State v. Meyers

2024 Ohio 4533

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: September 16, 2024
• Docket: CA2023-12-112
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as State v. Meyers, 2024-Ohio-4533.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO

WARREN COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO, :

Appellee, : CASE NO. CA2023-12-112

: OPINION - vs - 9/16/2024 :

ALLEN ROBERT MEYERS, :

Appellant. :

CRIMINAL APPEAL FROM WARREN COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS Case No. 20CR36941

David P. Fornshell, Warren County Prosecuting Attorney, and Kirsten A. Brandt, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.

James F. Maus, for appellant.

HENDRICKSON, J.

{¶ 1} Appellant, Allen Robert Meyers, appeals from a sentence imposed by the

Warren County Court of Common Pleas. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

{¶ 2} On July 27, 2020, the Warren County Grand Jury returned an indictment

against Meyers charging him with failure to comply with an order or signal of a police Warren CA2023-12-112

officer, a felony of the third degree; operating a vehicle under the influence of alcohol, a

drug of abuse, or a combination of them, a misdemeanor of the first degree; OVI (refusal

with a prior OVI conviction), a misdemeanor of the first degree; and failure to stop after

an accident, a misdemeanor of the first degree. From October 2020 to May 24, 2023,

Meyers was at large in the community, could not be located, and was unavailable for trial.

{¶ 3} On November 1, 2023, Meyers entered into a plea agreement in which he

would plead guilty to failure to comply, OVI (refusal with prior OVI conviction), and failure

to stop. In exchange, the state would dismiss the remaining OVI charge. Because the

failure to comply charge was a third-degree felony offense of violence, the change of plea

form advised Meyers that he was subject to mandatory postrelease control after his

release from prison for up to three years. However, at the plea hearing, Meyers' counsel

objected to the imposition of mandatory postrelease control, arguing that failure to comply

is not an offense of violence. In discussing postrelease control with Meyers, the trial court

advised him that mandatory postrelease control was applicable. Meyers then entered his

pleas of guilty.

{¶ 4} On December 13, 2023, a sentencing hearing was held. The prosecutor

gave a summary of the facts for the court's consideration:

This is a failure to comply from 2020 that occurred in the early morning hours in South Lebanon. It ended—he was OVI. He struck a parked car. Then there was a pursuit kind of in a circle around the streets of South Lebanon . . . he failed to stop at multiple different stop signs. Traveled up the center. Drove the wrong way down a one way before ultimately kind of pulling into a private driveway. Did not put the car in . . . park as he got out of the vehicle and troopers had to jump in and stop the vehicle before it ran into a structure.

The trial court then sentenced Meyers to one year of incarceration to be followed by

mandatory postrelease control of up to three years, but not less than one year.

{¶ 5} Meyers now appeals, raising one assignment of error for our review.

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II. Legal Analysis

{¶ 6} Assignment of Error:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY SENTENCING APPELLANT-DEFENDANT TO A TERM OF MANDATORY POST-RELEASE CONTROL IN THE ABSENCE OF A FELONY CONVICTION FOR AN "OFFENSE OF VIOLENCE."

{¶ 7} In his sole assignment of error, Meyers asserts that failure to comply is not

an offense of violence, and therefore the court erred in imposing a mandatory term of

postrelease control. In support, Meyers argues that failure to comply is not specifically

listed as an offense of violence under R.C. 2901.01(A)(9)(a), and the elements of failure

to comply under R.C. 2921.331(C)(5)(a)(ii) are broader than the 2901.01(A)(9)(c)

definition of an offense of violence.

{¶ 8} The crux of Meyers' argument is that his plea of guilty to R.C.

2921.331(C)(5)(a)(ii) does not clarify if his conduct created a risk of serious physical harm

to property only, persons only, or both—therefore it does not qualify as an offense of

violence which requires a risk of serious physical harm to persons specifically. We

disagree.

{¶ 9} R.C. 2967.28(B) states that "[e]ach sentence to a prison term . . . for a felony

of the third degree that is an offense of violence and is not a felony sex offense shall

include a requirement that the offender be subject to a period of post-release control

imposed by the parole board after the offender's release from imprisonment." R.C.

2967.28(B)(4) specifies the required period of postrelease control is up to three years, but

not less than one year.

{¶ 10} R.C. 2901.01(A)(9) defines an "offense of violence." R.C. 2901.01(A)(9)(a)

provides an enumerated list of offenses that qualify as offenses of violence. Failure to

comply is not specifically enumerated, however R.C. 2901.01(A)(9)(c) provides that "An

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offense, other than a traffic offense, under an existing or former municipal ordinance or

law of this or any other state or the United States, committed purposely or knowingly, and

involving physical harm to persons or a risk of serious physical harm to persons" is an

offense of violence.

{¶ 11} The offense of failure to comply is described in R.C. 2921.331(B) as follows:

"No person shall operate a motor vehicle so as willfully to elude or flee a police officer

after receiving a visible or audible signal from a police officer to bring the person's motor

vehicle to a stop." Meyers was specifically indicted under R.C. 2921.331(C)(5)(a), which

provides that "[a] violation of (B) of this section is a felony of the third degree if the jury or

judge as trier of fact finds any of the following by proof beyond a reasonable doubt . . . (ii)

[t]he operation of the motor vehicle by the offender caused a substantial risk of serious

physical harm to persons or property." (Emphasis added.)

{¶ 12} We do not agree with Meyer's contention that his guilty plea to failure to

comply did not include the "physical harm to a person" requirement necessary to impose

mandatory postrelease control. A guilty plea acts as a complete admission of factual guilt

and embraces "'not only the discreet acts alleged, but the totality of the substantive

conduct involved in committing the crime.' Therefore, the guilty plea subsumes any right

related to the state's ability to prove factual guilt." (Citation omitted.) State v. Dabney,

2023-Ohio-28, ¶ 25 (6th Dist.), quoting State v. Brimacombe, 2011-Ohio-5032, ¶ 16 (6th

Dist.). "A [guilty] plea 'provides the necessary proof of the elements of the crime and

sufficient evidence to support the conviction.'" State v. Taylor, 2011-Ohio-6797, ¶ 9 (12th

Dist.), quoting State v. Isbell, 2004-Ohio-2300, ¶16 (12th Dist.). By pleading guilty, "the

accused acknowledges full responsibility for all legal consequences of guilt and consents

to whatever judgment and sentence the court may legally impose." State v. Fore, 18 Ohio

App.2d 264, 267 (1969). Thus, by pleading guilty to failure to comply, appellant was

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admitting that his operation of the vehicle "caused a substantial risk of serious physical

harm to persons or property." Taylor at ¶ 9. The totality of the substantive conduct in

R.C. 2921.331(C)(5)(a)(ii) involves a "risk of serious physical harm to persons" and thus

qualifies as an offense of violence pursuant to R.C. 2901.01(A)(9)(c). Therefore, the

imposition of mandatory postrelease control for up to three years, but not less than one

year, pursuant to R.C. 2967.28(B)(4), was proper. Id.

{¶ 13} Further, although Meyers' plea rendered a review of the facts unnecessary,

his conduct clearly satisfied the R.C. 2967.28 "risk of serious physical harm to persons"

requirement. Meyers led police on a vehicle chase around the streets of South Lebanon,

struck a parked car, failed to stop at multiple stop signs, drove up the center line of the

road, and drove the wrong way on a one-way street. When Meyers abandoned his

vehicle, police had to jump in to stop the vehicle from colliding with a structure.

III. Conclusion

{¶ 14} For the reasons outlined above Meyers' sole assignment of error is

overruled.

{¶ 15} Judgment affirmed.

S. POWELL, P.J., and PIPER, J., concur.

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