State v. Mitchell

666 P.2d 486, 136 Ariz. 386
CourtCourt of Appeals of Arizona
DecidedMarch 29, 1983
Docket1 CA-CR 5271, 1 CA-CR 5352
StatusPublished
Cited by14 cases

This text of 666 P.2d 486 (State v. Mitchell) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Arizona primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State v. Mitchell, 666 P.2d 486, 136 Ariz. 386 (Ark. Ct. App. 1983).

Opinion

OPINION

JACOBSON, Presiding Judge.

The sole issue presented in these appeals is whether A.R.S. § 28-692.02 1 applies to *387 persons whose out-of-state licenses have been suspended, revoked, or refused by their home states.

On separate occasions, appellee Mitchell and appellee Williams were arrested in Yuma County during January, 1981 and charged with driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor while their driver’s licenses were revoked. Prior to trial, appellee Mitchell filed a motion in limine seeking to suppress the state’s evidence of the revocation of his Wisconsin driver’s license by the State of Wisconsin. A similar motion was made by Williams as to the revocation of his Arkansas license by the State of Arkansas. After these motions were granted, the state moved to dismiss the complaints without prejudice pursuant to State v. Million, 120 Ariz. 10, 583 P.2d 897 (1978) and appealed the suppression orders pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-4032(7). These appeals were consolidated on the state’s motion because of common questions of law and fact.

The state argues that the word “license” as used in A.R.S. § 28-692.02, given its ordinary meaning, would include nonresident licenses and should not be limited to Arizona licenses absent specific limiting language. Additionally, the state argues that the statute, viewed in context with the sentencing provisions of its preceding sections, reflects no rational basis to distinguish operators who are driving with a suspended, revoked, or refused Arizona license' from operators driving with out-of-state licenses which are equally infirm. 2

These sentencing provisions, the state contends, reflect a clear legislative intent to enhance punishment to felony status for drivers who have committed acts of such severity that their licenses have been suspended, revoked, or refused, regardless of where that action was taken.

In its amicus brief, the Maricopa County Attorney, in support of the state’s position, further argues that because a nonresident is permitted to drive in Arizona without first obtaining an Arizona license (See A.R.S. § 28-412), such nonresident should be subjected to the same sentencing provisions as an Arizona resident. Thus, the argument continues, the nonresident operator driving under the authority of his out-of-state license, should be punished under A.R.S. § 28-692.02 if that license has been suspended, revoked, or refused by his home state.

Appellees, in support of the trial court’s ruling, rely primarily upon A.R.S. § 28-1102(3) which states:

• “License” means any license, temporary instruction permit or temporary license issued under the laws of this state pertaining to the licensing of persons to operate motor vehicles. (Emphasis added.)

This definition appears in Arizona’s Safety Responsibility, Act and distinguishes “license” from “nonresident operating privilege” defined in A.R.S. § 28-1102(4):

“Nonresident operating privilege” means the privilege conferred upon a nonresident by the laws of this state pertaining to the operation by him of a motor vehicle, or the use of a motor vehicle owned by him in this state.

*388 Applying the Safety Responsibility Act definition of “license” to A.R.S. § 28-692.-02, they contend that only those persons whose Arizona licenses have been revoked fall within the statutory penalty. The state counters by arguing that since the definition of “license” in A.R.S. § 28-1102(3) appears only in Chapter 7 of Title 28, it is inapplicable to offenses charged in Chapter 6 of that title.

To resolve this issue, we start with the basic premise that in order for a person to lawfully drive a motor vehicle on the highways of this state that person must have a valid Arizona driver’s license or be exempt from obtaining such a license. See A.R.S. § 28-411. Falling within the exemptions, are nonresidents who have a valid license from their home state or are not required to have a driver’s license in their home state. See A.R.S. § 28-412. Thus, as the definitions in Chapter 7, dealing with Arizona’s Safety Responsibility Act makes clear, there are two primary classes of lawful drivers in Arizona (1) those who hold a valid Arizona license, and, (2) those who are otherwise privileged to drive because of exemptions from holding an Arizona license including nonresidents with valid home state licenses.

At this point, it is clear that the argument presented in the amicus brief begs the question. If a nonresident’s drivers license has been suspended, revoked, or refused by the home state rather than Arizona, the nonresident operator is not driving in Arizona under the authority of his nonresident license as claimed in the amicus brief, but, in fact, is specifically prohibited from driving in Arizona by the language of A.R.S. § 28-412 which requires a valid license from the home state.

With this premise in mind the definition of “license” as used in A.R.S. § 28-692.02 must be read in connection with A.R.S. § 28-473(A) which prohibits driving a motor vehicle while the operator’s license is suspended, revoked or refused since A.R.S. § 28-692.02 simply increases the penalty where the element of intoxication is present while driving when the license is suspended, revoked or refused. 3 A.R.S. § 28-473 provides in pertinent part that:

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Bluebook (online)
666 P.2d 486, 136 Ariz. 386, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-v-mitchell-arizctapp-1983.