[Cite as State v. Ogletree, 2013-Ohio-1538.]
Court of Appeals of Ohio EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION No. 96438
STATE OF OHIO PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE
vs.
RICHARD OGLETREE DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
JUDGMENT: CONVICTIONS AFFIRMED; SENTENCE REVERSED IN PART AND REMANDED
Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Case No. CR-535185
BEFORE: Keough, P.J., Blackmon, J., and E.T. Gallagher, J.
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: April 18, 2013 ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
Gayl M. Berger 30650 Pinetree Road Suite 19 Cleveland, Ohio 44124
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Timothy J. McGinty Cuyahoga County Prosecutor James M. Rice Assistant Prosecuting Attorney The Justice Center, 9th Floor 1200 Ontario Street Cleveland, Ohio 44113 KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, P.J.:
{¶1} This cause is before us on remand from the Ohio Supreme Court for further
review of our decision released November 10, 2011,1 in light of the Supreme Court’s
recent decision in State v. Brunning, 134 Ohio St.3d 438, 2012-Ohio-5752, 983 N.E.2d
316. The Supreme Court reversed our judgment in this case, thereby reinstating
Ogletree’s convictions for failure to provide notice of a change of residence address in
violation of R.C. 2950.05(E)(1) 2 and tampering with records in violation of R.C.
2913.42(A). The court remanded the matter to us for further proceedings consistent with
its opinion, which includes consideration of Ogletree’s second, third, and fourth
assignments of error that were previously rendered moot by our decision in Ogletree I.
For clarity, we consider Ogletree’s assignments of error out of order.
{¶2} Ogletree was classified as a sexually oriented offender under Megan’s Law;
subsequently reclassified under the Adam Walsh Act (“AWA”) as a Tier III offender, and
after the Ohio Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Bodyke, 126 Ohio St.3d 266,
2010-Ohio-2424, 933 N.E.2d 753, restored to his previous status as a sexually oriented
State v. Ogletree, 8th Dist. No. 96438, 2011-Ohio-5846 (Ogletree I). 1
“[T]he statute was misnumbered in the indictment — it should have read R.C. 2
2950.05(F)(1).” Brunning at ¶ 5. Error in the numerical designation of the statute that the defendant is alleged to have violated is not ground for dismissal of the indictment or for reversal of a conviction if the error did not prejudicially mislead the defendant. Crim.R. 7(B). Ogletree was not prejudiced in his defense; although the indictment listed the misnumbered statute, the text clearly charged that Ogletree “did fail to notify the Cuyahoga County Sheriff of a change of address * * *.” offender under Megan’s Law, with corresponding registration requirements. He was
subsequently indicted under the AWA for (1) failing to verify his address in violation of
R.C. 2950.06(F); (2) failing to notify the sheriff of a change of address in violation of
R.C. 2950.05(E)(1) (misnumbered); and (3) tampering with records in violation of R.C.
2913.42(A). The trial court denied Ogletree’s motion to dismiss the indictment and, after
a bench trial, found him not guilty of the failing-to-verify charge, but guilty of failure to
notify of a change in address and tampering with records. The court sentenced him to
three years incarceration on the failure-to-notify conviction and one year on the
tampering-with-records conviction, to be served concurrently for an aggregate term of
three years.
{¶3} In his third assignment of error, Ogletree contends that under Bodyke —
which held the reclassification provisions of the AWA unconstitutional, severed them
from the AWA, and reinstated the classifications and registration orders imposed
previously upon sex offenders originally classified under Megan’s Law — the provisions
of the AWA cannot be enforced against him. Therefore, he contends, the trial court
erred in not dismissing the indictment on the failure-to-notify and tampering-with-records
charges.
{¶4} But Brunning makes clear that Bodyke does not require dismissal where the
conduct underlying the indictment constitutes a violation under both Megan’s Law and
the AWA. Brunning at ¶ 31. Even where a defendant subject to Megan’s Law is
indicted under the AWA, if the indictment describes conduct that is also a violation of Megan’s Law, which a defendant originally classified under Megan’s Law remains
obligated to meet, the indictment is sufficient and a defendant can be convicted of the
charges. Id.
{¶5} Here, although Ogletree was indicted for conduct that violated the AWA
version of R.C. 2950.05 (failure to notify of a change in address), the conduct described
in the indictment also constituted a violation under the Megan’s Law version of R.C.
2950.05, which Ogletree was bound to follow. Brunning at ¶ 24. Accordingly, the
indictment properly charged an offense against Ogletree, and therefore, the trial court did
not err in denying Ogletree’s motion to dismiss this count.
{¶6} With respect to the tampering-with-records charge, R.C. 2913.42 provides
that “[n]o person * * * with purpose to defraud * * * shall (1) falsify * * * any writing * *
* or record; (2) utter any writing or record, knowing it to have been tampered with as
provided in division (A)(1) of this section.” Thus, the issue is whether Ogletree, with
purpose to defraud, falsified any writing or record. Brunning at ¶ 30. The evidence at
trial demonstrated that he filed an address-verification form with the sheriff that
contained false information. Accordingly, whether he was required to verify his address
under Megan’s Law or not, he voluntarily filed a form containing false information,
which is in itself a violation of R.C. 2913.42. Brunning at ¶ 32. Therefore, the trial
court properly denied Ogletree’s motion to dismiss this count.
{¶7} Appellant’s third assignment of error is overruled. {¶8} In his second assignment of error, Ogletree contends that the trial court
erred in not applying the provisions of former R.C. 2950.99 for sentencing. We agree
with respect to Ogletree’s conviction for failure to notify. In State v. Howard, 134 Ohio
St.3d 467, 2012-Ohio-5738, 983 N.E.2d 341, the Ohio Supreme Court held that the
applicable penalty provision for convictions where a defendant is charged with a violation
of the AWA that also constitutes a violation under Megan’s Law is contained in former
R.C. 2950.99. 3 Thus, the trial court should have applied former R.C. 2950.99 when
sentencing Ogletree on the failure-to-notify conviction; under former R.C.
2950.99(A)(1)(a)(i), Ogletree’s registration offense would have been punishable as a
third-degree felony, instead of as a first-degree felony.
{¶9} The same reasoning does not apply to Ogletree’s tampering-with-records
conviction, which is punishable as a violation of R.C. 2913.42 regardless of Ogletree’s
reporting duties under Megan’s Law.
{¶10} Accordingly, the second assignment of error is sustained in part and
overruled in part. We vacate Ogletree’s sentence on the failure-to-notify conviction and
remand for resentencing on that count only.
{¶11} In his fourth assignment of error, Ogletree contends that he was denied his
Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. To establish ineffective
“[F]or a defendant whose sex-offender classification was determined under Megan’s Law, the 3
penalty for a violation of the reporting requirements of former R.C.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
[Cite as State v. Ogletree, 2013-Ohio-1538.]
Court of Appeals of Ohio EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION No. 96438
STATE OF OHIO PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE
vs.
RICHARD OGLETREE DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
JUDGMENT: CONVICTIONS AFFIRMED; SENTENCE REVERSED IN PART AND REMANDED
Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Case No. CR-535185
BEFORE: Keough, P.J., Blackmon, J., and E.T. Gallagher, J.
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: April 18, 2013 ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
Gayl M. Berger 30650 Pinetree Road Suite 19 Cleveland, Ohio 44124
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Timothy J. McGinty Cuyahoga County Prosecutor James M. Rice Assistant Prosecuting Attorney The Justice Center, 9th Floor 1200 Ontario Street Cleveland, Ohio 44113 KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, P.J.:
{¶1} This cause is before us on remand from the Ohio Supreme Court for further
review of our decision released November 10, 2011,1 in light of the Supreme Court’s
recent decision in State v. Brunning, 134 Ohio St.3d 438, 2012-Ohio-5752, 983 N.E.2d
316. The Supreme Court reversed our judgment in this case, thereby reinstating
Ogletree’s convictions for failure to provide notice of a change of residence address in
violation of R.C. 2950.05(E)(1) 2 and tampering with records in violation of R.C.
2913.42(A). The court remanded the matter to us for further proceedings consistent with
its opinion, which includes consideration of Ogletree’s second, third, and fourth
assignments of error that were previously rendered moot by our decision in Ogletree I.
For clarity, we consider Ogletree’s assignments of error out of order.
{¶2} Ogletree was classified as a sexually oriented offender under Megan’s Law;
subsequently reclassified under the Adam Walsh Act (“AWA”) as a Tier III offender, and
after the Ohio Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Bodyke, 126 Ohio St.3d 266,
2010-Ohio-2424, 933 N.E.2d 753, restored to his previous status as a sexually oriented
State v. Ogletree, 8th Dist. No. 96438, 2011-Ohio-5846 (Ogletree I). 1
“[T]he statute was misnumbered in the indictment — it should have read R.C. 2
2950.05(F)(1).” Brunning at ¶ 5. Error in the numerical designation of the statute that the defendant is alleged to have violated is not ground for dismissal of the indictment or for reversal of a conviction if the error did not prejudicially mislead the defendant. Crim.R. 7(B). Ogletree was not prejudiced in his defense; although the indictment listed the misnumbered statute, the text clearly charged that Ogletree “did fail to notify the Cuyahoga County Sheriff of a change of address * * *.” offender under Megan’s Law, with corresponding registration requirements. He was
subsequently indicted under the AWA for (1) failing to verify his address in violation of
R.C. 2950.06(F); (2) failing to notify the sheriff of a change of address in violation of
R.C. 2950.05(E)(1) (misnumbered); and (3) tampering with records in violation of R.C.
2913.42(A). The trial court denied Ogletree’s motion to dismiss the indictment and, after
a bench trial, found him not guilty of the failing-to-verify charge, but guilty of failure to
notify of a change in address and tampering with records. The court sentenced him to
three years incarceration on the failure-to-notify conviction and one year on the
tampering-with-records conviction, to be served concurrently for an aggregate term of
three years.
{¶3} In his third assignment of error, Ogletree contends that under Bodyke —
which held the reclassification provisions of the AWA unconstitutional, severed them
from the AWA, and reinstated the classifications and registration orders imposed
previously upon sex offenders originally classified under Megan’s Law — the provisions
of the AWA cannot be enforced against him. Therefore, he contends, the trial court
erred in not dismissing the indictment on the failure-to-notify and tampering-with-records
charges.
{¶4} But Brunning makes clear that Bodyke does not require dismissal where the
conduct underlying the indictment constitutes a violation under both Megan’s Law and
the AWA. Brunning at ¶ 31. Even where a defendant subject to Megan’s Law is
indicted under the AWA, if the indictment describes conduct that is also a violation of Megan’s Law, which a defendant originally classified under Megan’s Law remains
obligated to meet, the indictment is sufficient and a defendant can be convicted of the
charges. Id.
{¶5} Here, although Ogletree was indicted for conduct that violated the AWA
version of R.C. 2950.05 (failure to notify of a change in address), the conduct described
in the indictment also constituted a violation under the Megan’s Law version of R.C.
2950.05, which Ogletree was bound to follow. Brunning at ¶ 24. Accordingly, the
indictment properly charged an offense against Ogletree, and therefore, the trial court did
not err in denying Ogletree’s motion to dismiss this count.
{¶6} With respect to the tampering-with-records charge, R.C. 2913.42 provides
that “[n]o person * * * with purpose to defraud * * * shall (1) falsify * * * any writing * *
* or record; (2) utter any writing or record, knowing it to have been tampered with as
provided in division (A)(1) of this section.” Thus, the issue is whether Ogletree, with
purpose to defraud, falsified any writing or record. Brunning at ¶ 30. The evidence at
trial demonstrated that he filed an address-verification form with the sheriff that
contained false information. Accordingly, whether he was required to verify his address
under Megan’s Law or not, he voluntarily filed a form containing false information,
which is in itself a violation of R.C. 2913.42. Brunning at ¶ 32. Therefore, the trial
court properly denied Ogletree’s motion to dismiss this count.
{¶7} Appellant’s third assignment of error is overruled. {¶8} In his second assignment of error, Ogletree contends that the trial court
erred in not applying the provisions of former R.C. 2950.99 for sentencing. We agree
with respect to Ogletree’s conviction for failure to notify. In State v. Howard, 134 Ohio
St.3d 467, 2012-Ohio-5738, 983 N.E.2d 341, the Ohio Supreme Court held that the
applicable penalty provision for convictions where a defendant is charged with a violation
of the AWA that also constitutes a violation under Megan’s Law is contained in former
R.C. 2950.99. 3 Thus, the trial court should have applied former R.C. 2950.99 when
sentencing Ogletree on the failure-to-notify conviction; under former R.C.
2950.99(A)(1)(a)(i), Ogletree’s registration offense would have been punishable as a
third-degree felony, instead of as a first-degree felony.
{¶9} The same reasoning does not apply to Ogletree’s tampering-with-records
conviction, which is punishable as a violation of R.C. 2913.42 regardless of Ogletree’s
reporting duties under Megan’s Law.
{¶10} Accordingly, the second assignment of error is sustained in part and
overruled in part. We vacate Ogletree’s sentence on the failure-to-notify conviction and
remand for resentencing on that count only.
{¶11} In his fourth assignment of error, Ogletree contends that he was denied his
Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. To establish ineffective
“[F]or a defendant whose sex-offender classification was determined under Megan’s Law, the 3
penalty for a violation of the reporting requirements of former R.C. 2950.05 that occurs after Megan’s Law was supplanted by the AWA is the penalty set forth in the version of R.C. 2950.99 in place just before the effective date of the AWA.” Id. at ¶ 29. assistance of counsel, a defendant must show that counsel’s representation was deficient
in that it “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness” and “there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding
would have been different.” State v. Sanders, 94 Ohio St.3d 150, 151, 2002-Ohio-350,
761 N.E.2d 18, citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-688, 104 S.Ct. 2052,
80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). “‘A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to
undermine confidence in the outcome.’” State v. Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d 136, 142, 538
N.E.2d 373 (1989), quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.
{¶12} Ogletree contends that counsel was ineffective because he (1) did not cite
appropriate case law to support the motion to dismiss; and (2) did not raise the issue of
applying former R.C. 2950.99 for sentencing. Ogletree’s arguments are without merit.
{¶13} Our review of the motion to dismiss demonstrates that counsel argued that
the trial court should dismiss the case in light of Bodyke, the same case appellate counsel
contends the trial court should have considered and the same case this court relied upon
(albeit erroneously) in vacating Ogletree’s convictions. Furthermore, our review of the
transcript demonstrates that counsel raised the issue of applying former R.C. 2950.99 with
the trial court in both his oral Crim.R. 29 motion for acquittal and at sentencing. In fact,
our review indicates that counsel represented Ogletree well, even obtaining a not guilty
verdict on Count 1 of the indictment.
{¶14} The fourth assignment of error is therefore overruled. {¶15} In light of Brunning, Ogletree’s convictions for failure to notify of an
address change in violation of R.C. 2950.05(E)(1) (misnumbered) and tampering with
records in violation of R.C. 2913.42(A) are affirmed. The sentence on the
failure-to-notify conviction is reversed and the matter is remanded for resentencing on
that count only under former R.C. 2950.99.
{¶16} Convictions affirmed; sentence reversed in part and remanded.
It is ordered that the parties share equally costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common
pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant’s convictions having
been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case remanded to the trial court
for execution of sentence.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of
the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, PRESIDING JUDGE
PATRICIA A. BLACKMON, J., and EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, J., CONCUR