State v. Oster, P1-02-3047a (r.I.super. 2004)
This text of State v. Oster, P1-02-3047a (r.I.super. 2004) (State v. Oster, P1-02-3047a (r.I.super. 2004)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Superior Court of Rhode Island primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
The Court held this evidentiary hearing on April 26 and 27 of 2004 ("Evidentiary Hearing"). The State called six witnesses, and defendant Oster examined all of those witnesses through his counsel but called no witnesses to testify on his own behalf. Testifying at the hearing were Investigator Clifford Coutcher ("Coutcher") and Detective Sergeant Brian Casilli ("Casilli") of the Rhode Island State Police Financial Crimes Unit; Alyson Adalio ("Adalio"), Administrative Assistant to the Chief of the Criminal Division for the Department of Attorney General; Marianne DeSimone ("DeSimone"), Chief Paralegal of the Criminal Division; Peter Neronha ("Neronha"), former Assistant Attorney General; and Saray Desnoyers ("Desnoyers"), Paralegal in the Criminal Division of the Department of Attorney General.
At the hearing, the State introduced as exhibits the previously-submitted affidavits of Adalio, DeSimone, and Desnoyers. The State also introduced as exhibits the wiretap applications and orders, along with the transcript of the October 3, 2003 hearing before the Presiding Justice for the unsealing of the wiretap applications, orders, and tapes. Following the Evidentiary Hearing, defendant Oster moved for leave to expand the record of the hearing to include an affidavit of Joseph F. Rodgers, Jr., Presiding Justice of the Superior Court. By stipulation, the parties agreed to augment the record to include the May 13, 2004 affidavit of the Presiding Justice.
At the time the State shut down the wiretaps, Coutcher was operating a facility that the State Police used to intercept communications pursuant to wiretap authorizations. This facility ("intercept post" or "post") was a secure building inside an old National Guard hanger. The State Police constructed the post for the purpose of intercepting communications. Inside the intercept post was a room in which the State Police intercepted, recorded, and temporarily stored recorded communications for ongoing wiretap investigations ("wiretap room"). The wiretap room is somewhat fortified. A padlocked, seven-foot chain-link fence, topped with barbwire, cordoned off the intercept post. Once inside this fence, the outside door to the post was locked and required a key. Inside this outer door was a so-called "bay" area leading to the wiretap room. Access to the wiretap room was controlled by another locked door, which required a separate key. Maintenance personnel could gain access to the bay area but only investigators assigned to the wiretap room had its access key. In addition, other state police personnel had access to the hanger, but only wiretap monitors had access to the intercept post.
At 11:55 a.m. on Saturday, February 16, 2002, Coutcher received orders to shut down the wiretaps. Coutcher shut down the intercepting devices and then emptied all of the previously recorded communications, which were recorded on cassette tapes ("tapes" or "recordings"), out of a metal cabinet inside the wiretap room.7 Coutcher counted the tapes to ensure that the number of tapes he collected matched the number of tapes in the logs that the monitors had used to document events throughout the wiretaps. He accounted for all of the tapes; thirty-one tapes comprised the Sprint 114 wiretap and forty tapes comprised the Verizon 115 wiretap.
While intercepting communications, the State Police simultaneously recorded the conversations on a separate set of duplicate tapes that it kept for investigatory purposes. SeeState v. Campbell,
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The Court held this evidentiary hearing on April 26 and 27 of 2004 ("Evidentiary Hearing"). The State called six witnesses, and defendant Oster examined all of those witnesses through his counsel but called no witnesses to testify on his own behalf. Testifying at the hearing were Investigator Clifford Coutcher ("Coutcher") and Detective Sergeant Brian Casilli ("Casilli") of the Rhode Island State Police Financial Crimes Unit; Alyson Adalio ("Adalio"), Administrative Assistant to the Chief of the Criminal Division for the Department of Attorney General; Marianne DeSimone ("DeSimone"), Chief Paralegal of the Criminal Division; Peter Neronha ("Neronha"), former Assistant Attorney General; and Saray Desnoyers ("Desnoyers"), Paralegal in the Criminal Division of the Department of Attorney General.
At the hearing, the State introduced as exhibits the previously-submitted affidavits of Adalio, DeSimone, and Desnoyers. The State also introduced as exhibits the wiretap applications and orders, along with the transcript of the October 3, 2003 hearing before the Presiding Justice for the unsealing of the wiretap applications, orders, and tapes. Following the Evidentiary Hearing, defendant Oster moved for leave to expand the record of the hearing to include an affidavit of Joseph F. Rodgers, Jr., Presiding Justice of the Superior Court. By stipulation, the parties agreed to augment the record to include the May 13, 2004 affidavit of the Presiding Justice.
At the time the State shut down the wiretaps, Coutcher was operating a facility that the State Police used to intercept communications pursuant to wiretap authorizations. This facility ("intercept post" or "post") was a secure building inside an old National Guard hanger. The State Police constructed the post for the purpose of intercepting communications. Inside the intercept post was a room in which the State Police intercepted, recorded, and temporarily stored recorded communications for ongoing wiretap investigations ("wiretap room"). The wiretap room is somewhat fortified. A padlocked, seven-foot chain-link fence, topped with barbwire, cordoned off the intercept post. Once inside this fence, the outside door to the post was locked and required a key. Inside this outer door was a so-called "bay" area leading to the wiretap room. Access to the wiretap room was controlled by another locked door, which required a separate key. Maintenance personnel could gain access to the bay area but only investigators assigned to the wiretap room had its access key. In addition, other state police personnel had access to the hanger, but only wiretap monitors had access to the intercept post.
At 11:55 a.m. on Saturday, February 16, 2002, Coutcher received orders to shut down the wiretaps. Coutcher shut down the intercepting devices and then emptied all of the previously recorded communications, which were recorded on cassette tapes ("tapes" or "recordings"), out of a metal cabinet inside the wiretap room.7 Coutcher counted the tapes to ensure that the number of tapes he collected matched the number of tapes in the logs that the monitors had used to document events throughout the wiretaps. He accounted for all of the tapes; thirty-one tapes comprised the Sprint 114 wiretap and forty tapes comprised the Verizon 115 wiretap.
While intercepting communications, the State Police simultaneously recorded the conversations on a separate set of duplicate tapes that it kept for investigatory purposes. SeeState v. Campbell,
Coutcher next placed the original tapes inside one "banker's box" and transported them to the FCU at State Police Headquarters. At State Police Headquarters, Coutcher did not store the tapes in the State Police evidence room. Rather, he stored the box of original tapes in a locked fireproof cabinet to which only he had access. Coutcher next accessed the tapes to inventory them on the following day, Monday, February 18, 2002. He placed the tapes on a table, counted the tapes, and checked to ensure that each tape was in its correct case. Coutcher determined that he had possession of all of the tapes comprising the Sprint 114 and Verizon 115 wiretaps. Other than keeping count of the tapes, however, no one kept paperwork documenting the custody and transfer of each individual tape.
At this time, pursuant to R.I. Gen. Laws §
After all of the tapes were sealed, they were placed in a box ("the Box"), and one of the four parties in attendance — it is not clear who — sealed the Box with a signed label or signed labels. Inexplicably, neither the Box and its seals nor demonstrative evidence depicting the Box and seals were introduced into evidence at the Evidentiary Hearing. The evidence thus is unclear as to the number of labels used to seal the Box; yet it seems that signed labels, which remained unused after sealing the tapes, may have been used in some fashion to seal the Box. Although it is not entirely clear, it seems that all signed labels were used during the sealing ceremony. Additionally, it appears, though again it is unclear, that someone may have sealed the Box with more than just address labels, such as with tape.See infra subheading (II)(D) (quoting observations from the unsealing hearing regarding the Box being taped closed and the difficulty in unsealing a similar box of recordings).
It is also unclear if the Box is the same "banker's box" that Coutcher used when he transported the tapes. The precise nature and description of this Box is unclear as well. It appears that the Box was not conspicuously marked as bearing wiretap evidence; the Box may have been marked with the wiretap authorization number or a telephone number and the date. In addition, no one present at the sealing ceremony is able to recall specific instructions from the Presiding Justice on sealing the Box of recordings. Nonetheless, it is evident that the Box was sealed as part of the evidence sealing process that took place in chambers under the auspices of the Presiding Justice.
The Presiding Justice understood that, once the tapes and the Box were sealed under his direction, the Department would place the Box in a commercial bank vault or safe-deposit box, consistent with the long-standing practice of the Department with respect to the storage of sealed wiretap evidence that had been followed before and during his tenure as Presiding Justice. See Affidavit of Presiding Justice, Joseph F. Rodgers, Jr. (May 13, 2004). According to the Presiding Justice, this long-standing practice of securing sealed tape recordings in a bank vault or safe-deposit box immediately after their sealing made the issuance of a written custody order in each case unnecessary.Id. He also noted that it is standard practice for the Department to prepare all necessary orders regarding intercepts for his signature. Id.
Neronha believed that the Presiding Justice in fact had issued an order requiring the recordings to be stored in a safe-deposit box, although no signed order was produced. He testified that he did not recall preparing a sealing order but that Stephen Dambruch, a former Assistant Attorney General who worked on this case, may have done so. Desnoyers testified that she was not aware of any judicial or statutory mandate requiring storage in a safe-deposit box but believed it was her office's "common practice" to store such evidence at a bank.
Regardless of whether there was an explicit written or verbal storage order, it is clear based on the testimony adduced at the Evidentiary Hearing that it was the Presiding Justice's understanding and expectation that the sealed wiretap recordings would be stored in a bank vault or safe-deposit box and that many persons in the Department connected with this wiretap probe (including Neronha, Desnoyers, Adalio, DeSimone, and Daly) knew that the State was obliged to secure the evidence in this manner, consistent with (1) its historic practice (with regard to the earlier wiretaps in this case and wiretaps in general), (2) its obligations under the wiretap statutes and (3) the well-understood directives of the Presiding Justice. At least impliedly, therefore, the Presiding Justice ordered that the subject wiretap recordings be stored in a secure bank vault, thereby requiring the State to store the recordings in that fashion under the dictates of the storage provisions of the state and federal wiretap statutes.8
On the one occasion in the past that the Presiding Justice recalls being informed by the Department at the time of sealing that the designated bank vault did not have sufficient space to hold the hundreds of wiretap tapes involved in that case, he made arrangements for the tapes to be stored in a locked room available to the Superior Court. See Affidavit of Presiding Justice, Joseph F. Rodgers, Jr. (May 13, 2004). An Assistant Attorney General removed those tapes from that locked room once he had sufficient space to store them according to standard practice. Id. In this case, however, no one in the Department alerted the Presiding Justice as to the claimed absence of storage space at Sovereign Bank nor did they take any action to secure a court-authorized alternative storage location (as the Department had done in the past), even though Desnoyers said that she and others were aware of the storage problems at the time the tapes and the Box were sealed.
Instead, Desnoyers kept the Box under her desk for approximately one year. According to Desnoyers, she informed Neronha about her storage of the Box and he did not object. Neronha testified credibly, to the contrary, that he was never so informed. Desnoyers explained that she may have informed him "in passing," and he may have believed that she was merely referring to Grand Jury tapes. Although Desnoyers believed that storing the Box under her desk was improper, she apparently failed to pursue the issue further and follow-up with appropriate personnel to obtain a secure storage location.
The next individual to acknowledge learning about the Box and its wayward storage was Adalio. Desnoyers told Adalio about the Box during the week of January 7, 2003, when the Department was in the midst of transition following the fall election of a new Attorney General. Desnoyers was to be reassigned to Kent County, DeSimone was to assume the previous duties of Desnoyers in Providence, and Adalio was to assume the workspace previously occupied by Desnoyers.9 Desnoyers told Adalio that the Box under her desk contained wiretap tapes from the Picerno and Oster investigation and that it needed to be stored in a safe-deposit box.
According to Desnoyers, she checked the seal on the Box frequently (testimony which this Court doubts) and noticed it was intact when she was leaving for reassignment in January of 2003. Adalio first saw the Box during the moving period but apparently did not notice the status of the seals.10 Sometime during the week of January 7, 2003, Adalio told DeSimone, the newly assigned Chief Paralegal, about the Box. Later that week, Adalio and DeSimone informed Paul Daly ("Daly"), the Chief of the Criminal Division of the Department, about the Box. Based on this conversation with Daly, Adalio and DeSimone decided to move the Box to a secure vault within the District Court Unit of the Department ("vault").
Adalio and DeSimone, however, could not immediately move the Box to the vault. The Department first needed to empty stored materials out of the vault. Adalio and DeSimone coordinated their efforts to gain access to the vault with the Department's Director of Operations, William Masse ("Masse"). Sometime within a month of January 7, 2003, Masse gave Adalio and DeSimone access to the vault. That same day, Adalio and DeSimone transferred to the vault the Box and a number of other boxes containing tapes of ongoing Grand Jury investigations from underneath the desk previously occupied by Desnoyers and then occupied by Adalio.
Although Adalio never noticed the status of the seal, DeSimone saw that the Box was unsealed when they were transferring it to the vault. She then opened the Box to determine its contents. DeSimone did not sift through the Box or otherwise disturb the tapes; she merely looked inside and described the Box on a sheet of paper.
The Box remained in the Department's vault until approximately September 29, 2003, when Assistant Attorney General Alan Goulart ("Goulart") asked DeSimone to locate the wiretap recordings for this case. Goulart sought to locate the tapes in preparation for the October 3, 2003 hearing at which the tapes would be unsealed in the presence of the Presiding Justice, the State, and defense counsel. DeSimone located the tapes for Sprint 114 and Verizon 115 in the vault and reported to Goulart that she had found the tapes in the vault but that the Box was unsealed.11 DeSimone and Goulart then went to Sovereign Bank in Providence, Rhode Island to locate tapes from the Sprint 113 wiretap12 in a safe-deposit box. DeSimone and Goulart located the tapes from the Sprint 113 wiretap and then stored the tapes from the Sprint 114 and Verizon 115 wiretaps in a safe-deposit box.
The Presiding Justice then proceeded to unseal a box containing sealed tapes from the Sprint 113 wiretap. Counsel for Oster and Picerno confirmed that the seal on that box was intact. The Presiding Justice observed that his unsealing of the outer box was "with some measure of difficulty." Unsealing Hearing Transcript at 10. The Presiding Justice further indicated that each individual cassette tape appeared sealed. This box was not introduced into evidence during the Evidentiary Hearing.
The State then presented the Presiding Justice with the Box that is the subject of this Decision. The Box contained the recordings from the Sprint 114 and Verizon 115 wiretaps. The State admitted that the seal on the Box was broken and that, "despite the order signed by [the Presiding Justice] that this box remain in a safe-deposit box over at Sovereign . . .," the Box was left in an unsecured area in the Department.14See Transcript of Unsealing Hearing at 11 (October 3, 2003). The State explained that members of the Department would be producing affidavits indicating their knowledge as to the Box's storage and the reason, if known, as to why the seal on the Box was broken. Counsel for Oster announced that "it's very apparent by looking at this box that it's been opened. It's been opened, intentionally, with an implement to break numerous areas where it had been taped closed. . . ." Unsealing Hearing Transcript at 12. The Presiding Justice confirmed that "the seal has been broken, and it appears to be, obviously, intentional." Id. Shortly thereafter, the hearing concluded with the Presiding Justice affording counsel the opportunity to inspect the tapes and to present any concerns to him following that inspection. After inspecting the tapes, no one placed any concerns on the record. The parties agreed that the Court would maintain possession of the wiretap applications and orders, while the State would keep the wiretap tapes in a secure location.
Although protecting the authenticity of the recordings has been identified as the central thrust of the Sealing Provision, as most cases discuss the relationship between a sealing violation and the authenticity of the evidence, there is also a less-discussed, yet equally important, secondary purpose of the Sealing Provision: to maintain the confidentiality of the recordings. See, e.g., United States v. Abraham,
Moreover, the Sealing Provision, together with the storage provisions of the state and federal statutes, help ensure that the integrity of the evidence, in terms of its completeness and its chain of custody, are preserved. The Sealing Provision seeks to guarantee that wiretap evidence that is generated pursuant to judicial authorization and presented to the Court for sealing is the same evidence that is ultimately disclosed to defendants and introduced at trial.
All of these goals are reflected in the legislative history of the Sealing Provision. The Senate Report on the Sealing Provision states that "[a]ppropriate procedures should be developed to safeguard the identity, physical integrity, and contents of the recordings to assure their admissibility into evidence." S. Rep. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1968 U.S. Code Cong. Admin. News 2112, 2193 (emphasis added). Further, in discussing the "safekeeping" of the recordings, the Senate Report states that the intent of
Regarding the actual procedure for sealing, the Sealing Provision does not specifically address the manner in which the Presiding Justice is to seal the wiretap tapes; it neither imposes nor limits the mechanics of the sealing process. See
In fact, court methods for sealing wiretap recordings vary greatly but generally ensure that the tapes, collectively, are sealed. See, e.g., United States v. Kincaide,
Accordingly, the Sealing Provision did not limit the Presiding Justice's sealing directives to sealing only individual tapes; directives for additional, all-inclusive seals — such as sealing an outer box — are permissible and therefore valid directives. If the Presiding Justice directed that the recordings be sealed in a manner akin to Russian dolls, which is his prerogative, then the breaking of any one seal technically would violate the Sealing Provision.20 The Presiding Justice has the discretion and authority to "develop" "appropriate procedures" to protect the integrity, confidentiality, and chain of custody of the recordings. See S. Rep. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess.,reprinted in 1968 U.S. Code Cong. Admin. News 2112, 2193.
While sealing only individual tapes serves to safeguard their confidentiality and authenticity, sealing an outer box containing those tapes further advances these goals and also serves to preserve the collective integrity and chain of custody of the tapes. Sealing the individual tapes but not sealing that outer container could compromise the collective integrity, confidentiality and chain of custody of the recordings as well as increase the risk of tampering.
In addition to overlooking the confidentiality, collective integrity, and chain of custody aspects of sealing the Box, the State's position — that only individual tapes need be sealed and all-inclusive sealing is irrelevant — is also hard to reconcile with cases where it has been acceptable to seal only the box of tapes. The Court in Abraham, for example, provided a list of instructions on the minimum requirements for the sealing and custody of recordings and permitted the placing of recordings in one or more cartons with only the carton being taped closed.Abraham,
Additionally, the Sealing Provision does not require a specific order on the placing of each individual seal for the seal to have meaning under the Sealing Provision. Due to the Sealing Provision's silence on the mechanics of sealing and the Presiding Justice's wide discretion on the matter, any sealing that occurs during the presentation of the wiretap tapes to the Court for sealing occurs "under [the Presiding Justice's] directions." It is clear, therefore, that the seals placed on the Box were official seals pursuant to the Sealing Provision, as they were part of the "sealing under [the Presiding Justice's] directions." The sealing of the Box occurred in chambers with the Presiding Justice and upon the State's presentation of the tapes for sealing. The Presiding Justice supervised and, at the very least, consented to the sealing of both the Box and the individual tapes.
In fact, the Presiding Justice went further by actively participating in the sealing, thereby implicitly, if not explicitly, directing the sealing of the Box. The Box was not unilaterally sealed by the State. Rather, the seal was endorsed by both the Presiding Justice and the State. Furthermore, there can be no view that the State haphazardly placed left-over signed seals on the Box unbeknownst to the Presiding Justice; Desnoyers testified that that the Presiding Justice was careful not to sign extra labels.
This sealing is consistent with, and just as valid as, the sealing pertaining to the tapes comprising the Sprint 113 wiretap and the wiretap applications and orders. The absence of a signed court order or direct evidence of a verbal order to place the Box under seal does not alter this Court's view that the Box was sealed under the Presiding Justice's directives. Moreover, the State cannot defend by arguing the absence of a written sealing order required by the Sealing Provisions when it is its obligation to prepare all necessary wiretap orders for the Presiding Justice's signature.
Consequently, this Court finds that by the Presiding Justice and the State affixing seals to the individual tapes and the Box in which those tapes were placed, the "recordings" that comprise the Sprint 114 and Verizon 115 wiretaps were "made available to the [Presiding Justice]" and "sealed under his directions" within the meaning of the Sealing Provision. The breaking of the seal on the Box thus violates the Sealing Provision and requires the State to prove a "satisfactory explanation" for the seal's absence as a prerequisite for its use of those tape recordings at trial.
To provide a "satisfactory explanation," the State first must provide an explanation for the sealing violation. See OjedaRios,
Of course, the total absence of an explanation is insufficient; it is axiomatic that the phrase "satisfactory explanation" presupposes the existence of some explanation. See
The second prong of the satisfactory-explanation test requires the State's explanation to be "satisfactory." See id.;Mora,
"[A]lthough freedom from adulteration is a necessary part of what the prosecution must show, it is by no means the extent of the proof which [this Court] will demand in these circumstances."Mora,
The hodgepodge of elements the Court must consider to assess the sufficiency of the excuse include: (1) whether the violation may have caused prejudice to the accused; (2) whether the State benefited unfairly or obtained a tactical advantage as a result of the failure; (3) the length of time for which the seal was absent;23 and (4) the cause of the violation, including whether the State's failure was willful or arose out of an honest mistake.24 See Mora,
The State attempted to explain why the Box was stored in an insecure area in the Department of the Attorney General for a year, notwithstanding the longstanding practice of the Department and at least an implied directive of the Presiding Justice to store the sealed wiretap evidence in a bank vault or a safe-deposit box. The State also attempted to explain the handling of the Box by different people in two different administrations while it was in the custody of the Department. Through this evidence, the State obliquely attempts to suggest that the Department kept the Box "secured" and that the seal was inadvertently broken during the moving and transition period for Department staff. See supra note 10 (office described as a "mess" and in "chaos" following transition).
While these circumstances undoubtedly created an opportunity for the seal on the Box to be broken under a host of imaginable scenarios, they in no way explain the reason why the seal was broken. See
For this Court to make a finding of fact in this case, on the state of the evidence, as to how and why the seal on the Box was broken, it would have to engage in the kind of rank speculation that the law forbids. See State v. Perry,
The blame for not being able to offer the legally required explanation for the broken seal must rest squarely with the State. The Box containing the recordings from the Sprint 114 and Verizon 115 wiretaps should have been stored in a bank vault or safe-deposit box, as at least impliedly directed by the Presiding Justice in accordance with past practice. That is the manner in which the State stored the recordings from the Sprint 113 wiretap and the applications and orders for all of the wiretaps connected with this case. Indeed, that is the manner in which the State historically stored all sensitive wiretap evidence and which all prosecutors and staff members involved with the wiretap evidence in this case recognized was appropriate.
If it is true that the only bank vault in which the Department could have stored the Box was full when the tapes and the Box were sealed, the State should have obtained an alternative, court-authorized secure location, at least temporarily. According to the Presiding Justice, just such an alternative (that of temporary court-authorized storage in a secure court vault) had been arranged under his auspices on at least one occasion in the past when the State lacked the immediate ability to store wiretap evidence in a bank vault. Allegedly armed with the same knowledge of the absence of bank storage space in this case at the very time that the subject tapes and the Box were sealed, the State inexplicably chose to depart from past practice and the implied directives of the Presiding Justice in storing the tapes in a bank vault and did not raise with the Court the need for court-authorized alternative secure storage space. It then failed to take any steps internally over the course of a year either to store the tapes in a more secure location than under a paralegal's desk or to obtain additional storage space at a bank.25
It is these failures in the handling of wiretap evidence — evidence known by the State to be sensitive and critical to its widespread corruption probe — that deprive the State of its ability to explain the broken seal on the Box. In turn, the State's inability to explain the broken seal is dispositive of the issue of whether the tape recordings at issue may be used at trial, as an explanation is required pursuant to the Sealing Provision where a seal is absent. See Ojeda Rios,
Accordingly, this Court need not address whether there is a "satisfactory" explanation for the broken seal on the Box, for there is no explanation to qualitatively assess. In the absence of an explanation, the subject tape recordings must be suppressed under the plain dictates of the Sealing Provision.
While the evidence may suggest that the tapes were secure at the intercept post, this Court is unable to find that the State met its burden to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that the tapes that were sealed and placed in the sealed Box under the auspices of the Presiding Justice remained intact collectively, uncompromised and confidential after the Department took custody of the Box and the seal was broken. See Mora,
The fact that the Box, at the time of unsealing, apparently contained the same number of tapes as were placed in the Box originally and the fact that those tapes apparently had intact seals at the time of the unsealing ceremony do not, by themselves, get the State to the clear and convincing level of proof — at least not when suspicious circumstances are created by the State's failure to store the Box properly, the mysterious events surrounding the broken seal on the Box and the existence of one or more blank duplicate tapes. In addition, there was insufficient evidence presented as to the nature and authenticity of the seals on the individual tapes, the identity, authentication and chain of custody of the tapes from the time that they were placed in the Box until the unsealing ceremony, and the confidentiality of this wiretap evidence during that time period. The evidence presented did not even include the physical evidence at issue, inclusive of the Box itself, the box used to store the tape recordings of the Sprint 113 wiretap, the envelopes used to store the applications and orders connected with the case, and the subject tape recordings and seals on those tapes. While there is no evidence to cause the Court to believe that the State engaged in a "purposeful attempt to evade the law or unfairly to pillory a suspect . . .," Mora,
Lastly, had any cause been offered, the Court would have been less inclined to find it excusable under the circumstances. Regardless of any explicit judicial orders on sealing the tapes, sealing the Box, or storage, those with supervisory capacity over this case knew of the solemnity of care associated with this evidence, as highlighted by the (1) State's careful handling of the tape recordings from the Sprint 113 wiretap and the applications and orders associated with the case, (2) Assistant Attorney General Goulart's apparent shock and displeasure upon learning about the Box26 and, (3) his candor in acknowledging the sealing and storage problems at the time of the unsealing hearing. Yet, the storage of the Box violated the Department's established customs and the Presiding Justice's implied directives, thus leaving the Box's seal susceptible to breaking. The seal on the Box likely would not have been broken if stored in the proper secured area. Simply put, the sealing problem is less excusable because it never should have happened — particularly in a post-DiPrete environment27 — and was easily avoidable if Department protocol and judicial directives had been followed.
Counsel are directed to confer and to submit to the Court forthwith for entry an agreed upon form of order that is reflective of this Decision.
The State argued, in connection with the defendants' joint suppression motion, that defendant Oster lacked standing to challenge the admissibility of the wiretap evidence. See Statev. Picerno, C.A. No. P1-02-3047B, State v. Oster, C.A. No. P1-02-3047A, 2004 R.I. Super. LEXIS 57, at *13-15 (March 10, 2004); "State's Memorandum of Law in Support of Its Objection to the Defendants' Motions to Suppress Wiretap Evidence," at 10-11 (Jan. 2, 2004) (challenging standing because the protected "Fourth Amendment rights are personal"). This Court found, in its March 10, 2004 decision, that it did not need to reach that issue because, among other reasons, defendant Picerno had standing and challenged the evidence on grounds identical to those advanced by defendant Oster, thus enabling the Court to consider the issues regardless of defendant Oster's ability to present his arguments.State v. Picerno, C.A. No. P1-02-3047B, State v. Oster, C.A. No. P1-02-3047A, 2004 R.I. Super. LEXIS 57, at *13-15 (March 10, 2004). Assuming, arguendo, that the Court now must reexamine defendant Oster's standing because defendant Picerno is no longer a party to the motion to suppress, the Court finds no merit to the State's standing argument with respect to the sealing provisions of the state and federal wiretap statutes. Unlike most wiretap challenges, the sealing requirements are not based on the Fourth Amendment protection from unreasonable searches and seizures; rather, they are designed to preserve the integrity, confidentiality, completeness and confidentiality of the tapes.See United States v. Ricco,
The absence of a formal written or verbal order issued in connection with the sealing ceremony, however, does not alter this Court's view that the Presiding Justice impliedly ordered or directed, pursuant to the storage provisions of the state and federal wiretap statutes, that the tapes at issue be stored in a bank vault or safe-deposit box. Such an order necessarily must be implied from the past practice of the Department and the Presiding Justice in storing wiretap evidence, the understanding of the parties and the Presiding Justice that the subject tapes would be stored in that manner, the State's view that an order in fact existed (as evidenced by the testimony of Neronha, Goulart's statements at the unsealing hearing and the State's earlier concessions in this regard) and the absence of any discussion about storage at the time of sealing. The State should not be able to circumvent the requirements of the statutory storage provisions by maintaining that the requisite order regarding storage was never signed by the Presiding Justice, as it is the obligation of the State to prepare whatever orders are necessary to effectuate the statutes and the intent of the Presiding Justice.
[t]he contents of any wire, electronic, or oral communication intercepted by any means authorized by this chapter shall, if practicable, be recorded on tape or wire or other comparable device. The recording of the contents of any wire, electronic, or oral communication under this section shall be done in such a way as will protect the recording from editing or other alterations. Immediately upon the expiration of the period of the order, or extensions of the order, the recordings shall be made available to the presiding justice of the superior court issuing the order and sealed under his or her directions. Custody of the recordings shall be wherever the presiding justice of the superior court orders. They shall not be destroyed except upon an order of the presiding justice of the superior court, and in any event, shall be kept for ten (10) years. Duplicate recordings may be made for use or disclosure pursuant to the provisions of §
12-5.1-10 (a) or (b) for investigations and bail hearings and any pre-trial hearings. The presence of the seal provided for by this section, or a satisfactory explanation for its absence, shall be a prerequisite for the use or disclosure of the contents of any wire, electronic, or oral communication or evidence derived from them at any bail hearing or pre-trial hearing.
In its entirety,
[t]he contents of any wire, oral, or electronic communication intercepted by any means authorized by this chapter [
18 U.S.C. § 2510 et seq.] shall, if possible, be recorded on tape or wire or other comparable device. The recording of the contents of any wire, oral, or electronic communication under this subsection shall be done in such way as will protect the recording from editing or other alterations. Immediately upon the expiration of the period of the order, or extensions thereof, such recordings shall be made available to the judge issuing such order and sealed under his [or her] directions. Custody of the recordings shall be wherever the judge orders. They shall not be destroyed except upon an order of the issuing or denying judge and in any event shall be kept for ten years. Duplicate recordings may be made for use or disclosure pursuant to the provisions of subsections (1) and (2) of section 2517 of this chapter for investigations. The presence of the seal provided for by this subsection, or a satisfactory explanation for the absence thereof, shall be a prerequisite for the use or disclosure of the contents of any wire, oral, or electronic communication or evidence derived therefrom under subsection (3) of section 2517.
is a degree of proof different from a satisfaction by a "preponderance of the evidence" which is the recognized burden in civil actions and from proof "beyond a reasonable doubt" which is the required burden in criminal suits. If [the Court] could erect a graduated scale which measured the comparative degrees of proof, the "preponderance" burden would be at the lowest extreme of our scale; "beyond a reasonable doubt" would be situated at the highest point; and somewhere in between the two extremes would be "clear and convincing evidence. . . ." [P]roof by "clear and convincing evidence" means that the [finder of fact] must believe that the truth of the facts asserted by the proponent is highly probable. One of the more articulate and descriptive definitions of clear and convincing evidence . . . [is that] it must be shown by clear and convincing evidence . . . [that] the witnesses to a fact must be found to be credible and that the facts to which they have testified are distinctly remembered and the details thereof narrated exactly and in due order and that the testimony be clear, direct and weighty and convincing, so as to enable you to come to a clear conviction without hesitancy of the truth of the precise facts in issue.
Parker v. Parker,
This factor is partly a subset of the above factors. A long-absent seal, for example, creates a greater danger of adulteration, and it also makes it more difficult for the State to show the absence of prejudice. Mora,
Related
Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
State v. Oster, P1-02-3047a (r.I.super. 2004), Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-v-oster-p1-02-3047a-risuper-2004-risuperct-2004.