[Cite as State v. Morgan, 2026-Ohio-1296.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT MAHONING COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
JOHN EUGENE MORGAN,
Defendant-Appellant.
OPINION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY Case No. 25 MA 0082
Criminal Appeal from the Court of Common Pleas of Mahoning County, Ohio Case No. 2022 CR 00438
BEFORE: Cheryl L. Waite, Mark A. Hanni, Katelyn Dickey, Judges.
JUDGMENT: Affirmed.
Atty. Lynn Maro, Mahoning County Prosecutor, and Atty. Kristie M. Weibling, Assistant Prosecutor, for Plaintiff-Appellee
Atty. Rhys Brendan Cartwright-Jones, for Defendant-Appellant
Dated: April 9, 2026 –2–
WAITE, P.J.
{¶1} Appellant John Eugene Morgan appeals an August 18, 2025 judgment entry
of the Mahoning County Court of Common Pleas overruling his postconviction petition.
On appeal, Appellant argues that he provided affidavits that establish evidence de hors
the record to support his arguments that dash camera footage was improperly admitted
at trial, a search warrant was improperly granted, and that jury instructions provided at
his trial were erroneous. Because Appellant has already raised some of his claims in
prior appeals, and could also have raised his other claims, he is barred by res judicata
from asserting them, here. Consequently, Appellant’s arguments are without merit and
the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Factual and Procedural History
{¶2} This matter involves a postconviction petition. Appellant was arrested and
convicted after an April 9, 2024 indictment charged Appellant with three offenses:
murder, an unclassified felony in violation of R.C. 2903.02(A), (D) and 2929.02(B);
murder, an unclassified felony in violation of R.C. 2903.02(B) (D), and 2929.02(B); and
felonious assault, a felony of the second degree in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(2) and
(D)(1)(a). Each count carried an attenuated firearm specification.
{¶3} This case arose following a shooting. While all of the facts are not relevant,
here, Appellant admittedly shot and killed a man during a fight. State v. Morgan, 2024-
Ohio-5843, ¶ 14 (7th Dist.) (“Morgan I”). The victim, D.P., was in a relationship with
Appellant’s wife. While Appellant constantly referred to her as his ex-wife, they had not
legally divorced. On the day in question, Appellant made arrangements to pick up the
daughter he shared with his ex-wife. Id. at ¶ 5. After learning of a contentious phone call
Case No. 25 MA 0082 –3–
that had occurred between Appellant and D.P., Appellant’s daughter asked him to pick
her up on a street corner a few houses down from the victim’s home to avoid any
confrontations. Appellant refused, and responded that he intended to pick her up at D.P.’s
house, where his ex-wife and daughter resided.
{¶4} After Appellant arrived, he and D.P. immediately began arguing. Appellant
had a gun on his person and at one point, D.P. noticed the gun and began running. As
D.P.’s back was turned to Appellant and D.P. was running away, Appellant fired a shot at
him, striking him in the back and killing him. At the point of impact, D.P. had run several
car lengths away from Appellant. Id. at ¶ 17.
{¶5} Apparently, Appellant’s own dash camera, which is at issue in this appeal,
recorded the event. Id. at ¶ 16. This video, along with witness testimony, corroborated
that Appellant brought the gun, fired a “warning shot,” engaged in an altercation, and then
shot D.P. in the back as he ran away.
{¶6} At trial, Appellant argued that he acted in self-defense. However, he was
convicted of the lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter (count one, originally
a charge of murder), murder (count two), and felonious assault. The jury also convicted
him on all attenuated firearm specifications.
{¶7} After the verdict was announced, some members of the jury were heard
saying that they felt the jury instructions were confusing and misleading. Appellant filed
a motion for leave to file a motion for a new trial on this basis, which the court overruled.
Id. at ¶ 32. The court determined that the jury did, in fact, undertake great effort to
understand the instructions, asking several questions and seeking clarification. They also
had in their possession a copy of the definition of self-defense.
Case No. 25 MA 0082 –4–
{¶8} On direct appeal Appellant attacked his conviction on questions of manifest
weight of the evidence pertaining to his voluntary manslaughter and felony murder
convictions, and questioned whether the jury instructions on the law of self-defense were
confusing and misleading. We affirmed Appellant’s convictions and sentence. Relevant
to the matter now before us, we held that even if jury members believed that Appellant
was “somehow not at fault for creating the situation giving rise to the affray, self-defense
was still not available to him because there was no imminent threat to Appellant at the
time of the shooting and he was not in a place that he was legally permitted to be.” Id. at
¶ 61.
{¶9} Three months after our Opinion was released, Appellant filed an application
to reopen his direct appeal in State v. Morgan, 2025-Ohio-1312 (7th Dist.) (“Morgan II”).
In that application, Appellant alleged several grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel
related to failure to object to the jury instructions regarding self-defense, failure to file a
motion to suppress the dash camera video, and failure to raise whether felony murder
properly serves as a predicate offense for felonious assault. Appellant also urged that
there was cumulative error that occurred at trial. This Court overruled the application,
and the Ohio Supreme Court declined jurisdiction.
{¶10} In early 2025, Appellant filed a series of documents in the trial court seeking
to obtain the dash camera video for forensic evaluation. On May 5, 2025, the trial court
denied all of these filings.
{¶11} On June 26, 2025, Appellant filed a “Petition for Post-Conviction Relief,
Request for Discovery Period, and Request for Evidentiary Hearing.” (Capitalization
omitted.) Within his petition, Appellant raised sixteen grounds, with some arguments
Case No. 25 MA 0082 –5–
overlapping, arguing essentially that his counsel failed to: challenge the unlawful seizure
of his dash camera video; investigate irregularities in the video footage; file a motion to
suppress; raise arguments pertaining to the warrant that led to “digital searches;” address
the jury instructions pertaining to the self-defense charge; and challenge the predicate
offense used to support the felony murder charge. Appellant also advanced an argument
that this Court erred in applying the cumulative error doctrine. Appellant did not raise any
argument pertaining to the jury instructions regarding voluntary manslaughter in this
petition.
{¶12} In support of his petition, Appellant attached two handwritten affidavits from
someone named Megan Owens, who apparently is or was Appellant’s girlfriend.
Interestingly, one of those affidavits states that it was intended to support Seventh District
Court of Appeals case number 2024 MA 0040, the case number of Appellant’s direct
appeal. This affidavit also states that it was prepared for purposes of Appellant’s
application to reopen his appeal. As the handwriting is nearly illegible, it is impossible to
determine the date the affidavit was actually signed.
{¶13} The trial court denied Appellant’s petition seeking postconviction relief.
Appellant timely appeals the trial court’s decision to deny this petition.
Postconviction Petition
{¶14} A motion not specifically authorized under the Ohio Rules of Criminal
Procedure is classified as a postconviction petition if “it is a motion that (1) was filed
subsequent to [the defendant's] direct appeal, (2) claimed a denial of constitutional rights,
(3) sought to render the judgment void, and (4) asked for vacation of the judgment and
sentence.” State v. Hudson, 2017-Ohio-4280, ¶ 9 (7th Dist.), quoting State v. Reynolds,
Case No. 25 MA 0082 –6–
79 Ohio St.3d 158, 160 (1997). Appellant's motion meets this criteria, as it was filed
subsequent to his direct appeal, asserts a violation of a constitutional right, claims that
his sentence is void, and asks for his sentence to be vacated.
{¶15} In order to successfully assert a postconviction petition, “the petitioner must
demonstrate a denial or infringement of his rights in the proceedings resulting in his
conviction sufficient to render the conviction void or voidable under the Ohio or United
States Constitutions.” State v. Agee, 2016-Ohio-7183, ¶ 9 (7th Dist.), citing R.C.
2953.21(A)(1). The petitioner is not automatically entitled to a hearing. State v. Cole, 2
Ohio St.3d 112, 113 (1982). Pursuant to R.C. 2953.21(C), the petitioner bears the burden
of demonstrating “substantive grounds for relief” through the record or any supporting
affidavits. However, as a postconviction petition does not provide a forum to relitigate
issues that could have been raised on direct appeal, res judicata bars many claims. Agee
at ¶ 10.
{¶16} The doctrine of res judicata “bars an individual from raising a defense or
claiming a lack of due process that was or could have been raised at trial or on direct
appeal.” State v. Croom, 2014-Ohio-5635, ¶ 7 (7th Dist.), citing State v. Ishmail, 67 Ohio
St.2d 16, 18 (1981). However, where “an alleged constitutional error is supported by
evidence that is de hors the record, res judicata will not bar the claim because it would
have been impossible to fully litigate the claim on direct appeal.” State v. Green, 2003-
Ohio-5142, ¶ 21 (7th Dist.), citing State v. Smith, 125 Ohio App.3d 342, 348 (12th Dist.
1997). To overcome the res judicata bar, the petitioner must demonstrate that the claim
could not have been appealed based on the original trial record. Agee at ¶ 11, citing
State v. Combs, 100 Ohio App.3d 90, 97 (1st Dist. 1994).
Case No. 25 MA 0082 –7–
Timeliness
{¶17} R.C. 2953.21(A)(2) requires a petitioner to file a petition within one year
after the trial transcripts are filed in the court of appeals. In relevant part, R.C.
2953.21(A)(2) provides that a postconviction petition:
[S]hall be filed no later than three hundred sixty-five days after the
date on which the trial transcript is filed in the court of appeals in the direct
appeal of the judgment of conviction[.] . . . If no appeal is taken, except as
otherwise provided in section 2953.23 of the Revised Code, the petition
shall be filed no later than three hundred sixty-five days after the expiration
of the time for filing the appeal.
{¶18} Ohio law sets out a two-part exception to this rule if the petitioner can
demonstrate that he or she meets the criteria found in R.C. 2953.23(A)(1)(a)-(b). Pursuant
to R.C. 2953.23(A)(1)(a), the petitioner must either show that he:
[W]as unavoidably prevented from discovery of the facts upon which
[he] must rely to present the claim for relief, or, . . . the United States
Supreme Court recognized a new federal or state right that applies
retroactively to persons in the petitioner's situation, and the petition asserts
a claim based on that right.
{¶19} This record reflects that Appellant filed trial transcripts with this Court on
June 28, 2024. Appellant filed his postconviction petition on June 26, 2025. Hence, his
petition is timely filed.
Case No. 25 MA 0082 –8–
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
The trial court abused its discretion and violated R.C. 2953.21, Brady, and
Strickland by denying Morgan’s postconviction petition without an
evidentiary hearing despite sworn, material facts dehors the record showing
undisclosed digital evidence, unlitigated suppression grounds, and
ineffective assistance of counsel.
{¶20} Appellant raises several different arguments within his sole assignment of
error. First, he contends that he filed affidavits demonstrating there were sections of the
dash cam video used at trial that were inexplicably missing, there were defects in the
search warrant used to seize this video, and trial counsel’s representation was ineffective.
Because the affidavits provide “evidence,” Appellant claims he was entitled to an
evidentiary hearing and discovery period. Specifically, Appellant contends that he has
evidence that he obtained outside of the record that shows the state did not provide a
dash camera file, and so the defense was unable to examine the dash camera’s
metadata. He also claims the search warrant appears defective due to alleged problems
with its timing and scope, and that his trial court counsel failed to object to a jury instruction
and to language contained in the verdict form.
{¶21} As to the dash camera file, Appellant argues that the failure of the state to
provide that file to the defense prevented examination of the embedded metadata, thus
impeding Appellant’s ability to verify the chain of custody, or obtain an expert to enable
him to attack this evidence. He claims that there were minutes of time “missing” from this
video.
Case No. 25 MA 0082 –9–
{¶22} The state counters by first explaining the dynamics behind Appellant’s legal
defense team. Appellant initially hired a private attorney who apparently advised
Appellant to challenge admission of the dash cam video. However, Appellant fired this
attorney and retained a different law firm. Counsel from that firm took a different
approach, and chose not to file a motion to suppress the dash cam evidence. Appellant’s
counsel, instead, obtained an expert witness, who testified at length as to the contents of
that video. Appellant testified at trial and also relied greatly on the video in giving his own
testimony.
{¶23} The record reflects it was Appellant who offered the video as evidence. As
noted by the state, the “elongated version” of the video was admitted by the defense as
Appellant’s exhibit E. (Trial Tr., p. 950.) The state is also correct that Appellant testified
at length about the video. The trial transcripts show that Appellant began his direct
testimony about the video on page 826. He continued to discuss and play the video, in
segments, through page 877. Appellant, himself, spent fifty-one pages of trial transcript
playing and discussing the events depicted on the video.
{¶24} Appellant produced affidavits from Megan Owens, who was his girlfriend at
the time of trial. Owens testified at Appellant’s trial. She testified that she works as a
caseworker and holds a bachelor’s degree in human services. (Trial Tr., pp. 666-667.)
Although Owens’ affidavit neglects to identify her employment or contain any reasons
why she may be qualified to address issues regarding a video’s metadata, it is readily
apparent from her testimony that she is not an expert on the issue of video metadata.
{¶25} Based on our review of the affidavits and the procedural history in this
matter, it is clear that Appellant could have, and should have, raised this issue on direct
Case No. 25 MA 0082 – 10 –
appeal. There is no question that he was aware suppression of the video was possible
and that arguments existed as to refuting the admissibility of the video, because in Owens’
affidavit she repeatedly avers that she and Appellant discussed this with defense counsel.
She concedes that Appellant's original counsel wanted to file a motion to suppress, but
Appellant fired that attorney and his new counsel decided against suppression, choosing
to attempt to rely on the video as part of the defense. Appellant failed to raise any issue
as to suppression on direct appeal. Relevant to this issue, in an affidavit Owens states:
1. In November 2022, [Appellant] and I met with [Appellant’s
attorney]. He provided [Appellant] with partial discovery, including the dash-
cam footage and the search warrant used to seize that footage.
2. While reviewing the warrant and metadata, [this attorney] and
[Appellant] discovered that detectives retrieved the dash-cam on a date that
fell outside the warrant’s authorized window. [This attorney] acknowledged
this discrepancy and suggested that John could use it during pretrial
proceedings.
(Postconviction Petition, Exh. 2.)
{¶26} Owens averred “[u]pon examining the filed properties for the incident
footage, I encountered a creation and modification date set to July 1, 2022. No other data
appears in the metadata for that file.” (Emphasis added.) (Postconviction Petition, Exh.
2.) She also stated that she “ran a standard metadata program that reveals deeper
‘created,’ ‘modified,’ and ‘accessed’ timestamps.” (Postconviction Petition, Exh. 2.) She
said that she sent an email to trial counsel on December 15, 2022, in which she mentioned
Case No. 25 MA 0082 – 11 –
these discrepancies. Owens also claims she addressed the discovery she admits was
provided by the state and was allegedly able to determine from a review of all twenty-six
minutes of video segments that approximately seventeen minutes of the video were
“missing.”
{¶27} Whether or not she is qualified, Owens clearly admits that she has already
reviewed the metadata that Appellant seeks to review, here, as she specifically stated
that “no other data appears in the metadata” and also that she “ran a meta data program.”
It is equally clear that Appellant possessed the dash cam footage as early as November
of 2022, since his girlfriend apparently reviewed the video around that time. While Owens
does not appear to be an expert, it can be gleaned that Appellant had access to the
metadata prior to trial. Thus, there is no question that Appellant could have raised the
issue he now complains of during a pretrial, trial, or at least on direct appeal.
{¶28} Regardless, this Court addressed the issue on Appellant’s application to
reopen his appeal. See Morgan II. In that application, Appellant raised the failure of his
counsel to contest admission of the dash cam video and argued that Strickland demanded
his counsel be found ineffective, the same argument he raises, here. We addressed the
issue at length, stating:
It appears Appellant advances good arguments in support of his
position that a motion to suppress the dash cam evidence should have been
filed. However, this court stresses that even without the dash cam video,
the testimony at trial supports Appellant's conviction establishing that he did
not act in self-defense, as addressed in our December 12, 2024 decision
. . . Accordingly, the failure to file a motion to suppress the dash cam
Case No. 25 MA 0082 – 12 –
evidence does not amount to “a reasonable probability the result of the trial
would have been otherwise had the motion been granted” as the testimony
at trial supports Appellant's conviction establishing that he did not act in self-
defense when he shot and killed D.P. in the back.
Id. at ¶ 13-14.
{¶29} To overcome res judicata, Appellant is required to show some evidence de
hors the record in support. While Appellant claims that Owens’ affidavits accomplish this
goal, she actually confirms the state’s contention that Appellant had direct knowledge of
the issue prior to trial and could have raised it earlier. Regardless, in Appellant’s
application to reopen, filed by the same counsel as the instant case, we specifically
determined that even if the dash cam evidence had been suppressed, the testimony at
trial absent the video evidence overwhelmingly supported Appellant’s conviction. This
fact remains true. Hence, Appellant’s argument as to the dash cam video and his
counsel’s alleged ineffectiveness is barred by res judicata.
{¶30} Appellant also contends that there were issues with the timing and the
scope of the search warrant used to seize the video. However, he fails to develop these
arguments and does not elaborate as to specific concerns about specific defects. Without
any guidance from Appellant as to what he seeks to have us review, we are unable to
address this argument. We note that Owens’ affidavits concede Appellant expressed
concern that his warrant contained defects during pre-trial proceedings. Thus, even if
Appellant had properly raised the issue in his petition, it would likewise be barred by res
judicata.
Case No. 25 MA 0082 – 13 –
{¶31} Finally, he takes issue with the court’s jury instructions pertaining to
voluntary manslaughter. Appellant contends that the instructions and the verdict form
treated voluntary manslaughter as a “lesser included offense” of his murder charge
instead of properly treating it as “an inferior-degree offense that mitigates murder upon
proof of serious provocation.” (Appellant’s Brf., p. 20.)
{¶32} We note that Appellant did not actually raise this issue within his
postconviction petition. While he did raise an issue involving the law regarding lesser-
included offenses, in his argument he actually complained that trial counsel should have
argued that felony murder cannot serve as a predicate to felonious assault. Nowhere in
this argument in his petition to the trial court does he mention the jury instructions treated
voluntary manslaughter improperly as a lesser included offense, which is what he now
argues in his appeal of the trial court’s denial of his petition. As his jury instruction
argument raises a new claim, not raised in the first instance to the trial court, we cannot
consider it for the first time on appeal.
{¶33} Regardless, in Appellant’s application for reopening, he raised an argument
that his counsel’s failed to raise the issue of whether felony murder serves as a predicate
offense for felonious assault, and in failing to challenge the issue provided ineffective
assistance as per Strickland v. Washington. Id. at ¶ 5. This Court analyzed the issue,
finding that a charged felony murder does serve as a predicate offense to a felonious
assault conviction. We held that Appellant was properly convicted of felonious assault,
voluntary manslaughter, and murder, which merged for sentencing purposes. Id. at ¶ 17.
{¶34} While Appellant did not challenge the jury instructions regarding voluntary
manslaughter when seeking reopening, he was aware of the instructions actually
Case No. 25 MA 0082 – 14 –
provided to the jury at the time he filed for reopening. If he sought to challenge the
instructions the trial court gave the jury on this issue, he could have done so either on
direct appeal or in his application for reopening. In fact, Appellant argued in his
application for reopening that the court gave erroneous jury instructions regarding the
elements of self-defense. Id. at ¶ 8. Appellant had advanced the identical argument on
direct appeal. State v. Morgan, 2024-Ohio-5843, ¶ 53 (7th Dist.). Consequently,
Appellant had two prior opportunities to raise this jury instruction argument as well, and
is barred by res judicata from raising the issue, here, even if it had been properly
advanced to the trial court in his petition.
Conclusion
{¶35} Appellant argues that he provided affidavits that establish evidence de hors
the record supporting his arguments that dash camera footage was improperly admitted
at trial, a search warrant was improperly granted, and that jury instructions provided to
the jury were erroneous. For the reasons provided, Appellant’s arguments are without
merit and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Hanni, J. concurs.
Dickey, J. concurs.
Case No. 25 MA 0082 [Cite as State v. Morgan, 2026-Ohio-1296.]
For the reasons stated in the Opinion rendered herein, Appellant’s assignment of
error is overruled and it is the final judgment and order of this Court that the judgment of
the Court of Common Pleas of Mahoning County, Ohio, is affirmed. Costs to be taxed
against the Appellant.
A certified copy of this opinion and judgment entry shall constitute the mandate in
this case pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. It is ordered that a
certified copy be sent by the clerk to the trial court to carry this judgment into execution.
NOTICE TO COUNSEL
This document constitutes a final judgment entry.