IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. COA25-631
Filed 20 May 2026
New Hanover County, No. 23CR312784-640
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v.
DAVID S. MYERS
Appeal by defendant from judgments entered 11 December 2024 by Judge
Augustus D. Willis, IV, in New Hanover County Superior Court. Heard in the Court
of Appeals 24 February 2026.
Attorney General Jeff Jackson, by Assistant Attorney General Emily E. Sorge, for the State.
Cooper Strickland for defendant-appellant.
ZACHARY, Judge.
Defendant appeals from the trial court’s judgments entered upon a jury’s
verdicts finding him guilty of 1) felony fleeing to elude arrest by motor vehicle and 2)
misdemeanor resisting a public officer, and responsible for 1) a lane change signal
violation and 2) failure to carry a valid driver’s license. On appeal, Defendant argues
that the trial court erred by 1) denying his motion to dismiss and 2) sentencing him
to 30 months’ probation in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1343.2(d)(2) (2023). After
careful review, we conclude that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over STATE V. MYERS
Opinion of the Court
Defendant’s traffic infractions. Accordingly, we vacate the judgment entered in file
number 23CR312784-640, which consolidated Defendant’s misdemeanor conviction
with his traffic infractions (the “consolidated judgment”), and remand to the trial
court for resentencing.
I. Background
Defendant’s case came on for jury trial on 9 December 2024 in New Hanover
County Superior Court. At trial, the State presented evidence that tended to show
the following:
In the early morning hours of 21 May 2023, Officer Beau Early of the
Wilmington Police Department was patrolling Market Street in a marked police
vehicle. He observed Defendant traveling eastbound on Market Street before making
“a U-turn to begin traveling westbound on Market Street.” As Officer Early watched,
Defendant “made another U-turn . . . to go back eastbound on Market Street.”
Defendant’s actions “appeared to be evasive,” which “sparked [Officer Early’s]
interest” because they suggested that Defendant “was trying to get away from”
Officer Early. Officer Early began following Defendant, who pulled off of Market
Street into a parking lot and then reentered the road “behind [Officer Early] so
[Officer Early] was no longer following him.”
Due to Defendant’s “evasive action coupled with [his] rapid, unnecessary lane
changes,” Officer Early continued to monitor Defendant’s vehicle. Officer Early
slowed down and Defendant “eventually passed” him. Officer Early then watched
-2- STATE V. MYERS
Defendant “make a lane change into the left-hand turn lane without using a [turn]
signal” before coming to a stop at a stop sign. At this point, Officer Early initiated a
traffic stop. Defendant stopped his vehicle “in the middle of [an] intersection.” Officer
Early ordered Defendant to pull into a nearby parking lot where he discovered that
Defendant, who was “extremely agitated,” did not have his driver’s license. Officer
Early “opened the car door and . . . asked [Defendant] to exit the vehicle”; Defendant
refused and drove off at a high rate of speed while the door of his vehicle remained
open. Officer Early “was not able to catch up to [Defendant’s] vehicle.”
Based on the encounter, Officer Early obtained a warrant for Defendant’s
arrest, which was served on 3 June 2023. A New Hanover County grand jury returned
an indictment charging Defendant with two criminal offenses—fleeing to elude arrest
with a motor vehicle, based on two aggravating factors (a felony); and resisting a
public officer (a misdemeanor)—and two traffic infractions (failure to signal a lane
change and failure to carry a valid driver’s license).
Footage from Officer Early’s dash-cam and body-worn camera of the incident
was admitted at trial and published to the jury.
Defendant testified at trial in his own defense. When asked on cross-
examination about the footage showing that he made a lane change without using his
turn signal, Defendant stated that he “used [his] turn signal.”
Defense counsel moved to dismiss all charges for insufficient evidence at the
close of the State’s evidence and renewed the motion at the close of all evidence; the
-3- STATE V. MYERS
court denied the motion on both occasions.
On 11 December 2024, the jury returned its verdicts finding Defendant guilty
of 1) fleeing to elude arrest with a motor vehicle and 2) resisting a public officer, and
responsible for 1) a lane change signal violation and 2) failure to carry a valid driver’s
license. That same day, the trial court entered judgments, first sentencing Defendant
to 6 to 17 months’ imprisonment in the custody of the North Carolina Department of
Adult Correction for his conviction for fleeing to elude arrest with two aggravating
factors and ordering Defendant to pay $1,805.75 in costs. The court entered a second
judgment consolidating Defendant’s conviction for resisting a public officer with his
two traffic infractions and sentencing him to 45 days’ imprisonment, suspended for a
term of 30 months of supervised probation, to begin upon the expiration of
Defendant’s sentence in the first judgment. The court further provided in the second
judgment that “once mental health assessment and treatment are completed, money
is paid and no violations, probation can be transferred to unsupervised.”
Defendant entered oral notice of appeal.
II. Discussion
Defendant argues that the trial court erred “by denying [his] motions to
dismiss after the State failed to establish that [he] committed a lane change signal
violation” and “by sentencing [him] to 30 months’ probation for consolidated
misdemeanor offenses in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1343.2(d)(2).” We need not
reach the merits of Defendant’s arguments, however, as our conclusion that the trial
-4- STATE V. MYERS
court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over Defendant’s traffic infractions is
dispositive of the appeal.
“Subject[-]matter jurisdiction is the authority of a court to adjudicate the type
of controversy presented by the action before it, and is conferred upon the courts by
either the North Carolina Constitution or by statute.” State v. Briggs, 257 N.C. App.
500, 502, 812 S.E.2d 174, 176 (2018) (cleaned up). “A trial court must have subject[-
]matter jurisdiction over a case in order to act in that case.” Id. (citation omitted).
“The issue of a court’s jurisdiction over a matter may be raised at any time, even for
the first time on appeal or by a court sua sponte.” State v. Hendricks, 277 N.C. App.
304, 306, 858 S.E.2d 384, 385 (2021) (cleaned up). “Whether a trial court has subject-
matter jurisdiction is a question of law, reviewed de novo on appeal.” State v.
Armstrong, 248 N.C. App. 65, 67, 786 S.E.2d 830, 832 (2016) (citation omitted).
Here, in addition to two criminal offenses (one felony and one misdemeanor),
Defendant was charged by indictment with two traffic offenses: 1) failure to signal a
lane change, which is a violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-154(a), and 2) failure to carry
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. COA25-631
Filed 20 May 2026
New Hanover County, No. 23CR312784-640
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v.
DAVID S. MYERS
Appeal by defendant from judgments entered 11 December 2024 by Judge
Augustus D. Willis, IV, in New Hanover County Superior Court. Heard in the Court
of Appeals 24 February 2026.
Attorney General Jeff Jackson, by Assistant Attorney General Emily E. Sorge, for the State.
Cooper Strickland for defendant-appellant.
ZACHARY, Judge.
Defendant appeals from the trial court’s judgments entered upon a jury’s
verdicts finding him guilty of 1) felony fleeing to elude arrest by motor vehicle and 2)
misdemeanor resisting a public officer, and responsible for 1) a lane change signal
violation and 2) failure to carry a valid driver’s license. On appeal, Defendant argues
that the trial court erred by 1) denying his motion to dismiss and 2) sentencing him
to 30 months’ probation in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1343.2(d)(2) (2023). After
careful review, we conclude that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over STATE V. MYERS
Opinion of the Court
Defendant’s traffic infractions. Accordingly, we vacate the judgment entered in file
number 23CR312784-640, which consolidated Defendant’s misdemeanor conviction
with his traffic infractions (the “consolidated judgment”), and remand to the trial
court for resentencing.
I. Background
Defendant’s case came on for jury trial on 9 December 2024 in New Hanover
County Superior Court. At trial, the State presented evidence that tended to show
the following:
In the early morning hours of 21 May 2023, Officer Beau Early of the
Wilmington Police Department was patrolling Market Street in a marked police
vehicle. He observed Defendant traveling eastbound on Market Street before making
“a U-turn to begin traveling westbound on Market Street.” As Officer Early watched,
Defendant “made another U-turn . . . to go back eastbound on Market Street.”
Defendant’s actions “appeared to be evasive,” which “sparked [Officer Early’s]
interest” because they suggested that Defendant “was trying to get away from”
Officer Early. Officer Early began following Defendant, who pulled off of Market
Street into a parking lot and then reentered the road “behind [Officer Early] so
[Officer Early] was no longer following him.”
Due to Defendant’s “evasive action coupled with [his] rapid, unnecessary lane
changes,” Officer Early continued to monitor Defendant’s vehicle. Officer Early
slowed down and Defendant “eventually passed” him. Officer Early then watched
-2- STATE V. MYERS
Defendant “make a lane change into the left-hand turn lane without using a [turn]
signal” before coming to a stop at a stop sign. At this point, Officer Early initiated a
traffic stop. Defendant stopped his vehicle “in the middle of [an] intersection.” Officer
Early ordered Defendant to pull into a nearby parking lot where he discovered that
Defendant, who was “extremely agitated,” did not have his driver’s license. Officer
Early “opened the car door and . . . asked [Defendant] to exit the vehicle”; Defendant
refused and drove off at a high rate of speed while the door of his vehicle remained
open. Officer Early “was not able to catch up to [Defendant’s] vehicle.”
Based on the encounter, Officer Early obtained a warrant for Defendant’s
arrest, which was served on 3 June 2023. A New Hanover County grand jury returned
an indictment charging Defendant with two criminal offenses—fleeing to elude arrest
with a motor vehicle, based on two aggravating factors (a felony); and resisting a
public officer (a misdemeanor)—and two traffic infractions (failure to signal a lane
change and failure to carry a valid driver’s license).
Footage from Officer Early’s dash-cam and body-worn camera of the incident
was admitted at trial and published to the jury.
Defendant testified at trial in his own defense. When asked on cross-
examination about the footage showing that he made a lane change without using his
turn signal, Defendant stated that he “used [his] turn signal.”
Defense counsel moved to dismiss all charges for insufficient evidence at the
close of the State’s evidence and renewed the motion at the close of all evidence; the
-3- STATE V. MYERS
court denied the motion on both occasions.
On 11 December 2024, the jury returned its verdicts finding Defendant guilty
of 1) fleeing to elude arrest with a motor vehicle and 2) resisting a public officer, and
responsible for 1) a lane change signal violation and 2) failure to carry a valid driver’s
license. That same day, the trial court entered judgments, first sentencing Defendant
to 6 to 17 months’ imprisonment in the custody of the North Carolina Department of
Adult Correction for his conviction for fleeing to elude arrest with two aggravating
factors and ordering Defendant to pay $1,805.75 in costs. The court entered a second
judgment consolidating Defendant’s conviction for resisting a public officer with his
two traffic infractions and sentencing him to 45 days’ imprisonment, suspended for a
term of 30 months of supervised probation, to begin upon the expiration of
Defendant’s sentence in the first judgment. The court further provided in the second
judgment that “once mental health assessment and treatment are completed, money
is paid and no violations, probation can be transferred to unsupervised.”
Defendant entered oral notice of appeal.
II. Discussion
Defendant argues that the trial court erred “by denying [his] motions to
dismiss after the State failed to establish that [he] committed a lane change signal
violation” and “by sentencing [him] to 30 months’ probation for consolidated
misdemeanor offenses in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1343.2(d)(2).” We need not
reach the merits of Defendant’s arguments, however, as our conclusion that the trial
-4- STATE V. MYERS
court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over Defendant’s traffic infractions is
dispositive of the appeal.
“Subject[-]matter jurisdiction is the authority of a court to adjudicate the type
of controversy presented by the action before it, and is conferred upon the courts by
either the North Carolina Constitution or by statute.” State v. Briggs, 257 N.C. App.
500, 502, 812 S.E.2d 174, 176 (2018) (cleaned up). “A trial court must have subject[-
]matter jurisdiction over a case in order to act in that case.” Id. (citation omitted).
“The issue of a court’s jurisdiction over a matter may be raised at any time, even for
the first time on appeal or by a court sua sponte.” State v. Hendricks, 277 N.C. App.
304, 306, 858 S.E.2d 384, 385 (2021) (cleaned up). “Whether a trial court has subject-
matter jurisdiction is a question of law, reviewed de novo on appeal.” State v.
Armstrong, 248 N.C. App. 65, 67, 786 S.E.2d 830, 832 (2016) (citation omitted).
Here, in addition to two criminal offenses (one felony and one misdemeanor),
Defendant was charged by indictment with two traffic offenses: 1) failure to signal a
lane change, which is a violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-154(a), and 2) failure to carry
a valid driver’s license, in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-7(a). “An infraction is a
noncriminal violation of law not punishable by imprisonment.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-
3.1(a); see also id. §§ 20-7, 20-154.
“[O]riginal, exclusive jurisdiction for the adjudication and disposition of
infractions lies in the district court division,” except under the limited circumstances
provided by § 7A-271(d). Id. § 7A-253.
-5- STATE V. MYERS
Pursuant to section 7A-271(d):
(1) If the infraction is a lesser-included violation of a criminal action properly before the court, the court must submit the infraction for the jury’s consideration in factually appropriate cases.
(2) If the infraction is a lesser-included violation of a criminal action properly before the court, or if it is a related charge, the court may accept admissions of responsibility for the infraction.
“The transfer of a matter not properly before a superior court is not a decision
that rests within the discretion of a superior court judge.” Armstrong, 248 N.C. App.
at 70, 786 S.E.2d at 834. Rather, “[b]efore a case proceeds to trial, a superior court
judge must transfer to the appropriate court a pending matter which is not properly
before the superior court.” Id.; see also State v. Baker, 263 N.C. App. 221, 231, 822
S.E.2d 902, 908 (2018) (determining that the superior court “erred in dismissing the
case, rather than transferring it to the district court upon the finding of a lack of
jurisdiction”).
In the case at bar, all four charges—one felony, one misdemeanor, and two
traffic infractions—were initiated by an indictment at the superior court level.
However, neither infraction meets the statutory exception provided by N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 7A-271(d). Neither failure to signal a lane change, a violation of N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 20-154(a), nor failure to carry a valid driver’s license, a violation of N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 20-7(a), was “a lesser-included violation of a criminal action properly before
the court.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-271(d)(1). Moreover, Defendant did not—and still
-6- STATE V. MYERS
does not—admit responsibility for either infraction. See id. § 7A-271(d)(2). Quite the
contrary, on appeal, Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support
the lane change signal violation. Therefore, the superior court did not have subject-
matter jurisdiction over these infractions, for which original, exclusive jurisdiction is
statutorily vested in the district court. Id. § 7A-253.
“Where a trial court lacks jurisdiction to allow a conviction, the appropriate
remedy is to vacate the judgment of the trial court.” Armstrong, 248 N.C. App. at 70,
786 S.E.2d at 834. Accordingly, we vacate the trial court’s judgment entered in file
number 23CR312784-640, which consolidated Defendant’s misdemeanor conviction
with his traffic infractions, and remand for resentencing.
Because our conclusion on this issue necessitates vacatur of the judgment
entered upon Defendant’s traffic infractions and misdemeanor conviction and remand
to the trial court for resentencing, we do not address Defendant’s remaining
argument. However, should the court impose a probationary period exceeding the
statutorily allowed maximum term of 24 months on remand, it must make the
requisite findings of fact to support that period of probation. See State v. Sale, 232
N.C. App. 662, 664, 754 S.E.2d 474, 476 (2014).
III. Conclusion
After careful review, we conclude that under these circumstances, the trial
court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to try Defendant for the two traffic
infractions with which he was charged in this case. Thus, we vacate the consolidated
-7- STATE V. MYERS
judgment and remand for resentencing. We leave undisturbed the judgment entered
in file number 23CR312784-640 which sentenced Defendant for his felony conviction.
VACATED IN PART AND REMANDED.
Judges STROUD and GORE concur.
-8-