NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
No. 128,646
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF KANSAS
STATE OF KANSAS,
Appellee,
v.
NATALIE NICOLE PALMER,
Appellant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appeal from Cowley District Court; NICHOLAS M. ST. PETER, judge. Submitted without oral argument. Opinion filed August 21, 2026. Affirmed.
Randall L. Hodgkinson, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, for appellant.
Ian T. Otte, deputy county attorney, and Kris W. Kobach, attorney general, for appellee.
Before HILL, P.J., ARNOLD-BURGER, J., and ANDREA PURVIS, District Judge, assigned.
PER CURIAM: Natalie Nicole Palmer (Natalie) appeals her convictions for nonresidential burglary, theft, and two counts of criminal damage to property. She challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to convict her and the district court's instruction to the jury on aiding and abetting. Finding no error, we affirm.
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FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In 2023, the State charged Natalie with committing a nonresidential burglary, a misdemeanor theft, and two misdemeanor counts of criminal damage to property, related to a break-in at the Main Street Storage facility in Udall.
In October 2024, the district court held a two-day jury trial. Because Natalie challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, a detailed recitation of the testimony is necessary.
Archer Blakney, a tenant of at the Main Street Storage facility in Udall, testified that on or about May 10, 2023, as he pulled up to his storage unit, a red SUV was "parked kind of suspiciously" in front of his unit. Adding to his suspicion, Blakney stated that when he pulled up, he saw the occupants jump out of the SUV. Blakney explained that he knew the owner of the storage facility and was aware of recent break-ins, which is what prompted him to record the SUV's temporary tag number and text it to the storage facility's owner, Bob Clasen.
Blakney stated that the SUV was blocking his access and he needed them to move their vehicle so he could get into his unit. Blakney described the SUV as parked "kind of weird" so he walked up to the occupants and asked them if they were having issues. The occupants told him that the SUV had overheated. Blakney explained that he offered to help because he was a mechanic, but they declined and seemed to have no problem moving their SUV forward. Blakney testified that during his encounter he did not notice any boxes or other materials in the SUV. Blakney added that the lock to his unit was intact when he left the facility that night, but it was discovered to have been cut when he returned the next day. Blakney stated that he did not recognize the occupants of the SUV. However, after pictures were presented to him by the police, he identified Natalie and her husband, Robert Palmer (Robert) as the people he saw.
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Clasen testified that he lives about a block from the storage facility, and explained that the facility is not directly accessible from the highway and typically requires traversing into town and following the road on the west side of the facility. Clasen also explained the layout of the storage facility and the positioning of the camera surveillance. During testimony, Clasen reviewed surveillance photos taken from his deer alert cameras, which take still pictures when movement is detected. Clasen reviewed the surveillance photos which showed Blakney and Natalie's SUV. Clasen also observed that the surveillance photos showed Natalie walking around the storage facility after Blakney left the facility. He did not recognize Natalie as a tenant.
Clasen explained that after Blakney contacted him, he drove through the facility but did not see anyone or notice whether locks were cut. He pointed out that additional surveillance photos showed the same SUV reappear at the storage facility about ten minutes after he had left. Clasen added that he daily and routinely drives through and checks the storage units. He stated that he observed no damage on the morning before Natalie's visit, but the following morning, he discovered that several units had either their locks cut or their latches broken. He called the police. Clasen notified the tenants who had locks cut off their units, including Travis Hart—a tenant who reported his property had been stolen.
Clasen acknowledged that he did not have any pictures that showed Natalie outside her SUV on its second visit to the facility. Clasen stated that the vehicle that reappeared had the "same luggage rack, same back, same reflectors, same taillights." Clasen testified that when the SUV returned a second time, it was parked right out of frame which would have been in front of Hart's unit. Clasen acknowledged that surveillance did not show Hart's storage unit nor did it capture any locks being cut or any boxes being loaded in the SUV.
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Clasen recognized that there were gaps in camera coverage. Nor did he know the range in which the cameras can detect motion. Clasen explained that it is possible that the cameras do not always pick up motion that may be farther away or smaller objects. Clasen explained that a unit containing his previous surveillance system had been broken into two days before the night in question, during which the wires were cut and all the hard drives were taken.
Out of the storage unit tenants whose locks had been cut, Hart was the only tenant to report missing property. Hart testified that after being notified that the lock on his unit had been cut, he went to the facility and noticed that a guitar, video game systems, several video games, and a box of DVDs were missing from his unit. Hart provided a list of missing items to the police. He testified that when his missing items were returned to him, there were more items in a box marked "Travis' electronics," that he did not even realize were missing. A Wii gaming console was also recovered, and Hart provided its serial number to confirm that it belonged to him. Hart testified that he had since realized a subwoofer and an amplifier were missing.
Captain Kendra Boyer of the Udall Police Department testified that after she received the SUV's tag number and the list of missing items from Hart, she identified Natalie as the owner of the SUV and located her address in Garden Plain. Boyer explained that she contacted Lieutenant Crownover at the Garden Plain Police Department. Crownover confirmed Natalie's address and also informed Boyer that Natalie had a storage unit in Garden Plain. Boyer obtained a search warrant for Natalie's Garden Plain residence and storage unit.
While executing the search warrant, police encountered Natalie's father at the main residence, who directed them to a backyard dwelling where Natalie and Robert lived. Police found Hart's stolen property in both Natalie's residence and her storage unit.
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Boyer reviewed another photo showing a letter that was found in Natalie's dwelling, addressed to Robert at the Sedgwick County Detention Facility. Boyer acknowledged that the letter was returned to Natalie, showing Robert was apparently no longer in jail. Boyer confirmed that the police did not exclude Robert as a suspect.
On cross-examination defense counsel asked Boyer how she was able to conclude that Natalie stole anything and not Robert. Boyer stated that the items were recovered from Natalie's residence, that two witnesses identified Natalie, and that she appears in a photograph walking around with a flashlight. Boyer added that Natalie's father said her storage unit contained only Natalie's belongings, but that the victim's items were also found in Natalie's storage unit. Boyer noted that the police were unable to locate Robert to interview him.
Boyer acknowledged that she did not know if Natalie was the only person who had access to Natalie's residence or storage unit. Boyer also recognized that no evidence showed Natalie driving the SUV when it returned for the second time on the evening in question.
Lieutenant Bryan Crownover testified that he was familiar with Natalie by sight.
Crownover stated that he often ran radar traffic enforcement in view of Natalie's storage unit in Garden Plain and also drives by it "10, 15 times a day." Because of those activities, he regularly saw Natalie access her storage unit and never saw anyone else access it without Natalie present.
Natalie's father testified that Natalie lived in the shed in his backyard and that Robert also lived there.
At the conclusion of testimony, the district court addressed the State's requested instruction on aiding and abetting. Defense counsel objected, arguing that it was factually
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inappropriate because the State's theory during trial was that Natalie acted alone. The district court overruled the objection based on the evidence that Robert was identified as a person at the storage facility and because of the testimony that he also stayed in Natalie's residence.
Finally, a review of the admitted surveillance pictures established that on the night in question, Natalie's SUV was positioned between the two storage buildings directly in front of one of the storage units. After Blakney left, Natalie exited the SUV and walked away from the SUV along the side of the storage units with a light. Less than two minutes later, she walked back towards the SUV. Approximately eight minutes later, her SUV exited the facility with its headlights on. Natalie's SUV returned shortly thereafter and again was parked between the storage units and positioned itself in substantially the same area as before, this time just outside the surveillance camera's view. The SUV remained in that area for nearly an hour, during which a light appeared minutes before the SUV left the facility without its headlights or taillights on.
A jury convicted Natalie as charged.
ANALYSIS
On appeal, Natalie challenges both the sufficiency of the evidence and the district court's ruling on the aiding and abetting jury instruction.
THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT EACH OF NATALIE'S CONVICTIONS
When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, this court reviews "the evidence in a light most favorable to the State to determine whether a rational fact- finder could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Mendez, 319 Kan. 718, 723, 559 P.3d 792 (2024). It does "not reweigh evidence, resolve
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conflicts in the evidence, or pass on the credibility of witnesses." 319 Kan. at 723. "'A reviewing court need only look to the evidence in favor of the verdict to determine whether the essential elements of a charge are sustained.'" State v. Barnes, 320 Kan. 147, 177, 563 P.3d 1255 (2025). "It is only in rare cases where the testimony is so incredible that no reasonable fact-finder could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt that a guilty verdict will be reversed." State v. Zeiner, 316 Kan. 346, 350, 515 P.3d 736 (2022).
Natalie contends that any inference that she engaged in any criminal activity is stacked upon an inference that she was even present at the scene of the crimes at the time of the crimes. According to her, the jury had to infer (1) that she was present during the second time period and then, from that fact, (2) further infer that she engaged in the criminal acts charged and was not just a passive observer. Natalie does not contest that any of the crimes occurred, only that the evidence does not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that she committed them.
The State claims the evidence supports an inference that Natalie returned to the storage units later that night after her encounter with Blakney and committed the offenses. And these inferences are independent of each other, not dependent. Natalie, on the other hand, claims the evidence is just as consistent with the possibility that she was a passive observer to Robert committing these crimes.
Here, the evidence consisted mostly of circumstantial evidence. The gravest offense can rest entirely on circumstantial evidence. Barnes, 320 Kan. at 178. Sufficient circumstantial evidence does not have to rule out every other reasonable conclusion to sustain a conviction. 320 Kan. at 177-78. At the same time, convictions based entirely on circumstantial evidence present a special challenge for appellate courts because the underlying circumstances must themselves be proved and cannot be inferred or presumed from other circumstances. Zeiner, 316 Kan. at 350; see State v. Valdez, 316 Kan. 1, 11-
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12, 512 P.3d 1125 (2022) (circumstances used to infer guilt must be proved and cannot be inferred or presumed from other circumstances).
Several key facts are undisputed: Robert and Natalie were in her SUV at the storage facility on the night in question and visited with Blakney; Natalie's SUV left but soon thereafter returned to the storage facility a second time. Locks on the units were intact around the time of Natalie's first visit to the facility. The next morning, locks and latches on storage units were cut. Items were missing from Hart's storage unit. Hart's missing items were found in Natalie's residence. Additional reported stolen items were found in Natalie's personal storage unit in Garden Plain. Absent from the record is any direct evidence of Natalie exiting the vehicle and moving throughout the facility during the second visit, or of her cutting the locks and latches, or loading items into her SUV.
Because this is one string of events, the offenses are inextricably intertwined, with each relying in part on the same underlying facts and evidence. That said, each conviction is discussed in turn.
1. Nonresidential burglary
Nonresidential burglary occurs when an individual lacks authority, and enters any building or another structure which is not a dwelling with the intent to commit a theft therein. K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 21-5807(a)(2).
Kansas law firmly establishes that burglary convictions may rest entirely on circumstantial evidence, provided that evidence allows a rational factfinder to reasonably infer guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Mitchell, 3 Kan. App. 2d 635, 641-42, 599 P.2d 1025 (1979). In Mitchell, the defendant was found at the scene of a nighttime burglary in an area where an individual normally would not be at that time, observed hiding behind a van containing items from the burglarized building, and then tried to flee.
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The Mitchell court determined those facts provided the basis in the evidence for a reasonable inference of guilt and that a rational trier of facts could have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 3 Kan. App. 2d at 642.
There is no dispute Natalie lacked authority to enter Hart's unit. Even though there is no direct evidence showing Natalie entered Hart's unit, there are several pieces of circumstantial evidence that create a reasonable basis to conclude that she intended to enter Hart's storage unit with the intent to commit theft.
a. Entry
Clasen established that on the morning of the 10th all the locks were intact during his routine daily check on his property. Blakney's interaction revealed that Natalie had no items in her vehicle during the first visit to the facility. Also, Blakney's lock was not damaged during Natalie's initial visit, which establishes that no burglary had yet occurred. The locks and latches were intact before Natalie's vehicle returned at about 9:40 p.m. and were found compromised the following morning. This narrow window of opportunity coincides with the period when Natalie's SUV was present but off camera.
The owner of the storage units testified when he reviewed motion-triggered surveillance stills sent to his phone overnight that he saw the same suspicious SUV; and he provided all photos that contained the SUV's activity. Natalie's vehicle was positioned between the two storage buildings directly in front of a storage unit. Surveillance shows no other parties at the facility, leaving no evidentiary basis for another party to have gone into Hart's unit. Because no damage was observed before the return of Natalie's vehicle, and the unit was found forcibly entered the next day, a reasonable inference is that the break-in occurred during that second visit. And finally, the stolen property appearing in Natalie's residence and her storage unit in Garden Plain provides a reasonable basis that she had entered Hart's unit to take it.
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b. Intent to commit theft
There was no legitimate reason for Natalie to be at the storage unit facility. There was no evidence presented that she had a storage unit there and Clasen did not recognize her as one of his tenants. Although she reported to Blakney that she was there because her car had overheated, the storage facility was not directly accessible from the highway and typically requires traversing into town and following the road on the west side of the facility. And because the very nature of that facility is to store property, the reasonable inference to be made is that when someone enters a unit without authorization, they intend to commit theft. Blakney's decision to report the license plate reflects that the situation appeared suspicious at the time. After Blakney left, only Natalie is shown walking around the facility with a flashlight. From this evidence, a jury can reasonably infer that Natalie's presence was intentional and for purposes of surveying the area, not for a mechanical issue. This also supports the inference that Natalie was an active participant and not a passive observer as she suggests.
The vehicle's return shortly after leaving suggests a deliberate plan rather than coincidence. Parking outside the camera's view supports the inference that the occupants were attempting to avoid detection, at a minimum to avoid view from the road, and possibly also from the surveillance camera. Leaving without the headlights turned on suggests an attempt to avoid detection. This element is also established by the circumstantial evidence that she did commit theft upon entering the unit.
2. Theft
Natalie was also convicted of theft under K.S.A. 21-5801(a)(1), which defines theft as any act of obtaining or exerting unauthorized control over property, done with intent to permanently deprive the owner of the possession, use, or benefit of the owner's
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property. The property did not belong to her, as testimony established that Hart identified several items as his and even provided a serial number for the missing Wii.
During the second trip to the storage facility, the SUV remained for nearly one hour. The nearly hour-long presence provides enough time to enter the unit and remove property. During this time, the motion-activated trail cameras were triggered, and a light appeared. Five minutes later the SUV drove around the corner without headlights. Because five minutes elapsed between that first appearance of light and the SUV's departure, it is reasonable to infer that the light was not from vehicle movement, like shifting into gear. The appearance of light, combined with the fact that the vehicle did not leave for several minutes thereafter, support the inference that the light was coming from the rear of the vehicle, consistent with the hatch or cargo area being opened and used during loading or securing items before leaving. Because the locks were not damaged before the second visit of Natalie's vehicle to the facility, and the locks were discovered cut the next morning, a reasonable inference is that she was the person who broke into Hart's unit to steal property.
The presence of the stolen property in Natalie's residence overwhelmingly supports the inference that she is the person who took that property. As the State points out, the discovery of stolen property in her Garden Plain residence and storage unit independently supports the inference that she committed theft. No stacking is necessary for that inference to exist. The additional evidence only strengthens the argument that she is the person who took the property. Also, her suspicious presence where the items were taken, within the narrow time frame in which the thefts occurred, creates the inference of how she came into possession of that property.
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3. Criminal damage to property
Natalie was convicted of two counts of criminal damage to property; one charge was based on Clasen's interest as an owner of a latch mechanism on a storage unit, the other was in regard to Hart's interest as an owner of a padlock on a storage unit. Criminal damage to property under K.S.A. 21-5813(a)(1) is defined as "[k]nowingly damaging, destroying, defacing or substantially impairing the use of any property in which another has an interest without the consent of such other person" by means other than by fire or explosive.
Natalie possessed Hart's property, which supports the inference that she entered the unit. Because the unit's lock and latch had been cut, that same evidence supports the inference that she gained entry by cutting the lock and latch. The what—possession of stolen property—establishes the how—forced entry. That is what ties Natalie to both the contents of the unit and the damage to the lock and latch.
For circumstantial evidence to be considered sufficient it need not rise to a degree of certainty that excludes any and all other reasonable conclusions. State v. Logsdon, 304 Kan. 3, 25, 371 P.3d 836 (2016). Instead, it is evidence that "'tends to prove a fact in issue by proving other events or circumstances which, according to the common experience of mankind, are usually or always attended by the fact in issue.'" 304 Kan. at 25.
4. Robert's Involvement
The possibility that Robert may also have been involved does not undermine this conclusion. See Barnes, 320 Kan. at 177-78 (sufficient circumstantial evidence does not have to rule out every other reasonable conclusion to sustain a conviction). Natalie's attempt to shift suspicion toward Robert does not negate the jury's ability to reasonably
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conclude that she committed theft, criminal damage to property, and burglary. His participation does not absolve all the evidence pointing to her. The evidence supports that Natalie herself participated in the burglary and theft, whether acting alone or with another. A rational factfinder could rely on this combination of direct evidence and reasonable inferences to conclude that Natalie committed the charged offenses. As analyzed below, she could be convicted of these crimes as an aider and abettor. State v. McCray, 321 Kan. 439, 445, 580 P.3d 682 (2025) ("'[A]iding and abetting is not a separate crime in Kansas. Instead, it extends criminal liability to a person other than the principal actor.'"); State v. Dupree, 304 Kan. 377, 385-86, 373 P.3d 811 (2016) ("[T]he State is not required to use the words "'aiding and abetting'" in the charging document in order to pursue a theory of accomplice liability at trial.").
When viewed as a whole, the evidence forms a consistent and logical sequence.
Natalie is identified at the scene, engages in suspicious conduct, and leaves. Immediately after, the owner does not notice damage to any units. Natalie's vehicle then returns, is positioned out of camera view, remains for an extended period with visible activity, and leaves in a manner suggesting an effort to avoid detection. Only after this sequence of events is the unit discovered to have been forcibly entered, with the stolen property later recovered from Natalie's residence. The combination of direct and circumstantial evidence strongly supports the conclusion that Natalie committed the burglary, theft, and criminal damage to property. A rational factfinder could reasonably reach that conclusion based on the evidence presented.
THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR BY INSTRUCTING THE JURY ON AIDING AND ABETTING
Natalie argues that because the record does not contain sufficient evidence that she aided and abetted Robert in committing the charged crimes, the district court erred by giving the aiding and abetting instruction as it was factually inappropriate.
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Generally, when analyzing jury instruction issues, this court follows a three-step process:
"(1) determine whether the appellate court can or should review the issue, in other words, whether there is a lack of appellate jurisdiction or a failure to preserve the issue for appeal; (2) consider the merits of the claim to determine whether error occurred below; and (3) assess whether the error requires reversal—in other words, whether the error can be deemed harmless." State v. Hollins, 320 Kan. 240, 242, 564 P.3d 778 (2025).
Steps one and three are interrelated because whether a party preserved a jury instruction issue affects this court's reversibility inquiry at step three. State v. Peters, 319 Kan. 492, 515, 555 P.3d 1134 (2024); State v. Holley, 313 Kan. 249, 254, 485 P.3d 614 (2021); State v. McLinn, 307 Kan. 307, 317, 409 P.3d 1 (2018).
At the first step, Natalie objected to the instruction, which preserved the issue for review. At the second step, appellate courts consider whether the aiding and abetting instruction was legally and factually appropriate, using an unlimited standard of review of the entire record. See Holley, 313 Kan. at 254. A legally appropriate jury instruction must fairly and accurately state the law and cover every essential element of the charged crime. State v. Gomez, 320 Kan. 3, 10, 561 P.3d 908 (2025). Neither party suggests that the instruction was legally deficient in any way, so the court may assume the instruction provided an accurate recitation of Kansas' aiding and abetting law. State v. Volle, 321 Kan. 447, 466, 580 P.3d 1223 (2025).
Review at the second step focuses solely on whether the aiding and abetting instruction was factually appropriate. In determining whether an instruction was factually appropriate, courts must determine whether there was sufficient evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the State, or the requesting party, that would have supported the instruction. See Volle, 321 Kan. at 466. "'Such an inquiry is closely akin to the sufficiency of the evidence review frequently performed by appellate courts in criminal
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cases.'" Gomez, 320 Kan. at 11 (quoting State v. Milo, 315 Kan. 434, 447, 510 P.3d 1 [2022]). Again, "[c]ircumstantial evidence is enough to support a conviction of even the gravest offense. In analyzing this issue, appellate courts do not reweigh the evidence, resolve conflicts in the evidence, or pass on the credibility of witnesses." Volle, 321 Kan. at 466.
The State requested that the district court issue the following jury instruction on aiding and abetting:
"A person is criminally responsible for a crime committed by another if the person, either before or during its commission, and with the mental culpability required to commit the crime intentionally aids the other person to commit the crime.
"All participants in a crime are equally responsible without regard to the extent of their participation. However, mere association with another person who actually commits the crime or mere presence in the vicinity of the crime is insufficient to make a person criminally responsible for the crime."
Here, the court gave a general aiding and abetting instruction to all the crimes charged which mirrors Pattern Instructions Kansas Criminal 4th 52.140 (2021 Supp.). As explained in Volle, this instruction sets out several related principles of accomplice liability. 321 Kan. at 467. K.S.A. 21-5210 codifies this theory of liability:
"(a) A person is criminally responsible for a crime committed by another if such person, acting with the mental culpability required for the commission thereof, advises, hires, counsels or procures the other to commit the crime or intentionally aids the other in committing the conduct constituting the crime.
"(b) A person liable under subsection (a) is also liable for any other crime committed in pursuance of the intended crime if reasonably foreseeable by such person as a probable consequence of committing or attempting to commit the crime intended.
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"(c) A person liable under this section may be charged with and convicted of the crime although the person alleged to have directly committed the act constituting the crime:
(1) Lacked criminal or legal capacity; (2) has not been convicted." K.S.A. 21-5210.
Mere association with a bad actor cannot establish guilt through accomplice liability. State v. Llamas, 298 Kan. 246, 253, 311 P.3d 399 (2013). "'[T]o be guilty of aiding and abetting a defendant must willfully and knowingly associate himself with the unlawful venture and willfully participate in it as he would in something he wishes to bring about or to make succeed.'" 298 Kan. at 253. An aiding-and-abetting instruction is factually appropriate if, based on the totality of the evidence, the jury could reasonably conclude that Natalie aided and abetted Robert in the commission of the crime. See State v. Shields, 315 Kan. 814, 835, 511 P.3d 931 (2022).
Natalie argues that even if she was aware of Robert's crimes and did not stop them, it does not make her an aider and abettor. She also argues that there is no evidentiary basis for the finding that she affirmatively aided Robert in committing the crimes.
As earlier explained, direct evidence shows that Natalie and Robert were present at the storage units after dark on the night of the burglary. Natalie exited her SUV and walked around the units. The vehicle left, later returned, and shortly thereafter a vehicle was parked near the unit that was burglarized. Property taken in the burglary was later found in Natalie's residence and storage unit, which she shared with Robert.
True, there is no direct evidence identifying who entered the storage unit or removed the property, nor any specific arrangement between Natalie and Robert. But as already noted, the absence of direct evidence showing who committed the crimes does not mean there is no evidence of guilt. Under applicable law, circumstantial evidence may support a conviction. Volle, 321 Kan. at 466. Viewed in a light most favorable to the
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State, sufficient evidence could support a jury's finding that Natalie willfully and knowingly associated with and participated in a criminal venture beyond mere association. That evidence could support a reasonable conclusion that Natalie, Robert, or both acted together in committing all the crimes to Hart's unit. The evidence is strongest against Natalie as the photos show her exiting the vehicle and the stolen items were found in locations that were primarily hers. Yet Robert was also present and had access to the locations where the property was recovered, which could support an inference of his involvement.
The aiding and abetting instruction was factually appropriate for all charges.
Because the instruction was both legally and factually appropriate, the district court did not err in giving the instruction.
Affirmed.