Spallone, J.
The defendant is appealing from the judgment rendered after his conviction by a jury of the crime of intentionally making a false statement under oath, in violation of General Statutes § 51-297 (b). The defendant claims that the trial court erred (1) by denying the defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal, (2) by erroneously charging on reasonable doubt, (3) by refusing the defendant’s request that the correction officers who had custody of the defendant during the trial be ordered to cover up their indicia of authority in the presence of the jury, (4) by erroneously charging on intent, and (5) by restricting the defendant’s voir dire in reference to extraneous influences on the jury.
The jury could reasonably have found the following facts. The defendant, while being held under bond for other offenses, applied for the services of a public defender. While being interviewed by an investigator, the defendant failed to disclose that he was the owner of approximately $57,000 worth of stock. As a result, that fact was omitted from his application. The defendant signed a completed application for the public defender services and made oath as to its veracity. A public defender was appointed and represented the defendant in court on the same day at a hearing at which his bond was lowered. Subsequently, it was discovered that the defendant, despite his sworn statement, did in fact own stock worth about $57,000. Had the fact been known earlier, it would have made the defendant ineligible for representation by a public defender.
[113]*113The defendant was arrested for giving a false statement and elected to be tried by a jury. During the voir dire process, a potential juror recalled that during the lunch break he had overheard a comment in the jury room to the effect that the defendant “was in jail now pending another trial or something.” The court excused this juror and denied the defendant’s request that the juror be called back and questioned as to whether any other jurors were present when he heard the remark. The court also denied the defendant’s request that after the lunch hour he be allowed to question two of the previously selected jurors as to whether they had overheard anything about the defendant. The court reasoned that both counsel had had the opportunity to and did in fact briefly question the jurors as to whether the jurors knew anything about the defendant or the case.1
At the beginning of the trial, and several times during the same, the defendant requested that the court order the correction officers who stood by the doors of the court during the trial to remove themselves from the courtroom, or at least to cover any indicia of their identity while in the presence of the jury. The court denied the defendant’s requests. The defendant was found guilty by the jury and this appeal followed.
The defendant first claims that his motion for judgment of acquittal should have been granted because the state failed to prove that he had violated General Statutes § 51-297 (b).2 The defendant contends that because [114]*114General Statutes § 51-297 (a) provides that the public defender “shall cause the person to complete a written statement” for a public defender, he cannot be convicted of falsifying a statement under § 51-297 (b) unless he fills out the application form in his own hand. The defendant argues that because an investigator from the public defender’s office assisted him in completing the application, he did not “complete a written statement” and cannot be found guilty of falsifying a statement under § 51-297 (b).
We note initially that § 51-297 (a) is descriptive rather than penal and its provisions do not constitute separate elements of the crime of making a false statement set forth in § 51-297 (b). Even if we were to read the sections together, however, as the defendant urges, we would find no basis for concluding that the language “[h]e shall cause the person to complete a written statement” must be interpreted to mean that the person completing the application must do so without another’s assistance. Under the defendant’s interpretation, persons who applied for public defenders and who could not complete the form in their own hand because of language, literacy or writing difficulties could never be prosecuted for false statements. We do not believe the legislature could have intended such a result. We find that General Statutes § 51-297 (b) applies to applicants who obtain assistance in completing the public defender applicant information form. The trial court, therefore, properly denied the defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal.
[115]*115The defendant’s second and fourth claims of error focus on the trial court’s jury instructions on reasonable doubt and intent.3 The defendant claims that the trial court erred in its instruction on reasonable doubt by allegedly overemphasizing the fact that the state’s burden of proof was not absolute.4 The defendant asserts that the instructions failed to impress upon the jury the need for them to reach a “subjective state of near certitude,” a standard approved by our Supreme Court in State v. DelVecchio, 191 Conn. 412, 419, 464 A.2d 813 (1983), quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 315, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560, reh. denied, 444 U.S. 890, 100 S. Ct. 195, 62 L. Ed. 2d 126 (1979). In State v. Ryerson, 201 Conn. 333, 341-42, 514 A.2d 337 (1986), however, our Supreme Court confirmed that the “near certitude” language quoted in State v. DelVecchio, supra, was not intended to be a required part of future jury instructions. The court in the Ryerson case approved an instruction containing language similar to the language used by the trial court in this case. State v. Ryerson, supra, 342-43 n.2; see also State v. Webb, 8 Conn. App. 620, 629-30, 514 A.2d 345 (1986) (approving a charge containing language “it is not necessary for the state to prove the absolute guilt [116]*116of the defendant with certainty”). On the basis of the foregoing, we conclude that the reasonable doubt charge, read as a whole as it must be, properly stated the law to the jury. State v. Dahlgren, 200 Conn. 586, 605, 512 A.2d 906 (1986).
The defendant also claims that the court’s charge on intent5 contained language that was erroneous and mis[117]*117leading. The defendant focuses, in particular, on a segment of the charge where the court stated that the jury should consider the amount of money involved in determining whether the defendant intentionally omitted the information from the application. The court then gave an example, stating “it’s easier to forget twenty-five dollars than it is a hundred thousand dollars.” The defendant also protests an additional definition of intent [118]
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Spallone, J.
The defendant is appealing from the judgment rendered after his conviction by a jury of the crime of intentionally making a false statement under oath, in violation of General Statutes § 51-297 (b). The defendant claims that the trial court erred (1) by denying the defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal, (2) by erroneously charging on reasonable doubt, (3) by refusing the defendant’s request that the correction officers who had custody of the defendant during the trial be ordered to cover up their indicia of authority in the presence of the jury, (4) by erroneously charging on intent, and (5) by restricting the defendant’s voir dire in reference to extraneous influences on the jury.
The jury could reasonably have found the following facts. The defendant, while being held under bond for other offenses, applied for the services of a public defender. While being interviewed by an investigator, the defendant failed to disclose that he was the owner of approximately $57,000 worth of stock. As a result, that fact was omitted from his application. The defendant signed a completed application for the public defender services and made oath as to its veracity. A public defender was appointed and represented the defendant in court on the same day at a hearing at which his bond was lowered. Subsequently, it was discovered that the defendant, despite his sworn statement, did in fact own stock worth about $57,000. Had the fact been known earlier, it would have made the defendant ineligible for representation by a public defender.
[113]*113The defendant was arrested for giving a false statement and elected to be tried by a jury. During the voir dire process, a potential juror recalled that during the lunch break he had overheard a comment in the jury room to the effect that the defendant “was in jail now pending another trial or something.” The court excused this juror and denied the defendant’s request that the juror be called back and questioned as to whether any other jurors were present when he heard the remark. The court also denied the defendant’s request that after the lunch hour he be allowed to question two of the previously selected jurors as to whether they had overheard anything about the defendant. The court reasoned that both counsel had had the opportunity to and did in fact briefly question the jurors as to whether the jurors knew anything about the defendant or the case.1
At the beginning of the trial, and several times during the same, the defendant requested that the court order the correction officers who stood by the doors of the court during the trial to remove themselves from the courtroom, or at least to cover any indicia of their identity while in the presence of the jury. The court denied the defendant’s requests. The defendant was found guilty by the jury and this appeal followed.
The defendant first claims that his motion for judgment of acquittal should have been granted because the state failed to prove that he had violated General Statutes § 51-297 (b).2 The defendant contends that because [114]*114General Statutes § 51-297 (a) provides that the public defender “shall cause the person to complete a written statement” for a public defender, he cannot be convicted of falsifying a statement under § 51-297 (b) unless he fills out the application form in his own hand. The defendant argues that because an investigator from the public defender’s office assisted him in completing the application, he did not “complete a written statement” and cannot be found guilty of falsifying a statement under § 51-297 (b).
We note initially that § 51-297 (a) is descriptive rather than penal and its provisions do not constitute separate elements of the crime of making a false statement set forth in § 51-297 (b). Even if we were to read the sections together, however, as the defendant urges, we would find no basis for concluding that the language “[h]e shall cause the person to complete a written statement” must be interpreted to mean that the person completing the application must do so without another’s assistance. Under the defendant’s interpretation, persons who applied for public defenders and who could not complete the form in their own hand because of language, literacy or writing difficulties could never be prosecuted for false statements. We do not believe the legislature could have intended such a result. We find that General Statutes § 51-297 (b) applies to applicants who obtain assistance in completing the public defender applicant information form. The trial court, therefore, properly denied the defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal.
[115]*115The defendant’s second and fourth claims of error focus on the trial court’s jury instructions on reasonable doubt and intent.3 The defendant claims that the trial court erred in its instruction on reasonable doubt by allegedly overemphasizing the fact that the state’s burden of proof was not absolute.4 The defendant asserts that the instructions failed to impress upon the jury the need for them to reach a “subjective state of near certitude,” a standard approved by our Supreme Court in State v. DelVecchio, 191 Conn. 412, 419, 464 A.2d 813 (1983), quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 315, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560, reh. denied, 444 U.S. 890, 100 S. Ct. 195, 62 L. Ed. 2d 126 (1979). In State v. Ryerson, 201 Conn. 333, 341-42, 514 A.2d 337 (1986), however, our Supreme Court confirmed that the “near certitude” language quoted in State v. DelVecchio, supra, was not intended to be a required part of future jury instructions. The court in the Ryerson case approved an instruction containing language similar to the language used by the trial court in this case. State v. Ryerson, supra, 342-43 n.2; see also State v. Webb, 8 Conn. App. 620, 629-30, 514 A.2d 345 (1986) (approving a charge containing language “it is not necessary for the state to prove the absolute guilt [116]*116of the defendant with certainty”). On the basis of the foregoing, we conclude that the reasonable doubt charge, read as a whole as it must be, properly stated the law to the jury. State v. Dahlgren, 200 Conn. 586, 605, 512 A.2d 906 (1986).
The defendant also claims that the court’s charge on intent5 contained language that was erroneous and mis[117]*117leading. The defendant focuses, in particular, on a segment of the charge where the court stated that the jury should consider the amount of money involved in determining whether the defendant intentionally omitted the information from the application. The court then gave an example, stating “it’s easier to forget twenty-five dollars than it is a hundred thousand dollars.” The defendant also protests an additional definition of intent [118]*118at the end of the charge, where the court stated that “of course, intent, in addition to the statutory definition, is sometimes defined as speaking against your mind, you know one thing and you say another thing.”6
We note, initially, that the defendant’s focus on specific segments of the charge is contrary to the method of analysis approved by our Supreme Court. We will not examine any individual component of the charge out of context. It is well settled that a charge must be [119]*119considered in its entirety. State v. Dahlgren, supra; State v. Reddick, 197 Conn. 115, 132, 496 A.2d 466 (1985) , cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1067, 106 S. Ct. 822, 88 L. Ed. 2d 795 (1986). Individual passages comprising the jury instructions must be construed in the light of the charge as a whole. State v. Dahlgren, supra; State v. Williams, 199 Conn. 30, 37, 505 A.2d 699 (1986); State v. Nims, 8 Conn. App. 631, 641, 513 A.2d 1280 (1986) . The ultimate test is whether the charge, read in its entirety, fairly presents the case to the jury so that no injustice is done. State v. Storlazzi, 191 Conn. 453, 466, 464 A.2d 829 (1983); State v. Mullings, 166 Conn. 268, 274-75, 348 A.2d 645 (1974).
While the charge was to some extent inartful and contained extraneous elements, we find that it complied with the foregoing principle. Although the court’s monetary example was somewhat related to the facts of the case, the court took care to instruct the jury that it was the jury’s recollection of the facts, not the court’s, that was to control. “The trial court may, at its discretion, call the attention of the jury to the evidence, or lack of evidence, bearing upon any point in issue and may comment upon the weight of the evidence so long as it does not direct or advise the jury how to decide the matter.” State v. Mullings, supra. We do not find that the court, in using this example, directed the jury how to decide this matter. Furthermore, the colloquial definition of intent provided by the court, while not identical to the statutory definition, did in fact amplify it and was not inconsistent with it. In making these comments, the court was fulfilling its duty of furnishing a practical guide to the jury as to how the stated law is to be applied to the evidence. Shea v. Tousignant, 172 Conn. 54, 60, 372 A.2d 151 (1976). We find that this charge, read as a whole, fairly and correctly presented the case to the jury. State v. Nims, supra, 640-41. We further find that there is no reasonable pos[120]*120sibility that the jury was misled by the charge. State v. Lopez, 5 Conn. App. 599, 602-606, 502 A.2d 418 (1985), cert. denied, 199 Conn. 803, 506 A.2d 1467 (1986) .
In his third claim of error, the defendant argues that the court denied the defendant a fair trial by refusing the defendant’s request that correction officers accompanying the defendant cover up their indicia of authority. The defendant contends that the court’s refusal might have resulted in the jury’s knowing that he was incarcerated for another crime. We find no merit to this claim. Initially, we note that the very nature of the charge for which the defendant was on trial, a false statement in an application for a public defender, by logic and common sense would lead reasonable people to believe that he would not be seeking a public defender unless he were charged with a crime. More compelling and dispositive of this claim, however, is the fact that the defendant himself took the stand and admitted that he had been convicted during the year before the trial of a crime carrying a penalty of more than one year of imprisonment. This admission had the effect of nullifying any prejudicial influence the court’s action might have engendered. State v. Yates, 174 Conn. 16, 19, 381 A.2d 536 (1977); State v. Barber, 173 Conn. 153, 160, 376 A.2d 1108 (1977). Thus, even if we found error in the court’s refusal of the defendant’s request, the error would be rendered harmless by his admission at trial that he had been convicted of a crime requiring imprisonment.
In his fifth claim of error, the defendant contends that the court erred by refusing to allow an additional voir dire of selected jurors to determine whether they had overheard remarks regarding the defendant’s incarceration. Because this claim raises the same issue that is raised in the defendant’s third claim of error, i.e., whether the court’s refusal may have resulted in [121]*121the defendant being tried before a jury that may have known that he was incarcerated, our discussion of that claim is dispositive of this argument.
There is no error.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.