State v. Mincey

• Court: Supreme Court of North Carolina
• Decided: May 22, 2026
• Docket: 68A24
• Status: Published
• Author: Justice Allison Riggs

Opinion

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA

No. 68A24

Filed 22 May 2026

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA

v. JULIE ANN MINCEY

Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-30(2) (2023) from the decision of a divided

panel of the Court of Appeals, 292 N.C. App. 345 (2024), affirming the trial court’s

judgment entered on 23 January 2023 by John E. Nobles Jr., in Superior Court,

Craven County. On 11 December 2024, the Supreme Court allowed the State’s

petition for discretionary review pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-31 and petition for writ

of certiorari as to additional issues. Heard in the North Carolina Supreme Court on

9 September 2025.

Jeff Jackson, Attorney General, by Kristin J. Uicker, Special Deputy Attorney General, for the State-appellee.

Glenn Gerding, Appellate Defender, by Aaron Thomas Johnson, Assistant Appellate Defender, for defendant-appellant.

RIGGS, Justice.

In this case, we are asked to determine whether the Court of Appeals erred as

a preliminary matter when it held that defendant Julie Ann Mincey had a right of

appeal under N.C.G.S. § 15A-1444(a2)(3) from her guilty plea to attaining habitual

felon status, and whether the Court of Appeals further erred in its review of the STATE V. MINCEY

Opinion of the Court

merits of Ms. Mincey’s appeal. In addressing the merits, the Court of Appeals

considered whether the trial court complied with N.C.G.S. § 15A-1022(c)’s statutory

mandate requiring the court to determine whether there was a factual basis for Ms.

Mincey’s guilty plea. State v. Mincey, 292 N.C. App. 345, 350 (2024). Because we

hold that Ms. Mincey lacked the right to appeal from her guilty plea to attaining

habitual felon status and that, therefore, the Court of Appeals did not have

jurisdiction to review the trial court’s judgment, we reverse the decision of the Court

of Appeals and remand this case for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

Julie Ann Mincey moved from Colorado to New Bern, North Carolina, and

operated a travel agency through which she systematically defrauded victims,

primarily elderly retirees, through elaborate travel booking schemes that netted her

over $100,000. Her victims trusted her to arrange complex international and

domestic travel packages, including anniversary trips, historic train tours, cruises,

and specialty excursions. Ms. Mincey would collect deposits and payments for her

services promising to handle all travel arrangements, but then she would suddenly

cancel the trips and cease communication, leaving the victims with no trip, no

refunds, and no way to get in touch with her.

A grand jury indicted Ms. Mincey for sixteen felony offenses—fourteen counts

of embezzlement and two counts of obtaining property by false pretenses—and for

attaining habitual felon status.

-2- STATE V. MINCEY

Ms. Mincey’s trial was held from 1 August to 8 August 2022. Of the charged

offenses, five were dismissed, and eleven ultimately reached the jury, including ten

counts of embezzlement and one count of obtaining property by false pretenses.

At trial, Ms. Mincey admitted to attaining habitual felon status. The trial

court engaged in a colloquy to ensure Ms. Mincey understood the consequences of her

admission on her right to appeal, and after Ms. Mincey confirmed her understanding

of the consequences, she pleaded guilty to the habitual felon status.

The State presented its factual basis for the habitual felon status through

evidence of three Colorado felony convictions from when Ms. Mincey lived in

Colorado: attempted theft from 13 January 1987 (convicted 31 March 1989) under

Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-4-401 in the District Court, Arapahoe County; second-degree

forgery from 15 March 1990 (convicted 22 April 1991) under Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-5-

103 in the District Court, Denver County; and five counts of theft committed between

3 February and 31 March 2001 (convicted 26 February 2004) under Colo. Rev. Stat.

§ 18-5-102 in the District Court, Douglas County. The State presented copies of the

Colorado statutes in effect on the dates of Ms. Mincey’s Colorado convictions as well

as certified records of the prior convictions.

In response to the State’s factual basis presentation, Ms. Mincey’s defense

counsel agreed with the State that “the statutes under which [Ms. Mincey] was

convicted, three predicate felonies, were all designated as felonies under Colorado

law at the time and [were] still designated as felonies.” Based on those

-3- STATE V. MINCEY

representations, the trial court found a factual basis for Ms. Mincey’s guilty plea to

attaining habitual felon status and found that “the plea is the informed choice of the

defendant given freely, voluntarily and understandingly.”

The jury found Ms. Mincey guilty of nine counts of embezzlement and one count

of obtaining property by false pretenses. The trial court consolidated the offenses,

including attaining habitual felon status, into one judgment, imposing a sentence in

the mitigated range of forty-four to sixty-five months imprisonment and ordering

restitution of $53,402.58. Ms. Mincey gave oral notice of appeal in open court.

On appeal, Ms. Mincey argued that the trial court failed to comply with

N.C.G.S. § 15A-1022(c). See N.C.G.S. § 15A-1022(c) (2025) (requiring trial courts not

to accept a guilty plea without first determining that there is a factual basis for the

plea). Ms. Mincey’s defense counsel had incorrectly stated that the second-degree

forgery conviction was still a felony in Colorado, and Ms. Mincey later determined

Colorado had, in 1993, reclassified the crime as a misdemeanor, subsequent to her

1991 conviction. Mincey, 292 N.C. App. at 347–48. Thus, Ms. Mincey argued there

was no factual basis for the guilty plea because the second underlying felony used to

determine that she had attained habitual felon status was no longer a felony at the

time she was being sentenced. Id. at 347. She contended that the Court of Appeals

“should consider whether a defendant’s underlying felonies are still felonies at the

time a defendant committed the substantive offense for which he or she is currently

being sentenced.” Id. Finally, Ms. Mincey asked the Court of Appeals to vacate the

-4- STATE V. MINCEY

judgment and remand for resentencing absent the habitual felon sentencing

enhancement. Id. at 348.

Before reaching the merits, the Court of Appeals first determined whether it

had jurisdiction to consider Ms. Mincey’s appeal, which required the court to

determine whether Ms. Mincey had the right to appeal after pleading guilty to

attaining habitual felon status. Id. The Court of Appeals ultimately determined that

Ms. Mincey had a statutory right of appeal under N.C.G.S. § 15A-1444(a2)(3) because

she was asserting that a deficient plea to habitual felon status resulted in an

unauthorized term of imprisonment. Id. at 348–49; see also N.C.G.S. § 15A-

1444(a2)(3) (2025). The Court of Appeals then dismissed as moot Ms. Mincey’s

petition for writ of certiorari, which she had also filed with the court below, because

she had a statutory right of appeal. Mincey, 292 N.C. App. at 349.

The Court of Appeals then reviewed the merits of Ms. Mincey’s appeal.

Regarding Ms. Mincey’s challenge to the sufficiency of the factual basis for the trial

court’s acceptance of a guilty plea for habitual felon status, the Court of Appeals held

that the trial court complied with subsection 15A-1022(c) and affirmed the judgment.

Id. at 349–51. The court then explained that the trial court did not err in determining

there was a factual basis for Ms. Mincey’s guilty plea because the second-degree

forgery was a felony at the time of Ms. Mincey’s conviction in 1991. Id. at 350–51.

Acknowledging that the Colorado law had subsequently changed, the Court of

Appeals relied on both N.C.G.S. § 14-7.1(a), the habitual felon statute, and State v.

-5- STATE V. MINCEY

Ross, 221 N.C. App. 185, 188 (2012), to conclude that any person who is convicted of

or pleads guilty to three felony offenses attains habitual felon status. Mincey, 292

N.C. App. at 350. It held that the application of the habitual felon statute was

compatible with the “primary goals” of the “recidivist statute” meant to “deter repeat

offenders.” Id. at 350–51 (cleaned up). Thus, the Court of Appeals declined to adopt

Ms. Mincey’s argument that habitual felon status should be determined based on

whether the predicate felonies were felonies at the time of the offense for which the

defendant was being sentenced. Id. at 351.

In his dissent, Judge Arrowood opined that he would have held that Ms.

Mincey lacked a right of appeal under N.C.G.S. § 15A-1444(a2), but that he would

have allowed her petition for writ of certiorari to review the adequacy of the factual

bases underlying Ms. Mincey’s guilty plea. Id. at 352 (Arrowood, J., dissenting).

Further, Judge Arrowood explained that, in his view, statutory interpretation of the

habitual felon statute and caselaw supported the conclusion that “courts are meant

to examine the classifications of prior offenses at the time of the offense the defendant

is being sentenced, not at the time the prior offense was committed.” Id. at 352–54.

On 12 March 2024, Ms. Mincey filed the present appeal based on dissent,

seeking review of the trial court’s acceptance of her guilty plea to attaining habitual

felon status. Then, on 25 March 2024, the State also filed a notice of appeal based on

the dissent, seeking this Court’s review of whether the Court of Appeals erred in

holding there was a right to appeal following Ms. Mincey’s guilty plea to habitual

-6- STATE V. MINCEY

felon status under N.C.G.S. § 15A-1444(a2)(3). Further, the State filed a petition for

discretionary review as to additional issues and, in the alternative, a petition for writ

of certiorari as to additional issues for this Court to determine whether the Court of

Appeals erred in holding there was a right to appeal and whether the factual bases

of a guilty plea are reviewed using a de novo standard. This Court allowed both of

the State’s petitions on 11 December 2024.

II. Analysis

A. Standard of Review

“This Court reviews the decision of the Court of Appeals to determine whether

it contains any errors of law.” State v. Melvin, 377 N.C. 187, 192 (2021) (quoting State

v. Golder, 374 N.C. 238, 244 (2020)); see also N.C. R. App. P. 16(a). Determining

whether the Court of Appeals erred when it held that Ms. Mincey had a right of

appeal turns on the interpretation of N.C.G.S. § 15A-1444. Questions of law, such as

questions of statutory interpretation, are reviewed de novo. In re D.S., 364 N.C. 184,

187 (2010).

B. Ms. Mincey did not have a right of appeal.

In North Carolina, the right to appeal a criminal proceeding is created through

our state statutes. See generally N.C.G.S. § 15A-1444(a), (g) (2025) (providing when

a defendant may appeal or file a petition for writ of certiorari); State v. Berryman,

360 N.C. 209, 214 (2006) (“Similar to federal procedure, a North Carolina criminal

defendant’s right to appeal a conviction is provided entirely by statute.”). A guilty

-7- STATE V. MINCEY

plea limits a defendant’s right to appeal. Subsection 15A-1444(e) of the General

Statutes provides:

Except as provided in subsections (a1) and (a2) of this section and G.S. 15A-979, and except when a motion to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest has been denied, the defendant is not entitled to appellate review as a matter of right when he has entered a plea of guilty or no contest to a criminal charge in the superior court, but he may petition the appellate division for review by writ of certiorari. If an indigent defendant petitions the appellate division for a writ of certiorari, the presiding superior court judge may in his discretion order the preparation of the record and transcript of the proceedings at the expense of the State.

N.C.G.S. § 15A-1444(e) (2025).

As outlined by the statute, the right to appeal following a guilty plea is narrow.

There are limited circumstances when a defendant is still entitled to an appeal of

right after entry of a guilty plea, such as when the sentence imposed resulted from

certain errors related to the defendant’s prior record or conviction levels. N.C.G.S. §

15A-1444(a1), (a2) (2025). Most relevant here, subsection (a2)(3) provides an

exception to the general limitation on appeals from a guilty plea for when a

defendant’s sentence “[c]ontains a term of imprisonment that is for a duration not

authorized by G.S. 15A-1340.17 or G.S. 15A-1340.23 for the defendant’s class of

offense and prior record or conviction level.” N.C.G.S. § 15A-1444(a2)(3) (2025); see

also id. §§ 15A-1340.17, 15A-1340.23 (prescribing the aggravated, presumptive, and

mitigated range of sentencing for each class of offense and prior record level).

-8- STATE V. MINCEY

Our statutes and case law make clear that a defendant “is not entitled to

appellate review as a matter of right” of the contention that the trial court improperly

accepted a guilty plea, particularly where the defendant did not raise one of the

challenges prescribed under the statute, withdraw the guilty plea, or petition for a

writ of certiorari. See N.C.G.S. § 15A-1444(e); State v. Bolinger, 320 N.C. 596, 601–

02 (1987) (explaining the limited bases under N.C.G.S. § 15A-1444 for appellate

review of judgments entered upon guilty pleas). A defendant may petition the

appellate division for a writ of certiorari, and the appellate division, which maintains

jurisdiction and authority to issue prerogative writs, may then choose to exercise its

authority to issue a writ of certiorari. See N.C.G.S. § 7A-32(c) (2025); N.C.G.S. § 15A-

1444(e). In fact, this Court has said that a defendant may obtain appellate review of

the acceptance of a guilty plea only upon issuance of a writ of certiorari. Bolinger,

320 N.C. at 601 (holding that the defendant who entered a guilty plea was not entitled

to appellate review as a matter of right when the defendant did not withdraw a guilty

plea and failed to petition for a writ of certiorari); State v. Ledbetter, 371 N.C. 192,

195 (2018) (“Subsection 15A-1444(e) specifically addresses review of a defendant’s

guilty plea through issuance of a writ of certiorari and contains no language limiting

the Court of Appeals’ jurisdiction or discretionary authority.”).

After having been informed that a guilty plea would limit her right to direct

appeal, Ms. Mincey entered the guilty plea willingly and voluntarily. She became

subject to the limitations set forth under N.C.G.S. § 15A-1444(e), and, unless certain

-9- STATE V. MINCEY

exceptions applied, she was not entitled to right of appeal outside an issuance of a

writ of certiorari. See Bolinger, 320 N.C at 601.

The Court of Appeals misinterpreted N.C.G.S. § 15A-1444(a2)(3) in holding

that Ms. Mincey had a right of appeal. Though habitual felon status would enhance

Ms. Mincey’s sentencing, whether the second-degree forgery conviction from 1991

could sufficiently serve as a factual basis for her guilty plea to attaining habitual

felon status under N.C.G.S. § 14-7.1 centers on interpretation of the habitual felon

statute itself. See generally N.C.G.S. § 14-7.1(a) (2025) (prescribing persons defined

as habitual felons, including which felony offenses are considered in determining

whether someone has attained habitual felon status); id. § 14-7.1(b) (“For the purpose

of this Article, a felony offense is defined to include all of the following: [listing

applicable offenses] . . . .”). This was not a question of whether her sentence

“[c]ontains a term of imprisonment that is for a duration not authorized by G.S. 15A-

1340.17 or G.S. 15A-1340.23 for the defendant’s class of offense and prior record or

conviction level.” N.C.G.S. § 15A-1444(a2)(3). Notably, Ms. Mincey conceded that

based on the plea that was entered, the sentence would have been correct, or at least,

would not have been challenged if not for her contention that the trial court

erroneously accepted the guilty plea. Oral Argument at 8:58, State v. Mincey, No.

68A24 (N.C. Sep. 9, 2025), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hZ2lwReJqZA.

Having concluded there was no statutory right of appeal and that the Court of

Appeals erred, we also hold that the Court of Appeals erred in reviewing the merits

-10- STATE V. MINCEY

of Ms. Mincey’s appeal as it lacked jurisdiction to do so. The only way the Court of

Appeals could have reached the merits of Ms. Mincey’s appeal was via a writ of

certiorari, which the court dismissed as moot.

The North Carolina Constitution and the Rules of Appellate Procedure

prescribe authority for appellate review in our state. See Ledbetter, 371 N.C. at 194

(“The Court of Appeals shall have such appellate jurisdiction as the General

Assembly may prescribe.” (quoting N.C. Const. art. IV, § 12(2))); Berryman, 360 N.C.

at 214 (“Procedures for appeal to the appellate division are as provided in this Article,

the rules of the appellate division, and Chapter 7A of the General Statutes.” (quoting

N.C.G.S. § 15A-1444(d) (2005))); see also State v. Woolard, 385 N.C. 560, 567–68

(2023) (holding that where no right of appeal existed, the State could petition this

Court for certiorari and where a writ of certiorari was properly granted, this Court

had jurisdiction to reach the merits); N.C. Const. art. IV, § 12(1) (providing this

Court’s ability to issue any remedial writs necessary in furtherance of its “general

supervision and control over the proceedings of other courts”).

The decision to issue a writ of certiorari ultimately rests in the sound discretion

of the presiding court, and this Court has explained that certiorari is an

“extraordinary remedial writ” that we use sparingly. Cryan v. Nat’l Council of

YMCAs, 384 N.C. 569, 572–73 (2023) (cleaned up); Woolard, 385 N.C. at 568. To issue

a writ of certiorari, we require petitioners to “show merit or that error was probably

committed below” and “extraordinary circumstances.” Cryan, 384 N.C.at 572. When

-11- STATE V. MINCEY

the Court of Appeals decides to issue the writ, then this Court reviews the issuance

for abuse of discretion. Id. at 573. However, in this case, the Court of Appeals

expressly declined to review Ms. Mincey’s appeal through certiorari review. Instead

of adhering to N.C.G.S. § 15A-1444, which established a well-defined structure for

limited appeals from guilty pleas, the Court of Appeals improperly concluded that

Ms. Mincey’s appeal fell under the exception prescribed in N.C.G.S. § 15A-

1444(a2)(3), which erroneously permitted her to retain the benefit of pleading guilty

while preserving the right to challenge her conviction for attaining habitual felon

status. Further, because the Court of Appeals did not properly allow certiorari review

below, it exercised jurisdiction that it did not have to reach the merits. See Woolard,

385 N.C. at 568–69.

Appellate courts cannot exercise jurisdiction that they do not possess. See

Veazey v. City of Durham, 231 N.C. 357, 364 (1950) (holding that an appeal to the

Supreme Court from a non-appealable order of the trial court confers no power on the

Supreme Court); see also State v. Wagner, 356 N.C. 599, 601 (2002) (vacating a Court

of Appeals’ opinion as it pertained to a conviction over which the trial court, and

consequently the Court of Appeals, lacked jurisdiction). When a court decides a

matter over which it lacks jurisdiction, the proceeding is null and void. See In re

T.R.P., 360 N.C. 588, 590 (2006) (explaining that a court must have jurisdiction over

a case and the type of relief sought to decide the case; otherwise, its judgment is void).

-12- STATE V. MINCEY

Having determined that Ms. Mincey had no right of appeal and therefore the

Court of Appeals did not have jurisdiction to reach the merits of Ms. Mincey’s appeal,

we decline the State’s invitation to overturn the standard of review set forth in State

v. Robinson, 381 N.C. 207 (2022), regarding an appellate court’s review of a trial

court’s determination of a factual basis for a guilty plea. See In re Peoples, 296 N.C.

109, 147 (1978) (stating that this Court’s function is not to “entertain or proceed with

a cause merely to determine abstract propositions of law”); In re A.K., 360 N.C. 449,

452 (2006) (stating that this Court will usually “decide a case only if the controversy

which gave rise to the action continues at the time of appeal”); Hoke Cnty. Bd. of

Educ. v. State, No. 425A21-3, slip op. at 86 (N.C. Apr. 2, 2026) (stating that “[a]n

appellate court, for instance, must first review its own [subject matter] jurisdiction”

and the jurisdiction of the court below to determine whether it has the authority to

pass on the merits of a case).

III. Conclusion

We hold that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that Ms. Mincey had a right

of appeal. The Court of Appeals therefore lacked jurisdiction to reach the merits of

Ms. Mincey’s appeal. Thus, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and

remand to that court for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

-13-