State v. Mills

2024 Ohio 3359

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: September 3, 2024
• Docket: CA2023-12-110
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as State v. Mills, 2024-Ohio-3359.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO

WARREN COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO, :

Appellee, : CASE NO. CA2023-12-110

: OPINION - vs - 9/3/2024 :

JOSHUA TAYLOR MILLS, :

Appellant. :

CRIMINAL APPEAL FROM WARREN COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS Case No. 23CR40769

David P. Fornshell, Warren County Prosecuting Attorney, and Kirsten A. Brandt, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.

Roger W. Kirk, for appellant.

BYRNE, J.

{¶ 1} Appellant, Joshua Taylor Mills, appeals his conviction in the Warren County

Court of Common Pleas following his guilty plea to one count of third-degree felony

aggravated possession of drugs. For the reasons outlined below, we affirm in part,

reverse in part, and remand to the trial court for the limited purpose of permitting the trial

court to employ the postrelease control correction procedures set forth in R.C. 2929.191. Warren CA2023-12-110

I. Factual and Procedural Background

{¶ 2} On July 31, 2023, the Warren County Grand Jury returned an indictment

charging Mills with one count of aggravated possession of drugs, a third-degree felony.

The indictment also charged Mills with one count of theft and one count of possessing

drug abuse instruments, both first-degree misdemeanors. Mills was arraigned on August

2, 2023. He entered a not guilty plea to all three charges.

{¶ 3} On August 28, 2023, Mills entered a plea agreement with the state and

thereafter pleaded guilty to the charge of third-degree felony aggravated possession of

drugs in exchange for the first-degree misdemeanor theft and possession of drug abuse

instruments offenses being dismissed. The trial court accepted Mills' plea upon finding

the plea was knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered. The trial court did this after

advising Mills that by entering a guilty plea he would be subject to an optional two-year

postrelease control term should he be sentenced to serve time in prison at his sentencing

hearing.

{¶ 4} On November 20, 2023, the trial court held a sentencing hearing where it

sentenced Mills to serve a 24-month prison term, less 55 days of jail-time credit. The trial

court issued this decision after advising Mills that it was "[i]ncorporat[ing] the post-release

control that we covered at the plea agreement." The trial court then issued its sentencing

entry, which included a complete and correct postrelease control notification. Mills then

appealed. Mills' appeal now properly before this court for decision, Mills has raised two

assignments of error for review.

II. Law and Analysis

A. Imposition of Postrelease Control

{¶ 5} Mills' first assignment of error states:

TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO PROPERLY OR

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ADEQUATELY NOTIFY JOSHUA OF THE POST RELEASE CONTROL CONDITION AT HIS SENTENCING HEARING.

{¶ 6} In his first assignment of error, Mills argues the trial court erred by failing to

properly impose postrelease control at his sentencing hearing.

{¶ 7} Referencing R.C. 2967.28 in State v. Bates, 2022-Ohio-475, the Ohio

Supreme Court stated, "[i]t is established that 'a trial court has a statutory duty to provide

notice of postrelease control at the sentencing hearing.'" Id. at ¶ 11, quoting State v.

Jordan, 2004-Ohio-6085, ¶ 23, overruled on other grounds by State v. Harper, 2020-Ohio-

2913. "The trial court must advise the offender at the sentencing hearing of the term of

supervision, whether postrelease control is discretionary or mandatory, and the

consequences of violating postrelease control." Id., citing State v. Grimes, 2017-Ohio-

2927, ¶ 11.

{¶ 8} Based on our recent decisions in State v. Bryars, 2024-Ohio-2765 (12th

Dist.) and State v. Ward, 2024-Ohio-2858 (12th Dist.), we find the trial court failed to

properly impose postrelease control in this case when it merely stated at Mills' sentencing

hearing, without further elaboration, that it was "[i]ncorporat[ing] the post-release control

that we covered at the plea agreement." This holds true even though, as noted above,

the trial court's sentencing entry provided Mills with a complete and correct postrelease

control notification. This is because, as this court stated in Bryars, "[n]otice of postrelease

control at the plea hearing and in the sentencing entry does not correct the trial court's

failure to impose a term of postrelease control at the sentencing hearing." Id. at ¶ 9, citing

State v. Nascembeni, 2022-Ohio-1662 (8th Dist.) and State v. Davis, 2022-Ohio-2373 (2d

Dist.). The trial court must also announce the proper postrelease control sanction at the

defendant's sentencing hearing. See, e..g., State v. Gross, 2024-Ohio-2598, ¶ 10

(remanding case for resentencing where the trial court "did not announce the postrelease

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control sanction at the sentencing hearing"). Therefore, in accordance with this court's

recent decisions in Bryars and Ward, we find the trial court failed to properly impose

postrelease control at Mills' sentencing hearing. Accordingly, finding merit to Mills'

argument raised herein, Mills' first assignment of error is sustained.

B. Knowing, Intelligent, and Voluntary Plea

{¶ 9} Mills' second assignment of error states:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED TO JOSHUA'S PREJUDICE BY ACCEPTING HIS GUILTY PLEA WHICH WAS NOT KNOWINGLY, INTELLIGENTLY OR VOLUNTARILY MADE.

{¶ 10} In his second assignment of error, Mills argues the trial court erred by

accepting his guilty plea because the plea was not knowingly, intelligently, or voluntarily

entered.1 We disagree.

a. Crim.R. 11(C) Standard

{¶ 11} "'A criminal defendant's choice to enter a plea of guilty or no contest is a

serious decision.'" State v. Johnson, 2024-Ohio-1089, ¶ 12 (12th Dist.), quoting State v.

Clark, 2008-Ohio-3748, ¶ 25. Given the seriousness of such a decision, "'[w]hen a

defendant enters a plea in a criminal case, the plea must be made knowingly, intelligently,

and voluntarily. Failure on any of those points renders enforcement of the plea

unconstitutional under both the United States Constitution and the Ohio Constitution.'"

State v. Hawkins, 2023-Ohio-2915, ¶ 7 (12th Dist.), quoting State v. Engle, 74 Ohio St.3d

525, 527, 1996-Ohio-179.

{¶ 12} "A trial court's obligations in accepting a defendant's plea as being

knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered is dependent 'upon the level of offense to

1. Mills bases his argument on the strict/substantial compliance framework set forth by the Ohio Supreme Court some twenty years ago in State v. Griggs, 2004-Ohio-4415. "However, a [more] recent decision of the Ohio Supreme Court reveals that whether a trial court substantially complies with Crim.R. 11(C)(2) is no longer part of the analysis in reviewing a trial court's plea colloquy." State v. Rogers, 2020-Ohio-4102, ¶ 15 (12th Dist.), citing State v. Dangler, 2020-Ohio-2765. -4- Warren CA2023-12-110

which the defendant is pleading.'" State v. Muhire, 2023-Ohio-1181, ¶ 11 (12th Dist.),

quoting State v. Jones, 2007-Ohio-6093, ¶ 6. "Crim.R. 11(C) prescribes the procedure a

trial court must follow in felony cases before accepting a guilty or no contest plea." State

v. Martin, 2019-Ohio-2792, ¶ 26 (12th Dist.). The rule "ensures an adequate record on

review by requiring the trial court to personally inform the defendant of his rights and the

consequences of his plea and determine if the plea is understandingly and voluntarily

made." State v. Stone, 43 Ohio St.2d 163, 168 (1975). This requires the trial court to

notify the defendant of the constitutional rights set forth in Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c). State v.

Oliver, 2021-Ohio-2543, ¶ 41 (12th Dist.). This also requires the trial court to make the

necessary determinations and give the defendant the necessary warnings set forth in

Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) and (b). Id.

{¶ 13} Specifically, pursuant to Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a), (b), and (c):

(2) In felony cases the court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty or a plea of no contest, and shall not accept a plea of guilty or no contest without first addressing the defendant personally either in-person or by remote contemporaneous video in conformity with Crim.R. 43(A) and doing all of the following:

(a) Determining that the defendant is making the plea voluntarily, with understanding of the nature of the charges and of the maximum penalty involved, and, if applicable, that the defendant is not eligible for probation or for the imposition of community control sanctions at the sentencing hearing.

(b) Informing the defendant of and determining that the defendant understands the effect of the plea of guilty or no contest, and that the court, upon acceptance of the plea, may proceed with judgment and sentence.

(c) Informing the defendant and determining that the defendant understands that by the plea the defendant is waiving the rights to jury trial, to confront witnesses against him or her, to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in the defendant's favor, and to require the state to prove the defendant's guilt beyond

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a reasonable doubt at a trial at which the defendant cannot be compelled to testify against himself or herself.

{¶ 14} "[I]in order to satisfy the requirement of informing a defendant of the effect

of a plea, a trial court must inform the defendant of the appropriate language under

Crim.R. 11(B)." State v. Chatman, 2019-Ohio-5026, ¶ 13 (12th Dist.). "Crim.R. 11(B)(1)

provides the applicable language for a plea of guilty." Johnson, 2024-Ohio-1089 at ¶ 15.

That rule states, "[t]he plea of guilty is a complete admission of the defendant's guilt."

Crim.R. 11(B)(1).

b. Crim.R. 11(C) and a Showing of Prejudice

{¶ 15} A defendant is generally "not entitled to have his plea vacated unless he

demonstrates he was prejudiced by a failure of the trial court to comply with the provisions

of Crim.R. 11(C)." State v. Dangler, 2020-Ohio-2765, ¶ 16. There are two exceptions to

this rule, however. State v. Luttrell, 2022-Ohio-1148, ¶ 17 (12th Dist.). Those two

exceptions being: "(1) when the trial court fails to explain the constitutional rights set forth

in Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c) that a defendant waives by pleading guilty or no contest, and (2) a

trial court's complete failure to comply with a portion of Crim.R. 11(C)." (Emphasis in

original.) Id., quoting Dangler at ¶ 15. "Under either exception, the defendant is not

required to show prejudice." State v. Henson, 2022-Ohio-2828, ¶ 6 (12th Dist.). That is

to say, when either of those two exceptions apply, the defendant need not establish that

his or her guilty plea "would [not] have otherwise been made." (Brackets in original.)

State v. Leonicio, 2023-Ohio-2433, ¶ 34 (12th Dist.), quoting State v. Henson, 12th Dist.

Fayette No. CA2021-12-029, 2022-Ohio-2828, ¶ 6. Prejudice is instead presumed to

have occurred as a matter of law. State v. Fabian, 2020-Ohio-3926, ¶ 15 (12th Dist.).

Prejudice, when required, "must be established on the face of the record and not solely

by virtue of challenging a plea on appeal." Hawkins, 2023-Ohio-2915 at ¶ 12.

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c. Whether Mills Was Required to Show Prejudice

{¶ 16} The focus when enforcing Crim.R. 11(C) is not on whether the trial court

recited the precise language set forth within the rule. This holds true for the language set

forth in Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a), (b), and (c). The focus is instead "on whether the dialogue

between the court and the defendant demonstrates that the defendant understood the

consequences of his plea." State v. Tancak, 2023-Ohio-2578, ¶ 16. But despite the focus

not being on whether the trial court recited the precise language set forth within Crim.R.

11(C), Mills argues that the trial court completely failed to satisfy the requirements of

Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) by "not reading any facts for the alleged offense" into the record to

ensure that he "understood the nature of the crime to which he was pleading guilty." But

as this court has stated previously, the trial court “need not advise the defendant of the

elements of the crime[]” for which he or she is pleading guilty before the trial court can

find the defendant's plea was made with an understanding of the nature of the charge

pursuant to Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a). State v. Huston, 2018-Ohio-2818, ¶ 19 (12th Dist.).

"[R]ather, 'it is sufficient if the totality of the circumstances warrant the trial court in making

a determination [that] the defendant understands the charge[].'" Id., quoting State v.

Goens, 2006-Ohio-4324, ¶ 10 (12th Dist.). To the extent Mills argues otherwise, such

argument lacks merit.

{¶ 17} Here, the record firmly establishes that Mills understood the nature of the

charge to which he would be pleading guilty, third-degree felony aggravated possession

of drugs, prior to entering his guilty plea. The trial court, in fact, expressly advised Mills

of the nature of the charge at the start of the plea hearing, stating:

Mr. Mills plans to plead guilty to aggravated possession of methamphetamine, bulk amount. That's a felony of the third degree that carries up to 36 months in prison and a maximum fine of $10,000.

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The trial court then turned to Mills and asked, "Mr. Mills, do you understand what you're

doing, sir?" To this, Mills responded, "Yes, Your Honor." Therefore, given the record

properly before this court, we find the trial court did not completely fail to comply with the

requirements set forth in Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a). The trial court instead fully complied with

the rule by expressly advising Mills of the nature of the charge to which he would be

pleading guilty, third-degree felony aggravated possession of drug, prior to entering his

guilty plea. To the extent Mills argues otherwise, such argument again lacks merit.

{¶ 18} The record also clearly demonstrates that the trial court did not completely

fail to advise Mills, prior to entering the guilty plea, that the effect of entering a guilty plea

would serve as a complete admission of his guilt in accordance with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(b).

This holds true even though the trial court did not advise Mills that, upon the acceptance

of his guilty plea, it could proceed with judgment and sentence. See State v. Jones, 2020-

Ohio-3919, ¶ 10-15 (3d Dist.). This is because, as the record plainly reveals, the trial

court specifically advised Mills that, if he were to plead guilty, he would be "admitting [he]

committed the offense" and waiving his "rights to a trial." When asked by the trial court if

he was "aware of that," Mills again responded, "Yes, Your Honor."

{¶ 19} A "complete failure" involves a trial court's complete omission in advising

about a distinct component of Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) or (b). Hawkins, 2023-Ohio-2915 at ¶

10. No "complete failure" occurred in this case. Therefore, despite Mills' claims, because

the trial court did not completely fail to comply with either Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) or (b) prior

to Mills entering his guilty plea, Mills was required to demonstrate prejudice by the trial

court's failure to fully comply with the rule, i.e., that his plea would not have otherwise

been made. Mills has failed to demonstrate any such prejudice. Mills instead claims that

the prejudice is "clear" that he "could not plead guilty voluntarily, knowingly, or

intelligently" under the "circumstances of this plea." This falls well short of what was

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required of Mills to demonstrate prejudice in this case. Accordingly, finding no error in

the trial court's decision to accept Mills' guilty plea, Mills' second assignment of error lacks

merit and is overruled.

III. Conclusion

{¶ 20} For the reasons set forth above, and having sustained Mills' first assignment

of error, we reverse Mills' sentence and remand this matter to the trial court for the limited

purpose of permitting the trial court to employ the postrelease control correction

procedures set forth in R.C. 2929.191. The judgment of the trial court in all other respects

is affirmed.

{¶ 21} Judgment affirmed in part, reversed in part, and the matter remanded.

S. POWELL, P.J., and M. POWELL, JJ., concur.

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