[Cite as State v. Okonski, 2026-Ohio-2144.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT SENECA COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO, CASE NO. 13-25-21 PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,
v.
MICK J. OKONSKI, OPINION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
STATE OF OHIO, CASE NO. 13-25-22 PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,
MICK J. OKONSKI, OPINION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
Appeals from Seneca County Common Pleas Court Trial Court Nos. 25 CR 0014 and 25 CR 0033
Judgments Affirmed
Date of Decision: June 8, 2026 Case Nos. 13-25-21, 13-25-22
APPEARANCES:
Brian A. Smith for Appellant
Stephanie J. Kiser for Appellee
WALDICK, J.
{¶1} This is a consolidated appeal in which the defendant-appellant, Mick
Okonski (“Okonski”), appeals the judgments of sentence entered against him in two
cases in the Seneca County Court of Common Pleas, following his pleas of guilty
to several felony-level sex offenses involving children. For the reasons set forth
below, we affirm.
Procedural History and Factual Background
{¶2} In Case Number 13-25-21 (25 CR 0014), a two-count indictment was
returned against Okonski on February 6, 2025. In that indictment, Okonski was
charged in both counts with Pandering Obscenity Involving a Minor, with each
count being a second-degree felony in violation of R.C. 2907.321(A)(1). On
February 21, 2025, an arraignment was held and Okonski entered an initial plea of
not guilty to both counts of the indictment.
{¶3} In Case Number 13-25-22 (25 CR 0033), a 31-count indictment was
returned against Okonski on March 20, 2025. That indictment charged Okonski as
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follows: Count 1 – Gross Sexual Imposition, a third-degree felony in violation of
R.C. 2907.05(A)(4); Counts 2 through 23 – Illegal Use of a Minor in Nudity-
Oriented Material or Performance, with each of those counts being a second-degree
felony in violation of R.C. 2907.323(A)(1); Counts 24 through 29 – Pandering
Obscenity Involving a Minor, with each of those counts being a second-degree
felony in violation of R.C. 2907.321(A)(1); and Counts 30 and 31 – Voyeurism,
with each of those counts being a fifth-degree felony in violation of R.C.
2907.08(C). On March 24, 2025, an arraignment was held on that indictment, and
Okonski entered an initial plea of not guilty to all counts.
{¶4} The charges in the two indictments were based on allegations that
Okonski had used the Internet to download and disseminate child pornography on a
repeated and ongoing basis and, additionally, that he had covertly taken sexually-
explicit photographs of family members who were minors. In January of 2025,
following an investigation that occurred over the course of several months, law
enforcement officials seized a computer and other electronic devices from
Okonski’s Seneca County residence, pursuant to a search warrant. Subsequent
review of the computer with the IP address used by Okonski revealed several files
downloaded on that computer containing still images and videos of adult males
engaging in sex acts with children, with some of those children as young as
toddlers. When interviewed by police as part of the investigation, Okonski
acknowledged having downloaded sexual-type images of children from the Internet,
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but claimed to have deleted the images once he saw what they depicted. Okonski
also admitted to having taken explicit photographs of young family members in
various states of nudity, in addition to having hidden a camera in his home from
which he obtained video images of minor females using the bathroom.
{¶5} On September 17, 2025, both cases were resolved with negotiated pleas
of guilty. In Case Number 13-25-21, Okonski pled guilty to Count 1 of the
indictment and, in exchange, the State of Ohio agreed to dismiss Count 2. In Case
Number 13-25-22, Okonski pled guilty to Counts 1, 2, 10, 13, 22, and 30, in
exchange for the prosecution agreeing to dismiss the remaining counts. In both
cases, the trial court accepted Okonski’s guilty pleas as outlined and ordered a
presentence investigation.
{¶6} On October 20, 2025, a joint sentencing hearing was held in the two
cases. In Case Number 13-25-21, the trial court sentenced Okonski to an indefinite
term of 7 to 10 1/2 years in prison. In Case Number 13-25-22, the trial court
sentenced Okonski as follows: Count 1 – 54 months in prison; Count 2 – an
indefinite term of 7 to 10 1/2 years in prison; Count 10 – an indefinite term of 7 to
10 1/2 years in prison; Count 13 – an indefinite term of 7 to 10 1/2 years in prison;
Count 22 – an indefinite term of 7 to 10 1/2 years in prison; and Count 30 – 12
months in prison. In that case, the trial court ordered that the sentence on Count 1
be served concurrently to the sentences on Counts 2, 10, 13, 22, and 30, which were
to be served consecutively to one another. The trial court further ordered that the
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sentence in that latter case be served consecutively to the sentence imposed in the
earlier case. The trial court also journalized its sentencing orders in both cases on
October 20, 2025.
{¶7} On October 24, 2025, the trial court filed a nunc pro tunc judgment
entry in both cases to correct an error in the October 20, 2025 judgment entries of
sentencing.
{¶8} On November 6, 2025, Okonski filed a notice of appeal in both
cases. On November 17, 2025, this Court ordered that the two appeals be
consolidated.
{¶9} On appeal, Okonski raises three assignments of error, all of which relate
to the sentences imposed.
First Assignment of Error
Because the trial court’s findings under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) were, by clear and convincing evidence, not supported by the record, the trial court’s imposition of consecutive sentences, in both case numbers 25 CR 0014 and 25 CR 0033, was not supported by the record.
Second Assignment of Error
Because the trial court’s sentence of Appellant, in both case numbers 25 CR 0014 and 25 CR 0033, as well as the trial court’s total aggregate sentence in both cases, was an extreme sentence, grossly disproportionate to the offenses to which Appellant pleaded guilty, and disproportionate to sentences given other offenders with similar records who had committed those offenses, the trial court’s sentence of Appellant, in both case numbers 25 CR 0014 and 25 CR 0033, was contrary to law, in violation of Appellant’s right against cruel and unusual punishment under
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the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 9 of the Ohio Constitution.
Third Assignment of Error
Because the trial court failed to consider Appellant’s military service record as required under R.C. 2929.12(F), the trial court’s sentence of Appellant was contrary to law, in both case numbers 25 CR 0014 and 25 CR 0033.
{¶10} In the first assignment of error, Okonski argues that the imposition of
consecutive sentences was not supported by the records in these cases.
{¶11} The standard of review applicable to this sentence-related claim is
whether the sentence is clearly and convincingly contrary to law. State v. Marcum,
2016-Ohio-1002; R.C. 2953.08. With regard to sentencing-review generally, the
Supreme Court of Ohio has limited that review by holding that R.C.
2953.08(G)(2)(b) “does not provide a basis for an appellate court to modify or
vacate a sentence based on its view that the sentence is not supported by the record
under R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12.” State v. Jones, 2020-Ohio-6729, ¶
39. Additionally, a trial court has full discretion to impose any sentence within the
statutory range. State v. Johnson, 2021-Ohio-1768, ¶ 9 (3d Dist). “A sentence
imposed within the statutory range is not contrary to law as long as the trial court
considered the purposes and principles of felony sentencing contained in R.C.
2929.11 and the sentencing factors contained in R.C. 2929.12.” Id., citing State v.
Dorsey, 2021-Ohio-76, ¶ 15 (2d Dist.).
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{¶12} In order to impose consecutive sentences, “a trial court is required to
make the findings mandated by R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) at the sentencing hearing and
incorporate its findings into its sentencing entry * * *.” State v. Bonnell, 2014-Ohio-
3177, syllabus.
R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) provides:
If multiple prison terms are imposed on an offender for convictions of multiple offenses, the court may require the offender to serve the prison terms consecutively if the court finds that the consecutive service is necessary to protect the public from future crime or to punish the offender and that consecutive sentences are not disproportionate to the seriousness of the offender’s conduct and to the danger the offender poses to the public, and if the court also finds any of the following:
(a) The offender committed one or more of the multiple offenses while the offender was awaiting trial or sentencing, was under a sanction imposed pursuant to section 2929.16, 2929.17, or 2929.18 of the Revised Code, or was under post-release control for a prior offense.
(b) At least two of the multiple offenses were committed as part of one or more courses of conduct, and the harm caused by two or more of the multiple offenses so committed was so great or unusual that no single prison term for any of the offenses committed as part of any of the courses of conduct adequately reflects the seriousness of the offender’s conduct.
(c) The offender’s history of criminal conduct demonstrates that consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the public from future crime by the offender.
{¶13} When reviewing consecutive sentences on appeal, “[t]he plain
language of R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) requires an appellate court to defer to a trial court’s
consecutive-sentence findings, and the trial court’s findings must be upheld unless
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those findings are clearly and convincingly not supported by the record.” State v.
Gwynne, 2023-Ohio-3851, ¶ 5.
{¶14} In the instant cases, both on the record at the sentencing hearing and
in the judgment entries of sentencing, the trial court made findings pursuant to R.C.
2929.14(C)(4), as well as under subsections (b) and (c) of that statutory section, in
support of the consecutive sentences, and Okonski does not contest that on appeal.
However, Okonski argues that those findings are not supported by the record.
{¶15} Upon reviewing the entire record before us, we cannot clearly and
convincingly find that the record does not support the trial court’s findings with
regard to consecutive sentences. On the contrary, there are multiple factors that
support consecutive sentences.
{¶16} For one, Okonski had a prior felony conviction for Gross Sexual
Imposition, for which he was sentenced to four years in prison. That fact,
particularly given the similar nature of the prior crime and the crimes committed in
these cases, supports the trial court’s finding pursuant to R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(c).
{¶17} Further, pursuant to R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(b), we concur with the trial
court’s determination that the crimes to which Okonski pled guilty in these cases
were part of a criminal course of conduct against multiple victims and that the harm
caused by the multiple offenses in that course of conduct was so great or unusual
that no single prison term adequately reflects the seriousness of Okonski’s conduct.
While Okonski asserts on appeal that “there was no evidence of actual physical harm
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to any of the alleged victims in this case”, R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(b) does not require
that the great or unusual harm caused by two or more of the multiple offenses in a
course of conduct be physical harm. Moreover, we firmly reject Okonski’s
suggestion that possession of child pornography is not particularly harmful to the
children depicted therein. “Both the Supreme Court of the United States and the
Supreme Court of Ohio have found unequivocally that children are seriously harmed
by the mere possession of pornography in which they are depicted.” State v.
Maynard, 132 Ohio App.3d 820, 827 (9th Dist.1999), citing State v. Meadows, 28
Ohio St.3d 43 (1986). In these cases, that type of serious harm, combined with the
fact that there were six separate victims involved in the crimes for which Okonski
was sentenced, more than adequately supports the trial court’s finding pursuant to
R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(b).
{¶18} Finally, Okonski asserts in the first assignment of error that the record
does not support the trial court’s finding pursuant to R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) that
consecutive sentences were not disproportionate to the seriousness of his conduct
and to the danger he poses to the public. In this regard, Okonski argues that this
Court must consider the total aggregate sentence in our review of the trial court’s
proportionality finding and, further, he argues that the trial court erred in failing to
expressly consider the total aggregate sentence when imposing consecutive
sentences.
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{¶19} In support of his contention that the total aggregate sentence must be
considered in the imposition and review of consecutive sentences, Okonski cites to
State v. Glover, 2024-Ohio-5195, and to State v. Mollett, 2025-Ohio-2826 (3d
Dist.).
{¶20} In State v. Glover, the Supreme Court of Ohio accepted the state’s
appeal of a decision of the First District Court of Appeals in which the court of
appeals reversed and modified the consecutive sentences imposed against Glover in
the trial court. Glover, 2024-Ohio-5195, at ¶ 1. In so doing, the First District had
found that the aggregate sentence was “‘disproportionate to Glover’s criminal
history, [t]he danger he posed to the public, and [his] offenses.’” Id., quoting State
v. Glover, 2023-Ohio-1153, ¶ 102, ¶ 108 (1st Dist.).
{¶21} On appeal in the Supreme Court of Ohio, the decision of the First
District in Glover was reversed. Glover, 2024-Ohio-5195. In the lead opinion of
the Ohio Supreme Court, three justices agreed that (1) to the extent the court of
appeals premised its holding on its disagreement with defendant’s aggregate
sentence rather than its review of the trial court’s findings, it erred in doing so, as
“[n]owhere does the appellate review statute direct an appellate court to consider
the defendant’s aggregate sentence”; and (2) the record did not clearly and
convincingly fail to support the trial court’s consecutive-sentence finding and that,
in concluding otherwise, the appellate court effectively and improperly substituted
its view for that of the trial court. Id. Writing separately, Justice Fischer then
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concurred in the overall judgment reversing the judgment of the First District Court
of Appeals and he joined in the second portion of the lead opinion finding that the
record did not clearly and convincingly fail to support the trial court’s consecutive-
sentence findings. Glover, at ¶ 62, ¶¶ 70-71 (Fischer, J., concurring in judgment and
concurring in part). However, Justice Fischer wrote that he disagreed with the
portion of the lead opinion holding that neither trial nor appellate courts are required
by R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) to focus on a defendant’s aggregate prison term when
imposing or reviewing consecutive sentences. Id., at ¶¶ 62-69. Finally, the
remaining three justices of the Ohio Supreme Court joined in a dissenting opinion
authored by Justice Stewart, noting that they would hold that trial courts and
appellate courts must consider whether the aggregate sentence imposed is
disproportionate to the seriousness of the offender’s conduct and to the danger the
offender poses to the public. Glover, at ¶¶ 73-82 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
{¶22} Thus, as this Court noted in State v. Mollett, 2025-Ohio-2826 (3d
Dist.), the Glover case resulted in four justices agreeing that trial courts and
appellate courts must consider the aggregate sentence, at least with respect to the
proportionality prong of the consecutive-sentencing statute. Id., at ¶ 40. However,
contrary to Okonski’s assertion on appeal in these cases, while we opted to conduct
an aggregate-sentence review in Mollett, this Court stopped short of holding in
Mollett that consideration of the aggregate sentence is required when imposing or
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reviewing consecutive sentences. Id. We decline to do the same here, for two
reasons.
{¶23} One, as detailed above, the four justices of the Ohio Supreme Court
who indicated in Glover that an aggregate-sentence review should be required in the
imposition and the review of consecutive sentences did not constitute a majority
opinion in that case. It is well established that a plurality opinion from the Supreme
Court of Ohio has “questionable precedential value inasmuch as it * * * fail[s] to
receive the requisite support of four justices * * * in order to constitute controlling
law.” Kraly v. Vannewkirk, 69 Ohio St.3d 627, 633 (1994). Put another way, a
plurality opinion is not binding authority. Nascar Holdings, Inc. v. Testa, 2017-
Ohio-9118, ¶ 18, citing Hedrick v. Motorists Mut. Ins. Co., 22 Ohio St.3d 42, 44
(1986), overruled on other grounds, Martin v. Midwestern Group Ins. Co., 1994-
Ohio-407 (1994). The four justices in Glover who agreed in theory as to the premise
of aggregate-sentence review when consecutive sentences are at issue did not even
constitute a plurality opinion, which is “[a]n opinion lacking enough judges’ votes
to constitute a majority, but receiving more votes than any other opinion.” Black’s
Law Dictionary (8 Ed. 2004) 1125.
{¶24} Second, in the time since the Glover decision was released by the
Supreme Court of Ohio, a number of Ohio’s appellate districts have declined to
require consideration of the aggregate sentence when imposing or reviewing
consecutive sentences. See, e.g., State v. Stone, 2026-Ohio-1372, ¶¶ 17-18 (5th
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Dist.); State v. Jackson, 2026-Ohio-1486, ¶ 96 (4th Dist.); State v. Volpi, 2026-Ohio-
599, ¶ 37, ¶ 42 (11th Dist.); State v. Anderson, 2025-Ohio-5732, ¶¶ 25-26 (6th Dist.).
{¶25} Therefore, on the basis of all of the foregoing, we find Okonski’s
argument regarding aggregate-sentence consideration to lack merit.
{¶26} In sum, when considering the record as a whole, we do not find that
Okonski has demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that his consecutive
sentences are clearly and convincingly contrary to law. Therefore, the first
assignment of error is overruled.
{¶27} In the second assignment of error, Okonski argues that his sentences
in both cases violate the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment contained
in the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and in Article I, Section
9 of the Ohio Constitution.
{¶28} In this assignment of error, Okonski first claims that his sentences
were grossly disproportionate to the offenses to which he pled guilty and, further,
that his aggregate sentence should also be considered extreme and disproportionate.
{¶29} The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides:
“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and
unusual punishments inflicted.” The Eighth Amendment is applicable to the states
pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660
(1962). Section 9, Article I of the Ohio Constitution sets forth the same restriction
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on cruel and unusual punishment, providing that “[e]xcessive bail shall not be
required; nor excessive fines imposed; nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”
{¶30} As the Supreme Court of Ohio has noted, “‘[t]he Eighth Amendment
does not require strict proportionality between crime and sentence. Rather, it
forbids only extreme sentences that are “grossly disproportionate” to the crime.’”
State v. Weitbrecht, 86 Ohio St.3d 368, 373 (1999), quoting Harmelin v. Michigan,
501 U.S. 957, 1001 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and in judgment). With
respect to the question of gross disproportionality, the Ohio Supreme Court
reiterated in Weitbrecht that “‘[c]ases in which cruel and unusual punishments have
been found are limited to those involving sanctions which under the circumstances
would be considered shocking to any reasonable person[,]’” and furthermore that
“‘the penalty must be so greatly disproportionate to the offense as to shock the sense
of justice of the community.’” Id., at 371, quoting McDougle v. Maxwell, 1 Ohio
St.2d 68, 70 (1964), and citing State v. Chaffin, 30 Ohio St.2d 13, paragraph three
of the syllabus (1972).
{¶31} For purposes of the Eighth Amendment and Section 9, Article I of the
Ohio Constitution, the Supreme Court of Ohio has further held that, when reviewing
the proportionality of sentences, courts should focus on individual sentences instead
of on the cumulative impact of multiple, consecutive sentences. State v. Hairston,
2008-Ohio-2338, ¶ 20. When none of the individual sentences are grossly
disproportionate to the sentences for other similar offenses, the aggregate prison
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term resulting from consecutive imposition of those sentences does not constitute
cruel and unusual punishment. Id. As the Ohio Supreme Court noted in Hairston,
“‘[i]f a proportionality review were to consider the cumulative effect of all the
sentences imposed, the result would be the possibility that a defendant could
generate an Eighth Amendment disproportionality claim simply because that
defendant had engaged in repeated criminal activity.’” Id., at ¶ 19, quoting Close v.
People, 48 P.3d 528, 539 (Colo. 2002).
{¶32} In the instant cases, the criminal conduct involved in the offenses for
which Okonski was sentenced was of a very serious nature, and those crimes were
part of a course of conduct in which Okonski preyed upon multiple victims of very
tender ages, and with some of whom he was also in a position of trust. Each of
Okonski’s individual sentences is within the range authorized by the Ohio Revised
Code, and we do not find that any of Okonski’s individual sentences would be
shocking to any reasonable person, nor are any of the sentences so greatly
disproportionate to the crime as to shock the sense of justice of the community.
While Okonski further asserts that his aggregate sentence should also be considered
extreme and disproportionate, we find nothing cruel and unusual about punishing
an offender who committed multiple crimes more severely than an offender who
committed only a single crime, which is the effect of consecutive sentencing. See
Hairston, supra, at ¶ 19, citing State v. August, 589 N.W.2d 740, 744 (Iowa 1999).
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{¶33} Okonski also argues in the second assignment of error that his
sentences were disproportionate to sentences imposed on other offenders who
committed the same crimes under similar circumstances.
As this Court stated in State v. Gossman, 2020-Ohio-5135 (3d Dist.):
A sentence within the statutory range generally will not be found to be in violation of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. U.S. v. Newsome, 898 F.2d 119 (10th Cir.1990). The Eighth Amendment only forbids extreme sentences that are “grossly disproportionate” to the crime. Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 12, 123 S.Ct. 1179, 155 L.Ed.2d 108 (2003). “A defendant alleging disproportionality in felony sentencing has the burden of producing evidence that his sentence is disproportionate to sentences given to other offenders with similar records who have committed these offenses.[”] State v. McMillan, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 105296, 2017-Ohio-8872, ¶ 16, 100 N.E.3d 1222.
Id., at ¶ 10.
{¶34} Here, Okonski claims that his sentences were disproportionate to those
imposed upon the defendant in the Seneca County Court of Common Pleas case of
State v. Dunbar, Case Number 25 CR 0189. Okonski asserts that in the Dunbar
case, the trial court sentenced the defendant to 12 months in prison on each of five
counts of Unlawful Sexual Conduct with a Minor, and to 4 to 6 years in prison on a
charge of Pandering Obscenity Involving a Minor, with the sentences to be served
concurrently.
{¶35} However, Okonski has not presented any evidence in these cases that
his sentence was not proportionate to similarly situated offenders. While the
sentence in the Dunbar case was referenced in passing by the prosecution on the
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record at Okonski’s sentencing hearing, the record here contains no information
about the facts of the Dunbar case, other than that Dunbar was apparently found
guilty of creating just a singular piece of sexually-oriented material involving a
child. (10/20/25 Tr., 4). The record before us is silent as to any other information
relating to that other case that might be relevant for comparison purposes, including
but not limited to the specifics of the crimes at issue, the defendant’s prior criminal
history or lack thereof, the position of the victim or victims as to sentencing, and
whether there was any agreement between the parties as to a sentencing
recommendation.
{¶36} In a direct appeal, this Court may not consider matters outside the
record. State v. Wilson, 2024-Ohio-5557, ¶ 17 (3d Dist.), citing State v. Jones, 2007-
Ohio-5624 (3d Dist.). Any evidence necessary to establish Okonski’s claim would
be evidence outside of the record in these cases, and therefore his claim fails on
direct appeal. See State v. Rentschler, 2023-Ohio-3009, ¶ 67 (3d Dist.), citing State
v. Cooperrider, 4 Ohio St.3d 226, 228 (1983).
{¶37} For all the reasons stated, the second assignment of error is overruled.
{¶38} In the third assignment of error, Okonski argues that the trial court
erred in failing to consider his military service record at the time of sentencing, as
required by R.C. 2929.12(F).
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{¶39} The statute at issue here, R.C. 2929.12, governs the factors that trial
courts must consider when imposing sentence for a felony crime. R.C. 2929.12(B)
sets forth ten potential factors indicating that an offender’s conduct is more serious
than conduct normally constituting the offense, while R.C. 2929.12(C) sets forth
four factors indicating that an offender’s conduct is less serious than conduct
normally constituting the offense. R.C. 2929.12(D) and (E) then each list five
factors that trial courts are to consider that indicate an offender is likely to commit
future crimes or is not likely to commit future crimes, respectively. Finally, R.C.
2929.12(F) requires the sentencing court to consider the offender’s military
service record, if any.
Specifically, R.C. 2929.12(F) provides:
The sentencing court shall consider the offender’s military service record and whether the offender has an emotional, mental, or physical condition that is traceable to the offender’s service in the armed forces of the United States and that was a contributing factor in the offender’s commission of the offense or offenses.
{¶40} While a trial court is required to consider the factors set forth in R.C.
2929.12, the trial court is not required to discuss the considerations on the
record. State v. Gossman, 2020-Ohio-5135, ¶ 7 (3d Dist.), citing State v. Agnew,
2020-Ohio-4260, ¶ 11 (3d Dist.). “‘A trial court’s statement that it considered the
required statutory factors, without more, is sufficient to fulfill its obligations under
the sentencing statutes.’” Agnew, supra, at ¶ 11, quoting State v. Maggette, 2016-
Ohio-5554, ¶ 32 (3d Dist.).
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{¶41} In particular, R.C. 2929.12(F) “does not require a particular outcome
or that the trial court do anything other than consider the defendant’s military
service record and any contributing factors to the offense that can be traced back to
such service.” State v. Cook, 2024-Ohio-2798, ¶ 39 (4th Dist.), citing State v.
Aburas, 2018-Ohio-1984, ¶ 13 (12th Dist.), citing State v. Mitchell, 2015-Ohio-
1132, ¶ 22 (4th Dist.) (Simply because the trial court did not enumerate R.C.
2929.12(F) on the record, does not also mean the trial court did not consider the
defendant’s military service.). See also State v. Stewart, 2024-Ohio-1640, at ¶ 48
(4th Dist.) (R.C. 2929.12(F) does not put the burden on the court to solicit
information as to whether the offender has such a condition).
{¶42} In the instant cases, the presentence investigation report contains a
section relating to Okonski’s prior military service, which states that he “joined the
Army in March of 1997 and left as an E2 in October of 1997 as he had a bad knee
with an Honorable Discharge.” There is no information in the presentence report
reflecting that Okonski has an emotional, mental, or physical condition that is
traceable to his seven months of military service and that was a contributing factor
in his commission of the crimes in these case, nor does Okonski allege on appeal
that he has, or had, such a condition.
{¶43} Nevertheless, the trial court specifically noted on the record at the time
of sentencing that it had considered the presentence investigation report and, further,
that the court had “balanced the seriousness and recidivism factors under Ohio
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Revised Code Section 2929.12.” (10/20/25 Tr., 21). The judgment entries of
sentencing also both reflect that the trial court considered “the record, oral
statements, Victim Impact Statement and Presentence Investigation Report, as well
as the principles and purposes of sentencing under Ohio Revised Code Section
2929.11, and has balanced the seriousness and recidivism factors under Ohio
Revised Code Section 2929.12.”
{¶44} Based on all of the foregoing, we find no merit to Okonski’s claim that
the trial court failed to consider Okonski’s prior military service or otherwise erred
in the application of R.C. 2929.12(F) when imposing sentence in these cases.
{¶45} The third assignment of error is overruled.
Conclusion
{¶46} Having found no error prejudicial to the defendant-appellant, Mick
Okonski, in the particulars assigned and argued, the October 20, 2025 judgments of
the Seneca County Court of Common Pleas are affirmed.
ZIMMERMAN, P.J., and WILLAMOWSKI, J., concur.
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JUDGMENT ENTRY
For the reasons stated in the opinion of this Court, the assignments of error
are overruled and it is the judgment and order of this Court that the judgments of
the trial court are affirmed with costs assessed to Appellant for which judgment is
hereby rendered. The causes are hereby remanded to the trial court for execution of
the judgment for costs.
It is further ordered that the Clerk of this Court certify a copy of this Court’s
judgment entry and opinion to the trial court as the mandate prescribed by App.R.
27; and serve a copy of this Court’s judgment entry and opinion on each party to the
proceedings and note the date of service in the docket. See App.R. 30.
Juergen A. Waldick, Judge
William R. Zimmerman, Judge
John R. Willamowski, Judge
DATED: /jlm
-21-