State v. Miller

Supreme Court of Iowa

State v. Miller

606 N.W.2d 310, 2000 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 11, 2000 WL 43006

CourtSupreme Court of Iowa

DecidedJanuary 20, 2000

Docket98-1775

StatusPublished

Cited by2 cases

This text of 606 N.W.2d 310 (State v. Miller) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Iowa primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

State v. Miller, 606 N.W.2d 310, 2000 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 11, 2000 WL 43006 (iowa 2000).

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Opinion

HARRIS, Senior Judge.

In common with the scheme prevailing throughout the country, Iowa law provides increasing penalties for repeat convictions of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated. Prior to 1997, only those OWI convictions occurring during the previous six years were reckoned in fixing enhanced punishment. In 1997 the General Assembly expanded this time frame for prior OWI offenses, increasing it to twelve years. Since then Iowa courts have been presented with many ex post facto claims that extension into the past should not apply for convictions that had already passed (by virtue of the passing of the six years formerly specified) in fixing punishment for offenses occurring later. We have rejected these claims. State v. Garcia, 600 N.W.2d 320, 321 (Iowa 1999); State v. Stoen, 596 N.W.2d 504, 507-08 (Iowa 1999). The present defendant raises a similar ex post facto claim, which we now reject on the basis of our Garcia and Stoen holdings. He also raises a similar chal *312 lenge on the basis of double jeopardy, which we now consider and, for the reasons that follow, also reject.

Defendant, Robert Miller, was convicted following a stipulated bench trial of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated (third offense) for an offense committed in January 1998. See Iowa Code § 321J.2 (1997). The two prior convictions on which the enhancement was based occurred in March of 1988 and November of 1991. He posits his double jeopardy claims on both the federal and Iowa constitutions. U.S. Const, amend. V; Iowa Const, art. I, § 12. The standards for review are the same under the two constitutions. State v. Franzen, 495 N.W.2d 714, 715-16 (Iowa 1993).

Miller’s situation is light years from double jeopardy. The clause protects persons accused of crime from both multiple prosecution and punishment. Id. at 716. But, as explained in both Garcia and Stoen, Miller is not being prosecuted now for his past offenses. Garcia, 600 N.W.2d at 321; Stoen, 596 N.W.2d at 507. The present enhanced punishment is based on his conduct at the time of the latest offense. Enhanced punishment is imposed only because, notwithstanding his past record, and the lessons he should have learned from it, he still did not get the point. This is a separate present affront to society and the only basis for the enhancement.

Because the present prosecution is not for any offense previously prosecuted, double jeopardy is not implicated. See Franzen, 495 N.W.2d at 716. The trial court was correct in so holding.

AFFIRMED.

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HARRIS, Senior Judge.

In common with the scheme prevailing throughout the country, Iowa law provides increasing penalties for repeat convictions of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated. Prior to 1997, only those OWI convictions occurring during the previous six years were reckoned in fixing enhanced punishment. In 1997 the General Assembly expanded this time frame for prior OWI offenses, increasing it to twelve years. Since then Iowa courts have been presented with many ex post facto claims that extension into the past should not apply for convictions that had already passed (by virtue of the passing of the six years formerly specified) in fixing punishment for offenses occurring later. We have rejected these claims. State v. Garcia, 600 N.W.2d 320, 321 (Iowa 1999); State v. Stoen, 596 N.W.2d 504, 507-08 (Iowa 1999). The present defendant raises a similar ex post facto claim, which we now reject on the basis of our Garcia and Stoen holdings. He also raises a similar chal *312 lenge on the basis of double jeopardy, which we now consider and, for the reasons that follow, also reject.

Defendant, Robert Miller, was convicted following a stipulated bench trial of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated (third offense) for an offense committed in January 1998. See Iowa Code § 321J.2 (1997). The two prior convictions on which the enhancement was based occurred in March of 1988 and November of 1991. He posits his double jeopardy claims on both the federal and Iowa constitutions. U.S. Const, amend. V; Iowa Const, art. I, § 12. The standards for review are the same under the two constitutions. State v. Franzen, 495 N.W.2d 714, 715-16 (Iowa 1993).

Miller’s situation is light years from double jeopardy. The clause protects persons accused of crime from both multiple prosecution and punishment. Id. at 716. But, as explained in both Garcia and Stoen, Miller is not being prosecuted now for his past offenses. Garcia, 600 N.W.2d at 321; Stoen, 596 N.W.2d at 507. The present enhanced punishment is based on his conduct at the time of the latest offense. Enhanced punishment is imposed only because, notwithstanding his past record, and the lessons he should have learned from it, he still did not get the point. This is a separate present affront to society and the only basis for the enhancement.

Because the present prosecution is not for any offense previously prosecuted, double jeopardy is not implicated. See Franzen, 495 N.W.2d at 716. The trial court was correct in so holding.

AFFIRMED.

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606 N.W.2d 310, 2000 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 11, 2000 WL 43006, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-v-miller-iowa-2000.

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