State v. Ohio Indus. Comm., Unpublished Decision (12-3-2002)

CourtOhio Court of Appeals
DecidedDecember 3, 2002
DocketNo. 02AP-336 (REGULAR CALENDAR)
StatusUnpublished

This text of State v. Ohio Indus. Comm., Unpublished Decision (12-3-2002) (State v. Ohio Indus. Comm., Unpublished Decision (12-3-2002)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Ohio Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State v. Ohio Indus. Comm., Unpublished Decision (12-3-2002), (Ohio Ct. App. 2002).

Opinion

DECISION
{¶ 1} Relator, Wanda W. Barker, commenced this original action requesting a writ of mandamus that orders respondent Industrial Commission of Ohio to vacate its order denying her application for permanent total disability compensation, and to issue an order finding that she is entitled to permanent total disability compensation pursuant to State ex rel. Gay v. Mihm (1994), 68 Ohio St.3d 315. In the alternative, relator requests a limited writ of mandamus ordering that the claim be returned to the commission for a new hearing followed by an order either granting or denying her application for permanent total disability compensation.

{¶ 2} Pursuant to Civ.R. 53 and Section (M), Loc.R. 12 of the Tenth Appellate District, this matter was referred to a magistrate who issued a decision, including findings of fact and conclusions of law. (Attached as Appendix A.) The magistrate concluded relator has not demonstrated the commission's order fails to satisfy the requirements of State ex rel. Noll v. Indus. Comm. (1991), 57 Ohio St.3d 203, nor has relator demonstrated that relief under Gay is warranted. Accordingly, the magistrate determined the requested writ should be denied.

{¶ 3} Relator has filed two objections to the magistrate's conclusions of law.

{¶ 4} Relator's first objection contends the commission's analysis of the nonmedical factors is inadequate. In particular, relator points to a sentence from the commission's order stating that a fully literate citizen with a high school diploma is inherently capable of sustained remunerative employment. Were that sentence the commission's sole analysis, we would agree that the analysis is inadequate. However, as the magistrate noted, the commission discussed various nonmedical factors, including relator's age, her education, her past employment, and the opinion of the vocational expert who opined that claimant is eligible for a number of entry-level jobs.

{¶ 5} Relator nonetheless suggests the commission's analysis here is similar to that set forth in Gay, supra. Initially, the facts of Gay are substantially different than those here. In Gay, although the claimant was younger than relator, (1) he had only a ninth grade education and had worked solely as a construction laborer for almost 30 years, (2) the injuries made it impossible for him to continue to perform his job, and (3) the vocational expert in that case further found him incapable of sustained remunerative employment. Moreover, the commission in Gay did not analyze the nonmedical factors, but simply stated them, noting that the claimant "is sixty-one years of age and has a ninth grade education. He has worked for the water department for twenty-nine years rising to the position of maintenance crew leader, indicating supervisory potential."

{¶ 6} By contrast, the commission order at issue, while brief, discusses the various nonmedical factors and whether they negatively or positively impact on relator's ability to engage in sustained remunerative employment at the sedentary level. As the magistrate properly concluded, the discussion, while brief, is sufficient to satisfy Noll. Relator's first objection is overruled.

{¶ 7} Similar to her first objection, relator's second objection contends the commission's order failed to set forth an explanation sufficient to allow a reviewing tribunal to understand the evidence. In particular, relator contends the commission's order found relator has marketable job experience, but failed to indicate the basis for the conclusion. Contrary to relator's objection, the commission specifically noted relator's past work history, and based on it determined relator had marketable job experience. Moreover, although relator contends the commission improperly relied on the vocational expert's report that showed only limited access to entry level jobs, the report indicated relator's access to a number of jobs, and the commission properly could rely on the report for that evidence. Relator's second objection is overruled.

{¶ 8} Following independent review pursuant to Civ.R. 53, we find the magistrate has properly determined the pertinent facts and applied the salient law to them. Accordingly, we adopt the magistrate's decision as our own, including the findings of fact and conclusions of law contained in it with one modification: in ¶ 28 the magistrate states that "[r]elator contends that the commission's explanation is insufficient and that the commission's statement that a full illiterate citizen with a high school education is capable of performing sustained remunerative employment is clearly a misstatement of law." That statement is modified to change the words "full illiterate" to "fully literate." In accordance with the magistrate's determination, we deny the requested writ of mandamus.

Objections overruled; writ denied.

KLATT and DESHLER, JJ., concur.

APPENDIX A IN MANDAMUS
{¶ 9} Relator, Wanda W. Barker, has filed this original action requesting that this court issue a writ of mandamus ordering respondent Industrial Commission of Ohio ("commission") to vacate its order which denied her application for permanent total disability ("PTD") compensation and ordering the commission to issue an order finding that she is entitled to PTD compensation pursuant to State ex rel. Gay v. Mihm (1994), 68 Ohio St.3d 315. In the alternative, relator requests a limited writ of mandamus ordering that the claim be returned to the commission for a new hearing followed by an order either granting or denying her application for PTD compensation.

Findings of Fact:

{¶ 10} 1. Relator sustained a work-related injury on September 8, 1998, and her claim was ultimately allowed for the following conditions: "Sprain hip and thigh NOS, left; sprain lumbosacral; aggravation of pre-existing arthritis of lumbar spine and multiple level disc disease."

{¶ 11} 2. Temporary total disability compensation was paid from the date of injury through September 27, 1999, and from July 13, 2000 through May 2, 2001.

{¶ 12} 3. On July 12, 2001, relator filed an application for PTD compensation supported by the July 2, 2001 report of her treating physician, Dr. Robert M. Holley, who stated as follows in his report:

{¶ 13} "This 71-year-old white female has been seen by me for several years for an injury to her lower back.

{¶ 14} "At this time, she has no evidence in improvement in her function or level of pain and still has moderate impairment of her range of motion and level of activity.

{¶ 15} "Because of her failure to improve despite conservative therapy and her advanced age which will probably make her not the best candidate for surgical intervention, I believe this patient is permanently and totally disabled."

{¶ 16} 4. On September 20, 2001, relator was examined by commission specialist, Dr. James H. Rutherford, who issued a report dated October 1, 2001. Dr. Rutherford opined that relator had a 21 percent permanent partial impairment and that she had some functional limitations. Dr. Rutherford opined that relator was capable of doing sedentary work activities lifting up to ten pounds occasionally with no stooping, bending, climbing, or crawling. He noted further that she can do occasional standing and walking and that she can drive for her own transportation but could not drive heavy equipment. Dr. Rutherford opined that, with regard to a physical strength rating, relator was capable of sedentary work activity.

{¶ 17} 5.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

State ex rel. Pressley v. Industrial Commission
228 N.E.2d 631 (Ohio Supreme Court, 1967)
State ex rel. Teece v. Industrial Commission
429 N.E.2d 433 (Ohio Supreme Court, 1981)
State ex rel. Elliott v. Industrial Commission
497 N.E.2d 70 (Ohio Supreme Court, 1986)
State ex rel. Lewis v. Diamond Foundry Co.
505 N.E.2d 962 (Ohio Supreme Court, 1987)
State ex rel. Stephenson v. Industrial Commission
509 N.E.2d 946 (Ohio Supreme Court, 1987)
State ex rel. Noll v. Industrial Commission
567 N.E.2d 245 (Ohio Supreme Court, 1991)
State ex rel. Gay v. Mihm
626 N.E.2d 666 (Ohio Supreme Court, 1994)
State ex rel. Domjancic v. Industrial Commission
635 N.E.2d 372 (Ohio Supreme Court, 1994)
State ex rel. Pass v. C.S.T. Extraction Co.
658 N.E.2d 1055 (Ohio Supreme Court, 1996)
State ex rel. Bryant v. Industrial Commission
659 N.E.2d 1256 (Ohio Supreme Court, 1996)
State ex rel. DeZarn v. Industrial Commission
659 N.E.2d 1259 (Ohio Supreme Court, 1996)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
State v. Ohio Indus. Comm., Unpublished Decision (12-3-2002), Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-v-ohio-indus-comm-unpublished-decision-12-3-2002-ohioctapp-2002.