State v. Moran

Opinion

STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS )ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COUNTY OF MEDINA )

STATE OF OHIO C.A. Nos. 2025CA0063-M 2025CA0064-M

Appellee

v.

APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT

PAUL MORAN ENTERED IN THE MEDINA MUNICIPAL COURT

Appellant COUNTY OF MEDINA, OHIO CASE Nos. 25CRB0037

25CRB0038

DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY Dated: August 24, 2026

SUTTON, Judge.

{¶1} Defendant-Appellant, Paul Moran, appeals from his sentence in the Medina Municipal Court. This Court affirms.

I.

{¶2} In Criminal Case No. 25 CRB 00037, Mr. Moran was charged with attempted theft.

The complaint alleged that he went to a pharmacy and tried to obtain a prescription belonging to E.K. In Criminal Case No. 25 CRB 00038, Mr. Moran was charged with falsification. The complaint alleged that he lied to the police while they were investigating him for menacing by stalking. The alleged victim in the menacing by stalking investigation was also E.K.

{¶3} The trial court consolidated Mr. Moran’s two criminal cases for trial. Before the trial occurred, Mr. Moran pleaded to reduced charges. In Criminal Case No. 25 CRB 00037, he pleaded no contest to the unauthorized use of property. In Criminal Case No. 25 CRB 00038, he

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pleaded no contest to persistent disorderly conduct. The trial court ordered a presentence investigation report (“PSI”) and set the matter for sentencing.

{¶4} The trial court issued Mr. Moran identical sentences in his two cases. In each case, the court ordered him to pay a $250 fine and serve 30 days in jail with three days’ credit for time served. The court ordered the two sentences to be served consecutively.

{¶5} Mr. Moran now appeals from his sentence and raises one assignment of error for review.

II.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT SENTENCED [MR.] MORAN WITHOUT PROPERLY CONSIDERING THE PURPOSES AND PRINCIPLES OF MISDEMEANOR SENTENCING CONTAINED IN R.C. 2929.21 AND THE FACTORS LISTED IN R.C. 2929.22.

{¶6} In his sole assignment of error, Mr. Moran argues the trial court erred when it failed to properly consider the purposes and principles of sentencing outlined in R.C. 2929.21 and the sentencing factors outlined in R.C. 2929.22. Upon review, we reject his argument.

{¶7} “A trial court has discretion in imposing sentence for misdemeanors.” State v.

Warner, 2023-Ohio-1083, ¶ 7 (9th Dist.). “Unless the sentence is contrary to law, we review challenges to misdemeanor sentencing for an abuse of discretion.” State v. Schneider, 2009-Ohio- 6025, ¶ 6 (9th Dist.). “The term ‘abuse of discretion’ means a ruling that is unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable.” State v. McAlpin, 2026-Ohio-148, ¶ 14.

{¶8} The two overriding purposes of misdemeanor sentencing are “to protect the public from future crime by the offender and others and to punish the offender.” R.C. 2929.21(A). To achieve those purposes, sentencing courts must consider “the impact of the offense upon the victim and the need for changing the offender’s behavior, rehabilitating the offender, and making

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restitution to the victim of the offense, the public, or the victim and the public.” R.C. 2929.21(A). The sentence the court imposes must be “reasonably calculated to achieve the two overriding purposes of misdemeanor sentencing . . . , commensurate with and not demeaning to the seriousness of the offender’s conduct and its impact upon the victim, and consistent with sentences imposed for similar offenses committed by similar offenders.” R.C. 2929.21(B).

{¶9} R.C. 2929.22(B)(1) also outlines a list of factors courts must consider in determining the appropriate sentence for a misdemeanant. Those factors are:

(a) The nature and circumstances of the offense or offenses;

(b) Whether the circumstances regarding the offender and the offense or offenses indicate that the offender has a history of persistent criminal activity and that the offender’s character and condition reveal a substantial risk that the offender will commit another offense;

(c) Whether the circumstances regarding the offender and the offense or offenses indicate that the offender’s history, character, and condition reveal a substantial risk that the offender will be a danger to others and that the offender’s conduct has been characterized by a pattern of repetitive, compulsive, or aggressive behavior with heedless indifference to the consequences;

(d) Whether the victim’s youth, age, disability, or other factor made the victim particularly vulnerable to the offense or made the impact of the offense more serious;

(e) Whether the offender is likely to commit future crimes in general, in addition to the circumstances described in divisions (B)(1)(b) and (c) of this section;

(f) Whether the offender has an emotional, mental, or physical condition that is traceable to the offender’s service in the armed forces of the United States and that was a contributing factor in the offender’s commission of the offense or offenses;

(g) The offender’s military service record.

R.C. 2929.22(B)(1)(a)-(g). The court also may consider “any other factors that are relevant to achieving the purposes and principles of sentencing set forth in section 2929.21 of the Revised Code.” R.C. 2929.22(B)(3).

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{¶10} “While it is preferable that the trial court state on the record that it has considered the statutory criteria [set forth in R.C. 2929.21 and 2929.22], the [Revised Code] imposes no requirement that it do so.” State v. Pippert, 2016-Ohio-1352, ¶ 23 (9th Dist.), quoting Cuyahoga Falls v. Bradley, 2004-Ohio-4583, ¶ 7 (9th Dist.). “A trial court is presumed to have considered the factors in R.C. 2929.22 absent an affirmative showing to the contrary.” State v. Taylor- Franklin, 2023-Ohio-1851, ¶ 10 (9th Dist.). “The burden of demonstrating this error falls to the appellant.” State v. Endress, 2008-Ohio-4498, ¶ 4 (9th Dist.).

{¶11} At sentencing, defense counsel indicated that both of Mr. Moran’s charges stemmed from incidents related to E.K. Defense counsel explained that, in the past, Mr. Moran had dated and had lived with E.K. By pleading no contest, Mr. Moran admitted that he had tried to obtain E.K.’s prescription from a pharmacy. He also admitted that he had made several false statements to the police when they investigated him for menacing by stalking. Mr. Moran apologized to the court for his behavior. He said he had gotten a job and was working to improve himself. The defense acknowledged that Mr. Moran needed “to move on with his life” and “move away from the idea of [E.K.]”

{¶12} The trial court noted that it had reviewed Mr. Moran’s PSI, the circumstances of his offenses, and the statements he made on his own behalf. The court described Mr. Moran as having “terrorized” E.K. It noted that, while she was hospitalized due to a domestic violence incident involving Mr. Moran, he had sent her a book “about a man who stalked and killed his ex- girlfriend.” Further, the court noted that Mr. Moran had a pending felony charge with E.K. as the named victim.

{¶13} The trial court found that Mr. Moran had a lengthy criminal history and that his score on the Ohio Risk Assessment Scale reflected he was at a high risk of reoffending. It found

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that “nothing seem[ed] to be deterring [him].” The court noted that it was required to fashion a sentence that would punish Mr. Moran and protect the public. Additionally, the court noted, it was required to consider other factors. The court discussed several of those factors in relation to Mr. Moran and E.K. Specifically, it discussed the need to change Mr. Moran’s behavior, the need to rehabilitate him, the impact on E.K., the consistency of his sentence with other similarly situated defendants, the nature and circumstances of his offenses, his criminal history, and his character and risk of reoffending. The court acknowledged that Mr. Moran still had time to change his behavior and had made representations regarding his plan to do so. The court stated that “[t]ime [would] tell” if Mr. Moran was serious about those representations. The court indicated that it had reached its sentencing decision based on all the foregoing considerations and factors.

{¶14} Mr. Moran argues that the trial court sentenced him without properly considering the purposes and principles of sentencing contained in R.C. 2929.21 and the sentencing factors in R.C. 2929.22. According to Mr. Moran, the court did not consider his rehabilitation, the fact that he had just gotten a new job, the fact that he had a job with health benefits, or the fact that he was suffering from a head injury. Moreover, Mr. Moran notes that the court considered an “unrelated felony charge that was still pending.”

{¶15} Upon review, Mr. Moran has not affirmatively shown that the trial court failed to consider R.C. 2929.21 and 2929.22. See Endress, 2008-Ohio-4498, at ¶ 4 (9th Dist.). The trial court specifically stated that it was sentencing Mr. Moran based on its need to punish him, its need to protect E.K., and its consideration of statutory factors including the nature and circumstances of the offenses, Mr. Moran’s history of criminal activity, and his risk of reoffending. See R.C. 2929.21; R.C. 2929.22 The record does not support Mr. Moran’s claim that the court failed to consider his rehabilitation or his recent efforts. The court specifically acknowledged Mr. Moran’s

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statements at sentencing and found that “[t]ime [would] tell” if he followed through with his desire to change. To the extent the court referenced a pending felony, that pending charge also involved E.K. and was included in Mr. Moran’s PSI. Mr. Moran has not explained why it was improper for the court to consider a serious pending charge involving the same victim. This Court will not construct an argument on his behalf. See App.R. 16(A)(7); Cardone v. Cardone, 1998 WL 224934, *8 (9th Dist. May 6, 1998).

{¶16} Mr. Moran has not shown that the trial court failed to properly consider R.C.

2929.21 and 2929.22 when issuing his sentence. Accordingly, his sole assignment of error is overruled.

III.

{¶17} Mr. Moran’s assignment of error is overruled. The judgment of the Medina Municipal Court is affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.

There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Medina Municipal Court, County of Medina, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.

Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is instructed to

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mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the mailing in the docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.

Costs taxed to Appellant.

BETTY SUTTON

FOR THE COURT

HENSAL, P. J. STEVENSON, J. CONCUR.

APPEARANCES: WESLEY ALTON JOHNSTON, Attorney at Law, for Appellant.

GREGORY HUBER, J. MATTHEW LANIER, and MEGAN A. PHILBIN, Prosecuting Attorneys, for Appellee.