[Cite as State v. Mofford, 2022-Ohio-3601.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT CRAWFORD COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO,
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, CASE NO. 3-22-04
v.
ROBERT MOFFORD, OPINION
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
Appeal from Crawford County Common Pleas Court Trial Court No. 21-CR-0145
Judgment Affirmed
Date of Decision: October 11, 2022
APPEARANCES:
Howard A. Elliott for Appellant
Bailey Higgins for Appellee Case No. 3-22-04
MILLER, J.
{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Robert Mofford, appeals the January 27, 2022
judgment of sentence of the Crawford County Court of Common Pleas. For the
reasons that follow, we affirm.
Background
{¶2} On May 11, 2021, the Crawford County Grand Jury indicted Mofford
on one count of aggravated possession of drugs in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A), a
fifth-degree felony, and one count of possession of marihuana in violation of R.C.
2925.11(A), a minor misdemeanor. At arraignment on June 1, 2021, Mofford
pleaded not guilty to the counts of the indictment.
{¶3} A change-of-plea hearing was held on December 15, 2021. At the
hearing, Mofford pleaded guilty to aggravated possession of drugs as charged in the
indictment. The trial court accepted Mofford’s plea, found him guilty, and
continued sentencing pending preparation of a presentence investigation report. In
addition, the trial court dismissed the single count of possession of marihuana
charged in the indictment.
{¶4} Mofford’s sentencing hearing was held on January 26, 2022. At the
hearing, the trial court sentenced Mofford to six months in prison. The trial court
filed its judgment entry of sentence on January 27, 2022.
-2- Case No. 3-22-04
{¶5} On February 25, 2022, Mofford filed a notice of appeal. He raises one
assignment of error for our review.
Assignment of Error
The imposition of a prison sentence by the trial court upon the defendant/appellant was clearly and convincingly contrary to law in that the trial court had failed at the sentencing to give due consideration to Ohio Revised Code § 2929.11 concerning the principles and purposes of sentencing and did not apply Ohio Revised Code § 2929.12, and the less serious factors when imposing a sentence.
{¶6} In his assignment of error, Mofford argues that the trial court erred by
sentencing him to six months in prison.
Standard of Review
{¶7} Under R.C. 2953.08(G)(2), an appellate court will reverse a sentence
“only if it determines by clear and convincing evidence that the record does not
support the trial court’s findings under relevant statutes or that the sentence is
otherwise contrary to law.” State v. Marcum, 146 Ohio St.3d 516, 2016-Ohio-1002,
¶ 1. Clear and convincing evidence is that “‘which will produce in the mind of the
trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to the facts sought to be established.’” Id.
at ¶ 22, quoting Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469 (1954), paragraph three of the
syllabus.
-3- Case No. 3-22-04
Relevant Authority
{¶8} “‘Trial courts have full discretion to impose any sentence within the
statutory range.’” State v. Smith, 3d Dist. Seneca No. 13-15-17, 2015-Ohio-4225, ¶
9, quoting State v. Noble, 3d Dist. Logan No. 8-14-06, 2014-Ohio-5485, ¶ 9, citing
State v. Saldana, 3d Dist. Putnam No. 12-12-09, 2013-Ohio-1122, ¶ 20. A sentence
imposed within the statutory range is generally valid so long as the trial court
considered the applicable statutory policies that apply to every felony sentencing,
including those contained in R.C. 2929.11, and the sentencing factors of 2929.12.
See State v. Watts, 3d Dist. Auglaize No. 2-20-10, 2020-Ohio-5572, ¶ 10, 14; State
v. Maggette, 3d Dist. Seneca No. 13-16-06, 2016-Ohio-5554, ¶ 31.
{¶9} R.C. 2929.11 provides, in pertinent part, that the “overriding purposes
of felony sentencing are to protect the public from future crime by the offender and
others, to punish the offender, and to promote the effective rehabilitation of the
offender using the minimum sanctions that the court determines accomplish those
purposes without imposing an unnecessary burden on state or local government
resources.” R.C. 2929.11(A). To achieve the overriding purposes of felony
sentencing, R.C. 2929.11 directs courts to “consider the need for incapacitating the
offender, deterring the offender and others from future crime, rehabilitating the
offender, and making restitution to the victim of the offense, the public, or both.”
Id. In addition, R.C. 2929.11(B) instructs that a sentence imposed for a felony “shall
-4- Case No. 3-22-04
be reasonably calculated to achieve the three overriding purposes of felony
sentencing * * *, commensurate with and not demeaning to the seriousness of the
offender’s conduct and its impact upon the victim, and consistent with sentences
imposed for similar crimes committed by similar offenders.”
{¶10} “In accordance with these principles, the trial court must consider the
factors set forth in R.C. 2929.12(B)-(E) relating to the seriousness of the offender’s
conduct and the likelihood of the offender’s recidivism.” Smith at ¶ 10, citing R.C.
2929.12(A). In addition, the trial court must consider “the factors set forth in [R.C.
2929.12(F)] pertaining to the offender’s service in the armed forces of the United
States.” R.C. 2929.12(A). “‘A sentencing court has broad discretion to determine
the relative weight to assign the sentencing factors in R.C. 2929.12.’” Smith at ¶
15, quoting State v. Brimacombe, 195 Ohio App.3d 524, 2011-Ohio-5032, ¶ 18 (6th
Dist.), citing State v. Arnett, 88 Ohio St.3d 208, 215 (2000).
Analysis
{¶11} In the instant case, Mofford was sentenced for one count of aggravated
possession of drugs in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A), a fifth-degree felony. For fifth-
degree felony aggravated possession of drugs, “the prison term shall be a definite
term of six, seven, eight, nine, ten, eleven, or twelve months.” R.C. 2929.14(A)(5).
The trial court sentenced Mofford to six months in prison, which is within the
statutory range.
-5- Case No. 3-22-04
{¶12} Furthermore, the record reflects that the trial court considered R.C.
2929.11 and 2929.12 when it sentenced Mofford. At various points during the
January 26, 2022 sentencing hearing, the trial court stated that it was “looking at”
or “going to consider” R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12. (Jan. 26, 2022 Tr. at 10, 13). The
trial court also specifically mentioned some of the principles of felony sentencing
contained in R.C. 2929.11, and it discussed the extent to which several of the R.C.
2929.12 factors were applicable. (Jan. 26, 2022 Tr. at 11-12). Furthermore, in its
judgment entry of sentence, the trial court indicated that it had considered “the
principles and purposes of sentencing under Ohio Revised Code section 2929.11,
and * * * balanced the seriousness and recidivism factors under Ohio Revised Code
section[s] 2929.12 and 2929.14.” (Doc. No. 31). While the trial court did not
discuss its consideration of R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12 in exhaustive detail or
specifically mention each of the R.C. 2929.12 factors, “[a] trial court’s statement
that it considered the required statutory factors * * * is sufficient to fulfill its
obligations under the sentencing statutes.” Maggette, 2016-Ohio-5554, at ¶ 32,
citing State v. Abrams, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No.
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[Cite as State v. Mofford, 2022-Ohio-3601.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT CRAWFORD COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO,
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, CASE NO. 3-22-04
v.
ROBERT MOFFORD, OPINION
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
Appeal from Crawford County Common Pleas Court Trial Court No. 21-CR-0145
Judgment Affirmed
Date of Decision: October 11, 2022
APPEARANCES:
Howard A. Elliott for Appellant
Bailey Higgins for Appellee Case No. 3-22-04
MILLER, J.
{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Robert Mofford, appeals the January 27, 2022
judgment of sentence of the Crawford County Court of Common Pleas. For the
reasons that follow, we affirm.
Background
{¶2} On May 11, 2021, the Crawford County Grand Jury indicted Mofford
on one count of aggravated possession of drugs in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A), a
fifth-degree felony, and one count of possession of marihuana in violation of R.C.
2925.11(A), a minor misdemeanor. At arraignment on June 1, 2021, Mofford
pleaded not guilty to the counts of the indictment.
{¶3} A change-of-plea hearing was held on December 15, 2021. At the
hearing, Mofford pleaded guilty to aggravated possession of drugs as charged in the
indictment. The trial court accepted Mofford’s plea, found him guilty, and
continued sentencing pending preparation of a presentence investigation report. In
addition, the trial court dismissed the single count of possession of marihuana
charged in the indictment.
{¶4} Mofford’s sentencing hearing was held on January 26, 2022. At the
hearing, the trial court sentenced Mofford to six months in prison. The trial court
filed its judgment entry of sentence on January 27, 2022.
-2- Case No. 3-22-04
{¶5} On February 25, 2022, Mofford filed a notice of appeal. He raises one
assignment of error for our review.
Assignment of Error
The imposition of a prison sentence by the trial court upon the defendant/appellant was clearly and convincingly contrary to law in that the trial court had failed at the sentencing to give due consideration to Ohio Revised Code § 2929.11 concerning the principles and purposes of sentencing and did not apply Ohio Revised Code § 2929.12, and the less serious factors when imposing a sentence.
{¶6} In his assignment of error, Mofford argues that the trial court erred by
sentencing him to six months in prison.
Standard of Review
{¶7} Under R.C. 2953.08(G)(2), an appellate court will reverse a sentence
“only if it determines by clear and convincing evidence that the record does not
support the trial court’s findings under relevant statutes or that the sentence is
otherwise contrary to law.” State v. Marcum, 146 Ohio St.3d 516, 2016-Ohio-1002,
¶ 1. Clear and convincing evidence is that “‘which will produce in the mind of the
trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to the facts sought to be established.’” Id.
at ¶ 22, quoting Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469 (1954), paragraph three of the
syllabus.
-3- Case No. 3-22-04
Relevant Authority
{¶8} “‘Trial courts have full discretion to impose any sentence within the
statutory range.’” State v. Smith, 3d Dist. Seneca No. 13-15-17, 2015-Ohio-4225, ¶
9, quoting State v. Noble, 3d Dist. Logan No. 8-14-06, 2014-Ohio-5485, ¶ 9, citing
State v. Saldana, 3d Dist. Putnam No. 12-12-09, 2013-Ohio-1122, ¶ 20. A sentence
imposed within the statutory range is generally valid so long as the trial court
considered the applicable statutory policies that apply to every felony sentencing,
including those contained in R.C. 2929.11, and the sentencing factors of 2929.12.
See State v. Watts, 3d Dist. Auglaize No. 2-20-10, 2020-Ohio-5572, ¶ 10, 14; State
v. Maggette, 3d Dist. Seneca No. 13-16-06, 2016-Ohio-5554, ¶ 31.
{¶9} R.C. 2929.11 provides, in pertinent part, that the “overriding purposes
of felony sentencing are to protect the public from future crime by the offender and
others, to punish the offender, and to promote the effective rehabilitation of the
offender using the minimum sanctions that the court determines accomplish those
purposes without imposing an unnecessary burden on state or local government
resources.” R.C. 2929.11(A). To achieve the overriding purposes of felony
sentencing, R.C. 2929.11 directs courts to “consider the need for incapacitating the
offender, deterring the offender and others from future crime, rehabilitating the
offender, and making restitution to the victim of the offense, the public, or both.”
Id. In addition, R.C. 2929.11(B) instructs that a sentence imposed for a felony “shall
-4- Case No. 3-22-04
be reasonably calculated to achieve the three overriding purposes of felony
sentencing * * *, commensurate with and not demeaning to the seriousness of the
offender’s conduct and its impact upon the victim, and consistent with sentences
imposed for similar crimes committed by similar offenders.”
{¶10} “In accordance with these principles, the trial court must consider the
factors set forth in R.C. 2929.12(B)-(E) relating to the seriousness of the offender’s
conduct and the likelihood of the offender’s recidivism.” Smith at ¶ 10, citing R.C.
2929.12(A). In addition, the trial court must consider “the factors set forth in [R.C.
2929.12(F)] pertaining to the offender’s service in the armed forces of the United
States.” R.C. 2929.12(A). “‘A sentencing court has broad discretion to determine
the relative weight to assign the sentencing factors in R.C. 2929.12.’” Smith at ¶
15, quoting State v. Brimacombe, 195 Ohio App.3d 524, 2011-Ohio-5032, ¶ 18 (6th
Dist.), citing State v. Arnett, 88 Ohio St.3d 208, 215 (2000).
Analysis
{¶11} In the instant case, Mofford was sentenced for one count of aggravated
possession of drugs in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A), a fifth-degree felony. For fifth-
degree felony aggravated possession of drugs, “the prison term shall be a definite
term of six, seven, eight, nine, ten, eleven, or twelve months.” R.C. 2929.14(A)(5).
The trial court sentenced Mofford to six months in prison, which is within the
statutory range.
-5- Case No. 3-22-04
{¶12} Furthermore, the record reflects that the trial court considered R.C.
2929.11 and 2929.12 when it sentenced Mofford. At various points during the
January 26, 2022 sentencing hearing, the trial court stated that it was “looking at”
or “going to consider” R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12. (Jan. 26, 2022 Tr. at 10, 13). The
trial court also specifically mentioned some of the principles of felony sentencing
contained in R.C. 2929.11, and it discussed the extent to which several of the R.C.
2929.12 factors were applicable. (Jan. 26, 2022 Tr. at 11-12). Furthermore, in its
judgment entry of sentence, the trial court indicated that it had considered “the
principles and purposes of sentencing under Ohio Revised Code section 2929.11,
and * * * balanced the seriousness and recidivism factors under Ohio Revised Code
section[s] 2929.12 and 2929.14.” (Doc. No. 31). While the trial court did not
discuss its consideration of R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12 in exhaustive detail or
specifically mention each of the R.C. 2929.12 factors, “[a] trial court’s statement
that it considered the required statutory factors * * * is sufficient to fulfill its
obligations under the sentencing statutes.” Maggette, 2016-Ohio-5554, at ¶ 32,
citing State v. Abrams, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 103786, 2016-Ohio-4570, citing
State v. Payne, 114 Ohio St.3d 502, 2007-Ohio-4642, ¶ 18. Therefore, because
Mofford’s sentence is within the statutory range and the record supports that the
trial court fulfilled its obligation of considering R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12,
Mofford’s sentence is valid. See Watts, 2020-Ohio-5572, at ¶ 14.
-6- Case No. 3-22-04
{¶13} Nevertheless, Mofford argues that his sentence is contrary to law
because the trial court “ignor[ed] the principles and purposes of sentencing” set
forth in R.C. 2929.11 by improperly balancing the R.C. 2929.12 factors. He also
claims that the record does not support some of the trial court’s findings under R.C.
2929.12. Mofford notes that the trial court found the R.C. 2929.12(B)-(C)
seriousness factors to be inapplicable. He claims that this finding was at least
partially erroneous as “the court ignored the factors under [R.C. 2929.12(C)] that
there really was no victim to the offense[,] * * * that there was [no] strong
provocation of this particular offense[,] [and that] * * * there was no physical harm
threatened or caused to a person or property.” He further maintains that the trial
court’s findings under R.C. 2929.12(D)-(E), relating to his likelihood of recidivism,
were “inconsistent with the rest of the record.”
{¶14} Although “R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(a) permits an appellate court to modify
or vacate a sentence if it clearly and convincingly finds that ‘the record does not
support the sentencing court’s findings under’ certain specified statutory
provisions[,] * * * R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12 are not among the statutory provisions
listed in R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(a).” State v. Jones, 163 Ohio St.3d 242, 2020-Ohio-
6729, ¶ 28. Furthermore, “an appellate court’s determination that the record does
not support a sentence does not equate to a determination that the sentence is
‘otherwise contrary to law’ as that term is used in R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(b).” Id. at ¶
-7- Case No. 3-22-04
32. Thus, R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) “does not provide a basis for an appellate court to
modify or vacate a sentence based on its view that the sentence is not supported by
the record under R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12.” Id. at ¶ 39. “[A]n appellate court errs
if it * * * modifies or vacates a sentence ‘based on the lack of support in the record
for the trial court’s findings under R.C. 2929.11 and R.C. 2929.12.’” State v.
Dorsey, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 28747, 2021-Ohio-76, ¶ 17, quoting Jones at ¶
29.
{¶15} Accordingly, even if we were to agree with Mofford that his sentence
is not supported by the record under R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12, we could not vacate
or modify his sentence on that basis. As discussed above, Mofford’s sentence is
within the statutory range and it is clear that the trial court considered R.C. 2929.11
and 2929.12. Hence, Mofford’s sentence is not clearly and convincingly contrary
to law, and it must therefore be affirmed. See State v. Slife, 3d Dist. Auglaize No.
2-20-17, 2021-Ohio-644, ¶ 17.
{¶16} Mofford’s assignment of error is overruled.
{¶17} Having found no error prejudicial to the appellant herein in the
particulars assigned and argued, we affirm the judgment of the Crawford County
Court of Common Pleas.
SHAW and WILLAMOWSKI, J.J., concur.
-8-