BEILFUSS, C. J.
On the evening of January 20, 1975, federal narcotics agents received a phone call from a confidential informant who stated a sale of 500 pounds of marijuana could be arranged. The informant then had Richard Hills speak with the agent. Hills stated the “deal” could not be arranged until January 21, 1975. The informant was instructed to contact Hills on the following day. The informant contacted the agents the next morning, stating the marijuana would be taken to Hills’ farm between noon and 1 p.m. The agents traveled from Milwaukee to Hills’ farmhouse in Dodge county, arrived at 12:15 p.m., and established surveillance. A meeting between Hills and the agents was arranged. During the 5 p.m., meeting at the “This Place” tavern in Watertown, Hills stated that 200 “Thai sticks” would [392]*392be delivered to the farmhouse at 7:30 p.m., and that he was to meet the party who was to deliver the marijuana at 9 p.m. “Thai sticks” are small bamboo shoots filled with marijuana and laced with opium. The agreed price for these Thai sticks was $21 per stick. The persons who were to deliver the marijuana and the Thai sticks were different people. Hills returned to his farmhouse; shortly after 7:30 p.m., he left and went to the Riverview Bar where he was to meet the agents. Hills stated that the “Thai sticks” had been delivered and the person who delivered them was waiting alone at the farmhouse. En route to the farmhouse Hills stated that this person did not want to meet anyone.
Upon arriving at the farmhouse, Hills, the informant and two agents entered. They passed through a limited area in the kitchen. Hills directed the three men into a den. He told the agents not to go into the living room; however, as they entered the house both agents observed the defendant-appellant, Thomas Monahan, seated in the living room. Following a discussion Hills left the den, went through the kitchen and into the living room. Following Hills into the kitchen, one agent observed Hills remove a bag from underneath a couch in the living room directly to the left of where Monahan was seated. In the den the sticks were counted, and after it was ascertained that there were 200, the bag with the sticks in it was returned to the hiding place in the living room. One agent left to get $4,200 from another agent waiting in the car while Hills brought the sticks back into the den. When the agent returned, both Hills and Monahan were arrested.
It was later discovered that the sticks were not laced with opium, but contained only marijuana and hashish.
Monahan brought a motion to suppress the evidence because it was obtained by an illegal search and seizure. The motion was denied on September 30, 1975. The original felony charge of possession with intent to de[393]*393liver was amended on October 8, 1975, to possession of marijuana, a misdemeanor. Monahan pled guilty to this charge and was placed on probation for one year on December 15,1975. As conditions of probation, Monahan was to spend 90 days in jail under Huber provisions, pay costs and a fine of $100. The condition imposing 90 days in the county jail was stayed pending appeal.
The basic issue agreed upon by Monahan and the state is whether the visual surveillance of the living room, where the agents saw Hills remove a bag containing marijuana-hashish sticks from under the couch and identified Monahan, was a search in the constitutional sense.
“ ‘ “A search implies a prying into hidden places for that which is concealed.” ’ . . .
“ ‘A search implies an examination of one’s premises or person with a view to the discovery of contraband'oF evidence of guilt to be used in prosecution of a criminal action. The term [search] implies exploratory investigation or quest. . . .’” State v. McDougal, 68 Wis.2d 399, 405, 228 N.W.2d 671, 674 (1975).
“A search can be conducted by one’s eyes alone.” Edwards v. State, 38 Wis.2d 332, 338, 156 N.W.2d 397, 401 (1968).
The agents were invited by Hills into his house. Implicit in this invitation is a right to look around. Any observations that they made as they entered were not a search. Observations made in this way were not a “prying into hidden places.” Once in the house the agents were directed to the den and instructed not to go into the living room. After a discussion concerning price of the sticks, Hills left the den and went to the living room. One agent followed Hills as far as the kitchen where he observed Hills in the living room removing the sticks from under a couch directly to the left of where Monahan was sitting. Monahan’s claim is essentially the same as that presented in State v. Gums, 69 Wis.2d 513, 517, [394]*394230 N.W.2d 813, 815 (1975) : “[T]he officers had no right to stand where they stood when they saw what they saw.” If the agent was entitled to be in the kitchen and could easily see Hills’ activities in the living room, no search took place.1
To determine whether a search took place we must answer the question whether the undercover agent had a right to be in the kitchen. To answer this question we must examine the conduct of the parties and rely on common sense. When one invites another into one’s home the invitation may implicitly extend to all areas of the home or it may be limited to a specific area. The extent of the invitation usually depends upon the relationship of the parties and the particular circumstances of the visit. The door-to-door salesperson invited into the home knows he or she is limited to the room they are brought into. One’s family or close friends may understand that they may move freely from room to room.
There was no statement that the agents were not to enter the kitchen. Did this mean they were entitled to enter the kitchen without invitation from Hills or in his absence? We do not believe so. The conduct of Hills demonstrates that the agents were to remain in the den. He specifically directed them to this room. He gave no indication that the agents were entitled to roam at will, on the contrary he stated they were not to go into the living room. The conduct of the agents is also of assistance in answering this question. The agent who entered the kitchen to view the living room did not do so with Hills. He waited until Hills was in the living room before entering the kitchen; he knew he was not [395]*395to be in the kitchen to make observation into the living room. When the agent followed Hills into the kitchen he was on an “exploratory investigation” examining Hills’ premises with a view to the discovery of contraband or evidence of guilt. In looking into the living room the agent was prying into hidden places for that which is concealed. We conclude that the entry into the kitchen and the visual surveillance of the living room was a search.
Having determined that a search took place, the issue becomes whether the search was circumscribed by either the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution or Art. I, sec. 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution. State v. Davidson, 44 Wis.2d 177, 194 (n. 12), 170 N.W.2d 755, 764 (1969). The Fourth Amendment requires searches and seizures be reasonable. State v. Tarrell, 74 Wis.2d 647, 653, 247 N.W.2d 696, 700 (1976), citing State v. Bell, 62 Wis.2d 534, 539-40, 215 N.W.2d 535, 539 (1974): “The fundamental rule applicable to searches and seizures is that warrantless searches are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment except under certain well-defined circumstances.” Id.
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BEILFUSS, C. J.
On the evening of January 20, 1975, federal narcotics agents received a phone call from a confidential informant who stated a sale of 500 pounds of marijuana could be arranged. The informant then had Richard Hills speak with the agent. Hills stated the “deal” could not be arranged until January 21, 1975. The informant was instructed to contact Hills on the following day. The informant contacted the agents the next morning, stating the marijuana would be taken to Hills’ farm between noon and 1 p.m. The agents traveled from Milwaukee to Hills’ farmhouse in Dodge county, arrived at 12:15 p.m., and established surveillance. A meeting between Hills and the agents was arranged. During the 5 p.m., meeting at the “This Place” tavern in Watertown, Hills stated that 200 “Thai sticks” would [392]*392be delivered to the farmhouse at 7:30 p.m., and that he was to meet the party who was to deliver the marijuana at 9 p.m. “Thai sticks” are small bamboo shoots filled with marijuana and laced with opium. The agreed price for these Thai sticks was $21 per stick. The persons who were to deliver the marijuana and the Thai sticks were different people. Hills returned to his farmhouse; shortly after 7:30 p.m., he left and went to the Riverview Bar where he was to meet the agents. Hills stated that the “Thai sticks” had been delivered and the person who delivered them was waiting alone at the farmhouse. En route to the farmhouse Hills stated that this person did not want to meet anyone.
Upon arriving at the farmhouse, Hills, the informant and two agents entered. They passed through a limited area in the kitchen. Hills directed the three men into a den. He told the agents not to go into the living room; however, as they entered the house both agents observed the defendant-appellant, Thomas Monahan, seated in the living room. Following a discussion Hills left the den, went through the kitchen and into the living room. Following Hills into the kitchen, one agent observed Hills remove a bag from underneath a couch in the living room directly to the left of where Monahan was seated. In the den the sticks were counted, and after it was ascertained that there were 200, the bag with the sticks in it was returned to the hiding place in the living room. One agent left to get $4,200 from another agent waiting in the car while Hills brought the sticks back into the den. When the agent returned, both Hills and Monahan were arrested.
It was later discovered that the sticks were not laced with opium, but contained only marijuana and hashish.
Monahan brought a motion to suppress the evidence because it was obtained by an illegal search and seizure. The motion was denied on September 30, 1975. The original felony charge of possession with intent to de[393]*393liver was amended on October 8, 1975, to possession of marijuana, a misdemeanor. Monahan pled guilty to this charge and was placed on probation for one year on December 15,1975. As conditions of probation, Monahan was to spend 90 days in jail under Huber provisions, pay costs and a fine of $100. The condition imposing 90 days in the county jail was stayed pending appeal.
The basic issue agreed upon by Monahan and the state is whether the visual surveillance of the living room, where the agents saw Hills remove a bag containing marijuana-hashish sticks from under the couch and identified Monahan, was a search in the constitutional sense.
“ ‘ “A search implies a prying into hidden places for that which is concealed.” ’ . . .
“ ‘A search implies an examination of one’s premises or person with a view to the discovery of contraband'oF evidence of guilt to be used in prosecution of a criminal action. The term [search] implies exploratory investigation or quest. . . .’” State v. McDougal, 68 Wis.2d 399, 405, 228 N.W.2d 671, 674 (1975).
“A search can be conducted by one’s eyes alone.” Edwards v. State, 38 Wis.2d 332, 338, 156 N.W.2d 397, 401 (1968).
The agents were invited by Hills into his house. Implicit in this invitation is a right to look around. Any observations that they made as they entered were not a search. Observations made in this way were not a “prying into hidden places.” Once in the house the agents were directed to the den and instructed not to go into the living room. After a discussion concerning price of the sticks, Hills left the den and went to the living room. One agent followed Hills as far as the kitchen where he observed Hills in the living room removing the sticks from under a couch directly to the left of where Monahan was sitting. Monahan’s claim is essentially the same as that presented in State v. Gums, 69 Wis.2d 513, 517, [394]*394230 N.W.2d 813, 815 (1975) : “[T]he officers had no right to stand where they stood when they saw what they saw.” If the agent was entitled to be in the kitchen and could easily see Hills’ activities in the living room, no search took place.1
To determine whether a search took place we must answer the question whether the undercover agent had a right to be in the kitchen. To answer this question we must examine the conduct of the parties and rely on common sense. When one invites another into one’s home the invitation may implicitly extend to all areas of the home or it may be limited to a specific area. The extent of the invitation usually depends upon the relationship of the parties and the particular circumstances of the visit. The door-to-door salesperson invited into the home knows he or she is limited to the room they are brought into. One’s family or close friends may understand that they may move freely from room to room.
There was no statement that the agents were not to enter the kitchen. Did this mean they were entitled to enter the kitchen without invitation from Hills or in his absence? We do not believe so. The conduct of Hills demonstrates that the agents were to remain in the den. He specifically directed them to this room. He gave no indication that the agents were entitled to roam at will, on the contrary he stated they were not to go into the living room. The conduct of the agents is also of assistance in answering this question. The agent who entered the kitchen to view the living room did not do so with Hills. He waited until Hills was in the living room before entering the kitchen; he knew he was not [395]*395to be in the kitchen to make observation into the living room. When the agent followed Hills into the kitchen he was on an “exploratory investigation” examining Hills’ premises with a view to the discovery of contraband or evidence of guilt. In looking into the living room the agent was prying into hidden places for that which is concealed. We conclude that the entry into the kitchen and the visual surveillance of the living room was a search.
Having determined that a search took place, the issue becomes whether the search was circumscribed by either the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution or Art. I, sec. 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution. State v. Davidson, 44 Wis.2d 177, 194 (n. 12), 170 N.W.2d 755, 764 (1969). The Fourth Amendment requires searches and seizures be reasonable. State v. Tarrell, 74 Wis.2d 647, 653, 247 N.W.2d 696, 700 (1976), citing State v. Bell, 62 Wis.2d 534, 539-40, 215 N.W.2d 535, 539 (1974): “The fundamental rule applicable to searches and seizures is that warrantless searches are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment except under certain well-defined circumstances.” Id. There was no warrant to search Hills’ house. If this warrantless search is to be found reasonable it must fall within one of the “specifically established and well-delineated exceptions” to the warrant requirement.2
Before examining these exceptions we note that there are recognized distinctions in the appropriate levels of protection afforded by the Fourth Amendment to different forms of intrusion. Wendricks v. State, 72. Wis.2d 717, 722, 242 N.W.2d 187, 190 (1976). The highest level of protection is afforded to a dwelling place. See State v. Pires, 55 Wis.2d 597, 604, 201 N.W.2d 153, 157 (1972).
[396]*396Contraband in plain view,3 consent,4 lawful arrest,5 exigent circumstances,6 hot pursuit7 or a “stop and frisk”8 present circumstances which may justify an exception to the warrant requirement.
A warrant is unnecessary if contraband is in plain view. But the plain view doctrine does not apply when an officer does not have a right to be in the place where he viewed the contraband. State v. Spraggin, 71 Wis.2d 604, 610, 239 N.W.2d 297, 304 (1976). Even if the agent had authority to be in the kitchen, plain view would not apply because plain view requires that discovery of the object be inadvertent. State v. O’Brien, 70 Wis.2d 414, 419 (n. 2), 234 N.W.2d 362, 364 (1975). The agent neither had authority to be in the kitchen nor was the view of the contraband being removed while Monahan was present inadvertent.
This case is unlike State v. O’Brien, supra, where police officers went to a farmhouse to execute an arrest warrant. In the process they obtained marijuana which was in plain view in the kitchen and which was in plain view in a third floor closet which was checked for hidden persons. There was no challenge to the right of the officers to be in the kitchen. This court found the police officers had the right to be on the third floor to locate, for interrogation purposes, all persons present concerning ownership of the contraband. In this case, because the narcotics agent was not entitled to be in the kitchen in the manner he was, the plain view exception does not apply.
[397]*397State v. Gums, supra, also concerned police proceeding to a home to execute a warrant. The mandate to arrest was contained in a probation violation warrant. After arriving at the home, police believed an escape attempt probable and this exigent circumstance entitled them to enter. There was no room to conduct an investigation at the foot of the stairs inside the entryway because of the number of people present, so the officers moved everyone to the kitchen. While in the kitchen one detective inadvertently saw hashish on top of the refrigerator. Other contraband was found by another officer in plain view, and a search warrant was obtained. Again, in this case, there was no warrant; no exigent circumstances were present, and because the view of Monahan and the marijuana was not inadvertent the plain view doctrine does not apply.
The state argues that because the agents had consent to enter the residence they committed no illegal act in entering the kitchen and that once in the kitchen they could look where they pleased. It argues Monahan had no reasonable expectation of privacy while sitting in the living room. This argument begs the question. As noted above, the agent did not have consent to enter the kitchen for the purpose and manner he did. Without consent, or some other exception which would justify the search, the entry into the kitchen and the subsequent search was illegal.
The entry into the kitchen and visual search of the living room was not a search incident to lawful arrest. The search took place prior to the arrest; it was unrelated to the actual arrest. One rationale for permitting warrantless searches incident to arrest is the expectation that the arrestee may attempt to destroy incriminating evidence. Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 295 (1973). If there had been an indication that Hills was going to [398]*398destroy the evidence, the search would have been permissible. But there was no such indication.
In many cases the exigency of the situation, the circumstances of the moment, demand a search without a warrant. Examples are when vehicles can be readily moved, the defendants might take flight, or that evidence of illegal contraband might be moved or destroyed. Milwaukee v. Cohen, 57 Wis.2d 38, 46, 203 N.W.2d 633, 638 (1973). Another example is the need to assist a victim or apprehend those responsible for the crime. State v. Pires, supra at 606, 201 N.W.2d at 157. No such urgency was present here. There was no need for the agent’s entry into the kitchen to apprehend an escaping criminal, prevent a crime or seize the contraband.
The agents arrived at Hills’ farmhouse at 12:15 p.m. At that time they had information that a crime was going to be committed. Further developments throughout the afternoon reinforced this information. A search warrant could have been obtained. They chose not to seek issuance of a warrant. Rather, they relied on their ability as undercover agents to gain the confidence of the suspects. Through subterfuge, they gained admittance to the house and were presented with the illegal drugs. This is a valid police technique, but any search which takes place must be reasonable under the circumstances. Edwards v. State, supra at 340, 156 N.W. 2d at 402. Under the circumstances the entry into the kitchen was not reasonable. There were no exigent circumstances justifying the entry and a warrant had not been obtained. “Belief, however well founded, that an article sought is concealed in a dwelling house furnishes no justification for a search of that place without a warrant. And such searches are held unlawful notwithstanding facts unquestionably showing probable cause.” Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 33 (1925). And [399]*399well founded belief that contraband is in another room of the dwelling house furnishes no justification of entry into that room absent a warrant. The agents knew in advance that a crime was to be committed. To allow them to forego obtaining a warrant and then conduct a search once inside the premises violates the protection of the Fourth Amendment.
“We are not dealing with formalities. The presence of a search warrant serves a high function. Absent some grave emergency, the Fourth Amendment has interposed a magistrate between the citizen and the police. This was done not to shield criminals nor to make the home a safe haven for illegal activities. It was done so that an objective mind might weigh the need to invade the privacy in order to enforce the law. The right of privacy was deemed too precious to entrust to the discretion of those whose job is the detection of crime and the arrest of criminals.” McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455-56 (1948).
“[W]here the discovery is anticipated, where the police know in advance the location of the evidence and intent to seize it, the situation is altogether different [from a plain view .seizure]. The requirement of a warrant to seize imposes no inconvenience whatever, or at least none which is constitutionally cognizable in a legal system that regards warrantless searches as ‘per se unreasonable’ in the absence of ‘exigent circumstances.’ ” Coolidge v. New Hampshire, supra at 470-71.
Because the discovery was anticipated, a warrant or circumstances which justified a search without a warrant were necessary to validate the entry into the kitchen and subsequent visual search of the living room. Neither a warrant nor those circumstances were present, therefore the search was constitutionally invalid.
To hold that the search was unconstitutional does not mean that all evidence obtained that evening should have been suppressed. Only the fruits of the illegal search should have been suppressed. This was the identifica[400]*400tion of Monahan sitting directly to the left of the couch as the bag containing the marijuana and hashish was removed by Hills. Monahan argues that the marijuana and hashish were products of an illegal search. This is not true. Hills voluntarily brought the marijuana and hashish into the den in the presence of the agents. Unaware they were police officers, he thought he was making a routine sale of an illegal substance. This evidence was not “seized” and there is no need to suppress it. Seizure implies a taking or removal of something from the possession of another.9 Additionally, there is no question that the agents’ original viewing of Monahan in the living room as they entered the house, shortly before they obtained the contraband, was not a product of the search.
On oral argument two questions arose which were not presented in the briefs. The first was whether Monahan had standing to contest the search of Hills’ home. We are convinced that he had such standing.10 The second was whether, on remand, the district attorney could reissue the original charge of possession of marijuana with intent to deliver, a felony, even though the appeal was from a misdemeanor conviction. Supplemental briefs were submitted on this issue. A stipulation was filed stating that if there was a reversal and remand Monahan would not be prosecuted for the more serious charge which was dismissed as a part of the plea agreement. Although there is conflicting authority on whether [401]*401the more serious charge could be reissued11 prior to receiving the stipulation, we were inclined to hold that the more serious charge could be reissued. The stipulation has mooted this question. We do not, therefore, make a determination on this issue.
The state suggests that a harmless error rule be formulated to apply where a defendant is appealing pursuant to sec. 971.31(10), Stats. It is suggested that such a rule will further the interests of judicial economy. We have considered this argument, but we do not adopt such a rule.
Testimony that the agent saw the marijuana being removed from under a couch while Monahan was sitting near the couch must be suppressed. Neither the contraband taken when the arrest was made nor testimony that the agents saw Monahan in the house as they entered need be suppressed.
By the Cowrt. — Judgment reversed and cause remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.