State v. Neal

219 So. 3d 482, 2017 WL 1632544, 2017 La. App. LEXIS 777
CourtLouisiana Court of Appeal
DecidedMay 2, 2017
DocketNo. 51,274-KA
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 219 So. 3d 482 (State v. Neal) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State v. Neal, 219 So. 3d 482, 2017 WL 1632544, 2017 La. App. LEXIS 777 (La. Ct. App. 2017).

Opinion

COX, J.

11Following a trial by jury, Rashard Neal was unanimously convicted as charged of second degree murder, in violation of La. R.S. 14:30.1. Neal was sentenced to the mandatory term of life imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension. Neal appeals only his conviction. For the following reasons, we affirm his conviction and sentence.

FACTS

At 8:32 p.m. on the evening of September 4, 2014, the Madison Parish Sheriffs Office in Tallulah, Louisiana, received a report of a shooting at a local carwash. When deputies arrived at the scene, they discovered that Lapatrick Mitchell1 had been shot and killed. Shortly before the shooting, several witnesses saw Mitchell and Neal engaged in a heated argument at the carwash over money. Neal conceded that the argument had occurred, but denied killing Mitchell. At trial, two eyewitnesses claimed that they saw Neal return to the carwash and shoot Mitchell.

A 9mm handgun was found on the rear passenger floorboard of Mitchell’s vehicle, but it had not been fired. Three spent .40 caliber shell casings were also found at the scene. No physical evidence connected Neal to the crime, and no weapon was recovered. Neal’s cellphone had little text message activity from 6:53 p.m. until 8:28 p.m. No witness could pinpoint the timing of the events. Based upon the eyewitness accounts, however, Neal was arrested the day after the shooting.

LOn December 8, 2014, Neal was charged by a grand jury indictment with the second degree murder of Mitchell. Neal’s five-day trial ended on June 11, 2016, when a unanimous jury found him guilty as charged of second degree murder.

On June 16, 2016, Neal was sentenced to the mandatory term of life imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. This appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

On appeal, Neal argues that the evidence was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was the person who shot Mitchell. Although he admits that he had an argument with Mitchell, Neal contends that the two eyewitnesses who claimed they saw him shoot Mitchell gave inconsistent versions of the event to police and were not credible witnesses. Additionally, Neal argues that no evidence linked him to the crime. Specifically, no murder weapon was ever found and no gun recovered matched the spent casings found at the crime scene. Finally, Neal argues that [485]*485detectives failed to investigate another possible suspect.

The state argues that the testimony of the two eyewitnesses identifying Neal as the shooter was sufficient to prove the elements of second degree murder. The state contends that investigations conducted by law enforcement corroborated the testimony of the two eyewitnesses and also provided a supporting timeline of the events. Ultimately, the state argues that witness credibility issues are reserved for the trier of fact. The state submits that, when viewed in the light most favorable to the state, the' evidence would lead [¡¡any rational factfinder to find that the elements of second degree murder were proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

Law

Under Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979), appellate courts review the record in the light most favorable to the prosecution to determine whether the evidence was sufficient to convince any rational trier of fact that all the essential elements of a -crime had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Tate, 01-1658 (La. 5/20/03), 851 So.2d 921, cert. denied, 541 U.S. 905, 124 S.Ct. 1604, 158 L.Ed.2d 248 (2004). This standard, now legislatively embodied in La. C. Cr. P. art. 821, does not provide the appellate court with a vehicle to substitute its own appreciation of the evidence for that of the factfinder. State v. Pigford, 05-0477 (La. 2/22/06), 922 So.2d 517; State v. Dotie, 43,819 (La.App. 2 Cir. 1/14/09), 1 So.3d 833, writ denied, 09-0310 (La. 11/6/09), 21 So.3d 297.

It is the function of the trier of fact to assess the credibility of witnesses and resolve conflicting testimony. State v. Washington, 50,424 (La.App. 2 Cir. 3/16/16), 188 So.3d 350. The trier of fact hears the testimony firsthand and, unless the factfinder’s assessment of believability is without any rational basis, it should not be disturbed by a reviewing court. State v. Mussall, 523 So.2d 1305 (La. 1988); State v. Price, 48,986 (La.App. 2 Cir. 5/15/14), 140 So.3d 1212, writ denied, 14-1274 (La. 2/6/15), 158 So.3d 814. A factual determination concerning conflicting testimony will not be disturbed on review unless it is clearly contrary to the evidence. Mussall, supra; State v. Williams, 32,631 (La.App. 2 Cir. 12/8/99), 747 So.2d 1256, writ denied, 00-40734 (La. 11/27/00), 775 So.2d 441, and writs denied, 00-0358, 00-0360 (La. 1/5/01), 778 So.2d 588.

A reviewing court accords great deference to a jury’s decision to accept or reject the testimony of a witness in whole or in part. State v. Hill, 42,025 (La.App. 2 Cir. 5/9/07), 956 So.2d 758, writ denied, 07-1209 (La. 12/14/07), 970 So.2d 529; State v. Gilliam, 36,118 (La.App. 2 Cir. 8/30/02), 827 So.2d 508, unit denied, 02-3090 (La. 11/14/03), 858 So.2d 422. The appellate court does not assess the credibility of witnesses- or reweigh the evidence. State v. Smith, 94-3116 (La. 10/16/95), 661 So.2d 442; State v. Eason, 43,788 (La.App. 2 Cir. 2/25/09), 3 So.3d 685, writ denied, 09-0725 (La. 12/11/09), 23 So.3d 913, cert. denied, 561 U.S. 1013, 130 S.Ct. 3472, 177 L.Ed.2d 1068 (2010).

In cases involving a defendant’s claim that he was not the person who committed the crime, the Jackson rationale requires the state to negate any reasonable probability of misidentification in order to carry its burden of proof. State v. Brady, 414 So.2d 364 (La. 1982); State v. Brock, 37,487 (La.App. 2 Cir. 9/26/03), 855 So.2d 939, writ denied, 04-1036 (La. 4/1/05), 897 So.2d 590; Williams, supra. Fáce-to-face transactions taking place during daylight hours and the length of time that transpires during the altercation are facts that reduce the likelihood of misiden-[486]*486tification. State v. Ruano, 12-1517 (La.App. 4 Cir. 7/31/13), 120 So.3d 908, writ denied, 13-2068 (La. 3/14/14), 134 So.3d 1193; State v. Payne, 04-828 (La.App. 5 Cir. 12/14/04), 892 So.2d 51.

Second degree murder is the killing of a human being when the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm. La. R.S. |s14:30.1. Specific intent is that state of mind that exists when the circumstances indicate the offender actively desired the prescribed criminal consequences to follow his act. La. R.S. 14:10(1); State v. Lindsey, 543 So.2d 886 (La. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1074, 110 S.Ct. 1796, 108 L.Ed.2d 798 (1990); State v. Wilhite, 40,539 (La.App. 2 Cir. 12/30/05), 917 So.2d 1252, unit denied, 06-1078 (La. 11/9/06), 941 So.2d 35. The determination of whether the requisite intent is present in a criminal case is for the trier of fact. State v. Huizar, 414 So.2d 741 (La. 1982); Wilhite, supra.

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Bluebook (online)
219 So. 3d 482, 2017 WL 1632544, 2017 La. App. LEXIS 777, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-v-neal-lactapp-2017.