State v. Newman

Opinion

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

STATE OF DELAWARE ) ) v. ) I.D. No. 1202018751 ) MARSAAN NEWMAN, ) ) Defendant. )

Submitted: September 29, 2025 Decided: November 18, 2025

Upon Defendant Marsaan Newman’s Motion for Postconviction Relief SUMMARILY DISMISSED.

ORDER

Brian J. Robertson, Esquire, Deputy Attorney General, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 820 North French Street, Wilmington, DE 19801, Attorney for the State of Delaware.

Marsaan Newman, SBI# 301878, James T. Vaughn Correctional Center, 1181 Paddock Road, Smyrna, DE 19971, pro se.

WHARTON, J. This 18th day of November 2025, upon consideration of Defendant Marsaan

Newman’s (“Newman”) Motion for Postconviction Relief1 (“PCR Motion”), his

Memorandum of Law in Support of Rule 61 Postconviction Relief, 2 and the record

in this case, it appears to the Court that:

1. Newman pled guilty on September 18, 2012 to Robbery First Degree

and Assault Second Degree.3 A pre-sentence investigation was ordered.4 On

November 16, 2012, this Court declared him a habitual offender pursuant to 11 Del.

C. § 4214(a) and sentenced him to 45 years of incarceration on the robbery charge. 5

He received an additional eight years in prison, suspended after five years for

decreasing levels of supervision on the assault charge. He was not declared an

habitual offender on that charge.6 Newman did not file a direct appeal, but, instead

filed a series of unsuccessful sentence modification motions and unsuccessful

postconviction relief motions.7 He also unsuccessfully sought to have his sentence

deemed illegal.8

1 D.I. 67. 2 D.I. 68. 3 D.I. 11. 4 Id. 5 D.I. 65. 6 D.I. 40 7 D.I. 23; D.I. 51. 8 State v. Newman, 2025 WL 1203111 (Del. Super. Apr. 25, 2025). 2 2. Newman now moves again for postconviction relief. 9 Accompanying that

motion is a memorandum of law. 10 Newman raises four claims. His first alleges his

guilty plea was involuntary. He alleges that the plea colloquy failed to establish that

he understood the elements of the crimes to which he pled guilty, the precise

sentencing range, and that by pleading guilty he would be subject to sentencing as an

habitual offender. The second alleges that his counsel was ineffective because he did

not challenge his status as an habitual offender because one of the predicate felonies

– escape after conviction – occurred while he was serving another sentence.

Relatedly, the third alleges that he was ineligible to be declared an habitual offender

because he had not completed a prior sentence before committing the escape charge.

The fourth claim is based on Erlinger v. United States.11 It alleges that a jury was

required to determine if he was an habitual offender.

3. Before addressing the merits of a defendant’s motion for postconviction

relief, the Court must first apply the procedural bars of Superior Court Criminal Rule

61(i).12 If a procedural bar exists, then the Court will not consider the merits of the

postconviction claim. 13 Under Delaware Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure,

a motion for postconviction relief can be barred for time limitations, repetitive

motions, procedural defaults, and former adjudications. A motion exceeds time

9 D.I. 67. 10 D.I. 68. 11 602 U.S. 821 (2024). 12 Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del. 1990). 13 Id. 3 limitations if it is filed more than one year after the conviction becomes final or if it

asserts a newly recognized, retroactively applied right more than one year after it was

first recognized. 14 A second or subsequent motion is repetitive and therefore barred.15

The Court considers a repetitive motion only if the movant was convicted at trial and

the motion pleads with particularity either: (1) actual innocence; 16 or (2) the

application of a newly recognized, retroactively applied rule of constitutional law

rendering the conviction invalid.17 Grounds for relief “not asserted in the proceedings

leading to the judgment of conviction” are barred as procedurally defaulted unless the

movant can show “cause for relief” and “prejudice from [the] violation.”18 Grounds

for relief formerly adjudicated in the case, including “proceedings leading to the

judgment of conviction, in an appeal, in a post-conviction proceeding, or in a federal

habeas corpus hearing” are barred.19 The above bars to relief do not apply either to a

claim the court lacked jurisdiction or to one claiming: (1) actual innocence; or (2) the

application of a newly recognized, retroactively applied, rule of constitutional law

rendering the conviction invalid.20 None of Rule 61(i)’s bars to relief are present here.

4. To successfully bring an ineffective assistance of counsel (“IAC”) claim,

a claimant must demonstrate: (1) that counsel’s performance was deficient; and (2)

14 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(1). 15 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(2). 16 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(d)(2)(i). 17 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(d)(2)(ii). 18 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(3). 19 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(4). 20 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(5), citing Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(d)(2)(i) and (ii). 4 that the deficiencies prejudiced the claimant by depriving him of a fair trial with

reliable results.21 To prove counsel’s deficiency, a defendant must show that

counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. 22

Moreover, a defendant must make concrete allegations of actual prejudice and

substantiate them or risk summary dismissal.23 “[A] court must indulge in a strong

presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable

professional assistance.” 24 A successful Sixth Amendment claim of IAC requires a

showing “that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional

errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” 25 When addressing

the prejudice prong of the IAC test in the context of a challenged guilty plea, an inmate

must show “that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he

would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.”26 An inmate

must satisfy the proof requirements of both prongs to succeed on an IAC claim.

Failure to do so on either prong will doom the claim and the Court need not address

the other. 27

21 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984). 22 Id. at 667-68. 23 Wright v. State, 671 A.2d 1353, 1356 (Del. 1996). 24 Strickland, 446 U.S. at 689. 25 Id. at 694. 26 Albury v. State, 551 A.2d 53, 59 (Del. 1988) (citing Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985)); Sartin v. State, 2014 WL 5392047, at *2 (Del. Oct. 21, 2014); State v. Hackett, 2005 WL 30609076, at *3 (Del. Super. Ct. Nov. 15, 2005). 27 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697; Ploof v. State, 75 A.3d 811, 825 (Del. 2013) (“Strickland is a two-pronged test, and there is no need to examine whether an attorney performed deficiently if the deficiency did not prejudice the defendant.”). 5 5. Newman recognizes that he must overcome Rule 61’s bars to relief, in

particular the timeliness requirement of Rule 61(i)(1) and the repetitiveness

prohibition of Rule 61(i)(2) . His effort to show cause for relief is based on Erlinger

and a claim that counsel’s ineffectiveness prevented him from raising these issues

earlier. As prejudice he asserts that his habitual offender designation significantly

enhanced his sentence.

6. Newman’s reliance on Erlinger is misplaced. As the Court stated when

it denied his Motion for Correction of Illegal Sentence:

The plea agreement reads, “Defendant acknowledges that he is subject to sentencing pursuant to 4214(a) given his convictions for Assault First Degree on April 29, 2003; Escape After Conviction on October 3, 2001; and Robbery Second Degree on March 21, 1997.” 28 Newman admitted his status as an habitual offender in the plea agreement. Just as Newman waived his right to have a jury determine his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt when he entered his guilty plea, so too did he waive his right to have a jury determine his status as a habitual offender.29

7. He is similarly incorrect that his conviction for escape after conviction

cannot be considered to declare him an habitual offender. There is no requirement

that a sentence for one crime must be completed before a defendant commits another

qualifying felony.

Although a defendant must have been given “some chance for rehabilitation” before he may be sentenced as an habitual offender, this Court has held that “some chance for rehabilitation” means only that some period of time

28 D.I. 11. 29 State v. Newman 2025 WL 120111, at *2. 6 must have elapsed between sentencing on an earlier conviction and the commission of the offense resulting in the later felony conviction. 30

The Motion to Declare Newman an habitual Offender shows he was sentenced on

the initial qualifying felonies on March 21, 1997.31 He did not commit the escape

charge until April 3, 2001. 32 Four years is more than ample time for Newman to

have “some chance for rehabilitation.” Newman’s claim that his counsel’s

ineffectiveness constituted cause for his failure to raise his claims earlier itself fails

because counsel was not ineffective. Newman simply misunderstands the law.

Since there was no violation, Newman was not prejudiced.

8. The Court finds that Newman has failed to establish that Rule 61’s bars

to relief are inapplicable. His postconviction relief claims are barred as untimely

and repetitive.

9. Summary dismissal is appropriate if it plainly appears from the motion

for postconviction relief and the record of prior proceedings in the case that the

movant is not entitled to relief. 33 Here, it is plain to the Court from the PCR Motion

and the record in this case that Newman is not entitled to relief.

30 Eaddy v. State, 1996 WL 313499, at *2 (del. 1996) (citing Hall v. State, 473 A.2d 352, 357 1984 discussing 11 Del. C. § 4214(b)). 31 D.I. 19. 32 Id. 33 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(d)(5). 7 THEREFORE, Defendant Marsaan Newman’s Motion for Postconviction

Relief is SUMMARILY DISMISSED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

/s/ Ferris W. Wharton Ferris W. Wharton, J.