State v. O'CONNOR

Supreme Court of Iowa

State v. O'CONNOR

346 N.W.2d 8, 1984 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 1063

CourtSupreme Court of Iowa

DecidedMarch 14, 1984

Docket68810

StatusPublished

Cited by6 cases

This text of 346 N.W.2d 8 (State v. O'CONNOR) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Iowa primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

State v. O'CONNOR, 346 N.W.2d 8, 1984 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 1063 (iowa 1984).

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Opinion

LARSON, Justice.

This is an appeal from the defendant’s conviction of the crimes of burglary in the second degree, Iowa Code sections 713.1 and 713.3, and theft in the fourth degree, Iowa Code sections 714.1 and 714.2(4). Following his conviction he appealed to this court and the case was referred to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the conviction by a three-to-two majority. On application of the defendant further review was granted by this court. We affirm.

On the early morning of December 19, 1981, a gas station in Hedrick, Iowa, was burglarized. A witness identified an automobile which eventually led to the arrest of this defendant, who was seventeen years old at the time of the offense. Investigating officers went to defendant’s home and were granted permission to enter. Upon entering, one of them, according to the officers, advised the defendant of his Miranda rights. The defendant then made an oral statement to him. This oral statement was later suppressed upon the defendant’s motion, and that ruling is not before us. The only issue involved here concerns the court’s refusal to suppress a later, written, statement.

The defendant was asked to go with the officers to the police station, which he did. His mother accompanied him.

The events which transpired at the police station are the subjects of considerable conflict in the testimony. There was testimony by the officers that the defendant was orally advised of his Miranda rights and that he signed a “juvenile” Miranda form which was read to him, then signed by the officer and by the defendant’s mother. The defendant was not advised that he could be tried as an adult if the juvenile court waived its jurisdiction. The officers also testified that a written statement of the events implicating the defendant was signed by him after the Miranda waiver was signed by the defendant and his mother.

The defendant now challenges the admission of this statement over his objection on *10 the ground that his waiver of his Miranda rights was not knowingly and voluntarily made. Specifically, he complains that he was not advised that the statement made by him could be used in the event he were charged as an adult. He testified it was his understanding that he would be processed as a juvenile as he had on five prior occasions. His mother’s testimony was to the same effect. Both the defendant and his mother testified that the Miranda waiver was signed after the written statement was given by him although this evidence was contradicted by the officers’ testimony and by the times shown on the waiver form and the written statement.

The issues presented are (1) whether a waiver by a juvenile of his Miranda rights must include evidence of an understanding on the part of the juvenile that he could be tried as an adult, and the statement used against him, if the juvenile court waives its jurisdiction; and (2) in the event such a per se rule is not required for a valid waiver of a juvenile’s Miranda rights do the totality of these circumstances indicate those rights were freely and voluntarily waived. 1

In determining whether a Miranda waiver is sufficient, we examine the totality of the circumstances surrounding the waiver. State v. Aldape, 307 N.W.2d 32, 36 (Iowa 1981). In addition, when a juvenile is involved, the court must consider the juvenile’s age, education, level of intelligence, his opportunity to consult with a parent, guardian or counsel, the length of detention prior to the waiver, and the nature of the questioning which solicited the statement. Iowa Code § 232.45(9).

Contrary to the assertions by the defendant and his mother, we believe the evidence establishes that the waiver of the defendant’s Miranda rights preceded the signing of the voluntary statement. The question remains whether the waiver was voluntary within the meaning of the law.

I. The Per Se Rule.

Addressing the issue of whether the juvenile must be informed of the possibility of the use of this statement in adult court, we note that there is support for the defendant’s per se argument. In State v. Lohnes, 324 N.W.2d 409 (S.D.1982), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 103 S.Ct. 1232, 75 L.Ed.2d 466 (1983), for example, the South Dakota Supreme Court concluded that “[bjefore a juvenile, who will be tried as an adult, effectively waives his constitutional right to counsel and against self-incrimination, the juvenile must be given notice that he may be tried as an adult.” (Citations omitted.) Id. at 414. On the other hand, the prevailing view is that the failure to advise the juvenile of the possibility of transfer to adult court is only one factor in assessing the totality of the circumstances bearing on voluntariness. See e.g., In the Matter of the Appeal in Pinal County, Juvenile Action No. J-677, 134 Ariz. 502, 657 P.2d 915 (Ariz.Ct.App.1982); People v. Prude, 66 Ill.2d 470, 6 Ill.Dec. 689, 363 N.E.2d 371 (1977); Edwards v. State, 227 Kan. 723, 608 P.2d 1006 (1980); State v. Loyd, 297 Minn. 442, 212 N.W.2d 671 (1973); State v. Rone, 515 S.W.2d 438 (Mo. 1974); Quiriconi v. State, 96 Nev. 766, 616 P.2d 1111 (1980); In the Matter of V.W.B., 665 P.2d 1222 (Okla.Cr.App.1983); Harris v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 715, 232 S.E.2d 751 (1977).

While we agree that it would be a better practice for officers to routinely advise juveniles of the possibility of waiver to adult court, we reject the per se approach urged by the defendant. We do consider this fact, however, in assessing the totality of the circumstances.

II. The Totality of Circumstances.

The question remains whether, under all of the circumstances shown, the defendant’s waiver of his Miranda rights was valid.

Iowa Code section 232.45(9) provides in part that when a court is construing a *11 voluntariness issue in connection with the juvenile statement, it

may consider any factors it finds relevant and shall consider the following factors:

a. Opportunity for the child to consult with a parent, guardian, custodian, lawyer or other adult.

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