[Cite as State v. Mort, 2026-Ohio-249.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT MAHONING COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
JESSICA ANN MORT,
Defendant-Appellant.
OPINION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY Case No. 25 MA 0078
Criminal Appeal from the Court of Common Pleas of Mahoning County, Ohio Case No. 2025 CR 00065
BEFORE: Cheryl L. Waite, Carol Ann Robb, Katelyn Dickey, Judges.
JUDGMENT: Reversed and Remanded.
Atty. Lynn Maro, Mahoning County Prosecutor and Atty. Kristie M. Weibling, Assistant Prosecutor, for Plaintiff-Appellee
Atty. Michael O. Kivlighan, for Defendant-Appellant
Dated: January 28, 2026 –2–
WAITE, P.J.
{¶1} Appellant Jessica Ann Mort appeals the July 18, 2025 decision of the
Mahoning County Court of Common Pleas denying her motion to suppress evidence.
The motion was based on the assertion that her boyfriend lacked the ability to consent to
a search of her purse, which was inside of his truck. In her motion she sought to exclude
drugs found in that purse. Because this discovery led to the discovery of drugs on her
person, she sought exclusion of this evidence also, as well as certain incriminating
statements. Appellant contends that neither she nor her boyfriend exhibited behavior that
would lead police officers to believe they were engaging in criminal activity. Even so, she
argues that her boyfriend’s consent to a police search of his vehicle did not extend to
include a search of her purse. Because she contends this search was improper, she
argues that any evidence from the subsequent search of her person and any statements
she made after the search should also be deemed inadmissible as fruit of the poisonous
tree. For the reasons provided, Appellant’s arguments have merit. The judgment of the
trial court is reversed and the matter is remanded for the state to determine if it can
proceed without the evidence obtained from the search of Appellant’s purse and her
person, along with any statements she made after the search.
Factual and Procedural History
{¶2} This appeal stems from a traffic stop that occurred at approximately 5:00
p.m. on January 12, 2024. Robert Helman, Appellant’s boyfriend, was operating a green
F-150 Ford pickup truck eastbound on route 224 in Canfield. Appellant was in the
passenger seat. Sergeant Aaron Young observed expired registration tags on the truck.
Sgt. Young then saw the truck abruptly turn into the parking lot of a restaurant. Based on
Case No. 25 MA 0078 –3–
the expired tags, Sgt. Young initiated a traffic stop of the truck. The following events
occurred in the restaurant parking lot.
{¶3} As Sgt. Young approached the truck, Helman opened his door, because the
window apparently did not open. Sgt. Young stood towards the back of the driver’s door
and Helman had to look backwards and lean out in order to speak to him. Helman
informed Sgt. Young that he planned to go to a friend’s house. When asked why he
pulled into the restaurant parking lot, he responded that he and Appellant intended to eat
dinner before heading to the friend’s house. Again, it was 5:00 p.m. at the time of the
stop. Sgt. Young obtained Helman and Appellant’s names and searched them in the
LEADS system, which revealed Helman had prior breaking and entering and concealed
carry convictions and Appellant had been convicted of disorderly conduct in the past.
{¶4} Sgt. Young wore a body camera. Sgt. Young and an unidentified officer,
who provided backup, discussed the stop, and their conversation was recorded. Sgt.
Young expressed curiosity as to why Helman turned suddenly into the parking lot. He
posited that there were multiple possibilities, but wondered whether a gun may be inside
the vehicle due to Helman’s past concealed carry conviction.
{¶5} Sgt. Young conceded on the recording that Helman’s quick turn into the
parking lot was equally likely the result of Helman’s awareness that his registration tags
had expired two months earlier, and speculated that Helman sought to avoid a traffic
infraction by preventing the officer from clearly seeing his license plate. Also, although
he appeared not to find Helman’s story plausible, it was possible he was being truthful
when he told Sgt. Young that they simply wanted to eat dinner before heading to a friend’s
house.
Case No. 25 MA 0078 –4–
{¶6} From this recorded exchange it can be gleaned that even though Sgt.
Young did not believe Helman entered the parking lot to eat dinner in the restaurant, he
understood that he lacked conclusive reasons to further detain Helman, because he
recognized there could be several plausible explanations for Helman’s action in quickly
entering the parking lot, and these were not necessarily criminal. Despite conceding that
he had no probable cause that any crime had been committed or was being committed,
Sgt. Young informed the other officer that he intended to “get [Helman] out, gonna chat
him up a little bit.” (Exh. 1, 11:02.)
{¶7} Sgt. Young then ordered Helman out of the truck. Sgt. Young took Helman
behind the vehicle, near the police cruiser. During this conversation with Sgt. Young,
Helman acknowledged his prior convictions but denied currently having weapons or
contraband on his person or inside of his truck. When Sgt. Young asked if he could
search the truck, Helman consented. After a search of Helman’s person revealed no
contraband, Sgt. Young walked over to the passenger side of the truck and ordered
Appellant out.
{¶8} Appellant had been sitting inside the truck in the passenger seat while Sgt.
Young and Helman were interacting outside, behind the truck. Hence, Appellant had no
idea that Helman had consented to a search. Appellant was in the midst of a call on her
cell phone, which she held in one hand. In her other hand, she held a lit cigarette. As
she exited the truck, she appeared confused on the video and asked Sgt. Young if
“everything was ok,” to which he responded, “yes” and said that he would explain shortly.
Instead of offering her an explanation, he walked her back to where Appellant and the
Case No. 25 MA 0078 –5–
other officer stood and immediately returned to the truck to begin his search. We do not
know whether the other officer offered her any explanation as to what was occurring.
{¶9} While the search of the vehicle itself proved to be fruitless, Sgt. Young can
be seen removing Appellant’s purse from its position on the center console and searching
the purse. We note that the video of the search reveals several important facts. First,
the truck did not have a backseat. Thus, there were no rear seats or flooring behind the
driver and passenger seats. The truck had no interior cargo area, as the seats were
positioned in the cab closely against the bed area. The state contends Appellant’s purse
was within easy reach of the driver, but this appears not to be the case. It appears that
four to six inches separated the driver and passenger seats from the rear window. The
center console stretched between the driver and front passenger seat areas from mid-
seat and extended to and abutted against the back window. There is no space between
the back of the console and the rear window. We can see that the console was
considerably raised above seat level, possibly more than twelve inches, and was very
wide. The purse had been turned sideways on the console and pushed up against the
window, as closely as was possible to the bed. Thus, while the purse was technically not
in the “backseat,” it was pushed as far away from the front seat area as it could be located.
In order to reach the purse, Appellant or Helman would have needed to reach behind their
seats and over the console. From the video, it is clear the top of the purse, containing its
opening, would probably have been as high as chin level for the driver and passenger,
due to both the height of the console and size of the purse.
{¶10} The state asserts that the purse was open inside the vehicle. While this is
technically true, in that from the video the purse does not appear to have a closing
Case No. 25 MA 0078 –6–
mechanism, such as a zipper or latch, there were several sheets of neatly placed and
undisturbed pieces of paper that were laid on top of the purse opening, acting as a lid.
This coverage also prevented an observer from looking inside of the purse and from
observing its contents. The papers were pulled through both purse handles, securing the
papers in place. Thus, in order to retrieve an item or place an item in the purse, the
papers would first have to be unsecured from the straps and removed from the purse
opening. This placement reveals that the papers were deliberately placed and intended
to act as a closure, substituting for a zipper or latch. Nothing about the state of these
papers suggested that they had been moved since their placement.
{¶11} The video also shows there was a medium to large sized red plastic bag,
apparently from a convenience store, placed on the center console in front of the purse.
This bag sat almost directly between Helman and Appellant. While both occupants could
certainly retrieve items from this plastic bag easily, its location (along with the height of
the console) made it much more difficult for either the driver or passenger to reach the
purse. It appears that the driver, who would have been forced to reach both up and back
to retrieve the purse and attempt to remove its covering could not have done so while
driving, and it would have been difficult even with vehicle at a stop.
{¶12} Sgt. Young did not ask Appellant for permission to search her purse prior to
searching it. Inside the purse, Sgt. Young discovered a silver vile that contained an
unknown white, powdery substance. While opening the vile, Sgt. Young fumbled. As a
result, he dumped the entire contents into Appellant’s purse. Sgt. Young approached
Appellant and inquired what the substance was, to which she responded that it was a
crushed “Norco” pill from a “busted” bottle. She later explained that she received the vile
Case No. 25 MA 0078 –7–
from her brother and was not entirely certain if it was a crushed prescription drug or
cocaine, which her brother uses and she had used in the past. Sgt. Young performed a
field test which revealed the substance as cocaine.
{¶13} Based on this discovery, Sgt. Young subsequently searched Appellant’s
person and located a metal tin with two multi-colored vials containing unknown
substances, a small spoon with a white powder, a cut straw, and a razor blade. Appellant
told Sgt. Young that one of the vials might contain cocaine.
{¶14} As no contraband was discovered during the search of the truck itself or
Helman’s person, he was issued a traffic citation and permitted to leave. However,
Appellant was arrested and taken into custody based on discovery of the drugs and
paraphernalia.
{¶15} On February 27, 2024, Appellant was indicted on one count of aggravated
possession of drugs, a felony of the fifth degree in violation of R.C. 2925.11 (A)(C), (1),
(a), and one count of possession of cocaine, a felony of the fifth degree in violation of
R.C. 2925.11 (A)(C), (1), (a).
{¶16} On April 28, 2025, Appellant filed a motion to suppress the drugs discovered
during the search of her purse, drugs subsequently found on her person, and statements
she made following these searches. On May 23, 2025, the court held a pretrial
conference. The parties agreed to submit only briefs on the motion, along with Sgt.
Young’s body camera video, and waive oral argument. Because no hearing was held on
the matter and no other evidence was introduced, we are limited to what can be heard
and observed on the body camera video. The record contains no independent evidence
as to Sgt. Young’s thoughts and impressions before or during his searches. On June 3,
Case No. 25 MA 0078 –8–
2025, the court denied Appellant’s motion to suppress. While the court referenced
consent, it appears that the court based its decision on the automobile exception to the
warrant requirement. However, the court did not provide a detailed analysis of its decision
to deny the motion. On July 1, 2025, Appellant filed a motion to reconsider which was
denied.
{¶17} On July 2, 2025, Appellant pleaded no contest to both counts as charged,
aggravated possession of drugs and possession of cocaine. On July 18, 2025, the court
sentenced Appellant in accordance with the parties’ agreement. The court did not set
forth individual sentences, instead imposing a single two-year community control term.
The court noted that violation of community control would result in Appellant serving a
two-year prison term and 360 days of local incarceration. It is from this entry that
Appellant timely appeals.
{¶18} We note that while Appellant filed a timely brief, the state sought and
received two extensions in which to file, the first being twenty days and the second,
fourteen days.
Motion To Suppress
{¶19} This matter entirely rests on a motion to suppress evidence filed by
Appellant. A motion to suppress presents mixed issues of law and fact. State v. Lake,
2003-Ohio-332, ¶ 12 (7th Dist.), citing State v. Jedd, 146 Ohio App.3d 167, 171 (4th Dist.
2001). If a trial court's findings of fact are supported by competent credible evidence, an
appellate court must accept them. Id. The court must then determine whether the trial
court's decision met the applicable legal standard. Id.
Case No. 25 MA 0078 –9–
{¶20} After the trial court denied Appellant’s motion to suppress, she pleaded no
contest to the charges, thus preserving her right to appeal the issues raised within her
motion to suppress.
Fourth Amendment
{¶21} “The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Section 14,
Article I of the Ohio Constitution secure an individual's right to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures and require warrants to be particular and supported by probable
cause.” State v. Telshaw, 2011-Ohio-3373, ¶ 12 (7th Dist.). In order for a search or
seizure to be lawful, there must be probable cause to believe evidence of criminal activity
will be found and the search or seizure must be executed pursuant to a warrant, unless
some exception to the warrant requirement exists. State v. Ward, 2011-Ohio-3183, ¶ 33
(7th Dist.).
{¶22} Hence, a valid search must be supported by a warrant or be based on a
recognized exception to the warrant requirement. State v. Ambrosini, 2015-Ohio-4150,
¶ 8 (7th Dist.), citing Katz v. U.S., 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). In Ohio, there are seven
recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement: (1) a search incident to a lawful arrest;
(2) consent; (3) the stop-and-frisk doctrine; (4) hot pursuit; (5) probable cause plus the
presence of exigent circumstances; (6) the plain view doctrine; and (7) administrative
searches. State v. McGee, 2013-Ohio-4165, ¶ 17 (7th Dist.), citing State v. Akron Airport
Post No. 8975, 19 Ohio St.3d 49, 51 (1985).
{¶23} This matter involves evidence discovered from the search of a purse located
inside an automobile which was not attributed to the driver of the vehicle at issue, but to
the passenger. We have recently underscored that “[d]uring a valid traffic stop, officers
Case No. 25 MA 0078 – 10 –
may order the occupants of a vehicle out of the vehicle pending completion of the stop
without violating the Fourth Amendment.” State v. Davis, 2020-Ohio-4821, ¶ 17 (7th
Dist.), citing State v. Chapman, 2019-Ohio-3339, ¶ 37 (7th Dist.); Maryland v. Wilson, 519
U.S. 408 (1997). We have also “previously acknowledged the application of this rule to
passengers of a vehicle even if the reason for the traffic stop is attributable only to the
driver.” State v. Gay, 2021-Ohio-3308, ¶ 13 (7th Dist.), citing State v. Koczwara, 2014-
Ohio-1946, ¶ 19 (7th Dist.); Wilson, 519 U.S. at 413-415 (1997).
{¶24} In the trial court’s entry, it determined: “The Defendant’s [sic] argues the
driver’s consent to search did not extend to her purse. The Court finds the Defendant is
mistaken. Under the automobile exception, the permissible search extends to
passengers’ belongings found in the car that are capable of concealing objects.” (6/3/25
J.E.) From this, it appears the court’s decision is based on the vehicle exception but also
mentions consent.
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR NOS. 1, 2, & 3
Did Sgt. Young have sufficient probable cause to justify the search of the
subject vehicle and its contents that may conceal the object of the search.
Can Mr. Helman’s consent to search his vehicle allow Sgt. Young to search
closed containers within the Defendant-Appellant’s purse.
Is there any evidence to suggest that the behaviors or actions of either
individual that would lead Sgt. Young to believe either were armed or about
to be engaged in criminal activity.
Case No. 25 MA 0078 – 11 –
{¶25} Our analysis begins with the “automobile exception” to the warrant
requirement, as this is the theory the trial court relied on in denying the motion. Appellant
explains that the automobile exception is two pronged, in that an officer must have
probable cause to believe that evidence of criminal activity is contained within the vehicle
sought to be searched and also that the vehicle must be readily mobile. It springs from
the fifth exception to the warrant requirement discussed in McGee. Appellant argues that
the first prong has not been satisfied, as Sgt. Young did not observe any contraband or
criminal activity from his vantage point that provided probable cause to believe a crime
had been committed or was in the process of being committed. Appellant cites to the
body camera footage, where Sgt. Young admits that his purpose for stopping the vehicle
was related to the registration tags and observing the vehicle abruptly turn into the parking
lot. He conceded that he had no reason to believe Helman’s quick turn was caused by
fear that he would be pulled over and a firearm might be found in the vehicle, because
his actions could be explained as he simply sought to avoid a traffic citation related to his
expired registration tags. To prolong the stop, Sgt. Young stated that he was “going to
get [Helman] out and chat him up a little bit,” suggesting he was engaging a stalling tactic
to try to obtain information that might support probable cause. Appellant believes this
violates Ohio law, which requires an officer to limit the scope and duration of a traffic
violation if the officer does not have probable cause to believe criminal activity is afoot.
While Sgt. Young knew Helman had a prior firearm conviction, Appellant argues that this
fact, alone, cannot serve as a basis for prolonging a traffic stop based on the expired
registration.
Case No. 25 MA 0078 – 12 –
{¶26} The state does not respond to Appellant’s arguments pertaining to the
automobile exception to the warrant requirement, and instead relies only on Helman’s
consent to search his truck.
{¶27} Our analysis must begin with the traffic stop, itself. There is no question
that Sgt. Young was entitled to initiate a traffic stop of the vehicle after observing it
operating on the road with expired registration tags. There is also no question that Sgt.
Young was permitted to engage in questioning with Helman related to the purpose of the
stop, including asking for identification, proof of insurance, and registration of the vehicle.
State v. Chapman, 2019-Ohio-3339, ¶ 36 (7th Dist.). Similarly, Sgt. Young was permitted
to order both passengers out of the vehicle while the stop was pending.
{¶28} During a valid traffic stop, “any questioning which occurs during the
detention, even if unrelated to the scope of the detention, is valid so long as the
questioning does not improperly extend the duration of the detention.” Id., citing State v.
Chagaris, 107 Ohio App.3d 551, 556-557 (9th Dist.1995).
{¶29} Moving to the automobile exception to the warrant requirement, it “was
created based on the ready mobility of automobiles and the lesser expectations of privacy
surrounding an automobile.” State v. Green, 2023-Ohio-4503, ¶ 23 (7th Dist.), citing
California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 391 (1985). Pursuant to the automobile exception,
where “probable cause justifies the search of a lawfully stopped vehicle, it justifies the
search of every part of the vehicle and its contents that may conceal the object of the
search.” State v. Vega, 2018-Ohio-4002, ¶ 13, quoting United States v. Ross, 456 U.S.
798, 825 (1982). Thus, it is insufficient to rely on only one prong of the test, the ready
Case No. 25 MA 0078 – 13 –
mobility of the vehicle, alone. Officers must have probable cause to believe that evidence
of a crime will be found within the vehicle. Green at ¶ 24.
{¶30} The seminal case in regard to an officer’s search of a passenger’s purse
which is located inside a third-party’s vehicle is Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295
(1999). In Houghton, officers initiated a traffic stop of a vehicle for speeding and operating
with a faulty brake light. Id. at 297. While an officer questioned the driver, he noticed a
hypodermic syringe in the driver’s shirt pocket. When asked about the syringe, the driver
readily admitted that he used it to take drugs. Id. at 298.
{¶31} The officer also spoke to the appellant, a passenger in the vehicle, and
asked her to identify herself. She complied, but claimed that she did not have
identification. The officer noticed a purse in the backseat and the appellant admitted that
it belonged to her. The officer removed a wallet that contained an identification card which
alerted the officer to the fact that she had given him a false name. Also within the purse,
the officer discovered drugs and drug paraphernalia. Id. at 298. The officer saw needle
marks on the appellant’s arm.
{¶32} The United States Supreme Court narrowed the issue, not to whether
officers had reason to believe who owned the purse, but whether officers had probable
cause to believe that a criminal offense had occurred or was in the process of occurring
and whether evidence of that offense could be found within that purse. Id. at 300. The
Houghton Court concluded that officers held probable cause to believe that a drug-related
offense had occurred or was in the process of occurring because of the syringe that the
driver admitted was used to take illegal drugs. Hence, officers were permitted to search
not only the vehicle but also its contents in places where drugs could be discovered, such
Case No. 25 MA 0078 – 14 –
as a purse, pursuant to the automobile exception to the warrant requirement. Id. at 302.
The Houghton Court cautioned that the issue must be considered on a case-by-case
basis, and different facts would certainly lead to different results. Id. at 305.
{¶33} We recently applied Houghton in State v. Green, 2023-Ohio-4503 (7th
Dist.). In Green, a police officer observed a driver of a vehicle engage in a “hand-to-hand
transaction” with a known drug user in an area where drug deals often took place. Id. at
3. The officer also heard one of the individuals caution the other to be careful, as police
were in the area. The officer approached the vehicle and spoke to the driver, who was
uncooperative. Id. at ¶ 7. While talking to the driver, the officer noticed a person was
sitting in the backseat with a small backpack sitting between her legs, the appellant.
{¶34} In the meantime, a K9 dog arrived to perform a sniff around the vehicle,
however, officers struggled with the driver of the vehicle who was uncooperative. During
the struggle, officers noticed the appellant clutch the backpack and attempt to leave the
area. Officers reached her and escorted her back to the area of vehicle. The K9 sniff
took seven seconds to complete and resulted in an area of the vehicle. During the
ensuing search, drugs and drug paraphernalia were discovered in the backpack. Id. at
¶ 9-10.
{¶35} The trial court denied a motion to suppress evidence seized from the
backpack, finding that the automobile exception to the warrant requirement authorized a
search of the vehicle and its contents, including the backpack. On appeal, we affirmed
the trial court’s decision, holding that officers clearly had probable cause to believe that a
drug-related offense had occurred after observing an apparent drug deal in an area
known for drug transactions. This probable cause authorized a search of the vehicle,
Case No. 25 MA 0078 – 15 –
including its contents, that could contain evidence of drugs. Because the backpack was
inside of the vehicle and because the appellant attempted to evade police contact with
the backpack, officers had probable cause to search the backpack for drugs. Id. at ¶ 30.
{¶36} With this in mind, the instant case hinges on whether Sgt. Young had
probable cause to believe Helman or Appellant had committed or were committing a
specific crime and evidence of that crime would be found in the vehicle. This probable
cause must exist in addition to whatever minor traffic violation that caused the stop. In
other words, the expired registration tags, alone, do not give rise for Sgt. Young to validly
search the interior of the vehicle for evidence of an unrelated criminal offense. And of
course, any probable cause must exist prior to the officer’s search, otherwise the search
would not be based on probable cause.
{¶37} At the time of the search in this case, Sgt. Young’s body camera clearly
contains his admission that he had no specific reason to believe that any crime, other
than the traffic infraction, had been committed. Sgt. Young conceded that Helman’s act
of “whipping” into the parking lot could have been because he knew he was driving with
an expired registration tag. Sgt. Young’s only suspicion regarding possession of a
weapon arose from learning that Helman had a prior conviction involving a firearm at
some time in the past.
{¶38} Sgt. Young discussed with the unidentified officer who provided backup at
the stop his intention to determine what caused Helman to suddenly pull into the
restaurant’s parking lot.
Sgt Young: I pulled out behind them and he immediately whipped
into here [parking lot] and then I asked him where he is going and he said
Case No. 25 MA 0078 – 16 –
he is going to a friend’s house. So, he had no reason to be turning into
here. So I don’t know if got a gun in there, he has a prior for carrying
concealed. Or if he just whipped in because of the almost expired two-
month plate. So, I’m gonna get him out, gonna chat him up a little bit.
(Exh. 1, 11:02.) We note that Sgt. Young omitted from this discussion that Helman also
told him that he and Appellant intended to eat before going to their friend’s house.
{¶39} The state urges that Appellant’s prior concealed carry conviction gave Sgt.
Young probable cause to believe that a firearm might have been in the vehicle. The
record does not contain the date of Helman’s conviction. Regardless, in Ohio a person’s
criminal record can only serve as the basis for probable cause where there is additional
evidence to support it. State v. Jones, 2020-Ohio-6667 (3d Dist.); State v. Siegel, 2021-
Ohio-4208 (4th Dist.). Hence, the question becomes whether Sgt. Young had any
knowledge to support probable cause, aside from Helman’s prior conviction, to believe
that a firearm was inside the vehicle.
{¶40} We again note that the parties submitted only briefs on the motion to
suppress without oral argument. There was no hearing on the matter. This is significant,
as Sgt. Young’s thought processes and actions can only be determined from his
statements heard in the body camera evidence. He did not testify nor did he file a police
or incident report.
{¶41} Sgt. Young conceded on the video that one of the reasons for Helman’s
action in abruptly turning into the restaurant’s parking lot could have been because he
had expired registration tags, noting that they had been expired for some weeks. He
speculates that Helman knew the registration tags were long expired and noticed a police
Case No. 25 MA 0078 – 17 –
cruiser was driving behind him in a position to observe his expired registration tag. Hence,
he abruptly turned into the parking lot in an attempt to avoid a traffic citation.
{¶42} At no time does Sgt. Young state there was reason to believe Helman had
a gun on his person or inside his truck, nor did he provide any articulable basis to believe
Helman might have possessed a weapon at the time. The record reflects Helman made
no furtive movements and did not appear to have anything in his hands. The record
shows that, at the dinner hour, Helman suddenly and abruptly turned his vehicle into the
parking lot of a restaurant, perhaps with knowledge that his registration tags were expired
and that a police cruiser was behind him.
{¶43} While the state claims that Helman did not make eye contact during the
encounter with Sgt. Young, this is unsupported by the video evidence. When Sgt. Young
approached the vehicle, Helman was forced to open the door because the driver’s window
was not working. Sgt. Young stood towards the back of the door and was positioned
somewhat behind Helman, thus making eye contact difficult unless the driver was to
reposition himself in the seat of the vehicle.
{¶44} As to Helman’s initial statement that he was on his way to a friend’s house,
again, Sgt. Young conceded on video that Appellant’s quick turn into the parking lot could
easily have been an attempt to avoid a ticket, something Helman would not necessarily
want to say to the officer. Also, Helman told Sgt. Young that he and Appellant planned
to eat dinner before heading to a friend’s house. At the time Helman entered the
restaurant parking lot, it was 5:00 p.m. It is plausible, based on the video, that he made
a last-minute decision in choosing a place to eat.
Case No. 25 MA 0078 – 18 –
{¶45} Sgt. Young never mentioned he was concerned about drug activity during
his encounter, and his supposed concern regarding Helman’s possession of a weapon
arose merely because Helman had a prior conviction for concealed carry. While Sgt.
Young spoke to Helman, nothing in their exchange would raise any articulable cause to
believe that a firearm or contraband was inside the vehicle, let alone provide enough
information to support probable cause. Thus, the automobile exception to the warrant
requirement does not support a valid search of the vehicle and its contents.
{¶46} Again, the trial court appears to have relied on the automobile exception to
the warrant requirement in denying the motion to suppress. The state also alleged that
Helman’s consent would extend to Appellant’s purse. It is unquestionable that Helman
gave consent to Sgt. Young for a search of his vehicle when asked. Even though this
search cannot be justified by means of the automobile exception, which does not apply
under the facts of this case, the court’s decision may still be affirmed if Helman’s consent
to search his truck in this instance equally applied to the search of Appellant’s purse.
{¶47} Appellant explains that, under Ohio law, before third-party consent can be
valid, officers must have a reasonable belief that the third party had authority to consent
to the search. Appellant contends that there are no facts in this case to suggest that
Helman had any control or authority over her purse and there was no evidence either of
them possessed contraband at that point. If the search of her purse was invalid, the
contraband taken from it and from her person, which was based solely on the search of
her purse, must be suppressed. Appellant also argues that any statements she made in
response to questions asked by police subsequent to searching her purse are barred as
fruit of the poisonous tree.
Case No. 25 MA 0078 – 19 –
{¶48} The state argues that it was reasonable for officers to believe that Helman
and Appellant mutually had custody and control of the purse because it was “wide open”
on the center console, suggesting that both had access to it and its contents. The state
also relies heavily on the fact that Appellant left her purse inside of the vehicle when she
was ordered out, despite the fact that officers did not order her to leave it behind.
{¶49} Again, this search of Helman’s vehicle was not supported under the
automobile exception to the warrant requirement, as officers had no probable cause to
believe criminal activity beyond the minor traffic infraction was taking place. Hence, the
search of the purse can only be justified under the consent exception. Under Ohio law,
the search of a purse must be conducted pursuant to a warrant, unless an exception to
the warrant requirement applies. State v. Withrow, 2022-Ohio-2850 (7th Dist.), citing
State v. Banks-Harvey, 2018-Ohio-201. The state contends that Helman’s consent to
search his truck permitted a search of Appellant’s purse because it was located on the
center console, between she and Helman. Interestingly, the only case the trial court cited
in its entry that addressed consent held that “[s]ince all are in agreement that the driver's
consent did not extend to a search of the passenger's purse, we see little point in further
discussing that issue.” State v. Raslovsky, 2020-Ohio-515, ¶ 11 (2d Dist.). The court in
Raslovsky ultimately held that the automobile exception to the warrant requirement
applied because a K9 sniff resulted in an alert, thus giving officers probable cause to
search both the vehicle and contents. Id. at ¶ 14.
{¶50} Contrary to the state’s assertions, the fact that Appellant left her purse
inside the vehicle does not affect the analysis. Under Ohio law, where the driver of the
vehicle leaves a bag or purse inside a vehicle, officers may search it. However, the result
Case No. 25 MA 0078 – 20 –
is different where the passenger leaves a purse inside the vehicle. Appellant cites to a
case arising out of the Ohio Supreme Court holding that a driver lacked the authority to
consent to a search of the passenger’s purse. See State v. Caulfield, 2013-Ohio-3029.
The Second District aptly explained the law as it pertains to third-party consent in
Caulfield:
Proper consent can be given by a third party, but the third-party must
possess “common authority over the area sought to be searched.” State v.
Miller, 117 Ohio App.3d 750, 759, 691 N.E.2d 703 (11th Dist.1997), citing
United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 172, 94 S.Ct. 988, 39 L.Ed.2d 242
(1974). (Other citation omitted.) “Common authority rests ‘on mutual use of
the property by persons generally having joint access or control for most
purposes, so that it is reasonable to recognize that any of the co-inhabitants
has the right to permit the inspection in his own right and that the others
have assumed the risk that one of their number might permit the common
area to be searched.’ ” State v. Pugh, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 25223,
2013-Ohio-1238, ¶ 9, citing Matlock at 172, fn. 7. “[T]he United States
Supreme Court has applied a ‘reasonable belief’ standard for determining
whether a police officer's reliance upon the consent of a third party was
proper under particular circumstances.” Miller at 759, 691 N.E.2d 703.
“That is, before a trial court can conclude that a warrantless search was
valid on the basis of a third-party consent, it must find that the facts of the
case supported a reasonable belief on the part of the police officer that the
Case No. 25 MA 0078 – 21 –
third party had the authority to consent to the search.” Id. at 759-760, 691
N.E.2d 703.
Id. at ¶ 23.
{¶51} Caulfield makes it clear that the facts of the case must clearly demonstrate
that the third party who provided consent had “mutual use” and “joint authority” to consent
to a search of property not owned by him or her. Although the general law is addressed
in depth, discussion pertaining to the factual application of the law regarding consent is
sparse. There are facts that distinguish the instant case from Caulfield, including that the
passenger of the vehicle in Caulfield knew the driver had consented to a search of the
vehicle and one of the officers in Caulfield had ordered her to leave her purse inside the
vehicle. Id. at ¶ 6. It is clear from this record Appellant did not know Helman had
consented to a search of his vehicle. While Sgt. Young did not instruct Appellant to leave
her purse, it appears that the purse could not have been seen by Sgt. Young based on
his vantage point when he ordered her from the car, so he had no reason to tell her to
leave an item he was unaware was in the vehicle. We note that, as Appellant was holding
items in both hands when ordered out of the truck and appeared startled and surprised
by the order, it is unsurprising she did not think to gather her belongings.
{¶52} Although not cited by the parties, a case arising out of the Ninth District is
factually similar, State v. Chojnowski, 2015-Ohio-1405 (9th Dist.). In that case, officers
approached a vehicle in a parking lot based on suspicions of prostitution. After dispelling
their concerns as to their stated investigation, and without additional evidence any other
criminal offense was occurring, officers sought and obtained consent to search the
Case No. 25 MA 0078 – 22 –
vehicle. The appellant passenger voluntarily left her purse partially opened inside the
vehicle. Id. at ¶ 6.
{¶53} Officers searched the purse and discovered contraband. On appeal, the
appellant argued that the owner of the vehicle could not consent to a search of a
passenger’s purse. The Ninth District agreed, first noting that there was no question that
officers lacked probable cause on which to search based on the automobile exception to
the warrant requirement. Id. at ¶ 7. As to consent, the Court focused on whether the
driver had “common authority” over the purse. Finding no facts of record to suggest
common authority, the court determined that the fact that the purse was left inside the
vehicle and that it was open was irrelevant. Id. at ¶ 11-12. The only distinguishing fact
between Chojnowski and the instant case is that the Chojnowski appellant had held the
purse on her lap at some point before the search.
{¶54} The question, here, becomes whether Helman’s consent applied to
Appellant’s purse. In order for Helman’s consent to search his truck to apply to
Appellant’s purse, the state must show the facts demonstrate that he had “common
authority” over the purse. The state would need to cite to facts in the record suggesting
that Helman had dominion and control over the purse or was in a position where it was
likely he had accessed the contents of the purse.
{¶55} In reviewing whether Sgt. Young possessed a reasonable belief that
Helman had common authority over Appellant’s purse, we first note that the state’s
argument relies on a misrepresentation of the nature and location of Appellant’s purse.
The state claims that the purse sat open, directly in between Appellant and Helman in a
manner where each of them could have at any time reached into the purse to retrieve
Case No. 25 MA 0078 – 23 –
items. While a review of the body camera video confirms that the purse sat on the center
console, the state neglects to accurately describe the center console area of this vehicle.
{¶56} As earlier discussed, Helman’s truck did not have a backseat. There are
two seats in the cab, which is then attached to the bed. There is no designated storage
area behind the driver’s and passenger’s seats. The center console extends from the
area between the driver/passenger seats to the back of the cab, touching the back window
that separates it from the bed. The distance between the seats and the back window
amounts to no more than a few inches. However, the console is raised significantly higher
than the seats for its entire length, and is very wide. Appellant’s purse was turned
sideways and pushed as far back as possible against the back window. It was not placed
in a manner to allow either occupant sufficiently easy access to reach in and retrieve
items from it. Instead, it was placed as far out of the front seat area as possible.
{¶57} Appellant’s purse does not sit directly between Appellant and Helman.
Either person was required to reach behind and over the edge of their seat to reach
Appellant’s purse. Because the console was raised, they would also be forced to reach
up, as the top of the console may have been at shoulder height, and so the top of the bag
was approximately chin height for the average person. Additionally, a medium to large
sized red plastic convenience store bag sat in front of the purse on the center console.
This plastic bag was positioned almost directly between Appellant and Helman, further
obstructing access to the purse. While the purse appears not to have been mutually
accessible, the plastic bag could have been accessed by both Helman and Appellant.
{¶58} Appellant’s purse was “open” in the technical sense. Apparently, it may not
have a zipper or other closing mechanism, based on the video evidence. However,
Case No. 25 MA 0078 – 24 –
apparently to correct this, full sheets of paper had been laid on top of the purse covering
its opening. The papers had been laid between the two purse straps, which then secured
the papers in place and effectively secured the purse closed. Neither Helman nor
Appellant would have been able to simply reach into the purse even if it was accessible
from their positions. In order to access the contents of the purse, someone seeking
access was required to remove these papers before reaching inside. This placement of
the papers was clearly deliberate, and meant to act as a secure closure for the purse.
Hence, it appears from this record that the purse was not within the custody and control
of Helman and was not easily accessed, nor could its contents be readily viewed.
{¶59} The state makes much of the fact that Appellant left her purse inside the
vehicle when she exited, essentially claiming it was thus “fair game” in a search of the
truck. Again, Appellant sat inside the truck while officers spoke to Helman outside and
behind the truck. Appellant was completely unaware of their conversation and did not
know that Helman had consented to a search of his truck, and her surprise at being
ordered out of the vehicle is readily apparent from the video evidence.
{¶60} In fact, Appellant was in the midst of a conversation on her cell phone at the
time Sgt. Young approached her, opened the door and told her to “step out real quick.”
(Exh. 1, 14:55.) She appeared confused and asked him if everything was ok. Sgt. Young
replied “yes,” and that he would give her an explanation for his action “in a second.” (Exh.
1, 15:19.) She exited the vehicle with the phone in one hand, still actively engaged in her
call, and a lit cigarette in the other hand that she placed in her mouth so that her hand
was free to aid in her exit. Even assuming Appellant spared a thought for her purse,
which was outside of her line of vision, she could not have readily picked it up.
Case No. 25 MA 0078 – 25 –
Significantly, there is no evidence whatsoever that she knew a search had been
authorized or was about to take place before she exited the truck. Although Sgt. Young
informed her that he would explain everything “in a second,” he did not. Instead, he left
her with Helman and the other officer and returned to the truck to begin his search.
{¶61} Based on the facts in this case, there is nothing to suggest that Helman had
common authority or control over Appellant’s purse. Her purse was not “open” so that
occupants of the vehicle could simply reach in and retrieve any of its contents. In fact, it
was placed out of convenient reach of both occupants. Again, as in Chojnowski, whether
Appellant voluntarily left her purse when she was ordered out of the vehicle is irrelevant
where there are no facts to support the reasonable belief that both occupants had
common authority over it. Further, the covering over the purse meant that persons
encountering it could not simply view its contents, and it is undisputed no contraband was
in plain view. Based on the totality of the facts in this case, Helman’s consent to search
his truck did not extend to the search of Appellant’s purse. Since no warrant was
obtained, the search was invalid and any evidence obtained should have been
suppressed.
{¶62} Turning to the question of whether the contraband found on Appellant’s
person after her purse was searched and statements she made following the warrantless
search were inadmissible as fruit of the poisonous tree:
The exclusionary rule requires suppression of evidence obtained as
a result of an unlawful search and derivative evidence that is the product of
the primary evidence or is otherwise acquired as an indirect result of the
unlawful search, unless the connection with the unlawful search is so
Case No. 25 MA 0078 – 26 –
attenuated that the taint is dissipated. Murray v. United States, 487 U.S.
533, 536-37, 108 S.Ct. 2529, 101 L.Ed.2d 472 (1988). The question is
whether the taint is sufficiently dissipated or whether the evidence is the fruit
of the poisonous tree. Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 804-805, 104
S.Ct. 3380, 82 L.Ed.2d 599 (1984).
State v. Nickelson, 2017-Ohio-7503, ¶ 27 (7th Dist.).
{¶63} While officers would have been permitted to frisk Appellant for the purpose
of officer safety upon her exit from the vehicle, apparently they did not, and officers would
not have been permitted to search her for contraband. It is clear from the body camera
video evidence that the contraband found on Appellant’s person was found in a more
extensive search conducted because Sgt. Young found drugs in her purse. The search
of her person was only conducted as a direct result of this discovery. Likewise, the
questioning of Appellant regarding contraband found in the illegal searches elicited
incriminating statements. Neither the questions nor the statements would have taken
place but for the illegal search. Because Helman’s consent did not extend to validate the
search of Appellant’s purse, any evidence obtained in or after that improper search was
inadmissible as fruit of the poisonous tree. Accordingly, Appellant’s first, second, and
third assignments of error have merit and are sustained.
Conclusion
{¶64} Appellant contends that neither she nor her codefendant exhibited behavior
that would lead police officers to possess probable cause they were engaging in criminal
activity. Regardless, she argues that her boyfriend’s act of consenting to a search of his
vehicle should not have extended to include a search of her purse. For the reasons
Case No. 25 MA 0078 – 27 –
provided, Appellant’s arguments have merit. The judgment of the trial court is reversed
and this matter is remanded to allow the state to determine if it can proceed without
evidence obtained from the search of Appellant’s purse, her person, or any statements
she made after the search of her purse.
Robb, J. concurs.
Dickey, J. concurs.
Case No. 25 MA 0078 [Cite as State v. Mort, 2026-Ohio-249.]
For the reasons stated in the Opinion rendered herein, Appellant’s assignments of
error are sustained and it is the final judgment and order of this Court that the judgment
of the Court of Common Pleas of Mahoning County, Ohio, is reversed. This matter is
remanded to allow the state to determine if it can proceed without evidence obtained from
the search of Appellant’s purse, her person, or any statements she made after the search
of her purse. Costs to be taxed against the Appellee.
A certified copy of this opinion and judgment entry shall constitute the mandate in
this case pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. It is ordered that a
certified copy be sent by the clerk to the trial court to carry this judgment into execution.
NOTICE TO COUNSEL
This document constitutes a final judgment entry.