[Cite as State v. Mendenhall, 2023-Ohio-3297.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT HARDIN COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO,
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, CASE NO. 6-23-01
v.
TRISTAN ALAN MENDENHALL, OPINION
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
Appeal from Hardin County Common Pleas Court Trial Court No. CRI 20222038
Judgment Affirmed
Date of Decision: September 18, 2023
APPEARANCES:
Emily P. Beckley for Appellant
McKenzie J. Klingler for Appellee Case No. 6-23-01
MILLER, P.J.
{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Tristan Alan Mendenhall (“Mendenhall”) appeals
the December 7, 2022 judgment of the Hardin County Court of Common Pleas
determining he violated the terms of his community control and imposing a prison
term. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
Background
{¶2} On April 13, 2022, the Hardin County Grand Jury indicted Mendenhall
on six counts: Counts One and Two of disrupting public services in violation of R.C.
2909.04(A)(1), (C), fourth-degree felonies; Count Three of tampering with evidence
in violation of R.C. 2921.12(A)(1), (B), a third-degree felony; Counts Four and Five
of domestic violence in violation of R.C. 2919.25(A), (D)(4), third-degree felonies;
and Count Six of theft in violation of R.C. 2913.02(A), (B)(2), a fifth-degree felony.
Mendenhall appeared for arraignment on May 3, 2022 and entered not guilty pleas.
{¶3} Pursuant to a negotiated-plea agreement, on June 2, 2022, Mendenhall
appeared for a change-of-plea hearing where he entered guilty pleas to Counts One,
Three, Four, and Six. In exchange, the State agreed to recommend dismissal of the
remaining counts. The trial court accepted Mendenhall’s guilty pleas, found him
guilty of the four counts and, at the request of the State, dismissed the remaining
counts. The trial court ordered a presentence investigation.
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{¶4} On August 8, 2022, Mendenhall appeared for sentencing. Pursuant to
the parties’ recommendation, the trial court sentenced Mendenhall to five years of
community control. As a condition of his community control, Mendenhall was
ordered to complete a treatment program at the W.O.R.T.H. Center, a community-
based-correctional facility (“CBCF”). He was also ordered to complete the Hardin
County Recovery Court (“Recovery Court”) program and follow all terms and
recommendations therein which also included completing treatment at a CBCF.
{¶5} On or about November 3, 2022, Mendenhall’s supervising officer was
notified Mendenhall was being unsuccessfully discharged from the W.O.R.T.H.
Center. Thereafter, on November 9, 2022, the trial court filed an entry suspending
Mendenhall’s participation in Recovery Court. In its judgment entry, the trial court
stated the Recovery Court treatment team recommended the termination of
Mendenhall’s participation in the program due to an alleged violation of the terms
of the Recovery Court program. On November 22, 2022, the State filed a motion
requesting the trial court revoke Mendenhall’s community-control supervision due
to his violation of the terms of his community control, specifically, his alleged
violation of the terms of his participation in the Recovery Court program and his
unsuccessful completion of a CBCF.
{¶6} On December 7, 2022, a hearing was held on Mendenhall’s alleged
violation of community control. At the hearing, Mendenhall denied violating the
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terms of his supervision. The State introduced evidence and rested. Mendenhall
rested without introducing evidence. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court
found Mendenhall violated the terms of his community-control supervision and his
participation in Recovery Court was terminated.
{¶7} The trial court proceeded immediately to sentencing and sentenced
Mendenhall to 8 months in prison on Count One, 12 months in prison on Count
Three, 30 months in prison on Count Four, and 10 months in prison on Count Six.
The trial court further ordered the prison terms be served consecutively for an
aggregate term of 60 months in prison. Later that day, the trial court filed its
attendant judgment entry.
{¶8} On January 3, 2023, Mendenhall filed a notice of appeal. He raises
three assignments of error for our review. For ease of discussion, we will first
address Mendenhall’s third assignment of error.
Third Assignment of Error
The trial court erred in revoking Appellant’s community control.1
1 Mendenhall’s argument for this assignment of error consists of three sentences. He complains the State did not prove a community-control violation due to a confrontation error. The brief fails to specify the nature of this confrontation violation, provide adequate contentions with respect to the assignment of error, and fails to provide any argument, citations or authorities. We are only able to discern the basis of appellant’s argument because he cites the transcript where trial counsel set forth the objection and argument challenging the State’s evidence. We choose to address the assignment of error out of fairness and to provide resolution in this matter.
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{¶9} In his third assignment of error, Mendenhall argues that the trial court
erred by revoking his community control. Mendenhall alleges he was denied his
constitutional right to confront and cross examine witnesses against him when the
trial court admitted State’s Exhibit 1, a letter from Mendenhall’s case manager at
the W.O.R.T.H. Center to Tyler Overly (“Overly”), Mendenhall’s probation officer,
indicating that Mendenhall was being unsuccessfully discharged from the
W.O.R.T.H. Center due to aggressive behavior. (State’s Ex. 1). While Mendenhall
could not deny that he was removed from the W.O.R.T.H. Center program, he
wanted to refute the allegations of aggressive behavior. Mendenhall alleges that,
because the author of the letter did not testify at his community-control violation
hearing, he was denied his constitution right to confront witnesses against him. We
disagree.
{¶10} “The Confrontation Clause to the Sixth Amendment of the United
States Constitution, made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment,
provides that ‘“[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right * * *
to be confronted with the witnesses against him * * *.”’” State v. Thomas, 3d Dist.
Marion No. 9-19-73, 2020-Ohio-5379, ¶ 17, quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541
U.S. 36, 42, 124 S.Ct. 1354 (2004), quoting the Confrontation Clause. The similar
provisions of Section 10, Article I of the Ohio Constitution “provide[ ] no greater
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right of confrontation than the Sixth Amendment * * *.” State v. Self, 56 Ohio St.3d
73, 79 (1990).
{¶11} However, Evid.R. 101(D)(3) expressly provides that the rules of
evidence do not apply to “proceedings with respect to community control
sanctions.” “A probation revocation hearing is not a formal criminal trial but is ‘“an
informal hearing structured to assure that the finding of a * * * [probation] violation
will be based on verified facts and that the exercise of discretion will be informed
by an accurate knowledge of the * * * [probationer’s] behavior.”’” State v. Reese,
8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 109055, 2020-Ohio-4747, ¶ 14, quoting State v. Hylton, 75
Ohio App.3d 778, 781 (4th Dist.1991), quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471,
92 S.Ct. 2593 (1972).
{¶12} Nonetheless, “[a] defendant charged with violating community control
and facing imprisonment is entitled to due process of the law under the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution.” State v. Theisen, 4th Dist. Athens
No. 22CA8, 2023-Ohio-2412, ¶ 20, citing Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 781,
93 S.Ct. 1756, 1759 (1973); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 485, 92 S.Ct. 2593
(1972); State v. Boling, 4th Dist. Athens No. 01CA30, 2001 WL 1646691, *2 (Dec.
17, 2001); Crim.R. 32.3. Specifically, at a final hearing on the alleged violation of
community control, before a defendant can be sent to prison for violating
community control, the defendant is entitled to the following procedures:
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“(a) written notice of the claimed violations of [community control]; (b) disclosure to the [defendant] of evidence against him; (c) opportunity to be heard in person and to present witnesses and documentary evidence; (d) the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses (unless the hearing officer specifically finds good cause for not allowing confrontation); (e) a ‘neutral and detached’ hearing body * * * ; and (f) a written statement by the factfinders as to the evidence relied on and reasons for [finding a community- control violation].”
Gagnon at 786, quoting Morrissey at 489.
{¶13} At the December 7, 2022 hearing, the State called Overly,
Mendenhall’s supervising community-control officer. (Dec. 7, 2022 Tr. at 6-7).
The State introduced State’s Exhibit 1, a letter written to Overly by Emily
Aufderhaar (“Aufderhaar”), Mendenhall’s case manager at the W.O.R.T.H. Center,
stating that Mendenhall is being “unsuccessfully discharged” from the facility “for
repeated verbal and physical aggression.” (Id. at 9); (State’s Ex. 1). Overly stated
that, as part of his responsibilities as a community-control officer, he receives such
letters with respect to his supervisees. (Dec. 7, 2022 Tr. at 9-10). The State moved
for the admission of State’s Exhibit 1, and Mendenhall’s trial counsel objected on
the basis of hearsay, lack of foundation, and violation of Mendenhall’s right to
confront Aufderhaar. (Id. at 10-11). The trial court admitted State’s Exhibit 1 over
Mendenhall’s objection. (Id. at 11).
{¶14} Overly stated that around November 3, 2022, he learned Mendenhall
was unsuccessfully discharged from the W.O.R.T.H. Center. (Id.). Overly
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indicated that successful completion of the program at the W.O.R.T.H. Center was
a term of Mendenhall’s community control; however, Mendenhall failed to
complete the program. (Id. at 11-12). According to Overly, after being discharged
from the W.O.R.T.H. Center, Mendenhall was preliminarily terminated from
Recovery Court. (Id. at 12). Overly stated that completion of the Recovery Court
program was a term of Mendenhall’s community control. (Id.). Thus, according to
Overly, Mendenhall violated the terms of his community control by (1) his
unsuccessful discharge from the W.O.R.T.H. Center and (2) his termination from
Recovery Court. (Id.).
{¶15} Overly also specified that he was responsible for retrieving
Mendenhall from the W.O.R.T.H. Center and that the W.O.R.T.H. Center staff
released Mendenhall to him because he was being discharged. (Dec. 7, 2022 Tr. at
14).
{¶16} Mendenhall was given the opportunity to cross examine Overly, but
declined to do so. (Id. at 12-14). Mendenhall did not present any evidence or
witnesses. (Id. at 14-15).
{¶17} “‘The introduction of hearsay evidence into a [community-control]-
revocation hearing is reversible error when that evidence is the only evidence
presented and is crucial to a determination of a [community-control] violation.’”
State v. Johnson, 4th Dist. Meigs No. 14CA10, 2015-Ohio-1373, ¶ 25, quoting State
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v. Ohly, 166 Ohio App.3d 808, 2006-Ohio-2353, ¶ 21 (6th Dist.). After reviewing
the evidence adduced at the hearing, it is evident the trial court did not rely
exclusively on hearsay evidence. Notably, the State presented testimony in addition
to State’s Exhibit 1 to demonstrate that Mendenhall violated the terms of his
community control. For instance, Overly testified he picked up Mendenhall from
the W.O.R.T.H. Center following his discharge. See State v. Newsome, 4th Dist.
Hocking No. 17CA2, 2017-Ohio-7488, ¶ 22-23. Furthermore, we note that
Mendenhall does not contest that he was discharged from the W.O.R.T.H. Center
or that he did not successfully complete the treatment program, rather he argues he
did not actually engage in the repeated violence and aggression referenced in State’s
Exhibit 1. However, the reason for his termination from the treatment program at
the W.O.R.T.H. Center is not necessarily relevant to the trial court’s determination
that he violated the terms of his community control by not completing (1) the
treatment program at the W.O.R.T.H. Center and (2) Recovery Court, both of which
were specific conditions of his community control.
{¶18} Moreover, State’s Exhibit 1 is not hearsay. Hearsay is a “statement,
other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered
in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the statement.” Evid.R.
801(C). “Only testimonial hearsay implicates the Confrontation Clause.” State v.
McKelton, 148 Ohio St.3d 261, 2016-Ohio-5735, ¶ 185. “If the statement is
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nontestimonial, it is merely subject to the regular admissibility requirements of the
hearsay rules.” State v. Peeples, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 07 MA 212, 2009-Ohio-
1198, ¶ 19.
{¶19} Here, State’s Exhibit 1 was introduced not for the truth of its contents,
i.e. that Mendenhall engaged in aggressive behavior, but to demonstrate that
Mendenhall was terminated from the W.O.R.T.H. Center and how Overly was
informed of Mendenhall’s discharge from the program. Accordingly, the State
relied on State’s Exhibit 1 to demonstrate how Overly became aware of
Mendenhall’s discharge from the W.O.R.T.H. Center rather than to demonstrate the
veracity of Aufderhaar’s statement that Mendenhall engaged in repeated verbal and
physical aggression. Overly testified, based on his personal knowledge, that
Mendenhall was unsuccessfully discharged from the W.O.R.T.H. Center.
{¶20} Moreover, State’s Exhibit 1 fell within the business record exception
to hearsay. “Documents that are ‘neither prepared for the primary purpose of
accusing a targeted individual nor prepared for the primary purpose of providing
evidence in a criminal trial [are] nontestimonial, and [their] admission into evidence
at trial under Evid.R. 803(6) as a business record does not violate a defendant’s
Sixth Amendment confrontation rights.’” State v. Shepherd, 3d Dist. Hardin Nos.
6-19-02 and 6-19-03, 2020-Ohio-3915, ¶ 32, quoting State v. Maxwell, 139 Ohio
St.3d 12, 2014-Ohio-1019, syllabus. “Generally, business records are
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nontestimonial because they are * * * typically not prepared for litigation.” Id.
citing State v. Hood, 135 Ohio St.3d 137, 2012-Ohio-6208, ¶ 34. Here, it appears
the primary purpose of State’s Exhibit 1 was for the W.O.R.T.H. Center to inform
Mendenhall’s supervising officer of Mendenhall’s progress and status in the
treatment program. Overly testified that he regularly receives such communication
from the W.O.R.T.H. Center with respect to his supervisees and that, as part of his
duties, he retains such communication as part of the file he maintains on each person
he supervises. Thus, State’s Exhibit 1 is a business record, which is nontestimonial
in nature. See Shepherd at ¶ 33-34.
{¶21} Accordingly, for the aforementioned reasons, there is no
Confrontation-Clause Violation.
{¶22} Mendenhall’s third assignment of error is overruled.
First Assignment of Error
Appellant’s [sentence] was not supported by sufficient evidence.
Second Assignment of Error
The trial court erred in sentencing Appellant to consecutive sentences.
{¶23} In his first assignment of error, Mendenhall argues that the trial court
erred by sentencing him to a prison term. Specifically, Mendenhall alleges the trial
court did not properly weigh the recidivism factors. In his second assignment of
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error, Mendenhall argues the consecutive sentences imposed by the trial court were
not supported by the record. For the reasons that follow, we disagree.
Standard of Review
{¶24} Under R.C. 2953.08(G)(2), an appellate court may reverse a sentence
“only if it determines by clear and convincing evidence that the record does not
support the trial court’s findings under relevant statutes or that the sentence is
otherwise contrary to law.” State v. Marcum, 146 Ohio St.3d 516, 2016-Ohio-1002,
¶ 1. Clear and convincing evidence is that “‘which will produce in the mind of the
trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to the facts sought to be established.’” Id.
at ¶ 22, quoting Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469 (1954), paragraph three of the
syllabus.
Relevant Authority: Felony Sentencing
{¶25} “‘Trial courts have full discretion to impose any sentence within the
statutory range.’” State v. Smith, 3d Dist. Seneca No. 13-15-17, 2015-Ohio-4225, ¶
9, quoting State v. Noble, 3d Dist. Logan No. 8-14-06, 2014-Ohio-5485, ¶ 9. A
sentence imposed within the statutory range is generally valid so long as the trial
court considered the applicable statutory policies that apply to every felony
sentencing, including those contained in R.C. 2929.11, and the sentencing factors
of 2929.12. See State v. Watts, 3d Dist. Auglaize No. 2-20-10, 2020-Ohio-5572, ¶
10 and 14; State v. Maggette, 3d Dist. Seneca No. 13-16-06, 2016-Ohio-5554, ¶ 31.
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{¶26} R.C. 2929.11 provides, in pertinent part, that the “overriding purposes
of felony sentencing are to protect the public from future crime by the offender and
others, to punish the offender, and to promote the effective rehabilitation of the
offender using the minimum sanctions that the court determines accomplish those
purposes without imposing an unnecessary burden on state or local government
resources.” R.C. 2929.11(A). To achieve the overriding purposes of felony
sentencing, R.C. 2929.11 directs courts to “consider the need for incapacitating the
offender, deterring the offender and others from future crime, rehabilitating the
offender, and making restitution to the victim of the offense, the public, or both.”
Id. In addition, R.C. 2929.11(B) instructs that a sentence imposed for a felony “shall
be reasonably calculated to achieve the three overriding purposes of felony
sentencing * * *, commensurate with and not demeaning to the seriousness of the
offender’s conduct and its impact upon the victim, and consistent with sentences
imposed for similar crimes committed by similar offenders.”
{¶27} “In accordance with these principles, the trial court must consider the
factors set forth in R.C. 2929.12(B)-(E) relating to the seriousness of the offender’s
conduct and the likelihood of the offender’s recidivism.” Smith at ¶ 10, citing R.C.
2929.12(A). In addition, the trial court must consider “the factors set forth in [R.C.
2929.12(F)] pertaining to the offender’s service in the armed forces of the United
States.” R.C. 2929.12(A). “‘A sentencing court has broad discretion to determine
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the relative weight to assign the sentencing factors in R.C. 2929.12.’” Smith at ¶
15, quoting State v. Brimacombe, 195 Ohio App.3d 524, 2011-Ohio-5032, ¶ 18 (6th
Dist.), citing State v. Arnett, 88 Ohio St.3d 208, 215 (2000).
Analysis: Felony Sentencing
{¶28} The trial court sentenced Mendenhall to 12 months and 30 months in
prison for third-degree felony tampering with evidence and domestic violence
respectively; 8 months in prison for fourth-degree felony disrupting public services;
and 10 months in prison for fifth-degree-felony theft. Thus, Mendenhall’s sentences
fall within the respective statutory ranges. See R.C. 2929.14(A)(3)(b); R.C.
2929.14(A)(4); R.C. 2929.14(A)(5).
{¶29} The record reflects that the trial court considered R.C. 2929.11 and
2929.12 when fashioning Mendenhall’s sentence. In its judgment entry of sentence,
the trial court indicated that “a prison sentence * * * is consistent with the purposes
and principles of sentencing under Ohio Revised Code Section 2929.11 because a
prison sentence is reasonably necessary to punish the offender and to deter,
rehabilitate, and incapacitate the offender in order to protect the public from future
crime, and would not place an unnecessary burden on governmental resources.”
(Doc. No. 52). See R.C. 2929.11(A). Additionally, during sentencing, the trial court
addressed several of the seriousness and recidivism factors contained in R.C.
2929.12. (Dec. 7, 2022 Tr. at 19-22). Therefore, because Mendenhall’s prison
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sentence is within the applicable statutory range and the record supports that the
trial court fulfilled its obligation of considering R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12,
Mendenhall’s individual sentences are valid. See Watts, 2020-Ohio-5572, at ¶ 14.
{¶30} Yet, Mendenhall argues the trial court improperly weighed the
recidivism factors in light of his desire to seek substance-abuse treatment to address
his underlying issues. Mendenhall contends the trial court erred by sentencing him
to prison rather than continuing him on community control and considering another
CBCF or allowing him to complete Recovery Court. However, pursuant to the
agreement of the parties, the trial court did initially sentence Mendenhall to
community control with the special requirements that he complete a treatment
program at the W.O.R.T.H. Center and complete Recovery Court. However, the
record indicates that Mendenhall was terminated from the treatment program at the
W.O.R.T.H. Center and, as a result, was unsuccessfully terminated from Recovery
Court.
{¶31} At the December 7, 2022 hearing, the trial court detailed the efforts
that it previously made at rehabilitating Mendenhall, including a prior placement in
the W.O.R.T.H. program. The trial court commented, “[w]e tried very hard” and
“went way over the mark in trying to bring him into Recovery Court just to try to
help him.” (Dec. 7, 2022 Tr. at 20). However, the trial court remarked that “all our
efforts were unavailing.” (Id.).
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{¶32} Further, although “R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(a) permits an appellate court
to modify or vacate a sentence if it clearly and convincingly finds ‘the record does
not support the sentencing court’s findings under’ certain specified statutory
provisions[,] * * * R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12 are not among the statutory provisions
listed in R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(a).” State v. Jones, 163 Ohio St.3d 242, 2020-Ohio-
6729, ¶ 28. Moreover, “an appellate court’s determination that the record does not
support a sentence does not equate to a determination that the sentence is ‘otherwise
contrary to law’ as that term is used in R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(b).” Id. at ¶ 32. Thus,
R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) “does not provide a basis for an appellate court to modify or
vacate a sentence based on its view that the sentence is not supported by the record
under R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12.” Id. at ¶ 39. “[A]n appellate court errs if it * * *
modifies or vacates a sentence ‘based on the lack of support in the record for the
trial court’s findings under R.C. 2929.11 and R.C. 2929.12.’” State v. Dorsey, 2d
Dist. Montgomery No. 28747, 2021-Ohio-76, ¶ 17, quoting Jones at ¶ 29.
{¶33} Accordingly, even if we were to agree with Mendenhall that his
sentence is not supported by the record under R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12, which we
do not, we could not vacate or modify his sentence on that basis. As discussed
above, Mendenhall’s prison sentence is within the applicable statutory range, and it
is clear the trial court considered R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12 when fashioning his
sentence. Hence, Mendenhall’s prison sentence is not clearly and convincingly
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contrary to law, and it must therefore be affirmed. See State v. Slife, 3d Dist.
Auglaize No. 2-20-17, 2021-Ohio-644, ¶ 17.
{¶34} Next, Mendenhall argues that the trial court erred by ordering the
sentences in the instant case to be served consecutively to each other.
Relevant Authority: Consecutive Sentencing
{¶35} “Except as provided in * * * division (C) of section 2929.14, * * * a
prison term, jail term, or sentence of imprisonment shall be served concurrently with
any other prison term, jail term, or sentence of imprisonment imposed by a court of
this state, another state, or the United States.” R.C. 2929.41(A). R.C. 2929.14(C)
provides:
(4) * * * [T]he court may require the offender to serve the prison terms consecutively if the court finds that the consecutive service is necessary to protect the public from future crime or to punish the offender and that consecutive sentences are not disproportionate to the seriousness of the offender’s conduct and to the danger the offender poses to the public, and if the court also finds any of the following:
(a) The offender committed one or more of the multiple offenses while the offender was awaiting trial or sentencing, was under a sanction imposed pursuant to section 2929.16, 2929.17, or 2929.18 of the Revised Code, or was under post-release control for a prior offense.
(b) At least two of the multiple offenses were committed as part of one or more courses of conduct, and the harm caused by two or more of the multiple offenses so committed was so great or unusual that no single prison term for any of the offenses committed as part of any of the courses of conduct adequately reflects the seriousness of the offender’s conduct.
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(c) The offender’s history of criminal conduct demonstrates that consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the public from future crime by the offender.
{¶36} R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) requires a trial court to make specific findings on
the record when imposing consecutive sentences. State v. Hites, 3d Dist. Hardin
No. 6-11-07, 2012-Ohio-1892, ¶ 11. Specifically, the trial court must find: (1)
consecutive sentences are necessary to either protect the public or punish the
offender; (2) the sentences would not be disproportionate to the offense committed;
and (3) one of the factors in R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(a), (b), or (c) applies. Id.
{¶37} The trial court must state the required findings at the sentencing
hearing prior to imposing consecutive sentences and incorporate those findings into
its sentencing entry. State v. Sharp, 3d Dist. Putnam No. 12-13-01, 2014-Ohio-
4140, ¶ 50, citing State v. Bonnell, 140 Ohio St.3d 209, 2014-Ohio-3177, ¶ 29. A
trial court “has no obligation to state reasons to support its findings” and is not
“required to give a talismanic incantation of the words of the statute, provided that
the necessary findings can be found in the record and are incorporated into the
sentencing entry.” Bonnell at ¶ 37.
Analysis: Consecutive Sentencing
{¶38} Mendenhall does not argue that the trial court failed to make the
requisite consecutive-sentencing findings under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4). Rather,
Mendenhall contends the record does not support the trial court’s findings.
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{¶39} At the sentencing hearing, the trial court stated:
The Court will find that consecutive sentencing is appropriate, that two or more of the events were committed as a course of action, and that a single prison term would not be appropriate and would not address adequately the seriousness of his conduct and danger that he poses to the public.
Further, the Court will find that the defendant has a history of criminal conduct which demonstrates that consecutive sentencing is necessary. The Court will, therefore, order that the 8-month, 12-month, 30- month, and 10-month term[s] of imprisonment run consecutive for an aggregated term of 60 months with the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction.
(Dec. 7, 2022 Tr. at 23). The trial court memorialized those findings in its
sentencing entry. Accordingly, the record reflects that the trial court made the
appropriate R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) findings before imposing consecutive sentences and
incorporated those findings into its sentencing entry.
{¶40} Nonetheless, Mendenhall summarily argues that his consecutive
sentences are not supported by the record because the charges stemmed from a
single incident. (Appellant’s Brief at 11). Mendenhall has failed to argue
specifically how his consecutive sentences are not supported by the record. Having
found no error in the trial court’s imposition of consecutive sentences, we decline
to root out any possible argument for him. See App.R. 16(A)(7).
{¶41} Mendenhall’s first and second assignments of error are overruled.
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Conclusion
{¶42} Having found no error prejudicial to the appellant herein in the
particulars assigned and argued, we affirm the judgment of the Hardin County Court
of Common Pleas.
WALDICK and ZIMMERMAN, J.J., concur.
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