State v. Norrell

53 P. 610, 17 Utah 8, 1898 Utah LEXIS 41
CourtUtah Supreme Court
DecidedJune 6, 1898
StatusPublished

This text of 53 P. 610 (State v. Norrell) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Utah Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State v. Norrell, 53 P. 610, 17 Utah 8, 1898 Utah LEXIS 41 (Utah 1898).

Opinion

Zahe, C. J.:

This is an application for a peremptory writ of mandamus, directed to the defendant, as judge, commanding him to make and sign the findings of fact, conclusions of law', and decree referred to in the petition. It appears that the North Point Consolidated Irrigation Company on March 9, 1897, commenced an action in the district court against the Utah & Salt Lake Canal Company, the South Jordan [9]*9Canal Company, the North Jordan Irrigation Company, Salt Lake City, and Salt Lake County, to restrain them from discharging seepage or surplus water, unfit for irrigation or domestic purposes, into the Jordan & Salt Lake Surplus-Water Canal, and to recover damages from the effects of such water so discharged. The action was based upon a number of facts alleged in the complaint, to which the defendants filed their respective answers. The trial of the issues at law were reserved^ and the equitable cause upon which the injunction was asked, was tried by the defendant, sitting as chancellor, who made findings of facts, stated conclusions of law, and entered a decree denying the injunction. The plaintiff took numerous exceptions, appealed from the decree, and assigned various errors. Having heard the appeal, this court reversed the decree, and remanded the case to the court below, with directions to set aside the findings of fact and conclusions of law, so far as contrary to its opinion, and to make additional findings required thereby, and to enter a decree perpetually enjoining the three canal companies, defendants, from draining the seepage or surplus water from the land irrigated from their canals, or from either of them, or the waters of the chain of lakes mentioned in the pleadings, into the Salt Lake Surplus-Water Canal, or Into White Lake, connected with it. 52 Pac. 168. The corporate existence and purpose of the respective parties to the case; the legal right of the plaintiff to take water from the Salt Lake Surplus-Water Canal into its irrigation ditches; that defendant canal companies, without right, discharge seepage and surplus waters from lands irrigated by them, by means of drain ditches, into the Surplus Canal, which rendered its waters unfit for irrigation or domestic use, to the injury of the plaintiff; that such deterioration and befouling of the waters used for irrigation and domestic pur[10]*10poses from plaintiff’s canal by numerous persons constituted a nuisance; and that the facts essential to give the defendants a right by prescription, relied upon by defendants, did not exist, — with other facts, were all distinctly found in the opinion of the court. The conclusions of law predicated upon the facts found were also clearly stated, and the decree to be entered was directed with sufficient certainty. But it appears that the court below, — in whicli the defendant presided, — in making its findings and stating its conclusions of law, failed, in some material particulars, to follow the mandate of this court; and the defendant insists that in making those findings and stating those conclusions he exercised his judicial discretion, and that, therefore, the writ should not issue. As to the decree directed by the opinion, it is conceded, the court below -had no discretion. This court will not direct a definite decree to be entered by the court below, without ascertaining the facts on which to base it. If discretion is left as/ to the facts to be found, discretion should also be left as to the decree. The findings of fact, conclusions of law, and decree must all stand together, and be consistent with each other. The court below had exercised its judicial discretion in making the findings and in stating its conclusions, and in making the decree appealed from ;and this court, in the exercise of its judicial discretion from the same evidence, made different findings, and stated, different conclusions of law, and directed the court below to enter a different decree; and the lower court was directed to enter the findings of fact, conclusions of law, and decree determined by this court, instead of its own. As to them, the lower court was left no discretion. The defendant urges, however, that it was his duty to determine what facts would be, in accordance with the opinion. In order to do that, it was necessary for him to read the opinion, and [11]*11ascertain tbe facts this court bad found to exist, and tbe law applicable to tbem as stated in tbe opinion. Tbe lower-court was required to take tbe facts and tbe law found and stated in tbe opinion, and was left no discretion with respect to tbem, but to put tbem in form and sign tbem. Its authority extended only to tbe execution of tbe mandate of tbis court. Gaines v. Rugg, 148 U. S. 228, was a petition for mandamus. That case bad been appealed from tbe circuit court, and its decree bad been reversed, with directions that sucb further proceedings be “bad in said cause, in conformity with tbe opinion and decree of tbe supreme court, as, according to right and justice and tbe laws of tbe United States, ought to be bad.” In its opinion, deciding tbe mandamus case, tbe court said: “It is contended for tbe respondent that tbe construction of tbe intent.and meaning of tbe opinion of tbis court in Goode v. Gaines, 145 U. S. 141, was a matter for tbe exercise of judicial discretion by tbe circuit court. But we are of opinion that it is proper for tbis court, on tbis application for a writ of mandamus, to construe its own mandate in connection with its opinion, and if it finds that tbe circuit court has erred, or acted beyond its province, in construing tbe mandate and opinion, to correct tbe mistake now and here, and to do so by a writ of mandamus.” And further on in tbe opinion tbe court said, “In tbe present case, as we have before observed, there was no discretion to be exercised by tbe circuit court; and, although it might have been admissible to raise tbe question by a new appeal to tbe proper court, yet, in view of tbe delay to be caused thereby, we do not consider that sucb remedy would have been, or would be, fully adequate, or that a writ of mandamus is not improper.” We therefore order a peremptory writ of mandamus to issue, commanding tbe defendant, as judge of said district court, to duly sign, .and enter as tbe [12]*12findings, conclusions of law, and decree of that court, the following findings of fact, conclusions of law, and decree found by this court, to conform to its opinion and mandate :

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Related

Goode v. Gaines
145 U.S. 141 (Supreme Court, 1892)
Gaines v. Rugg
148 U.S. 228 (Supreme Court, 1893)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
53 P. 610, 17 Utah 8, 1898 Utah LEXIS 41, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-v-norrell-utah-1898.