State v. Nosrati

2025 Ohio 2343

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: July 2, 2025
• Docket: 24 CAA 11 0102
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as State v. Nosrati, 2025-Ohio-2343.]

COURT OF APPEALS DELAWARE COUNTY, OHIO FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

STATE OF OHIO JUDGES: Hon. Andrew J. King, P.J. Plaintiff-Appellant Hon. William B. Hoffman, J. Hon. Kevin W. Popham, J. -vs-

MAJID NOSRATI Case No. 24 CAA 11 0102

Defendant-Appellee OPINION

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDINGS: Appeal from the Delaware County Court of Common Pleas, Case No. 24 CRI 020137

JUDGMENT: Judgment Reversed and Remanded for Resentencing

DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY: July 2, 2025

APPEARANCES:

For Plaintiff-Appellant For Defendant-Appellee

KATHERYN L. MUNGER APRIL F. CAMPBELL Delaware County Prosecutor’s Office Campbell Law, LLC Assistant Prosecuting Attorney 6059 Frantz Road, Suite 206 117 North Union Street Dublin, Ohio 43017 Delaware, Ohio 43015 Hoffman, J. {¶1} Plaintiff-appellant the State of Ohio appeals the judgment entered by the

Delaware County Common Pleas Court convicting Defendant-appellee Majid Nosrati

following his plea of guilty to felonious assault (R.C. 2903.11(A)(2)), and sentencing him

to a term of community control not to exceed three years.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND CASE

{¶2} On February 25, 2024, Appellee invited the victim, who was a friend of

Appellee’s, to his home for dinner and drinks. Appellee became intoxicated, and became

angry with the victim. Appellee broke a glass bottle, and using the neck of the broken

bottle, Appellee stabbed the victim’s neck just below the victim’s ear. Appellee then

grabbed a knife, and began chasing the victim with the knife. Appellee stabbed the victim

with the knife, causing a large laceration on the victim’s back. The victim was able to flee

the home, and went to the hospital for treatment.

{¶3} Appellee was indicted by the Delaware County Grand Jury with two counts

of attempted murder and two counts of felonious assault. Pursuant to a negotiated plea,

Appellee pled guilty to one count of felonious assault, and the State dismissed the

remaining charges.

{¶4} A presentence investigation was completed and the case proceeded to a

sentencing hearing. The State recommended a prison term of eight years. The trial court

imposed a term of community control not to exceed three years. It is from the November

5, 2024 judgment of the trial court the State prosecutes its appeal, assigning as error: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN IMPOSING A SENTENCE THAT

DID NOT INCLUDE A PRISON TERM, DESPITE A PRESUMPTION

FAVORING A PRISON TERM FOR THE OFFENSE FOR WHICH IT WAS

IMPOSED.

{¶5} The State argues the trial court erred in sentencing Appellee to community

control without making the findings required by R.C. 2929.13(D)(2). We agree.

{¶6} In the instant case, Appellee was convicted of felonious assault, a second-

degree felony. R.C. 2929.13(D) provides:

(D)(1) Except as provided in division (E) or (F) of this section, for a

felony of the first or second degree, for a felony drug offense that is a

violation of any provision of Chapter 2925., 3719., or 4729. of the Revised

Code for which a presumption in favor of a prison term is specified as being

applicable, and for a violation of division (A)(4) or (B) of section 2907.05 of

the Revised Code for which a presumption in favor of a prison term is

specified as being applicable, it is presumed that a prison term is necessary

in order to comply with the purposes and principles of sentencing under

section 2929.11 of the Revised Code. Division (D)(2) of this section does

not apply to a presumption established under this division for a violation of

division (A)(4) of section 2907.05 of the Revised Code.

(2) Notwithstanding the presumption established under division

(D)(1) of this section for the offenses listed in that division other than a violation of division (A)(4) or (B) of section 2907.05 of the Revised Code,

the sentencing court may impose a community control sanction or a

combination of community control sanctions instead of a prison term on an

offender for a felony of the first or second degree or for a felony drug offense

that is a violation of any provision of Chapter 2925., 3719., or 4729. of the

Revised Code for which a presumption in favor of a prison term is specified

as being applicable if it makes both of the following findings:

(a) A community control sanction or a combination of community

control sanctions would adequately punish the offender and protect the

public from future crime, because the applicable factors under section

2929.12 of the Revised Code indicating a lesser likelihood of recidivism

outweigh the applicable factors under that section indicating a greater

likelihood of recidivism.

(b) A community control sanction or a combination of community

control sanctions would not demean the seriousness of the offense,

because one or more factors under section 2929.12 of the Revised Code

that indicate that the offender's conduct was less serious than conduct

normally constituting the offense are applicable, and they outweigh the

applicable factors under that section that indicate that the offender's

conduct was more serious than conduct normally constituting the offense.

{¶7} The sentencing factors as set forth in R.C. 2929.12 are as follows: (B) The sentencing court shall consider all of the following that apply

regarding the offender, the offense, or the victim, and any other relevant

factors, as indicating that the offender's conduct is more serious than

conduct normally constituting the offense:

(1) The physical or mental injury suffered by the victim of the offense

due to the conduct of the offender was exacerbated because of the physical

or mental condition or age of the victim.

(2) The victim of the offense suffered serious physical, psychological,

or economic harm, including serious physical harm the victim caused to the

victim's self, as a result of the offense.

(3) The victim died by suicide as a result of the offense.

(4) The offender held a public office or position of trust in the

community, and the offense related to that office or position.

(5) The offender's occupation, elected office, or profession obliged

the offender to prevent the offense or bring others committing it to justice.

(6) The offender's professional reputation or occupation, elected

office, or profession was used to facilitate the offense or is likely to influence

the future conduct of others.

(7) The offender's relationship with the victim facilitated the offense.

(8) The offender committed the offense for hire or as a part of an

organized criminal activity. (9) In committing the offense, the offender was motivated by

prejudice based on race, ethnic background, gender, sexual orientation, or

religion.

(10) If the offense is a violation of section 2919.25 or a violation of

section 2903.11, 2903.12, or 2903.13 of the Revised Code involving a

person who was a family or household member at the time of the violation,

the offender committed the offense in the vicinity of one or more children

who are not victims of the offense, and the offender or the victim of the

offense is a parent, guardian, custodian, or person in loco parentis of one

or more of those children.

(C) The sentencing court shall consider all of the following that apply

regarding the offender, the offense, or the victim, and any other relevant

factors, as indicating that the offender's conduct is less serious than conduct

normally constituting the offense:

(1) The victim induced or facilitated the offense.

(2) In committing the offense, the offender acted under strong

provocation.

(3) In committing the offense, the offender did not cause or expect to

cause physical harm to any person or property.

(4) There are substantial grounds to mitigate the offender's conduct,

although the grounds are not enough to constitute a defense. (D) The sentencing court shall consider all of the following that apply

regarding the offender, and any other relevant factors, as factors indicating

that the offender is likely to commit future crimes:

(1) At the time of committing the offense, the offender was under

release from confinement before trial or sentencing; was under a sanction

imposed pursuant to section 2929.16, 2929.17, or 2929.18 of the Revised

Code; was under post-release control pursuant to section 2967.28 or any

other provision of the Revised Code for an earlier offense or had been

unfavorably terminated from post-release control for a prior offense

pursuant to division (B) of section 2967.16 or section 2929.141 of the

Revised Code; was under transitional control in connection with a prior

offense; or had absconded from the offender's approved community

placement resulting in the offender's removal from the transitional control

program under section 2967.26 of the Revised Code.

(2) The offender previously was adjudicated a delinquent child

pursuant to Chapter 2151. of the Revised Code prior to January 1, 2002, or

pursuant to Chapter 2152. of the Revised Code, or the offender has a

history of criminal convictions.

(3) The offender has not been rehabilitated to a satisfactory degree

after previously being adjudicated a delinquent child pursuant to Chapter

2151. of the Revised Code prior to January 1, 2002, or pursuant to Chapter

2152. of the Revised Code, or the offender has not responded favorably to

sanctions previously imposed for criminal convictions. (4) The offender has demonstrated a pattern of drug or alcohol abuse

that is related to the offense, and the offender refuses to acknowledge that

the offender has demonstrated that pattern, or the offender refuses

treatment for the drug or alcohol abuse.

(5) The offender shows no genuine remorse for the offense.

(E) The sentencing court shall consider all of the following that apply

regarding the offender, and any other relevant factors, as factors indicating

that the offender is not likely to commit future crimes:

(1) Prior to committing the offense, the offender had not been

adjudicated a delinquent child.

(2) Prior to committing the offense, the offender had not been

convicted of or pleaded guilty to a criminal offense.

(3) Prior to committing the offense, the offender had led a law-abiding

life for a significant number of years.

(4) The offense was committed under circumstances not likely to

recur.

(5) Except as provided in division (G) of this section, the offender

shows genuine remorse for the offense.

{¶8} The sentencing court must make both of the findings specified in R.C.

2929.13(D)(2) before it may deviate from the R.C. 2929.13(D)(1) presumption a prison term should be imposed, and the trial court must make the findings at the sentencing

hearing. E.g., State v. Fisher, 2013-Ohio-4063, ¶ 7 (10th Dist.).1

{¶9} While the law is not clear regarding the degree of specificity with which the

trial court must make the findings required by R.C. 2929.13(D)(2) to overcome the

presumption of a prison sentence, the Ohio Supreme Court has provided guidance

concerning the requirements of findings in support of the imposition of consecutive

sentences as required by R.C. 2929.14(C). The trial court must make the R.C.

2929.14(C)(4) findings, but has no obligation to state reasons to support its findings, nor

must it recite certain talismanic words or phrases in order to be considered to have

complied. State v. Bonnell, 2014-Ohio-3177, syllabus. “[A] word-for-word recitation of the

language of the statute is not required, and as long as the reviewing court can discern

that the trial court engaged in the correct analysis and can determine that the record

contains evidence to support the findings, consecutive sentences should be upheld.” Id.

at ¶ 29. We find the guidance set forth regarding consecutive sentencing to be instructive

in the instant case, and look to the trial court’s statements at the sentencing hearing to

determine if we can discern the trial court engaged in the correct analysis required by

R.C. 2929.13(D)(2).

{¶10} At the sentencing hearing, the parties argued their respective positions with

regard to whether the statutory presumption in favor of prison had been overcome. The

trial judge stated he was thinking about what to do, considering all of the statements made

in the hearing, as well as the information in the PSI. The trial court noted Appellee was

1 Because the trial court is statutorily required to make these findings in order to impose a sentence of

community control in this case, we reject Appellee’s argument the State has waived all but plain error by its failure to object to the trial court’s failure to make the statutory findings. a high school graduate and spent thirteen days in jail in connection with the case. The

court noted Appellee’s statement in the PSI set forth Appellee and the victim had been

friends for ten years, Appellee never wanted to hurt the victim, and Appellee was suffering

from complex post-traumatic stress disorder. Appellee stated the victim was drunk when

he came to Appellee’s house for dinner, and the victim “kept making sexual comments.”

Sent. Tr. 24. Appellee became angry, asked the victim to leave, and then lost control.

Appellee stated he did not remember what happened after that. Appellee represented in

the PSI his issues came from his mental health and alcoholism, he is no danger to society,

and he hoped the victim could forgive him.

{¶11} The trial court noted Appellee’s prior record included a disorderly conduct

conviction in 2009, a reckless operation traffic offense in 2019, a disorderly conduct

conviction in 2022, and an OVI conviction. The OVI conviction occurred just a few weeks

before the crime in the instant case. Appellee’s traffic record included four speeding

tickets, two reckless operation offenses, and a stop sign violation. Appellee was

employed as part-owner of Yummy Baker for fifteen years.

{¶12} The trial court also discussed the victim impact statement. The victim wrote

he suffered severe lacerations to his head, neck, and back which required both stitches

and staples to close. The victim was in therapy for PTSD, anxiety, and sleep

disturbances. The victim described the harm as “profound and life changing.” Sent. Tr.

25. The victim stated he was unable to return to work, was in therapy once a week, and

the family was considering moving to a new location for safety reasons. The victim stated

he would not feel safe if Appellee was placed on probation. {¶13} The trial court referenced a report indicating Appellee is in treatment for

complex post-traumatic stress disorder, bipolar disorder, anxiety, insomnia, and has a

history of alcohol and benzodiazepine use. The report indicated Appellee was actively

participating and complying with his treatment program.

{¶14} The trial court concluded:

I did look at recidivism and seriousness factors that apply in a felony

case.

Factors that suggest recidivism is more likely include the fact that Mr.

Nosrati was out on bail when the offense was committed, there is a history

of some violations of law in the past as an adult, and of course there was a

demonstrated pattern of alcohol abuse tied to the offense, though there

does appear to be an engagement in treatment now.

A factor that suggests recidivism is not as likely is the lack of a

juvenile delinquency record.

A factor of course that made this a more serious case is the serious

physical as well as it seems psychological and now economic harm caused.

The computerized risk assessment tool put Mr. Nosrati in the low risk

category for likelihood of reoffending.

After thinking about all these things, I will impose in the case a

community control sentence. The community control period will last for

three years starting today. {¶15} Sent. Tr. 26-27.

{¶16} From the trial court’s statements on the record, we find the record

demonstrates the trial court made a finding, required by R.C. 2929.13(D)(2)(a), that the

applicable factors set forth in R.C. 2929.12 indicate a lesser likelihood of recidivism

outweigh the factors indicating a greater likelihood of recidivism. Although the trial court

did not expressly make such a finding using the statutory language, the trial court set forth

the applicable factors suggesting recidivism is less likely, as well as those which suggest

recidivism is more likely. The parties argued extensively concerning whether or not the

presumption of a prison sentence was overcome in this case. Therefore, when the trial

court set forth the factors it considered regarding whether recidivism was more or less

likely in thiis case, and concluded community control was appropriate, we find the trial

court made the requisite finding “[a] community control sanction or a combination of

community control sanctions would adequately punish the offender and protect the public

from future crime, because the applicable factors under section 2929.12 of the Revised

Code indicating a lesser likelihood of recidivism outweigh the applicable factors under

that section indicating a greater likelihood of recidivism.” R.C. 2929.13(D)(2)(a).

{¶17} Pursuant to R.C. 2929.13(D)(2)(b), the trial court was also required to find

“[a] community control sanction or a combination of community control sanctions would

not demean the seriousness of the offense, because one or more factors under section

2929.12 of the Revised Code that indicate that the offender's conduct was less serious

than conduct normally constituting the offense are applicable, and they outweigh the

applicable factors under that section that indicate that the offender's conduct was more

serious than conduct normally constituting the offense.” {¶18} We find the record does not demonstrate the trial court made this finding.

The trial court stated a factor which made this more serious is the serious physical,

psychological, and economic harm caused to the victim. However, the trial court did not

make any findings concerning what would make Appellee’s conduct less serious than that

which normally constitutes the offense of felonious assault. While the trial court stated

generally it considered the seriousness factors under R.C. 2929.12, the trial court is

required to do so in every case involving felony sentencing. We do not find the trial court

made a finding a community control sanction would not demean the seriousness of the

offense because one or more factors indicating Appellee’s conduct was less serious than

conduct normally constituting the offense was applicable and outweighed its finding

indicating the conduct was more serious.

{¶19} Further, the trial court’s sentencing entry does not provide further guidance,

as it cites only generally to R.C. 2929.11 and .12, and finds Appellee is “amenable” to

community control, which is not included in the findings a trial court is required to make

pursuant to R.C. 2929.13(D)(2) to overcome the presumption of a prison sentence, and

is not one of the factors the trial court is to weigh in considering the seriousness of the

offense..

{¶20} The State argues the proper remedy for the trial court’s failure to make the

requisite findings is to remand for resentencing. Appellee cites to State v. Wooden, 2006-

Ohio-212 (10th Dist.), in which the court did not remand for resentencing, but remanded

solely for the trial court to make the findings on the record. We decline to remand with

instructions solely to make findings in support of a community control sanction without

giving the trial court an opportunity to reconsider its sentence by applying the correct statutory standard. The act of making findings is not merely ministerial in this case. The

trial court may upon remand make the requisite findings to support its initial conclusion

the presumption of a prison sentence was overcome, and impose a sentence of

community control. However, the trial court’s consideration of the required statutory

findings may lead it to find the presumption was not overcome in this case. It is not clear

from the record the trial court engaged in the requisite statutory analysis, and therefore,

on remand, the trial court must be afforded the opportunity to reach either the same or

different conclusion in imposing sentence after applying the correct statutory standard.

{¶21} The assignment of error is sustained. The judgment of the Delaware

County Common Pleas Court is reversed. This case is remanded to that court for

resentencing.

By: Hoffman, J. King, P.J. and Popham, J. concur