[Cite as State v. Murphy, 2012-Ohio-1186.]
Court of Appeals of Ohio EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION No. 95705
STATE OF OHIO PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE
vs.
JAYSON S. MURPHY DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
JUDGMENT: APPLICATION DENIED
Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Case No. CR-530815 Application for Reopening Motion No. 448609
RELEASE DATE: March 19, 2012 FOR APPELLANT Jayson Murphy Inmate No. 591-367 Mansfield Correctional Inst. P. O. Box 788 Mansfield, OH 44901
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
William D. Mason Cuyahoga County Prosecutor
By: Anna M. Faraglia Mary McGrath Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys The Justice Center, 8th Fl. 1200 Ontario Street Cleveland, OH 44113 LARRY A. JONES, SR., J.:
{¶1} On October 17, 2011, the applicant, Jayson Murphy, applied pursuant to
App.R. 26(B) and State v. Murnahan, 63 Ohio St.3d 60, 584 N.E.2d 1204 (1992), to
reopen this court’s judgment in State v. Murphy, 8th Dist. No. 95705, 2011-Ohio-3686, in
which this court affirmed Murphy’s convictions for four counts of sexual battery. 1
Murphy maintains that his appellate counsel was ineffective, because she should have
argued sufficiency of the evidence, prosecutorial misconduct, inconsistent jury verdicts,
the failure to request lesser included offenses, and allied offenses properly. On
November 3, 2011, the state of Ohio filed its brief in opposition, and Murphy filed a
reply brief on November 15, 2011. For the following reasons, this court denies the
application.
{¶2} In order to establish a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, the
applicant must demonstrate that counsel’s performance was deficient and that the
The grand jury indicted Murphy on four counts of rape, four counts of sexual battery, 1
one count of kidnapping, and one count intimidation of a crime witness. At trial the evidence showed that the victim and Murphy had been in a sexual relationship for several months. However, on the night in question, the victim took a sleeping pill. While she was asleep, Murphy took photographs of sexual acts he committed on her. The victim testified that in the morning Murphy showed her the pictures and told her that if she did not stay with him, he would put the pictures on the internet. The jury found Murphy guilty of the four counts of sexual battery and not guilty on the other charges. The trial judge sentenced him to five years on each count consecutive. deficient performance prejudiced the defense. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,
104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); State v. Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d 136, 538 N.E.2d
373 (1989); and State v. Reed, 74 Ohio St.3d 534, 1996-Ohio-21, 660 N.E.2d 456.
{¶3} In Strickland the United States Supreme Court ruled that judicial scrutiny of
an attorney’s work must be highly deferential. The Court noted that it is all too
tempting for a defendant to second-guess his lawyer after conviction and that it would be
all too easy for a court, examining an unsuccessful defense in hindsight, to conclude that
a particular act or omission was deficient. Therefore, “a court must indulge a strong
presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional
assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the
circumstances, the challenged action ‘might be considered sound trial strategy.’”
Strickland, 104 S.Ct. at 2065.
{¶4} Specifically, in regard to claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel,
the United States Supreme Court has upheld the appellate advocate’s prerogative to
decide strategy and tactics by selecting what he thinks are the most promising arguments
out of all possible contentions. The court noted: “Experienced advocates since time
beyond memory have emphasized the importance of winnowing out weaker arguments
on appeal and focusing on one central issue if possible, or at most on a few key issues.”
Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 103 S.Ct. 3308, 3313, 77 L.Ed.2d 987 (1983). Indeed,
including weaker arguments might lessen the impact of the stronger ones. Accordingly,
the Court ruled that judges should not second-guess reasonable professional judgments and impose on appellate counsel the duty to raise every “colorable” issue. Such rules
would disserve the goal of vigorous and effective advocacy. The Supreme Court of
Ohio reaffirmed these principles in State v. Allen, 77 Ohio St.3d 172, 1996-Ohio-366,
672 N.E.2d 638.
{¶5} Moreover, even if a petitioner establishes that an error by his lawyer was
professionally unreasonable under all the circumstances of the case, the petitioner must
further establish prejudice: but for the unreasonable error there is a reasonable probability
that the results of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is
a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. A court need not
determine whether counsel’s performance was deficient before examining prejudice
suffered by the defendant as a result of alleged deficiencies.
{¶6} Murphy contends that his appellate counsel should have argued sufficiency
of the evidence. However, he cannot show prejudice. His appellate counsel did argue
manifest weight of the evidence. In State v. Kryzwkowski, 8th Dist. No. 80392,
2002-Ohio-4438, 2002 WL 1987257, reopening disallowed, 2003-Ohio-3209, this court
ruled: “In determining that the judgment was not against the manifest weight of the
evidence, this court was required to go beyond the question of law which a claim of
insufficiency of the evidence would present and examine the broader issues of credibility,
etc. Appellate counsel did not, therefore, violate any essential duty to applicant nor was
applicant prejudiced by the absence of an assignment of error asserting insufficiency of
the evidence,” citing State v. Dines, 8th Dist. No. 57661, 1990 WL 166452 (Nov. 1, 1990), reopening disallowed, Motion Nos. 43617, 42620, 42628 and 48243 (May 26,
1994) (Slip op. at pg. 8). Similarly in State v. Peterson, 8th Dist. 88248,
2007-Ohio-1837, 2007 WL 1153434, ¶ 19 this court observed that although sufficiency
and manifest weight are different legal concepts, manifest weight may subsume
sufficiency when conducting the analysis; i.e., a finding that a conviction was supported
by the manifest weight of the evidence necessarily includes a finding of sufficiency.
State v. Logan, 8th Dist. No 88472, 2007-Ohio-2636, 2007 WL 1559305, reopening
disallowed, 2008-Ohio-1934. The court further notes that Murphy incorporated
verbatim large sections of his appellate counsel’s argument on manifest weight into his
argument on sufficiency. Accordingly, this argument on ineffective assistance of
appellate counsel is unpersuasive.
{¶7} Next, Murphy argues that his appellate counsel should have argued
prosecutorial misconduct for cross-examining him on his drug offense and domestic
violence convictions, his drinking habits, and temper. However, his appellate counsel
argued this same issue of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Indeed, most of
Murphy’s argument about prosecutorial misconduct is again a verbatim incorporation of
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
[Cite as State v. Murphy, 2012-Ohio-1186.]
Court of Appeals of Ohio EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION No. 95705
STATE OF OHIO PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE
vs.
JAYSON S. MURPHY DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
JUDGMENT: APPLICATION DENIED
Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Case No. CR-530815 Application for Reopening Motion No. 448609
RELEASE DATE: March 19, 2012 FOR APPELLANT Jayson Murphy Inmate No. 591-367 Mansfield Correctional Inst. P. O. Box 788 Mansfield, OH 44901
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
William D. Mason Cuyahoga County Prosecutor
By: Anna M. Faraglia Mary McGrath Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys The Justice Center, 8th Fl. 1200 Ontario Street Cleveland, OH 44113 LARRY A. JONES, SR., J.:
{¶1} On October 17, 2011, the applicant, Jayson Murphy, applied pursuant to
App.R. 26(B) and State v. Murnahan, 63 Ohio St.3d 60, 584 N.E.2d 1204 (1992), to
reopen this court’s judgment in State v. Murphy, 8th Dist. No. 95705, 2011-Ohio-3686, in
which this court affirmed Murphy’s convictions for four counts of sexual battery. 1
Murphy maintains that his appellate counsel was ineffective, because she should have
argued sufficiency of the evidence, prosecutorial misconduct, inconsistent jury verdicts,
the failure to request lesser included offenses, and allied offenses properly. On
November 3, 2011, the state of Ohio filed its brief in opposition, and Murphy filed a
reply brief on November 15, 2011. For the following reasons, this court denies the
application.
{¶2} In order to establish a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, the
applicant must demonstrate that counsel’s performance was deficient and that the
The grand jury indicted Murphy on four counts of rape, four counts of sexual battery, 1
one count of kidnapping, and one count intimidation of a crime witness. At trial the evidence showed that the victim and Murphy had been in a sexual relationship for several months. However, on the night in question, the victim took a sleeping pill. While she was asleep, Murphy took photographs of sexual acts he committed on her. The victim testified that in the morning Murphy showed her the pictures and told her that if she did not stay with him, he would put the pictures on the internet. The jury found Murphy guilty of the four counts of sexual battery and not guilty on the other charges. The trial judge sentenced him to five years on each count consecutive. deficient performance prejudiced the defense. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,
104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); State v. Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d 136, 538 N.E.2d
373 (1989); and State v. Reed, 74 Ohio St.3d 534, 1996-Ohio-21, 660 N.E.2d 456.
{¶3} In Strickland the United States Supreme Court ruled that judicial scrutiny of
an attorney’s work must be highly deferential. The Court noted that it is all too
tempting for a defendant to second-guess his lawyer after conviction and that it would be
all too easy for a court, examining an unsuccessful defense in hindsight, to conclude that
a particular act or omission was deficient. Therefore, “a court must indulge a strong
presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional
assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the
circumstances, the challenged action ‘might be considered sound trial strategy.’”
Strickland, 104 S.Ct. at 2065.
{¶4} Specifically, in regard to claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel,
the United States Supreme Court has upheld the appellate advocate’s prerogative to
decide strategy and tactics by selecting what he thinks are the most promising arguments
out of all possible contentions. The court noted: “Experienced advocates since time
beyond memory have emphasized the importance of winnowing out weaker arguments
on appeal and focusing on one central issue if possible, or at most on a few key issues.”
Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 103 S.Ct. 3308, 3313, 77 L.Ed.2d 987 (1983). Indeed,
including weaker arguments might lessen the impact of the stronger ones. Accordingly,
the Court ruled that judges should not second-guess reasonable professional judgments and impose on appellate counsel the duty to raise every “colorable” issue. Such rules
would disserve the goal of vigorous and effective advocacy. The Supreme Court of
Ohio reaffirmed these principles in State v. Allen, 77 Ohio St.3d 172, 1996-Ohio-366,
672 N.E.2d 638.
{¶5} Moreover, even if a petitioner establishes that an error by his lawyer was
professionally unreasonable under all the circumstances of the case, the petitioner must
further establish prejudice: but for the unreasonable error there is a reasonable probability
that the results of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is
a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. A court need not
determine whether counsel’s performance was deficient before examining prejudice
suffered by the defendant as a result of alleged deficiencies.
{¶6} Murphy contends that his appellate counsel should have argued sufficiency
of the evidence. However, he cannot show prejudice. His appellate counsel did argue
manifest weight of the evidence. In State v. Kryzwkowski, 8th Dist. No. 80392,
2002-Ohio-4438, 2002 WL 1987257, reopening disallowed, 2003-Ohio-3209, this court
ruled: “In determining that the judgment was not against the manifest weight of the
evidence, this court was required to go beyond the question of law which a claim of
insufficiency of the evidence would present and examine the broader issues of credibility,
etc. Appellate counsel did not, therefore, violate any essential duty to applicant nor was
applicant prejudiced by the absence of an assignment of error asserting insufficiency of
the evidence,” citing State v. Dines, 8th Dist. No. 57661, 1990 WL 166452 (Nov. 1, 1990), reopening disallowed, Motion Nos. 43617, 42620, 42628 and 48243 (May 26,
1994) (Slip op. at pg. 8). Similarly in State v. Peterson, 8th Dist. 88248,
2007-Ohio-1837, 2007 WL 1153434, ¶ 19 this court observed that although sufficiency
and manifest weight are different legal concepts, manifest weight may subsume
sufficiency when conducting the analysis; i.e., a finding that a conviction was supported
by the manifest weight of the evidence necessarily includes a finding of sufficiency.
State v. Logan, 8th Dist. No 88472, 2007-Ohio-2636, 2007 WL 1559305, reopening
disallowed, 2008-Ohio-1934. The court further notes that Murphy incorporated
verbatim large sections of his appellate counsel’s argument on manifest weight into his
argument on sufficiency. Accordingly, this argument on ineffective assistance of
appellate counsel is unpersuasive.
{¶7} Next, Murphy argues that his appellate counsel should have argued
prosecutorial misconduct for cross-examining him on his drug offense and domestic
violence convictions, his drinking habits, and temper. However, his appellate counsel
argued this same issue of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Indeed, most of
Murphy’s argument about prosecutorial misconduct is again a verbatim incorporation of
his appellate counsel’s brief on this point. This court examined the issue and concluded
that the prosecutor’s questions on cross-examination were not improper, because Murphy
had “opened the door” and placed his credibility in issue. Thus, Murphy has not
established prejudice. {¶8} Murphy’s third argument is that appellate counsel did not raise the issue of
lesser included offenses. This argument is unpersuasive because Murphy never states
what the lesser included offenses were. Without that information, this court cannot
examine, much less determine, whether instructions for a lesser included offense would
have been appropriate or could have been given. Moreover, the decision to request a
jury instruction for a lesser included offense constitutes trial strategy and does not
provide a basis for claiming ineffective assistance of counsel. State v. Caldwell, 8th
Dist. No. 80556, 2002-Ohio-4911, 2002 WL 31087623 reopening disallowed,
2005-Ohio-5134; and State v. Griffie, 74 Ohio St.3d 332, 333, 1996-Ohio-71, 658 N.E.2d
764. Indeed, the record indicates that Murphy decided as a matter of trial strategy not to
ask for instructions on a lesser included offense. (Tr. 589.)
{¶9} Murphy’s fourth assignment of error is ill-founded. He argues that the
jury’s finding him not guilty of rape is necessarily inconsistent with the finding of guilty
on sexual battery, because the jury must have found consent to find him not guilty of
rape, and that consent should have exonerated him on the sexual battery counts.
However, his own authority, State v. Brown, 12 Ohio St.3d 147, 465 N.E.2d 889 (1984),
refutes his position. The court held that the several counts in an indictment containing
more than one count are not interdependent, and an inconsistency in a verdict does not
arise out of inconsistent responses to different counts, but only arises out of inconsistent
responses to the same count. Thus, the counts on rape and sexual battery are not
interdependent and cannot provide the basis for arguing inconsistent verdicts. Moreover, Murphy’s argument is based on speculation, which he does not support from
the record, that the jury necessarily determined the rape counts on the issue of consent.
Appellate counsel in the exercise of professional judgment could choose not to raise this
argument.
{¶10} Finally, Murphy argues that his appellate counsel did not correctly argue the
issue of allied offenses. Again, Murphy does not establish prejudice. His appellate
counsel raised the issue, and this court conducted a full de novo review. It concluded:
“The facts establish that these acts were not a single, continuous sexual act.
Accordingly, the trial court was correct when it found that the four counts of sexual
battery were not allied offenses of similar import.” Murphy at ¶ 41.
Accordingly, this court denies the application to reopen.
LARRY A. JONES, SR., JUDGE
PATRICIA A. BLACKMON, P.J., and KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, J., CONCUR