[Cite as State v. Pames, 2022-Ohio-616.]
COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
STATE OF OHIO, :
Plaintiff-Appellee, : No. 110647 v. :
CORNELIUS PAMES, :
Defendant-Appellant. :
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: March 3, 2022
Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Case Nos. CR-18-633079-A, CR-18-633735-A, CR-19-636100-A and CR-19-643254-A
Appearances:
Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Brandon A. Piteo, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.
Brian R. McGraw, for appellant.
EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, P.J.:
Defendant-appellant Cornelius Pames appeals the trial court’s denial
of his presentence motion to withdraw his guilty pleas. Pames contends that he
should have been permitted to withdraw his guilty pleas because (1) his father and his lawyers pressured him into changing his pleas and (2) he entered his guilty pleas
without “a full understanding of what he was doing.”
For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
Procedural and Factual Background
In 2018 and 2019, Pames was indicted on multiple charges in four
separate cases as follows.
On October 26, 2018, a Cuyahoga County Grand Jury indicted Pames
on four counts in Cuyahoga C.P. No. CR-18-633735-A (“633735”) — two counts of
importuning, one count of gross sexual imposition (with a sexually violent predator
specification), one count of kidnapping (with sexual motivation and sexually violent
predator specifications) and count of aggravated menacing. The charges related to
an incident in September 2018 in which Pames allegedly pushed a 14-year-old
victim onto a bed, restrained her and attempted sexual contact with her, pulling at
her top and trying to kiss her, before she was able to escape.
On November 1, 2018, a Cuyahoga County Grand Jury indicted
Pames on three counts of escape in Cuyahoga C.P. No. CR-18-633079-A (“633079”).
The charges were due to postrelease control violations.
On January 14, 2019, a Cuyahoga Grand Jury indicted Pames on
eleven counts in Cuyahoga C.P. No. CR-19-636100-A (“636100”) — two counts of
aggravated murder, one count of aggravated burglary, two counts of aggravated
robbery, two counts of kidnapping, one count of murder, one count of attempted
murder and two counts of felonious assault. The charges arose out of the September 17, 2018 assault of two elderly sisters, Eusebia Garcia, age 94, and
Marina Garcia, age 74, after Pames allegedly broke into the home of a relative with
whom they were staying. The sisters were from Honduras and were in the United
States visiting family. Eusebia later died from her injuries.
On August 29, 2019, a Cuyahoga County Grand Jury indicted Pames
on eight counts in Cuyahoga C.P. No. CR-19-643254-A (“643254” or the “rape case”)
— five counts of rape (four of which included sexually violent predator
specifications), two counts of kidnapping (with sexual motivation and sexually
violent predator specifications) and one count of aggravated burglary. The charges
arose out of an incident on October 1, 2018 in which Pames allegedly broke into a
residence, orally and vaginally raped an autistic 16-year-old girl multiple times and
then bound her to a chair with duct tape. DNA evidence obtained from the duct tape
linked Pames to the assault.
Pames initially pled not guilty to all charges. Significant plea
negotiations followed.
Plea Negotiations
During the course of the plea negotiations, the state extended several
plea offers to Pames, including a plea offer pursuant to which Pames would have
entered guilty pleas to the charges in the rape case only and proceeded to trial on the
charges in the other three cases. Pames rejected each of those offers; the rape case
proceeded to trial on May 10, 2021. On May 12, 2021, during the trial in the rape case, the parties reached
a plea agreement. The state set forth the terms of the parties’ plea agreement on the
record. Pursuant to the plea agreement, Pames agreed to plead guilty to the
following charges:
● In 643254, Pames agreed to plead guilty to two counts of rape (one of which was amended to delete the sexually violent predator specification), one amended count of kidnapping (deleting the sexual motivation and sexually violent predator specifications) and one count of aggravated burglary.
● In 636100, Pames agreed to plead guilty to an amended count of involuntary manslaughter, one count of aggravated burglary, two counts of kidnapping and one count of attempted murder.
● In 633735, Pames agreed to plead guilty to an amended count of gross sexual imposition (deleting the sexually violent predator specification) and an amended count of kidnapping (deleting the sexual motivation and sexually violent predator specifications).
● In 633079, Pames agreed to plead guilty to one count of escape.
As part of the plea agreement, the parties further agreed to an agreed sentencing
range of 30 to 40 years with no opportunity for judicial release. In exchange for
Pames’ guilty pleas, the remaining counts would be dismissed.
Defense counsel confirmed that the state had accurately represented
the terms of the plea agreement. Defense counsel further stated that he had
reviewed the terms of the plea agreement with Pames, that “[a]t this time it is
[Pames’] desire to withdraw his former pleas of not guilty on all four cases and enter
pleas of guilt as outlined by the State of Ohio,” and that he believed Pames’ guilty
pleas would be “knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily made” and that no threats or promises had been made to induce his guilty pleas except “the assumption and
* * * the notion that [the] Court will accept the agreed recommended sentence of 30
to 40 years.” The trial court indicated that it would accept the recommended
sentence and impose a sentence in the range of 30 to 40 years.
The trial court asked Pames whether the state and defense counsel
had accurately described the plea agreement as he understood it. Pames indicated
that they had done so. The trial court then proceeded with the plea colloquy.
The Plea Colloquy
In response to the trial judge’s preliminary questions, Pames
indicated that he was a 27-year-old United States citizen, that he attended high
school through 12th grade and that he was then on postrelease control. Pames stated
that he was not under the influence of any drugs or alcohol and that he was satisfied
with the representation he had received from his counsel. The trial judge advised
Pames of his constitutional rights and confirmed that Pames understood the rights
he would be waiving by entering his guilty pleas. The trial judge then identified each
count to which Pames would be pleading guilty, outlined the potential penalties he
faced on each of those counts and confirmed that Pames understood each of the
offenses to which he would be pleading guilty and the potential consequences of his
guilty pleas. Pames confirmed that no threats or promises had been made to him to
induce him to change his pleas other than what had been stated on the record that
day. Pames then entered guilty pleas to each of the counts at issue in accordance with the plea agreement. Pames further confirmed that he was, in fact, guilty of each
of the offenses to which he entered guilty pleas.
The trial court found that Pames had entered his guilty pleas
“knowingly and voluntarily, with a full understanding of his rights.” The trial court
accepted his guilty pleas and found that Pames was, in fact, guilty of the offenses at
issue. Upon inquiry by the trial court, the state and defense counsel both confirmed
that the trial court had complied with Crim.R. 11. The trial court ordered a
presentencing investigation report and mitigation of penalty report and scheduled
the sentencing hearing for the following month.
Motion to Withdraw Guilty Pleas
On June 17, 2021, the trial court held the sentencing hearing. At the
outset of the hearing, the trial judge indicated that he had received a handwritten
“letter” from Pames indicating that he wished to withdraw his guilty pleas (the
“letter”). The letter, entitled “Memorandum in Support,” stated:
I, Cornelius Pames, hereby rescind my plea of guilty to the charges against me, and reinstate my plea of not guilty on all charges. I am aware that I had accepted a negotiated plea agreement; however, I was not, at the time, in an appropriate state of mind and could not fully comprehend what I was agreeing to. This was due to receiving news of a dire medical diagnosis for an immediate family member, leaving me severely emotionally distraught.
I offer my sincere apologies to the court, Judge Corrigan, and all other parties involved, including the prosecutor and my own attorney. I, however, cannot, in good faith, accept the negotiated plea agreement at this time.
Please rescind my plea of guilty, and reinstate my plea of not guilty on all charges. The letter was undated but the envelope was postmarked May 19,
2021. Neither Pames nor his counsel filed a written motion to withdraw his guilty
pleas, and Pames’ letter was not filed with the trial court.
Upon inquiry by the trial court, Pames stated that he wanted to
withdraw his guilty pleas in 63307, 633735 and 636100 — all of the cases except the
rape case — and explained his reasons for seeking to withdraw his guilty pleas as
follows:
I didn’t understand fully. I had a family crisis. My father told me had cancer, so I was in the middle of dealing with that. I feel like I was forced into taking the plea and I didn’t understand a lot of stuff that you were saying then. The only reason I was saying yes is because I was told to say yes when you were reading the charges. I was told to say yes to all of them.
Before deciding to accept the state’s plea offer, Pames met with his
father. Pames stated that that his father told him, at that time, that he had been
diagnosed with cancer and that this affected Pames “[l]ike real bad,” “like in a bad
way” because “my father is all I really have.” Pames told the trial court that he had
only ever been willing to plead guilty to the offenses in the rape case and that,
notwithstanding his statements to the contrary during the plea colloquy, he did not
hear the trial court and did not understand that he was pleading guilty to offenses in
all four cases because his mind was focused on his father’s condition:
THE COURT: So what about that information caused you not to understand what was happening in the plea?
THE DEFENDANT: Because my mind was somewhere else. THE COURT: You didn’t hear what I said when you were responding?
THE DEFENDANT: No, not really.
THE COURT: Not really or you didn’t hear?
THE DEFENDANT: I didn’t.
THE COURT: You didn’t hear at all?
THE DEFENDANT: No, Your Honor.
***
THE COURT: All right. And you do recall that I asked you when you were entering your pleas about whether you were, in fact, guilty; do you recall that?
THE DEFENDANT: I really didn’t hear that part, sir.
THE COURT: You don’t recall?
THE DEFENDANT: No.
THE COURT: Or you didn’t hear it?
THE DEFENDANT: Didn’t hear it.
THE COURT: The transcript indicates that you answered yes when I asked you those questions. How do you explain your answer?
THE DEFENDANT: I was told when you talking — you ask me a question say yes. [Defense counsel] told me that, just say yes.
THE COURT: Okay. Because you didn’t answer yes to every question.
THE DEFENDANT: On the charges I did.
Pames further claimed that he was “forced” to enter the guilty pleas
because his attorneys told him he would receive a life sentence if he rejected the state’s plea offer and his father told him he needed to accept the plea agreement. As
Pames explained:
THE COURT: Right. You know that you pled in all four cases, right?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. I was only willing to plead to just the rape case.
THE COURT: All right. But you had been telling that to your attorneys for some time, right?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. I told them that that day, too. I told them and my father that same day.
THE COURT: And then you changed your mind?
THE DEFENDANT: No. I was forced to change my mind.
THE COURT: Someone forced you?
THE DEFENDANT: Because they said if I didn’t cop out to all of them I was going to get a life sentence.
THE COURT: Okay. Right. That was another potential consequence of several of the charges, life without parole. So that was true. What else forced you to change your mind and enter a plea?
THE DEFENDANT: My father talking to me. He told me that I better take the plea.
THE COURT: So your father gave you some advice?
THE DEFENDANT: He told me to take the plea. It wasn’t any advice. He told me to take the plea.
THE COURT: Okay. So how did that force you to change your plea?
THE DEFENDANT: Because any time — The way I was raised by him, anytime he say something it goes. When asked by the trial court whether she had any indication that
Pames “had difficulty understanding the process of the [change-of-plea] hearing,”
defense counsel stated that although she was “not able to speak” to Pames’ “mindset”
or “mental capacity” at that time, she had had multiple conversations with Pames
about what a plea would entail and the rights he would be giving up by entering into
a plea agreement. She stated that she not aware that Pames had any difficulty
understanding what was occurring during the change-of-plea hearing or that he
wished to withdraw his guilty pleas until she received a copy of the letter Pames sent
the trial judge. Defense counsel stated that although she was in the room when
Pames spoke with his father, she did not hear everything they said. She indicated,
however, that she did not hear what would lead her to believe that Pames “wasn’t
totally understanding” the terms of the state’s plea offer.
The trial court asked Pames whether he wished to make an oral
motion to withdraw his guilty pleas. Pames indicated that he did:
THE COURT: Mr. Pames, you wrote me a letter. You didn’t file a motion. Your attorneys have not filed a motion. You wish to file a motion with the Court?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: To do what?
THE DEFENDANT: To withdraw my guilty plea.
THE COURT: Which pleas?
THE DEFENDANT: The murder. I was willing to cop out to the rape. THE COURT: Okay. So you fully understood everything we talked about with the rape case when you pled?
THE DEFENDANT: Yeah.
Pames’ attorneys did not join in his oral motion. Although noting that
hybrid representation was not permitted, “out of an abundance of caution to give
[Pames] every opportunity to explore, this issue,” the trial court indicated that it
would consider Pames’ oral motion.
The state urged the trial court to deny Pames’ motion on the grounds
that “[n]othing about [Pames’] behavior” at the change-of-plea hearing indicated
emotional distress, a lack of understanding or any other issue on the part of Pames.
The state noted that the trial court had inquired “several times” as to whether Pames
understood “the nature of the plea as well as all of the rights that he was giving up
to enter into that plea agreement.” The state further noted that it had extended an
alternate plea offer to Pames, pursuant to which Pames would enter guilty pleas to
the charges in the rape case only and to proceed to trial in the other three cases, but
that Pames had rejected that offer. The state also noted that trial had begun in the
rape case, that significant progress had been made in selecting a jury before Pames
decided to accept the state’s plea offer and that “significant arrangements” had been
made to enable the victims’ family members to participate in the sentencing hearing
scheduled for that day. After confirming that Pames and defense counsel had nothing more
to “tell the [c]ourt” regarding the issue, the trial court denied Pames’ motion,
explaining its reasoning as follows:
So I have considered this information carefully and also considering all the information I have with respect to this defendant from psychological reports and my very vivid recollection of two days of trial, the opportunity the State gave for several different pleas, at least two, and the efforts made to make sure that his rights were preserved.
It doesn’t make sense to me at this point that you would understand one plea but somehow not understand his rights or be forced in the other cases. It just doesn’t add up, doesn’t make sense. Those are all discussed at the same hearing.
He has two extremely qualified, seasoned attorneys advising him; that he’s been advised for months with respect to all the issues in these cases; and that his specific answers to my questions indicated that he did knowingly, voluntarily, and with a full understanding of all his rights entered these guilty pleas.
I’d also note that there is a significant prejudice to the State of Ohio in the middle of the trial when he made these pleas. A very attentive, engaged jury panel that certainly had an [e]ffect on whether or not Mr. Pames should accept responsibility. I believe that definitely that voir dire was a motivating factor in Mr. Pames finally accepting responsibility in all his cases.
I’m going to deny his oral pro se motion at this time.
The trial court then proceeded with the sentencing hearing. After
hearing from Pames, defense counsel, the state, and family members of the victims,
reviewing the presentence investigation report, psychological evaluations of Pames
and various victim impact statements and considering “the principles and purposes
of felony sentencing [and] all the appropriate recidivism and serious factors as required by law,” the trial court sentenced Pames to a 40-year aggregate prison
sentence with no consideration of judicial release, as follows.
● In 643254, the trial court sentenced Pames to 10 years on each of the rape, kidnapping and aggravated burglary counts to be served concurrently with each other but consecutively to the sentences imposed in 636100 and 633735 and concurrently with the sentence imposed in 633079.
● In 636100, the trial court found that one of the kidnapping counts merged with the involuntary manslaughter count and that the other kidnapping count merged with the attempted murder count. The state elected to have Pames sentenced on the involuntary manslaughter and attempted murder counts. The trial court sentenced Pames to 10 years each on the involuntary manslaughter, aggravated burglary and attempted murder counts, with the sentence on the aggravated burglary count to be served concurrently with the sentences on the other counts and the sentences on the involuntary manslaughter and attempted murder counts to be served consecutively to each other and consecutively to the sentences imposed in 643254 and 633735 but concurrently with the sentence imposed in 633079.
● In 633735, the trial court found that the gross sexual imposition count merged with the kidnapping count, and the state elected to have Pames sentenced on the kidnapping count. The trial court sentenced Pames to 10 years on the kidnapping count to be served consecutively to the sentences imposed in 643254 and 636100 but concurrently with the sentence imposed in 633079.
● In 633079, the trial court sentenced Pames to 18 months on the escape count to be served concurrently with the sentences imposed in the other cases.
Pames was also sentenced to five years of mandatory postrelease control and
designated a Tier III sex offender.
Pames appealed, raising the following sole assignment of error for
review: The trial court abused its discretion in denying Pames’ request to withdraw his guilty pleas prior to sentencing.
Law and Analysis
We review a trial court’s ruling on a presentence motion to withdraw
a guilty plea for an abuse of discretion. State v. Xie, 62 Ohio St.3d 521, 527, 584
N.E.2d 715 (1992). Unless it is shown that the trial court acted unreasonably,
arbitrarily or unconscionably in denying a defendant's motion to withdraw a plea,
there is no abuse of discretion and the trial court’s decision must be affirmed. See,
e.g., State v. Musleh, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 105305, 2017-Ohio-8166, ¶ 36, citing
Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219, 450 N.E.2d 1140 (1983), and Xie at
527.
In general, “a presentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea should be
freely and liberally granted.” Xie at 527. However, even before the trial court
imposes a sentence, a defendant does not have an “absolute right” to withdraw a
plea. Id. at paragraph one of the syllabus. Before ruling on a presentence motion to
withdraw a plea, the trial court must conduct a hearing to determine whether there
is a reasonable and legitimate basis for withdrawal of the plea. Id. At the hearing,
the defendant is entitled to “‘full and fair consideration’” of his or her motion. State
v. Hines, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 108326, 2020-Ohio-663, ¶ 8, quoting State v.
Peterseim, 68 Ohio App.2d 211, 428 N.E.2d 863 (8th Dist.1980). It is “‘within the
sound discretion of the trial court’” to determine whether circumstances exist that
warrant withdrawal of the guilty plea. Xie at 526, quoting Barker v. United States, 579 F.2d 1219, 1223 (10th Cir.1978). A mere “change of heart” regarding a guilty
plea is not enough to justify withdrawal of a guilty plea. See, e.g., Musleh at ¶ 35;
State v. Shaw, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 102802, 2016-Ohio-923, ¶ 6.
This court has identified a number of nonexhaustive factors for trial
courts to consider when deciding a presentence motion to withdraw a plea. See, e.g.,
State v. Moore, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 108962, 108963 and 108964, 2020-Ohio-
3459, ¶ 56; State v. Walcot, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 99477, 2013-Ohio-4041, ¶ 19.
These factors include: (1) whether the motion was made in a reasonable time; (2)
whether the motion states specific reasons for withdrawal; (3) whether the
defendant understood the nature of the charges and the possible penalties; (4)
whether the defendant was perhaps not guilty or had a complete defense and (5)
whether the state would be prejudiced by the withdrawal of the plea. See, e.g.,
Moore at ¶ 56; Hines at ¶ 10; State v. Heisa, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 101877, 2015-
Ohio-2269, ¶ 19.
As a general matter, a trial court does not abuse its discretion in
denying a presentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea where (1) the defendant was
represented by highly competent counsel, (2) the defendant was afforded a full
hearing, pursuant to Crim.R. 11, before he or she entered the plea, (3) the defendant
was given a complete and impartial hearing on the motion to withdraw the guilty
plea and (4) the record reveals that the court gave full and fair consideration to the
plea withdrawal request. Peterseim, 68 Ohio App.2d 211, 428 N.E.2d 863, at
paragraph three of the syllabus; see also Moore at ¶ 57; State v. Armstrong, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 103088, 2016-Ohio-2627, ¶ 17. On the record before us, we cannot
say that the trial court abused its discretion in denying Pames’ motion to withdraw
his guilty pleas.
Pames contends that the trial court abused its discretion in denying
his presentence motion to withdraw his guilty pleas because (1) he had “explained,
in writing, and before he was sentenced” that he was “not fully engaged when he
pled guilty” and that he had been “forced” to plead guilty through “a combination of
pressure from his father and [his] lawyers,” (2) his “mouthing of ‘yes’ and ‘guilty’ did
not represent his state of mind at the time” and (3) the trial court’s questioning of
Pames at the sentencing hearing “did not, in any way, disturb his representation that
his guilty pleas were not made with a full understanding of what he was doing.”
In this case, Pames sought to withdraw his guilty pleas within a week
of entering them. However, he did not file a motion and his attorneys did not join
in his oral motion to withdraw his guilty pleas. For that reason alone, the trial court
could have properly denied Pames’ request. See, e.g., State v. Williams, 8th Dist.
Cuyahoga No. 109972, 2021-Ohio-2032, ¶ 15 (“It is well established that ‘[a]
criminal defendant has the right to counsel or the right to act pro se; however, a
defendant does not have the right to both, simultaneously, or “hybrid
representation.’” * * * Where a represented defendant makes an oral pro se motion
to withdraw his guilty plea, the trial court can refuse to entertain such motion.”),
quoting State v. Powell, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 107006, 2019-Ohio-346, ¶ 16; see also State v. Mongo, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 100926, 2015-Ohio-1139, ¶ 13-14, 17-
18; State v. Hill, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 107290, 2019-Ohio-1647, ¶ 11-14.
Nevertheless, the trial court held a hearing on Pames’ oral motion to
withdraw his guilty pleas. Pames does not claim that the hearing was incomplete or
impartial. Likewise, there is no dispute that Pames was represented throughout the
proceedings by two highly competent, “extremely qualified, seasoned” attorneys and
that he was afforded a full hearing, in compliance with Crim.R. 11, before he entered
his guilty pleas. The record reflects that the trial court gave full and fair
consideration to Pames’ request to withdraw his guilty pleas.
Pames’ claim that he “didn’t hear” the trial court during the plea
colloquy or did not understand that he was pleading guilty to any offenses — other
than those in the rape case — is not credible and is contradicted by the record. The
trial judge who ruled on Pames’ motion was present for, and actively engaged with
Pames throughout, the change-of-plea hearing. Pames pled guilty to a total of 12
counts — four counts in the rape case and eight counts in the other three cases. At
the outset of the plea hearing, the state outlined the parties’ plea agreement in detail,
identifying each of the 12 counts to which Pames would be pleading guilty. Defense
counsel confirmed that the state had accurately described the plea agreement and
Pames also expressly acknowledged that the state and defense counsel had
accurately described the plea agreement as he understood it. Before beginning the
plea colloquy, the trial judge told Pames, “I’m going to ask you some questions for
the record.” He instructed Pames, “[i]f there’s anything that I ask that you don’t understand, let me know and I’ll explain it to you.” Although Pames claimed that he
“didn’t hear” or understand anything the trial judge said — except with respect to
the rape case — the transcript reveals that Pames provided intelligent and
appropriate responses to each and every question posed by the trial judge during the
change-of-plea hearing. During the plea colloquy, the trial court carefully described
each offense to which Pames would be pleading guilty, including the nature of the
offense, the date of the offense, the victim of the offense and the potential penalty
associated with the offense. Pames indicated that he understood each offense to
which he would be pleading guilty and that he was, in fact, guilty of each such
offense. It strains credulity to believe that Pames heard and understood everything
with respect to the rape case but was too distracted during the change-of-plea
hearing to hear and understand the information that was provided with respect to
his guilty pleas in the other cases.
When the trial court asked Pames at the sentencing hearing what
questions he had about the guilty pleas, i.e., what did he not understand about the
guilty pleas, Pames did not provide a cogent response:
THE COURT: What did you not understand?
THE DEFENDANT: A lot of stuff like stuff you were reading about appeals and all that stuff.
THE COURT: Appeals?
THE DEFENDANT: Of all the stuff you were reading.
THE COURT: You remember me talking about appeals? THE DEFENDANT: Yes. You said that I wouldn’t be allowed to appeal. That’s the only part I understood.
THE COURT: Okay. So what questions do you have about the plea?
THE DEFENDANT: Like just when I told my father and I’ve been telling him and telling them only terms I was ready — or willing to cop out to was the rape charge. Both my attorneys knew that and my family knew. I even said it on the phone I was agreeing to cop out to the rape and that was it.
Likewise, Pames’ claim that he was “forced” to enter guilty pleas in
633079, 633735 and 636100 is not supported by the record.
The uncertainty associated with going to trial and the fear of being
found guilty of, and sentenced on, more offenses (or more serious offenses) than the
defendant would have been convicted of had he or she accepted a plea agreement is
a motivation that underlies virtually all guilty pleas. The fact that a defendant may
have felt “pressured” to enter a guilty plea is not a sufficient basis upon which to
withdraw a plea in the absence of evidence of coercion. See, e.g., Moore, 2020-Ohio-
3459, at ¶ 60; Shaw, 2016-Ohio-923, at ¶ 6-9; see also Musleh, 2017-Ohio-8166, at
¶ 42-44 (defendant’s claim that he had been “confused, depressed, and worried
about his family” when he entered his no contest plea was not sufficient to warrant
withdrawal of his plea). To show coercion in the entry of a guilty plea, ‘“an appellant
must submit supporting material containing evidence that the guilty plea was
induced by false promises.’” Shaw at ¶ 6, quoting State v. Thomas, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 85294, 2005-Ohio-4145, ¶ 5, citing State v. Kapper, 5 Ohio St.3d 36,
448 N.E.2d 823 (1983).
Defense counsel’s expression of opinion regarding the strength of the
state’s case, his or her explanation of the worst-case scenario or other possible
sentencing scenarios (including the potential that the defendant could receive
multiple life sentences) if the defendant were to go to trial and lose, and defense
counsel’s recommendation regarding whether to accept a plea deal does not amount
to coercion or duress sufficient to justify withdrawal of a guilty plea; “it is merely
evidence of * * * defense counsel doing his job.” Walcot, 2013-Ohio-4041, at ¶ 24;
see also State v. Martre, 3d Dist. Allen No. 1-18-61, 2019-Ohio-2072, ¶ 15 (“simply
stating the projected outcome of a trial based upon the evidence * * * is not
necessarily duress”).
Further, the record contains nothing to support Pames’ assertion that
defense counsel “pressured” him to accept the state’s plea offer. To the contrary, the
record shows that Pames freely rejected other plea offers the state had made. Pames
has not claimed that he was threatened in any way by defense counsel, that he was
promised anything he did not receive in exchange for his guilty pleas by defense
counsel or that defense counsel (or anyone else) provided him with incomplete or
inaccurate information with regard to the offenses with which he was charged, the
sentences for those offenses or the evidence in support of the state’s case against
him. At the change-of-plea hearing, Pames stated that he was satisfied with the
representation he had received from his counsel. Pames does not claim that he did not commit the offenses to which he pled guilty or that he had any potential
defenses. And although Pames asserts that any prejudice to the state as a result of
the withdrawal of his guilty pleas would be “limited,” i.e., that “asking a prosecutor
to ‘resurrect’ a file and move it from the ‘pled guilty’ drawer to the ‘get ready for trial
drawer’ is an inconvenience (and upsetting) but it doesn’t rise to the level of
prejudice,” the record reflects otherwise. The trial court specifically found, as
detailed above, that there was “a significant prejudice” to the state, i.e., that “[a] very
attentive, engaged jury panel” had been seated “that certainly had an [e]ffect on
whether or not Mr. Pames should accept responsibility.” Nothing in the record
contradicts that finding.
Likewise, Pames’ statement that his father told him to “take the plea”
is not sufficient evidence of “coercion” to warrant withdrawal of Pames’ guilty pleas.
See, e.g., Shaw, 2016-Ohio-923, at ¶ 9 (‘“feeling pressured’ into pleading guilty on
the day of his trial by his father’s presence” was “not synonymous with ‘being
coerced’”); State v. Slater, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 101358, 2014-Ohio-5552, ¶ 13
(“family pressure” to enter guilty plea ‘“does not necessarily show coercion’” in the
absence of evidence that the defendant was competent or incapable of making his
own decision), quoting State v. Westley, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 97650, 2012-Ohio-
3571, ¶ 8; State v. Christian, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 16 MA 0148, 2017-Ohio-9373,
¶ 37 (noting that “family pressure is generally insufficient to show coercion,
particularly when the defendant was capable of making his own decision” and that
“[n]o case can be found where a plea was permitted to be withdrawn due to family pressure”); State v. Mitchell, 11th Dist. Portage No. 94-P-0070, 1995 Ohio App.
LEXIS 2803, 5 (June 30, 1995) (although familial “advice” or “pressure” may be
probative of a defendant’s motivation for entering guilty pleas, it does not constitute
coercion, duress or involuntariness); cf. State v. Sidney, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No.
70686, 1997 Ohio App. LEXIS 2914, 2, 7-8 (July 3, 1997) (concluding that trial court
did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant’s presentence motion to withdraw
guilty plea and that defendant merely had a “change of heart” regarding his guilty
plea where defendant claimed that that he was “not thinking clearly” when he
entered guilty pleas because he was “under tremendous stress” due to wife’s
upcoming surgery for breast cancer but made no mention of his wife’s surgery or
any stress he was experiencing at change-of-plea hearing); State v. Vales, 8th Dist.
Cuyahoga Nos. 102014 and 102015, 2015-Ohio-3874, ¶ 13-14, 30-31 (trial court did
not abuse its discretion in denying defendant’s presentence motion to withdraw his
guilty pleas where defendant claimed that he “felt great pressure in making [his
decision to plead guilty] because of the possible life sentence, being on the brink of
trial, and considering his prior conviction versus the credibility of the alleged victim
in the case, and the age of the case”).
At the change-of-plea hearing, Pames made no mention of his father’s
health condition or any related stress and repeatedly acknowledged that no threats
or promises had been made to him to induce him to change his pleas other than
what had been stated on the record that day. Pames has provided no specifics on
how his father allegedly coerced him into entering his guilty pleas other than to state “anytime he say something it goes.” However, at the time of his guilty pleas, Pames
was 27 years old. There is nothing in the record to suggest that Pames was not
competent and capable of making his own choices.
It was within the trial court’s province to determine whether Pames’
arguments in support of his motion to withdraw his guilty pleas were reasonable and
legitimate. We defer to the trial court’s judgment in evaluating the “good faith,
credibility and weight” of Pames’ assertions in entering and attempting to withdraw
his guilty pleas. See, e.g., Westley at ¶ 12, citing Xie, 62 Ohio St.3d at 525, 584
N.E.2d 715. Pames has not shown that his guilty pleas were entered unwillingly,
were entered without an understanding of the consequences or that false promises
were made to him to induce his guilty pleas. Where, as here, a defendant offers no
evidence, “other than mere persuasion and convincing by family and counsel” that
his guilty pleas were coerced, a trial court does not abuse its discretion in denying a
defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty pleas. See, e.g., Westley at ¶ 12-13.
Based on the record before us, we cannot say that the trial court
abused its discretion in denying Pames’ oral motion to withdraw his guilty pleas.
Pames’ assignment of error is overruled.
Judgment affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant the costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the
Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant’s convictions having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is
terminated.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27
of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
_________________________________ EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, PRESIDING JUDGE
EMANUELLA D. GROVES, J., and MARY J. BOYLE, J., CONCUR