State v. Musgrove

• Court: Montana Supreme Court
• Decided: December 29, 1982
• Docket: 82-032
• Status: Published

Opinion

No. 82-32 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

STATE OF MONTANA, Plaintiff and Respondent,

THURMAN J. MUSGROVE,

Defendant,

INTERNATIONAL FIDELITY INSURANCE COMPANY, BONDING COMPANY, Petitioner and Appellant.

Appeal from: District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, In and for the County of Mineral Honorable Douglas Harkin, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: C. J. Tornabene argued, Missoula, Montana For Respondent: Hon. Mike Greely, Attorney General, Helena, Montana Sarah Powers argued, Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana M. Shaun Donovan, County Attorney, Superior, Montana

submitted : FTovembei- 26, 1982

Decided: December 29, 1982

Filed: DEC & 8 % ! I %! M r . J u s t i c e J o h n Conway H a r r i s o n d e l i v e r e d t h e O p i n i o n of the Court.

Defendant appeals a Mineral County judgment finding him g u i l t y , f o r a second t i m e , of m i t i g a t e d d e l i b e r a t e homicide. The

j u d g m e n t i n t h i s c a s e a r i s e s from a r e t r i a l t h i s C o u r t o r d e r e d i n

State v. Musgrove (1978), 178 Mont. 162, 582 P.2d 1246. This time, defendant presents four issues to this Court.

F i r s t , d e f e n d a n t c o n t e n d s t h e D i s t r i c t Court e r r e d by d i s c u s s i n g i s s u e s of the case with prospective jurors, i n t h e a b s e n c e of defendant and his counsel, without recording the discussion.

Second, defendant argues the trial court erred by allowing r e f e r e n c e s to d e f e n d a n t ' s p r i o r t r i a l . Third, defendant contends t h e t r i a l c o u r t e r r e d by a d m i t t i n g e v i d e n c e of a crime d e f e n d a n t

was n o t c h a r g e d w i t h . F o u r t h , d e f e n d a n t claims t h e t r i a l c o u r t violated his rights to due process by giving the jury the following instruction: "The law a l s o p r e s u m e s that a person

i n t e n d s t h e o r d i n a r y c o n s e q u e n c e s of a n y v o l u n t a r y a c t c o m m i t t e d b y him." W e need o n l y a n a l y z e t h e f o u r t h i s s u e , and b e c a u s e w e f i n d e r r o r , w e m u s t r e v e r s e and remand f o r a new t r i a l . I n view

of our reversal i n t h i s case, comment w i l l a l s o be d i r e c t e d to i s s u e s t w o and t h r e e . The instruction complained of was jury instruction number

s e v e n ; i n f u l l it s t a t e s : " I n e v e r y crime or p u b l i c o f f e n s e t h e S t a t e m u s t e s t a b l i s h e a c h e l e m e n t d e s c r i b e d by t h e s t a t u t e d e f i n i n g t h e o f f e n s e and t h e S t a t e must f u r t h e r e s t a b l i s h t h a t t h e Defendant a c t e d while having t h e mental state required by the s t a t u t e defining the offense. "In t h i s action the s t a t u t e requires t h a t the Defendant performed t h e acts knowingly o r pur- posely. A p e r s o n acts knowingly w i t h r e s p e c t t o c o n d u c t or t o a c i r c u m s t a n c e d e s c r i b e d b y a s t a t u t e d e f i n i n g a n o f f e n s e when he i s a w a r e of h i s conduct or t h a t t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e exists. When k n o w l e d g e of t h e e x i s t e n c e of a p a r t i c u l a r f a c t is a n e l e m e n t of t h e o f f e n s e , s u c h k n o w l e d g e i s e s t a b l i s h e d i f a p e r s o n is aware of a h i g h p r o b a b i l i t y of i t s e x i s t e n c e . "A p e r s o n a c t s p u r p o s e l y w i t h respect t o a r e s u l t or t o c o n d u c t d e s c r i b e d b y a s t a t u t e d e f i n i n g a n o f f e n s e i f it is h i s c o n s c i o u s o b j e c t t o e n g a g e i n t h a t c o n d u c t or to c a u s e that result. When a p a r t i c u l a r p u r p o s e is a n element of an offense the element is e s t a b l i s h e d , a1 t h o u g h s u c h p u r p o s e i s con- d i t i o n a l u n l e s s t h e c o n d i t i o n n e g a t e s t h e harm o r e v i l s o u g h t t o be p r e v e n t e d b y t h e l a w defining the offense . "Any r e q u i r e d m e n t a l s t a t e need n o t be p r o v e d b y d i r e c t e v i d e n c e b u t may be i n f e r r e d from a c t s , c o n d u c t and c i r c u m s t a n c e s a p p e a r i n g i n t h e evidence. The law - - - - a l s o -r e s u m e s t h a t a p p e r s o n i n t e n d s t h e o r d i n a r y consequences of - - - - a r y - -c o m m i t t e d by - T h i s p r K a n y v o l u n- c t t a him. s u m p t i o n , h o w e v e r , is termed a d i s p u t a b l e p r e - s u m p t i o n and may be c o n t r o v e r t e d b y o t h e r e v i d e n c e . " (Emphasis added. ) The underlined portion, which may be referred to as the "Sandstrom i n s t r u c t i o n ," is t h e f o c u s of appellant's argument. Appellant contends the giving of that portion of instruction

number s e v e n is c l e a r l y r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r i n v i e w of t h e United S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t ' s holding i n Sandstrom v. Montana (1979), 494 4-552- U.S. 5 1 0 , 99 S . C t . 2450, 6 1 L.Ed.2d 39. I n t h a t case, t h e United S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t s t r u c k down a s u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l an instruction almost identical to the language emphasized above " [blecause David Sandstrom's jury may have interpreted the

judge I s i n s t r u c t i o n as c o n s t i t u t i n g e i t h e r a b u r d e n s h i f t i n g p r e -

sumption . . . or a conclusive presumption . . ." 4 2 2 U.S. at 524. On remand t o t h i s C o u r t , t h e q u e s t i o n was " w h e t h e r t h e erro-

neous instruction constituted harmless error as against the

defendant." S t a t e v. Sandstrom (1979) -.- Mont . 6 0 3 P.2d 244, 245, 36 St.Rep. 2099, 2100. W e found r e v e r s i b l e error. W e reversed because " [ t ]h e e r r o n e o u s i n s t r u c t i o n [ w e n t ] t o a v i t a l e l e m e n t of t h e proof of t h e crime, n a m e l y t h e i n t e n t of t h e defendant Sandstrom i n committing t h e homicide. If the j u r y f o l l o w e d t h e i n s t r u c t i o n , it c o u l d h a v e presumed t h e i n t e n t w i t h o u t p r o o f beyond a r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t . " Mont. at I

6 0 3 P.2d a t 2 4 5 , 36 S t . R e p . a t 2101. I n t h e c a s e now b e f o r e u s , the question is the same, was the giving of the instruction

h a r m l e s s error? W e must answer i n t h e n e g a t i v e .

I n t h i s c a s e , as i n S a n d s t r o m , t h e i n s t r u c t i o n o b v i o u s l y p e r - m i t t e d t h e j u r y to presume i n t e n t w i t h o u t proof beyond a r e a s o n - able doubt. The d e f e n d a n t ' s i n t e n t was a h o t l y c o n t e s t e d i s s u e of fact i n t h e case and i n t e n t is a n i m p o r t a n t e l e m e n t o f the crime t h e S t a t e c h a r g e d . B e c a u s e of the instruction, the jury

c o u l d d i s r e g a r d t h e d e f e n d a n t s t e s t i m o n y t h a t he i n t e n d e d o n l y

t o f i r e a w a r n i n g s h o t ; t h e n w i t h t h e p r e s u m p t i o n of i n t e n t , t h e j u r y c o u l d h a v e c o n c l u d e d t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t used d e a d l y f o r c e to

intentionally kill the victim. Therefore, because of the

Sandstrom instruction, the State could obtain a convict ion without having to introduce any evidence of the defendant's

intent. Respondent argues that the issue here was not intent but justification i n t h e use of f o r c e by the defendant, and since

i n t e n t was n o t a n i s s u e , t h e g i v i n g o f t h e S a n d s t r o m i n s t r u c t i o n was harmless error. Respondent c i t e s S t a t e v. Sunday ( 1 9 8 0 ),

---- Mon t . , 609 P.2d 1188, 37 St.Rep. 561, t o support its

argument. In Sunday the jury was given the Sandstrom instruction; " t h e l a w presumes t h a t a person intends the ordi- n a r y consequences of h i s v o l u n t a r y a c t s . " W e found t h e g i v i n g o f

the i n s t r u c t i o n to b e , a t most, harmless e r r o r . Such w a s o u r

holding because by Sunday's own a d m i s s i o n , h i s o b j e c t was "to s h o o t t h e McLeans or t o c a u s e t h a t r e s u l t . " C o n s e q u e n t l y , it was

never an i s s u e w h e t h e r S u n d a y p u r p o s e l y or k n o w i n g l y s h o t the victims. I n o t h e r words, overwhelming e v i d e n c e e s t a b l i s h e d the p r e s u m p t i o n of t h e Sandstrom i n s t r u c t i o n . Sunday's j u r y d i d n o t

h a v e t o p r e s u m e t h a t h e i n t e n d e d t h e o r d i n a r y c o n s e q u e n c e s of h i s v o l u n t a r y a c t s ; t h a t h e s h o t a t t h e McLeans i n t e n d i n g to k i l l or seriously injure. Sunday a d m i t t e d that. The o n l y issue was w h e t h e r o r n o t t h e s h o o t i n g w a s done i n s e l f d e f e n s e . T h i s c a s e i s d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e from Sunday. Here, t h e defen- dant testified that he only intended to f i r e a warning shot.

However, the Sandstrom i n s t r u c t i o n allowed the jury to p r e s u m e t h a t b e c a u s e Musgrove p u l l e d t h e t r i g g e r , he i n t e n d e d t o k i l l t h e victim.

The respondent also argues that the instruction was per- m i s s i v e i n n a t u r e r a t h e r t h a n mandatory; consequently, the prin- c i p l e s o f S a n d s t r o m were n o t v i o l a t e d . W e have r e c o g n i z e d this distinction i n S t a t e v. Bad Horse ( 1 9 8 0 ) , - - - - Mont. I

605 P.2d 1113, 37 St.Rep. 45, and State v. Coleman (1979),

Mon t . -- , 6 0 5 P.2d 1 0 5 1 , 36 S t . R e p . 2237. However, in t h i s case, af ter a r e a d i n g of a l l of t h e j u r y i n s t r u c t i o n s , espe-

c i a l l y t h e f u l l t e x t of i n s t r u c t i o n no. 7 , we c a n n o t be c e r t a i n beyond a reasonable doubt that members of the jury did not misconstrue the instruction. A s t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t

s t a t e d i n S a n d s t r o m v . Montana:

"We d o n o t r e j e c t t h e p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t some j u r o r s may h a v e i n t e r p r e t e d t h e c h a l l e n g e d i n s t r u c t i o n as p e r m i s s i v e , o r , i f m a n d a t o r y , a s r e q u i r i n g o n l y t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t come f o r - ward with 'some1 e v i d e n c e in rebuttal. However, t h e f a c t t h a t a r e a s o n a b l e j u r o r c o u l d h a v e g i v e n t h e p r e s u m p t i o n c o n c l u s i v e or p e r s u a s i o n - s h i f t i n g e f f e c t means t h a t we can- not discount the possibility a t 519. . . ." 442 U.S.

Accordingly, we must r e v e r s e .

The m a t t e r of r e f e r e n c e s to p r e v i o u s t r i a l s s h o u l d n o t o c c u r if the trial court f o l l o w s o u r recommendation t h a t a change of

venue t a k e p l a c e . However, i n r e g a r d to t h i s i s s u e , o u r s t a t u t e ,

s e c t i o n 46-16-701, MCA, provides: " a Inew t r i a l is a reexamina- t i o n of t h e i s s u e i n t h e same c o u r t b e f o r e a n o t h e r j u r y a f t e r a

v e r d i c t or a f i n d i n g h a s b e e n r e n d e r e d . The g r a n t i n g o f a new

trial places the p a r t i e s i n the same p o s i t i o n as i f t h e r e had b e e n no t r i a l ." Appellant contends that this statute compels an automatic

reversal if a n y o n e ( o t h e r t h a n d e f e n d a n t o r h i s w i t n e s s e s ) men- tions that there has been another trial. W decline e to so

s t r i c t l y construe t h i s statute. W e c a n e n v i s i o n many s i t u a t i o n s

where i t may be necessary to mention the fact t h e r e h a s been another trial. W d i r e c t t h e t r i a l c o u r t and c o u n s e l e for the

S t a t e and d e f e n s e t o c a r e f u l l y g u a r d t h e r e c o r d to see t h a t n o n e

of the parties i n v o l v e d l o s e o r g a i n a n y r i g h t s b e c a u s e of the r e s u l t of t h e p r e v i o u s t r i a l . The f a i r t r i a l i s s u e m u s t p r e d o m i -

n a t e i n t h e new t r i a l . Concerning i s s u e t h r e e , the f a c t t h a t the appellant did not

h a v e a gun p e r m i t , w e n o t e t h a t t h i s i s s u e was c r e a t e d b y t h e opening argument of appellant's counsel and suggest that on

r e t r i a l t h e c o u r t a d m o n i s h c o u n s e l n o t to r e p e a t t h i s a r g u m e n t . I f c o u n s e l , o n r e t r i a l , a r g u e s a p p e l l a n t s r i g h t to c a r r y a l o a d e d

p i s t o l , t h e n t h e S t a t e may c o u n t e r as it d i d i n t h i s t r i a l .

F i n a l l y , we d i r e c t t h e District C o u r t g r a n t a change of venue f o r r e t r i a l i n t h i s case. I n Montana, t h e r u l e p e r t a i n i n g to a c h a n g e o f v e n u e is:

". . . a n accused i s e n t i t l e d to a change of v e n u e when i t a p p e a r s t h e r e a r e r e a s o n a b l e grounds to b e l i e v e t h a t t h e p r e j u d i c e a l l e g e d a c t u a l l y e x i s t s and t h a t by r e a s o n o f t h e p r e - j u d i c e t h e r e is a r e a s o n a b l e a p p r e h e n s i o n t h a t t h e a c c u s e d c a n n o t r e c e i v e a f a i r and impar- tial trial." S t a t e v. Austad (1982), --- - -.-- Mont . , 6 4 1 P.2d 1373, 1 3 8 1 , 39 S t . R e p . 3 5 6 , 3 6 4 ; S t a t e v. L i n k ( 1 9 8 1 ) , Mont. --- I

6 4 0 P.2d 3 6 6 , 38 S t . R e p . 982. I n l o o k i n g a t t h e r e c o r d , and t h e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f M i n e r a l C o u n t y , w e t h i n k t h e r e are a number of

r e a s o n s t o s u p p o r t a change of venue i n t h i s c a s e . First, i t is

obvious t h a t Mineral County is a v e r y small c o u n t y c o n t a i n i n g o n l y a b o u t 993 r e s i d e n t s . This alone substantially increases the p r o b a b i l i t y t h a t p u b l i c i t y c o n c e r n i n g t h e case c o u l d be p e r v a s i v e

i n t h e c o u n t y and a f f e c t t h e o p i n i o n s o f p o t e n t i a l j u r o r s . As a

stronger reason, however, we n o t e t h a t t h e r e have a l r e a d y been t w o t r i a l s i n t h i s county. Each o f t h e s e t r i a l s were h o t l y con-

tested and attended by many residents of the county. C o n s e q u e n t l y , t h e p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t t h e r e s u l t s and c o n t e n t o f t h e p r i o r t r i a l s h a v e b e e n w i d e l y d i s s e m i n a t e d is much h i g h e r t h a n i f n o p r e v i o u s t r i a l s had o c c u r r e d . Therefore, the criteria f o r a change of venue articulated in -ink L- and Austad are to be fulfilled.

Reversed. Xe c o n c u r :

" h i&J u s! c e C i e f f &t i f .?%i-Jq Ilk. Justice Daniel J. Shea, specially concurring:

I join the majority in ruling that defendant is entitled to a new trial &cause the unconstitutional Sandstrom instruction was qiven. Although the first issue--discussion of the case by the District Court with prospective jurors in the absence of defendant and his counsel--need not be decided, for future guidance, this Court should have provided a detailed analysis of what happened and why the procedure should be condemned. And the same is true of the second issue--defendant's contention that he was prejudiced by references to his first trial. This Court should have set forth some quidelines in an effort to eliminate potential prejudice arising from mentioning that a defendant is being tried for a second or even.third time. On the third issue, I agree with the Court that defendant opened the door by defense counsel's statement i the n opening statement and therefore no preiudice occurred because the State went into the concealed weapon issue during its case i chief. n

H"