community control are
possible sentences for a particular felony offense, absent an express exception, the
court must impose either a prison term or a community-control sanction or
sanctions.” (Emphasis added.) Anderson at ¶ 31. In other words, for a felony
offense, a term of imprisonment and community-control sanctions are alternatives.
See id. at ¶ 23, 28, 31-32. “[A] no-contact order is a community-control sanction.”
Id. at ¶ 17, 32 (trial court erred in imposing both a prison term and a no-contact
order).
{¶27} R.C. 2929.11 sets forth the overriding purposes of felony sentencing,
which the sentencing court must be guided by when sentencing an offender. It
states, in relevant part:
(A) A court that sentences an offender for a felony shall be guided by the overriding purposes of felony sentencing. The overriding purposes of felony sentencing are to protect the public from future crime by the offender and others, to punish the offender, and to promote the effective rehabilitation of the offender using the minimum sanctions that the court determines accomplish those purposes without imposing an unnecessary burden on state or local government resources. To achieve those purposes, the sentencing court shall consider the need for incapacitating the offender, deterring the offender and others from
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future crime, rehabilitating the offender, and making restitution to the victim of the offense, the public, or both.
(B) A sentence imposed for a felony shall be reasonably calculated to achieve the three overriding purposes of felony sentencing set forth in division (A) of this section, commensurate with and not demeaning to the seriousness of the offender’s conduct and its impact upon the victim, and consistent with sentences imposed for similar crimes committed by similar offenders.
R.C. 2929.11(A), (B). “R.C. 2929.12 addresses factors to be taken into account
when imposing a sentence under R.C. 2929.11.” State v. Jones, 2020-Ohio-6729, ¶
19. Specifically, R.C. 2929.12(B) through (F) list factors the sentencing court must
consider, which include factors relating to the seriousness of the conduct, the
likelihood of the offender’s recidivism, and the offender’s services in the armed
forces. Neither statute “requires a trial court to make any specific factual findings
on the record.” Id. at ¶ 20; see also R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12.
2. Analysis
{¶28} To make his argument, Parsons contends that since the fine was a no-
contact order, it therefore was a community control sanction, and—because the trial
court was prohibited from imposing both a prison term and a community control
sanction—the fine constituted a cruel and unusual punishment and was unlawful.
We do not agree with Parsons’ strained interpretation of the fine, and note that he
cites no legal authority in support of his contention that the fine was a no-contact
order.
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{¶29} Simply stated, the fine was not a no-contact order. Nothing in the trial
court’s sentence actually prohibited Parsons from contacting anyone, including by
calling or writing a letter. This is true even though the trial court apparently hoped
the fine might have the same effect as a no-contact order. Therefore, the fine was
not a community control sanction and, consequently, was not unlawful. As Parsons
concedes, the trial court was permitted to impose a $10,000 fine, in accordance with
the sentencing statute.
{¶30} Parsons also argues the fine “was not designed to protect the public
from future crime, or to punish [him], or as a rehabilitative effort.” (Appellant’s
Brief at 14). Thus, he argues the fine was not guided by one or more of the
overriding purposes of felony sentencing set forth in R.C. 2929.11. Again, we
disagree. The trial court specifically indicated it imposed the fine to protect the
public by attempting to prevent future grooming and victimization of others.
Furthermore, the fine certainly was meant to punish Parsons. Having reviewed the
record, we find that the trial court complied with R.C. 2929.11 in imposing the
sentence. (See also Mar. 28, 2024 Tr. at 24 (trial court expressly noting it had
considered the purposes and principles of sentencing under R.C. 2929.11 as well as
the seriousness and recidivism factors under R.C. 2929.12(B) through (E)); Apr. 1,
2024 Judgment Entry of Sentencing). Ultimately, we do not clearly and
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convincingly find that the sentence imposed was contrary to law. 1 R.C.
2953.08(G)(2).
{¶31} Parsons’s second assignment of error is overruled.
IV. CONCLUSION
{¶32} For the foregoing reasons, Parsons’ assignments of error are overruled.
Having found no error prejudicial to the appellant in the particulars assigned and
argued, we affirm the judgment of the Marion County Court of Common Pleas.
ZIMMERMAN and WILLAMOWSKI, J.J., concur.
/jlm
1 We note that, although Parsons declares that the fine constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Article I, Section 9 of the Ohio Constitution, he does not undertake any sort of Eighth Amendment analysis or cite any legal authority in support of this declaration. See generally State v. Weitbrecht, 86 Ohio St.3d 368, 370-372, 1999-Ohio-113 (1999) (discussing when the Eighth Amendment prohibition has been applied and a test for determining whether to reverse a felony sentence on proportionality grounds). Regardless, “[a]s a general rule, a sentence that falls within the terms of a valid statute cannot amount to a cruel and unusual punishment.” McDougle v. Maxwell, 1 Ohio St.2d 68, 69 (1964) (“[i]t is generally accepted that punishments which are prohibited by the Eighth Amendment are limited to torture or other barbarous punishments, degrading punishments unknown at common law, and punishments which are so disproportionate to the offense as to shock the moral sense of the community”).
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