State v. Miller

Arizona Supreme Court

State v. Miller

535 P.2d 15, 111 Ariz. 558, 1975 Ariz. LEXIS 285

CourtArizona Supreme Court

DecidedMay 14, 1975

Docket3141, 3142

StatusPublished

Cited by10 cases

This text of 535 P.2d 15 (State v. Miller) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Arizona Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

State v. Miller, 535 P.2d 15, 111 Ariz. 558, 1975 Ariz. LEXIS 285 (Ark. 1975).

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Opinion

HAYS, Justice.

This court has jurisdiction of the instant cases pursuant to Rule 47(e)(5), Rules of the Supreme Court, 17A A.R.S. Thomas Walter Cade and Gregory David Miller have each appealed from the judgments entered against them. Each raises identical issues in identical briefs and we have therefore ordered their appeals to be consolidated by this court.

Cade and Miller were arrested and charged with the possession of marijuana. A.R.S. § 36-1002.05. They were determined to be indigent by the trial judge and counsel was appointed to represent them. Subsequently, the defendants pleaded guilty to the charge. The sentence was suspended and probation imposed, the conditions being that each spend a maximum of seven days in the Yavapai County Jail and that they each pay the county the amount expended for their legal representation. On appeal they contend that the sentence imposed was unconstitutional and an abuse of judicial discretion..

The required contribution by the defendants is in accord with Rule 6.7(d), 1973 Rules of Criminal Procedure, 17 A. *559 R.S., and with Fuller v. Oregon, 417 U.S. 40, 94 S.Ct. 2116, 40 L.Ed.2d 642 (1974). The argument that the defendant was denied the constitutional right to counsel afforded the indigent by Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963), is ill-founded. The knowledge that the defendant may have that he could be required to pay all or part of the cost of his legal representation cannot be said to “chill” the exercise of his constitutional right, nor is the defendant in any way deprived of necessary legal assistance. Fuller v. Oregon, supra. Like the Oregon statute before the United States Supreme Court, our rule insures that only those whom the court finds to have the requisite financial resources to offset the costs of legal services become obligated. The obligation cannot be incurred if it would mean “substantial hardship” to the defendant or his family. This is not, therefore, a penalty placed on the exercise of a constitutional right. No hardship on the defendants has been argued.

The judgments and sentences are affirmed.

CAMERON, C. J., STRUCKMEYER, V. C. J., and LOCKWOOD and HOLO-HAN, JJ., concur.

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HAYS, Justice.

This court has jurisdiction of the instant cases pursuant to Rule 47(e)(5), Rules of the Supreme Court, 17A A.R.S. Thomas Walter Cade and Gregory David Miller have each appealed from the judgments entered against them. Each raises identical issues in identical briefs and we have therefore ordered their appeals to be consolidated by this court.

Cade and Miller were arrested and charged with the possession of marijuana. A.R.S. § 36-1002.05. They were determined to be indigent by the trial judge and counsel was appointed to represent them. Subsequently, the defendants pleaded guilty to the charge. The sentence was suspended and probation imposed, the conditions being that each spend a maximum of seven days in the Yavapai County Jail and that they each pay the county the amount expended for their legal representation. On appeal they contend that the sentence imposed was unconstitutional and an abuse of judicial discretion..

The required contribution by the defendants is in accord with Rule 6.7(d), 1973 Rules of Criminal Procedure, 17 A. *559 R.S., and with Fuller v. Oregon, 417 U.S. 40, 94 S.Ct. 2116, 40 L.Ed.2d 642 (1974). The argument that the defendant was denied the constitutional right to counsel afforded the indigent by Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963), is ill-founded. The knowledge that the defendant may have that he could be required to pay all or part of the cost of his legal representation cannot be said to “chill” the exercise of his constitutional right, nor is the defendant in any way deprived of necessary legal assistance. Fuller v. Oregon, supra. Like the Oregon statute before the United States Supreme Court, our rule insures that only those whom the court finds to have the requisite financial resources to offset the costs of legal services become obligated. The obligation cannot be incurred if it would mean “substantial hardship” to the defendant or his family. This is not, therefore, a penalty placed on the exercise of a constitutional right. No hardship on the defendants has been argued.

The judgments and sentences are affirmed.

CAMERON, C. J., STRUCKMEYER, V. C. J., and LOCKWOOD and HOLO-HAN, JJ., concur.

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Bluebook (online)

535 P.2d 15, 111 Ariz. 558, 1975 Ariz. LEXIS 285, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-v-miller-ariz-1975.

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