[Cite as State v. Moffett, 2016-Ohio-5314.]
STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS )ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COUNTY OF SUMMIT )
STATE OF OHIO C.A. No. 28001
Appellee
v. APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT ENTERED IN THE SATOYA D. MOFFETT COURT OF COMMON PLEAS COUNTY OF SUMMIT, OHIO Appellant CASE No. CR 2014 05 1480
DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY
Dated: August 10, 2016
HENSAL, Judge.
{¶1} Defendant-Appellant, Satoya Moffett, appeals her conviction and sentence for
endangering children from the Summit County Court of Common Pleas. For the following
reasons, we affirm.
I.
{¶2} In April 2014, Ms. Moffett was in a long-distance relationship with J.W., whom
she had been dating for about a year. Ms. Moffett lived in Erie, Pennsylvania, but would often
visit J.W. at her apartment in Cuyahoga Falls. During this time, J.W. was working as an
academic advisor and pursuing a doctorate degree. J.W. employed a nanny to care for her then
two-year-old daughter, N.W., while she was at school and work.
{¶3} On April 28, 2014, J.W.’s nanny was unable to care for N.W. because her
husband had suffered a heart attack. Ms. Moffett was in town and offered to care for N.W while
J.W. went to school and work. Ms. Moffett took N.W. to Wal-Mart to purchase hair ties, and 2
then later to Chapel Hill Mall to ride the carousel. While on the carousel, Ms. Moffett took a
picture of N.W. to send to J.W. After taking the picture, N.W. reached for Ms. Moffett’s cell
phone because she wanted to see the picture and slipped off of the carousel. Ms. Moffett,
however, caught N.W. before she fell to the ground, and she sustained no injuries.
{¶4} Ms. Moffett and N.W. then headed back to J.W.’s apartment. Upon arriving, Ms.
Moffett walked down the four cement stairs that led to the apartment door and left N.W. at the
top of the stairs. While unlocking the door, N.W. fell down the stairs. According to Ms.
Moffett, N.W. “teared up a little bit” but otherwise did not complain of any injuries. Also
according to Ms. Moffett, when they got inside, she realized that N.W. was bruised and swollen,
so she contacted J.W. J.W. returned home shortly thereafter and they took N.W. to Akron
General Medical Center in Stow.
{¶5} Upon arriving to the hospital, the examining physician noted that N.W.’s injuries
– including injuries to her head, neck, buttocks, thighs, and abdomen – were not consistent with
falling down the stairs, and suspected child abuse. The physician contacted the Stow police, and
an officer arrived shortly thereafter. That officer, however, contacted the Cuyahoga Falls police
after realizing it was their jurisdiction. He then took photos of N.W.’s injuries.
{¶6} An officer from the Cuyahoga Falls police department arrived and noted serious
injuries to N.W.’s head, legs, and abdomen. At trial, he testified that N.W.’s injuries were the
most severe injuries he had seen on a child in his 19-year career with the police force. N.W. was
then transferred to Akron Children’s Hospital’s trauma unit, where she reported that Ms. Moffett
“spanked” her and “hit [her] with a belt.” N.W. also reported that she fell down the stairs.
{¶7} N.W. was treated for injuries to her head, thighs, buttocks, face, lower abdomen,
and spine, which the treating physician attributed to “multiple blows” to N.W.’s body with a belt 3
or belt-like instrument. Children’s Services took N.W. under their care, and a detective from the
Cuyahoga Falls police department interviewed Ms. Moffett. During the interview, Ms. Moffett
maintained that N.W.’s injuries were a result of her falling down the stairs. She admitted,
however, that no one else had access to N.W. that day, and that N.W. did not have any injuries
that morning.
{¶8} A grand jury indicted Ms. Moffett on one count of felonious assault under
Revised Code Section 2903.11(A)(1), one count of endangering children under Section
2919.22(A), and one count of child endangering under Section 2919.22(B)(1). Ms. Moffett
waived her right to a jury trial, and the case proceeded to a bench trial. The trial court found Ms.
Moffett guilty of all charges and, because the counts merged, the State elected to proceed with
sentencing as to the endangering children charge under Section 2919.22(B)(1). The trial court
then sentenced Ms. Moffett to eight years of imprisonment. Ms. Moffett now appeals, raising
three assignments of error for our review.
II.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I
APPELLANT WAS DEPRIVED OF HER RIGHT TO THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL AS GUARANTEED BY THE SIXTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE I, SECTION 10 OF THE OHIO CONSTITUTION, MERITING REVERSAL.
{¶9} In her first assignment of error, Ms. Moffett argues that her counsel was
ineffective because he failed to obtain experts, and that this failure affected the outcome of trial.
Specifically, she argues that her counsel failed to secure a medical expert to refute the State’s
medical experts’ opinions, and failed to secure an expert in the field of childhood development
that could opine as to the ability of a child of N.W.’s age to negotiate stairs. 4
{¶10} “To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must demonstrate that
h[er] counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonable representation and
that [s]he was prejudiced by that performance.” State v. Smith, 9th Dist. Summit No. 24382,
2009-Ohio-1497, ¶ 9, citing State v. Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d 136 (1989), paragraph two of the
syllabus. As this Court has stated, “[a] defendant must demonstrate that defense counsel’s trial
tactics prejudiced h[er], not merely speculate that trial counsel’s allegedly deficient performance
prejudiced the defense.” State v. Jones, 9th Dist. Summit No. 21448, 2003-Ohio-4518, ¶ 12. A
defendant, therefore, cannot establish ineffective assistance of counsel based upon his or her trial
counsel’s failure to obtain an expert witness when the defendant’s argument is based “entirely
upon speculation that such a witness exists, and speculation as to what the testimony of such a
witness would be.” Id. at ¶ 13. See In re Ohler, 4th Dist. Hocking No. 04CA8, 2005-Ohio-
1583, ¶ 28 (rejecting the appellant’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim and stating that “[i]n
order to find prejudice, we would have to presume that another expert would have testified
favorably on the appellant’s behalf. Such an assumption would amount to pure speculation * *
*.”).
{¶11} Here, Ms. Moffett’s argument is based entirely upon speculation that a medical
expert and/or expert in the field of childhood development would have provided relevant,
favorable testimony on her behalf. She, therefore, has not established prejudice for purposes of
proving ineffective assistance of counsel. See State v. Murawski, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 70854,
2002-Ohio-3631, ¶ 8 (“Arguing what * * * a witness might have testified requires a court to
indulge in baseless speculation, which will not establish prejudice.”). To the extent that Ms.
Moffett’s argument is dependent on evidence outside the record, it is more appropriately 5
reserved for a petition for post-conviction relief. State v. Capers, 9th Dist. Lorain No.
10CA009801, 2011-Ohio-2443, ¶ 22. Ms. Moffett’s first assignment of error is overruled.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR II
MOFFETT’S CONVICTIONS WERE AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE, MERITING REVERSAL.
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[Cite as State v. Moffett, 2016-Ohio-5314.]
STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS )ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COUNTY OF SUMMIT )
STATE OF OHIO C.A. No. 28001
Appellee
v. APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT ENTERED IN THE SATOYA D. MOFFETT COURT OF COMMON PLEAS COUNTY OF SUMMIT, OHIO Appellant CASE No. CR 2014 05 1480
DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY
Dated: August 10, 2016
HENSAL, Judge.
{¶1} Defendant-Appellant, Satoya Moffett, appeals her conviction and sentence for
endangering children from the Summit County Court of Common Pleas. For the following
reasons, we affirm.
I.
{¶2} In April 2014, Ms. Moffett was in a long-distance relationship with J.W., whom
she had been dating for about a year. Ms. Moffett lived in Erie, Pennsylvania, but would often
visit J.W. at her apartment in Cuyahoga Falls. During this time, J.W. was working as an
academic advisor and pursuing a doctorate degree. J.W. employed a nanny to care for her then
two-year-old daughter, N.W., while she was at school and work.
{¶3} On April 28, 2014, J.W.’s nanny was unable to care for N.W. because her
husband had suffered a heart attack. Ms. Moffett was in town and offered to care for N.W while
J.W. went to school and work. Ms. Moffett took N.W. to Wal-Mart to purchase hair ties, and 2
then later to Chapel Hill Mall to ride the carousel. While on the carousel, Ms. Moffett took a
picture of N.W. to send to J.W. After taking the picture, N.W. reached for Ms. Moffett’s cell
phone because she wanted to see the picture and slipped off of the carousel. Ms. Moffett,
however, caught N.W. before she fell to the ground, and she sustained no injuries.
{¶4} Ms. Moffett and N.W. then headed back to J.W.’s apartment. Upon arriving, Ms.
Moffett walked down the four cement stairs that led to the apartment door and left N.W. at the
top of the stairs. While unlocking the door, N.W. fell down the stairs. According to Ms.
Moffett, N.W. “teared up a little bit” but otherwise did not complain of any injuries. Also
according to Ms. Moffett, when they got inside, she realized that N.W. was bruised and swollen,
so she contacted J.W. J.W. returned home shortly thereafter and they took N.W. to Akron
General Medical Center in Stow.
{¶5} Upon arriving to the hospital, the examining physician noted that N.W.’s injuries
– including injuries to her head, neck, buttocks, thighs, and abdomen – were not consistent with
falling down the stairs, and suspected child abuse. The physician contacted the Stow police, and
an officer arrived shortly thereafter. That officer, however, contacted the Cuyahoga Falls police
after realizing it was their jurisdiction. He then took photos of N.W.’s injuries.
{¶6} An officer from the Cuyahoga Falls police department arrived and noted serious
injuries to N.W.’s head, legs, and abdomen. At trial, he testified that N.W.’s injuries were the
most severe injuries he had seen on a child in his 19-year career with the police force. N.W. was
then transferred to Akron Children’s Hospital’s trauma unit, where she reported that Ms. Moffett
“spanked” her and “hit [her] with a belt.” N.W. also reported that she fell down the stairs.
{¶7} N.W. was treated for injuries to her head, thighs, buttocks, face, lower abdomen,
and spine, which the treating physician attributed to “multiple blows” to N.W.’s body with a belt 3
or belt-like instrument. Children’s Services took N.W. under their care, and a detective from the
Cuyahoga Falls police department interviewed Ms. Moffett. During the interview, Ms. Moffett
maintained that N.W.’s injuries were a result of her falling down the stairs. She admitted,
however, that no one else had access to N.W. that day, and that N.W. did not have any injuries
that morning.
{¶8} A grand jury indicted Ms. Moffett on one count of felonious assault under
Revised Code Section 2903.11(A)(1), one count of endangering children under Section
2919.22(A), and one count of child endangering under Section 2919.22(B)(1). Ms. Moffett
waived her right to a jury trial, and the case proceeded to a bench trial. The trial court found Ms.
Moffett guilty of all charges and, because the counts merged, the State elected to proceed with
sentencing as to the endangering children charge under Section 2919.22(B)(1). The trial court
then sentenced Ms. Moffett to eight years of imprisonment. Ms. Moffett now appeals, raising
three assignments of error for our review.
II.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I
APPELLANT WAS DEPRIVED OF HER RIGHT TO THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL AS GUARANTEED BY THE SIXTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE I, SECTION 10 OF THE OHIO CONSTITUTION, MERITING REVERSAL.
{¶9} In her first assignment of error, Ms. Moffett argues that her counsel was
ineffective because he failed to obtain experts, and that this failure affected the outcome of trial.
Specifically, she argues that her counsel failed to secure a medical expert to refute the State’s
medical experts’ opinions, and failed to secure an expert in the field of childhood development
that could opine as to the ability of a child of N.W.’s age to negotiate stairs. 4
{¶10} “To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must demonstrate that
h[er] counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonable representation and
that [s]he was prejudiced by that performance.” State v. Smith, 9th Dist. Summit No. 24382,
2009-Ohio-1497, ¶ 9, citing State v. Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d 136 (1989), paragraph two of the
syllabus. As this Court has stated, “[a] defendant must demonstrate that defense counsel’s trial
tactics prejudiced h[er], not merely speculate that trial counsel’s allegedly deficient performance
prejudiced the defense.” State v. Jones, 9th Dist. Summit No. 21448, 2003-Ohio-4518, ¶ 12. A
defendant, therefore, cannot establish ineffective assistance of counsel based upon his or her trial
counsel’s failure to obtain an expert witness when the defendant’s argument is based “entirely
upon speculation that such a witness exists, and speculation as to what the testimony of such a
witness would be.” Id. at ¶ 13. See In re Ohler, 4th Dist. Hocking No. 04CA8, 2005-Ohio-
1583, ¶ 28 (rejecting the appellant’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim and stating that “[i]n
order to find prejudice, we would have to presume that another expert would have testified
favorably on the appellant’s behalf. Such an assumption would amount to pure speculation * *
*.”).
{¶11} Here, Ms. Moffett’s argument is based entirely upon speculation that a medical
expert and/or expert in the field of childhood development would have provided relevant,
favorable testimony on her behalf. She, therefore, has not established prejudice for purposes of
proving ineffective assistance of counsel. See State v. Murawski, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 70854,
2002-Ohio-3631, ¶ 8 (“Arguing what * * * a witness might have testified requires a court to
indulge in baseless speculation, which will not establish prejudice.”). To the extent that Ms.
Moffett’s argument is dependent on evidence outside the record, it is more appropriately 5
reserved for a petition for post-conviction relief. State v. Capers, 9th Dist. Lorain No.
10CA009801, 2011-Ohio-2443, ¶ 22. Ms. Moffett’s first assignment of error is overruled.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR II
MOFFETT’S CONVICTIONS WERE AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE, MERITING REVERSAL.
{¶12} In her second assignment of error, Ms. Moffett argues that her convictions were
against the manifest weight of the evidence. In this regard, she argues that the evidence did not
establish that she caused N.W.’s injuries. She further argues that the State’s witnesses were
biased and not credible.
{¶13} If a defendant asserts that a conviction is against the manifest weight of the
evidence,
an appellate court must review the entire record, weigh the evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider the credibility of witnesses and determine whether, in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the trier of fact clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered.
State v. Otten, 33 Ohio App.3d 339, 340 (9th Dist.1986). Weight of the evidence pertains to the
greater amount of credible evidence produced in a trial to support one side over the other side.
State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387 (1997). An appellate court should only exercise its
power to reverse a judgment as against the manifest weight of the evidence in exceptional cases.
State v. Carson, 9th Dist. Summit No. 26900, 2013-Ohio-5785, ¶ 32, citing Otten at 340.
{¶14} The State presented testimony from N.W.’s mother, two responding police
officers, the detective that interviewed Ms. Moffett, and two treating physicians (Dr. Carol
Cunningham and Dr. R. Daryl Steiner, the medical director of the CARE center at Akron
Children’s Hospital). Both physicians testified that N.W.’s injuries were not consistent with a
fall. In this regard, N.W. did not present with localized abrasions, cuts, or scrapes, which would 6
be consistent with falling down cement stairs. Instead, N.W. presented with bilateral welt-like
injuries over several areas of her body.
{¶15} Dr. Steiner testified that N.W. “suffered physical abuse, and that physical abuse
resulted in massive bruising to the head and face, body surface injury to the extremities and a
tear of the nuchal ligament in the cervical spine.” He further testified that N.W.’s injuries
appeared to come from a belt or belt-like instrument. On cross-examination, Dr. Steiner testified
that falling down stairs could not cause a spinal injury. Dr. Cunningham, however, testified that
a fall could potentially cause a spinal injury depending on the mechanism of injury.
{¶16} The detective testified that Ms. Moffett’s story “made no sense” in light of N.W.’s
injuries. Further, one of the police officers testified that, although N.W. initially told him she
had fallen off of the carousel, she later told him that Ms. Moffett hit her with a belt. Further yet,
N.W.’s mother testified that Ms. Moffett once told her she was too lenient with N.W., and that
N.W. “needed a good whooping.” When asked whether she was lying in order to get her
daughter back from Children’s Services, J.W. replied that she was not.
{¶17} Ms. Moffett was the sole witness for the defense. She testified that N.W. did not
have injuries that morning, that she was the only person that had access to N.W. all day after
J.W. left for school, and that N.W.’s injuries were a result of her falling down the cement stairs.
She further testified that she “never hit [N.W.]”
{¶18} In support of her argument that her conviction was against the manifest weight of
the evidence, Ms. Moffett argues that Dr. Steiner was not credible. Ms. Moffett cites the fact that
Dr. Steiner and Dr. Cunningham’s opinions differed as to whether a fall could hypothetically
cause a spinal injury. She also argues that J.W. was not credible because it was in her best
interest to cooperate with the State in order to regain custody of N.W. 7
{¶19} Regarding the allegedly inconsistent expert testimony, both physicians made
clear that N.W.’s particular injuries were not consistent with a fall down cement stairs. The fact
that they differed as to whether a fall, in general, could cause a spinal injury is of no consequence
here. Regarding J.W.’s alleged bias, the prosecutor specifically asked J.W. whether she was
lying in order to regain custody of her daughter, to which she responded she was not.
{¶20} To the extent that the trial court’s verdict relied upon the credibility of the State’s
witnesses, “[c]redibility determinations are primarily within the province of the trier of fact[,]”
who is “‘free to believe all, part, or none of the testimony of each witness.’” State v. Just, 9th
Dist. Wayne No. 12CA0002, 2012-Ohio-4094, ¶ 42, citing State v. Violett, 9th Dist. Medina No.
11CA0106–M, 2012–Ohio–2685, ¶ 11; Id., quoting State v. Cross, 9th Dist. Summit No. 25487,
2011–Ohio–3250, ¶ 35. Here, the record reflects that the trial court weighed the evidence and
resolved credibility determinations in favor of the State. Indeed, the trial court specifically
stated, “I don’t believe [Ms. Moffett]. That’s the bottom line.” The fact that the trial court chose
to believe the State’s version of the events is not a basis for reversal. State v. Knicely, 9th Dist.
Wayne No. 10CA0029, 2011-Ohio-4879, ¶ 20. Ms. Moffett’s second assignment of error is
overruled.
III.
{¶21} Ms. Moffett’s assignments of error are overruled. The judgment of the Summit
County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
There were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 8
We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common
Pleas, County of Summit, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy
of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.
Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of
judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the
period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is
instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the
mailing in the docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.
Costs taxed to Appellant.
JENNIFER HENSAL FOR THE COURT
CARR, P. J. SCHAFER, J. CONCUR.
APPEARANCES:
KRISTEN KOWALSKI, Attorney at Law, for Appellant.
SHERRI BEVAN WALSH, Prosecuting Attorney, and HEAVEN DIMARTINO, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Appellee.