State v. Middleton

1 Tex. L. R. 269
CourtTexas Supreme Court
DecidedJuly 15, 1882
StatusPublished

This text of 1 Tex. L. R. 269 (State v. Middleton) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Texas Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State v. Middleton, 1 Tex. L. R. 269 (Tex. 1882).

Opinion

Stayton, J.

Opinion by -This action was brought by the State of Texas against W. B. Middleton, collector of taxes for Leon county, and the sureties upon his bond, to recover the sum of $5868.37 on his account as collector of taxes due the State for the year 1876.

W. B. Middleton having died pending the suit, it was dismissed as to him and prosecuted to finnal judgment against his securities.

The cause was tried by a jury, which, under the instructions of the court, made special findings, upon which the court rendered a judgment against the defendants for the sum of $1159.73 with interest, from which the State appealed, and both parties have assigned errors.

The jury found that the collector had collected of the taxes due for the year 1876 the sum of $4151.90, and that the same had been paid into the State treasury, but that it had been applied by the Comptroller upon the accounts of the collector for the [270]*270years 1874 and 1875, lie having been the collector of taxes for Leon county during those years, and being in arrears for those years about $12,000. It was, in effect, found that the collector had none of the money by him collected for the years 1874 and 1875 in his hands on the second day of May, 1876, at which time he executed the bond upon which the present suit is based. Uo direction was given by Middleton as to how the $4151.90 should be appropriated, and it does not appear that the Comptroller knew from what source the same was derived.

Although the sum so paid into the treasury of the State had been appropriated by the Comptroller to the accounts of the collector for the years 1874 and 1875, the court applied the same a credit upon his account for the year 1876, and this is assigned as error by the State.

It is claimed by the State’s counsel that as no directions were given by the collector to the Comptroller at the time the money was paid into the treasury as to what account the same should be appropriated, that the appropriation made by the Comptroller must stand, he having no notice at the time the appropriation was made that the fund arose from taxes collected for the year 1876, after the execution of the bond sued upon.

There has been some contrariety of decisions upon this question, but it is believed that by the great weight of authority, as well as upon principle, the question must be decided adversely to the position assumed by the State.

The rule for the appropriation of payments between -parties acting in their own right is well settled, and is, that the debtor may direct in what manner the money paid by him shall be appropriated, and that if he fails to do so, that the creditor may make the appropriatión, and that in the absence of an appropriation by either the debtor or creditor, the law will appropriate it as may be just between the parties, having reference to the character of the indebtedness and all the circumstances.

It is not, however, believed that this rule obtains between the collecting officers of the State and their sureties and the auditing or accounting officer for the State.

The sureties upon the collector’s bond for the years 1874 and 1875 were not the same as on the bond sued upon.

The rule is thus stated by the Supreme Court of the United States: “A majority of the. court is of opinion that the rule [271]*271adopted in ordinary cases is not applicable to a case where different sureties under distinct obligations are interested. The treasury officers are the agents of the law. It regulates their duties, as it does the duties and rights of the collector and his sureties. The officers of the treasury cannot, by any exercise of their discretion, enlarge or restrict the obligation of the collector’s bond. Much less can they, by the mere fact of keeping an account current, in which debits and credits are entered as they occur, and without any express appropriation of payments, affect the rights of sureties. The collector is a mere agent or trustee of the government. He holds the money he receiv es in trust, and is bound to pay it over to the government as the law requires. And in the faithful performance of this trust the sureties have a direct interest, and their rights cannot be disregarded. It is true, as argued, if the collector shall misapply the public funds his sureties are responsible; but that is not the question under consideration. The collector does not misapply the funds in his hands, but pays them over to the government, without any special directions as to their application. Can the treasury' officers say, under such circumstances, that the funds currently received and paid over shall be appropriated in discharge of a defalcation which occurred long before the sureties were bound for the collector, and by such appropriation hold the sureties liable for the amount ? The, statement, of the case is the best refutation of the argument. It is so unjust to the sureties, and so directly in conflict with the law and its policy, that it requires but little consideration.

“ If the collector be in default for a preceeding term, it is the duty of the Treasury Department to require payment from him and his sureties for that term. To pay such defalcation out of accruing receipts during a subsequent term, even with the assent of the collector, would be a fraud upon the sureties for such term. The money in the hands of the collector is not his money. Without a violation of duty he cannot appropriate it as such. He pays it over in the performance of his duty — the duty which the sureties have undertaken that he shall perform faithfully. And shall the sureties not be exonerated ? The collector has done all that they stipulated he should do. How, then, can they be made responsible ? It is contended that their responsibility arises, not from the default of the collector, but from the appropriation of his payments by the treasury.

This, at least, is the fair result of the doctrine advanced. For, if [272]*272such appropriation is properly made by the treasury, in payment of the defalcation of the collector, before the commencement of the current term, it must follow that the sureties for such term are responsible for the amount thus paid.” (The United States v. Eckford’s Executors, 1 How., 261.) We have quoted largely from the opinion in the above cited case, because it is believed to state clearly the true doctrine upon the question now under consideration, and to state clearly the only true ground upon which the liability of the sureties depends.

The same principles are announced in the following cases: Jones vs. The United States, 7 How., 688; The United States vs. January, 7 Cranch, 575; Meyers vs. The United States, 1 McLean, 496; Pickering vs. Day, 2 Del. Chan. Rep., 367; Boring et al. vs. Williams, Treasurer, 17 Ala., 525; Porter vs. Stanley, 47 Maine, 518. There are cases in which it has been held that the want of notice to the officers of the treasury department of the source from which money came will render valid and binding the appropriation of the same to an indebtedness of the collecting officer, accruing prior to the time the liability of the sureties whose bonded obligation is sought to be enforced attached, even though the money so appropriated was collected during a second term of office, and for which alone such sureties are liable, and even though such appropriation goes to liquidate an indebtedness of the collecting officer incurred during a former term of office, and for which other persons are sureties. Among these are the cases of Chapman et al. v. Commonwealth, 25 Grattan, 742; Lyndon v.

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Jones v. United States
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Boring v. Williams
17 Ala. 510 (Supreme Court of Alabama, 1850)

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Bluebook (online)
1 Tex. L. R. 269, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-v-middleton-tex-1882.