State v. Paddock

Opinion

[Cite as State v. Paddock, 2026-Ohio-2635.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT MONTGOMERY COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO : : C.A. No. 30640 Appellee : : Trial Court Case No. 2019 CR 02787/1 v. : : (Criminal Appeal from Common Pleas AARON C. PADDOCK : Court) : Appellant : FINAL JUDGMENT ENTRY & : OPINION

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Pursuant to the opinion of this court rendered on July 10, 2026, the judgment of the

trial court is affirmed.

Costs to be paid as stated in App.R. 24.

Pursuant to Ohio App.R. 30(A), the clerk of the court of appeals shall immediately

send a copy of the court’s ruling to each party and note that action on the docket.

Additionally, pursuant to App.R. 27, the clerk of the court of appeals shall send a certified

copy of this judgment, which constitutes a mandate, to the clerk of the trial court and note

the service on the appellate docket.

For the court,

CHRISTOPHER B. EPLEY, JUDGE

TUCKER, J., and HANSEMAN, J., concur. OPINION MONTGOMERY C.A. No. 30640

AARON C. PADDOCK, Appellant, Pro Se ANDREW T. FRENCH, Attorney for Appellee

EPLEY, J.

{¶ 1} Aaron C. Paddock appeals from a judgment of the Montgomery County Court

of Common Pleas, which overruled his motion to vacate his violent offender database

(“VOD”) enrollment requirement. For the following reasons, the trial court’s judgment is

affirmed.

I. Facts and Procedural History

{¶ 2} According to a presentence investigation report and Paddock’s testimony at his

co-defendant’s trial, during the overnight hours of August 20 to 21, 2019, Paddock met

William Taylor, whom Paddock did not previously know, when Paddock was walking toward

the east side of Dayton to sell methamphetamine, and he decided Taylor could help him in

his drug sales. After using drugs themselves, the two encountered C.L., who was walking

home from work. Taylor decided to rob C.L. and took his headphones. Paddock then

punched C.L. several times, causing him to fall, and Taylor “stomped” on him. C.L. was

dragged to a fence, stripped of his clothing, and beaten some more. Taylor tried to burn

C.L.’s face. Eventually, C.L. was able to escape.

{¶ 3} Later, Paddock and Taylor broke a window at E.G.’s home on McLain Street.

E.G. confronted them, and Paddock hit him on the head with a 2 x 4. The police were called,

and Paddock and Taylor ran and went to a nearby residence on Boltin Street, which was

occupied. The two entered through a window, and Taylor proceeded to break things in the

house. The family inside fled to an upstairs bedroom. At Taylor’s instruction, Paddock

2 followed and pushed on the door. The family reported that the perpetrators tried to get in the

door and threatened to rape the children. The police arrived while this burglary was in

progress. Paddock was arrested without incident. Taylor fled with police officers in pursuit,

and he assaulted several officers before he was restrained.

{¶ 4} Soon after, Paddock was indicted on three counts of felonious assault (two

serious harm and one deadly weapon) and one count each of aggravated robbery (serious

harm), kidnapping (terrorize/physical harm), criminal damaging, and aggravated burglary

(physical harm). C.L. was specified as the victim of the aggravated robbery and a felonious

assault (Counts 1 and 3), E.G. was the victim of two felonious assault charges and criminal

damaging (Counts 4-6), and the aggravated burglary concerned the residence on Boltin

Street (Count 7). The kidnapping charge (Count 2) did not identify the victim.

{¶ 5} Approximately six months later, Paddock and the State reached a plea

agreement, under which Paddock would plead guilty to the felony charges and would agree

to testify against his co-defendant, William Taylor. In exchange, the State would dismiss the

criminal damaging charge and would agree that Paddock would receive concurrent

sentences.

{¶ 6} During the plea hearing, the trial court told Paddock that “at least one or more

of these offenses is considered to be a violent offender offense and that triggers a violent

offender specification or reporting requirement of you, and I will advise you of that at the

time of sentencing. But I do tell you ahead of time that you will be designated as a violent

offender, and you would have to register for a period of ten years on an annual basis.”

Paddock expressed that he understood. The court did not explain to Paddock that the

requirement to enroll in the VOD was rebuttable and the process for rebutting the

3 presumption. At the end of the plea hearing, the court accepted Paddock’s guilty pleas and

ordered a presentence investigation. Sentencing was delayed until after Taylor’s trial.

{¶ 7} More than two years later, on March 31, 2022, the sentencing hearing was held.

After merging the felonious assault charges involving E.G., the trial court imposed

concurrent sentences totaling six to nine years in prison on the five remaining charges and

ordered Paddock to pay restitution and court costs. The court further informed Paddock that

he would be required to register as a violent offender on account of the kidnapping charge,

and it reviewed with him a form notifying him of his duties to enroll in the VOD. Paddock did

not appeal from his convictions.

{¶ 8} On June 26, 2025, after his release from prison, Paddock moved for the trial

court to vacate his VOD enrollment requirement. He argued that neither the trial court before

sentencing nor a prison official prior to his release notified him of the presumption of

enrollment in the VOD, of his right to file a motion rebutting the presumption, of the procedure

and criteria for rebutting the presumption, and of the effect of a rebuttal and the post-rebuttal

hearing procedures and possible outcomes, as required by R.C. 2903.42.

{¶ 9} In its response, the State conceded that nothing in the record demonstrated that

Paddock had been advised of his ability to rebut the presumption that he would be required

to enroll in the VOD. The State asserted that this omission was nevertheless moot, because

Paddock’s testimony at Taylor’s trial established that he was a principal offender in the

kidnapping of C.L. and, consequently, Paddock could not rebut the presumption. The State

argued that any failure to advise Paddock of the ability to rebut the presumption was

therefore harmless. Alternatively, the State asked the court to hold a hearing to advise

Paddock of his right to rebut the presumption and the procedures for doing so.

4 {¶ 10} On September 22, 2025, the trial court overruled Paddock’s motion, finding

that the failure to advise him of his right to rebut the presumption was moot. It reasoned that

Paddock’s testimony at Taylor’s trial established that he had restrained the liberty of the

victim for the purpose of committing aggravated robbery and that he would be unable to

rebut the presumption of enrollment even if he were granted a hearing.

{¶ 11} Paddock, pro se, appeals from the trial court’s judgment, raising four

assignments of error. He argues that (1) the trial court erred in failing to inform him of his

right to rebut the presumption that he enroll in the VOD as a violent offender, (2) the court

erred in denying his motion to vacate his VOD enrollment requirement by adopting the

State’s response in its decision, (3) the prosecutor engaged in misconduct throughout his

case, and (4) the court erred in failing to merge allied offenses of similar import. We address

Paddock’s assignments of error in a manner that facilitates our analysis.

II. Lack of Notice under R.C. 2903.42(A)(1)(a)

{¶ 12} In his first assignment of error, Paddock claims that the trial court erred and

deprived him of due process by failing to inform him, either prior to sentencing or his release

from prison, of his statutory right to rebut the presumption that he enroll as a violent offender.

His second assignment of error asserts that the trial court erred in denying his motion to

vacate his enrollment requirement by failing to conduct an independent review and in

adopting the rationale in the State’s opposition memorandum. The State responds that

Paddock’s arguments are barred by res judicata.

{¶ 13} “Senate Bill 231, known as Sierah’s Law, established a statewide violent

offender database, along with the legal presumption that offenders convicted of certain

violent crimes must enroll in the database for a period of 10 years following their release

from prison.” State v. Williams, 2021-Ohio-1340, ¶ 128 (2d Dist.), citing R.C. 2903.41

5 through R.C. 2903.43. As relevant to Paddock, the term “violent offender” includes a person

who pleads guilty to kidnapping. R.C. 2903.41(A)(1)(a).

{¶ 14} Individuals who are classified as violent offenders are presumed to be required

to enroll in the VOD with respect to the classifying offense. R.C. 2903.42(A)(1)(a). The

presumption is rebuttable, and the sentencing court must inform the offender before

sentencing of the presumption, of the offender’s right to file a motion to rebut the

presumption, of the procedure and criteria for rebutting the presumption, and of the possible

outcome. R.C. 2903.42(A)(1)(a).

{¶ 15} If an offender was incarcerated on a classifying offense when R.C. 2903.41

became effective on March 20, 2019, the offender must be notified before release of the

presumption, the right, the procedure and criteria, and the possible outcome. See

R.C. 2903.41(A)(2); R.C. 2903.42(A)(1)(b). Paddock relies, in part, on this provision, but it

is inapplicable to him.

{¶ 16} To rebut the presumption, a violent offender must file a motion with the trial

court, prior to or at sentencing, asserting that he or she was not the principal offender in the

commission of the classifying offense and requesting that the court not require enrollment

in the VOD. R.C. 2903.42(A)(2)(a). The offender bears the burden to establish by a

preponderance of the evidence that he or she was not the principal offender in the

commission of the offense. R.C. 2903.42(A)(4). If the violent offender proves that he or she

was not the principal offender, the court must “continue the hearing for the purpose of

determining whether the offender, notwithstanding the rebuttal of the presumption, should

be required to enroll in the violent offender database and have all VOD duties with respect

to that offense.” R.C. 2903.42(A)(4)(a).

6 {¶ 17} In this case, Paddock asserts, and the State concedes, that the trial court failed

to provide him the notifications required by R.C. 2903.42(A)(1)(a). Paddock further argues

that the court erred in concluding that he could not establish that he was not the principal

offender, because the kidnapping charge was not based on the conduct toward C.L., as the

State contended, but was based on his actions at the residence on Boltin Street.

{¶ 18} It is not entirely clear what conduct formed the basis of Paddock’s kidnapping

charge. Kidnapping was Count 2 of the indictment, and it was sandwiched between the

aggravated robbery (Count 1) and felonious assault (Count 3) charges, which both alleged

that C.L. was the victim. Although the placement of the kidnapping charge supports a

conclusion that it also related to C.L., the indictment did not specify the victim of the

kidnapping. Defense counsel requested a bill of particulars, but none was filed. At the plea

hearing, the State articulated the facts and circumstances of the case by quoting the

indictment, which used the statutory language for the offenses. Nothing in the record clarifies

what conduct formed the basis for the kidnapping charge.

{¶ 19} In its response to Paddock’s motion to vacate, the State directed the trial court

to Paddock’s testimony at Taylor’s trial. Taylor was indicted similarly to Paddock, although

he had additional charges and specifications. Like Paddock’s indictment, Counts 1 and 3 of

Taylor’s indictment related to C.L., and the kidnapping charge was Count 2. No bill of

particulars was filed in Taylor’s case either.

{¶ 20} At Taylor’s trial, the prosecutor indicated that C.L. was the victim of the

kidnapping, and it repeatedly stated that the charge was based on C.L.’s being dragged from

the sidewalk to a fence for the purpose of inflicting serious physical harm or terrorizing him.

The State described the kidnapping charge in its opening statement, stating that the

evidence would show that C.L. “tried to get away from both of these individuals, and he was

7 drug back. In fact, you are going to see pictures of his injuries that are consistent with being

drug across that pavement.” The State’s closing argument highlighted the evidence that C.L.

“was clearly removed from a place against his will. You saw the drag marks on his back.

The testimony was that he was dragged by his legs. He clearly did not want to be going with

these defendants. He was clearly forced, physically forced to go from that sidewalk to that

back fence area and did remove another from a place where the other person was found or

restrained the liberty of that person.”

{¶ 21} Paddock testified about the attack on C.L., which began when Taylor grabbed

C.L.’s headphones. Paddock admitted that he then hit C.L. on the side of his stomach with

a closed fist, causing him to fall down, and punched C.L. a few more times after he fell.

Taylor Trial Tr. 352. At that point, Taylor started stomping C.L. “[a]nywhere his foot can

reach.” Paddock stated that Taylor grabbed C.L. by his legs, dragged him several feet to a

fence in a grassy area, and began to strip off C.L.’s clothes. Taylor continued to beat C.L.

and attempted to burn C.L.’s face with a lighter. Eventually, C.L. was able to get up and

escape. Paddock testified that all he did was “watch[], for the most part,” when Taylor

dragged C.L., and he denied participating in the removal of C.L.’s clothing.

{¶ 22} Assuming that Paddock’s kidnapping charge involved C.L., we disagree with

the trial court that Paddock’s trial testimony necessarily precluded a claim that he was not a

principal offender in the kidnapping. Paddock’s testimony reflected that he punched C.L.

several times at the beginning of the violent encounter, but he did not actively participate in

dragging C.L. to a different location or in further assaulting him. Paddock had at least a

colorable argument that he was not a principal offender in the kidnapping.

{¶ 23} We thus turn to whether the trial court erred in denying the motion to vacate,

given the court’s failure to provide Paddock the advisements required by

8 R.C. 2903.42(A)(1)(a). The State asserts that, under the doctrine of res judicata, Paddock

could not challenge that failure through his motion to vacate. We agree with the State.

{¶ 24} It is well established that res judicata precludes consideration of issues that

were or could have been raised on direct appeal. State v. Saxon, 2006-Ohio-1245, ¶ 17;

State v. Shah, 2023-Ohio-2328, ¶ 12 (2d Dist.). Under this doctrine, “a final judgment of

conviction bars a convicted defendant who was represented by counsel from raising and

litigating in any proceeding except an appeal from that judgment, any defense or any claimed

lack of due process that was raised or could have been raised by the defendant . . . on an

appeal from that judgment.” State v. Perry, 10 Ohio St.2d 175 (1967), paragraph nine of the

syllabus; State v. Moody, 2024-Ohio-864, ¶ 15 (2d Dist.).

{¶ 25} Paddock did not file a direct appeal from his convictions. Nevertheless, the trial

court’s failure to provide the notifications in R.C. 2903.42(A)(1)(a) prior to sentencing could

have been raised in a direct appeal. See, e.g., State v. Wright, 2021-Ohio-4107 (2d Dist.);

State v. Smith, 2025-Ohio-990 (2d Dist.). Indeed, in cases that have raised this issue on

direct appeal, we have held that “the failure to comply with these requirements will result in

the reversal of a trial court’s order to enroll in the violent offender database and a

corresponding order to provide, on remand, the appropriate advisements and the

opportunity to file a motion to rebut the presumption for enrollment.” State v. Smith, 2026-

Ohio-144, ¶ 10 (2d Dist.).

{¶ 26} Paddock’s affidavit in support of his motion to vacate stated that his defense

counsel had not informed him about his right to rebut the presumption of enrolling in the

VOD, and until shortly before his release from prison, he was unaware of the trial court’s

obligation under R.C. 2903.42(A)(1)(a) and of his right to rebut the presumption of

enrollment. Paddock points to State v. Brown, 2021-Ohio-4130 (8th Dist.), for the proposition

9 that an offender may file an untimely motion to vacate the enrollment requirement when he

or she was not timely provided the statutory advisements. In Brown, the Eighth District

considered the motion to be timely because Brown was challenging the constitutionality of

Sierah’s Law, not whether he was a principal offender. Accordingly, Brown is inapposite to

Paddock’s situation. While we are sympathetic to Paddock’s predicament, these

circumstances did not permit him to file a postconviction motion to vacate on the ground that

the trial court had failed to provide the required advisements.

{¶ 27} In short, although we disagree with the trial court’s rationale, the trial court

properly denied Paddock’s motion to vacate as it was barred by res judicata. Accordingly,

Paddock’s first and second assignments of error are overruled.

III. Other Issues

{¶ 28} Paddock’s third and fourth assignments raise issues that are unrelated to the

VOD notifications. His third assignment of error claims that the prosecutor engaged in

misconduct throughout his case, and his fourth assignment of error asserts that the trial

court erred by failing to merge allied offenses of similar import.

{¶ 29} Paddock argues that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by holding a

coercive plea meeting with him without his defense counsel physically present, by

associating the aggravated robbery and kidnapping charges to the same event, by

mislabeling the violent offender notification form in the docket, by advocating at sentencing

for the maximum sentence, and by opposing his motion to vacate in bad faith.

{¶ 30} Apart from Paddock’s claim regarding the State’s response to his motion to

vacate, none of the issues he raises is relevant to whether the trial court properly overruled

his motion to vacate his VOD enrollment requirement. As to the State’s response to

Paddock’s motion to vacate, we cannot conclude that it amounted to bad faith. Paddock’s

10 affidavit supporting his motion to vacate complained of how the VOD notice was labeled on

the docket, but the prosecutor bore no responsibility for that. The other issues Paddock

raises are not properly before us in this appeal. Paddock’s third assignment of error is

overruled.

{¶ 31} Finally, Paddock failed to raise the trial court’s failure to merge allied offenses

of similar import in his motion. Paddock’s allied-offense argument could have been raised

on direct appeal or, if evidence outside the record were required, by a timely petition for

postconviction relief. The argument is also now barred by res judicata.

{¶ 32} Paddock’s third and fourth assignments of error are overruled.

IV. Conclusion

{¶ 33} The trial court’s judgment is affirmed.

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TUCKER, J., and HANSEMAN, J., concur.