State v. Mele

Opinion

[Cite as State v. Mele, 2026-Ohio-2604.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COLUMBIANA COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

CHRISTOPHER C. MELE,

Defendant-Appellant.

OPINION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY Case No. 25 CO 0046

Criminal Appeal from the Court of Common Pleas of Columbiana County, Ohio Case No. 24 CR 33

BEFORE: Cheryl L. Waite, Carol Ann Robb, Mark A. Hanni, Judges.

JUDGMENT: Reversed and Remanded.

Atty. Vito J. Abruzzino, Columbiana County Prosecutor and Atty. Alec A. Beech, Assistant Prosecutor, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Atty. David J. Betras and Atty. Frank L. Cassese, Betras Kopp, LLC, for Defendant- Appellant

Dated: July 2, 2026 –2–

WAITE, P.J.

{¶1} Appellant Christopher C. Mele appeals a November 7, 2025 judgment entry

convicting him of various offenses related to driving under the influence following a traffic

accident. Appellant’s arguments are specifically directed towards three judgment entries

by the trial court denying his three separate motions to suppress evidence: September

30, 2024 (search warrant); March 13, 2025 (refrigeration of blood vials); and June 4, 2025

(time limit to draw blood samples). Appellant contends that the Columbiana County

Municipal Court Judge lacked jurisdiction to issue a warrant for a search in Mahoning

County, his blood sample was taken outside of the time limits prescribed by law, and his

sample was left unrefrigerated for a lengthy period of time in violation of provisions

contained in the Ohio Administrative Code. Because Appellant’s blood sample was left

unrefrigerated for thirty-two hours and nineteen minutes between transit periods,

Appellant’s arguments have merit, in part. The judgment of the trial court denying

suppression of the blood evidence is reversed and the matter is remanded to allow the

state to elect whether sufficient grounds remain to proceed with prosecution without the

relevant blood test results.

Factual and Procedural History

{¶2} On August 12, 2023, officers responded to the scene of an accident

involving two motor vehicles where multiple persons had been injured. The accident

occurred on State Route 14 near Timberline Road in Columbiana County. The record

reflects that Appellant operated his vehicle left of center and struck an oncoming vehicle,

causing significant injuries to its passengers.

{¶3} Officers responded to the scene at 6:02 p.m. Patrolman Colin Trayes spoke

to Appellant and observed that he exhibited signs of intoxication, including slurred speech

Case No. 25CO0046 –3–

and glassy, bloodshot eyes. Following the accident, Appellant was transported to St.

Elizabeth’s Hospital in Youngstown, Mahoning County.

{¶4} Patrolman Trayes sought and obtained a search warrant from a municipal

court judge in Columbiana County to seize a sample of Appellant’s blood for purposes of

performing a blood-alcohol test. At 10:04 p.m., a registered nurse drew Appellant’s blood

using an Ohio State Patrol blood draw kit, and transferred the blood vials to the officers.

Patrolman Trayes transported the vials to the Columbiana Police Department. He placed

them in a temporary evidence locker at 12:33 a.m. on August 13, 2023. It is undisputed

this locker was not refrigerated. Patrolman Trayes opted not to refrigerate the samples

due to his unsubstantiated belief that refrigeration was not required.

{¶5} Appellant’s vials of blood were not mailed to the Ohio State Patrol Crime

Lab until 8:52 a.m. on August 14, 2023, approximately forty-seven hours after the draw

and thirty-two hours after placement in the evidence locker. It is unclear why mailing was

delayed, however the reason is irrelevant, as the issue is whether the sample remained

unrefrigerated during the time it was stored and not whether the sample was timely

mailed. Nonetheless, the vials were received by the lab on August 16, 2023, two days

after mailing. An analysis showed the sample to contain 0.160 grams by weight of alcohol

per one hundred milliliters of whole blood.

{¶6} On January 11, 2024, Appellant was indicted on one count of aggravated

vehicular assault, a felony of the third degree in violation of R.C. 2903.08(A)(1)(a); one

count of vehicular assault, a felony of the fourth degree in violation of R.C.

2903.08(A)(2)(b); and two counts of operating a vehicle under the influence,

misdemeanors of the first degree in violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(a) and R.C.

Case No. 25CO0046 –4–

4511(A)(1)(B). The state later nolled the R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(B) charge due to the failure

of police to obtain a blood sample within the legal time constraints.

{¶7} Appellant’s counsel filed three separate motions to suppress the blood test

results. On May 23, 2024, he filed a motion seeking to exclude the test results due to

violations of the Ohio Administrative Code, arguing that the vials were held in an

unrefrigerated storage locker for forty-seven hours before being mailed to the testing lab.

On August 14, 2024, Appellant sought exclusion of the testing results because the

warrant to seize the blood samples was signed by a Columbiana County Municipal Court

judge despite the fact that Appellant was located at the time in a Mahoning County

hospital. In his final motion, filed on April 16, 2025, Appellant urged exclusion of the

testing results because his blood was drawn outside of the three-hour time limit set forth

within the Code.

{¶8} While the trial court found that multiple violations of law had occurred in

regard to the blood draw, it determined that suppression was not warranted because

officers had substantially complied with the law. The court found that the issuing judge

lacked jurisdiction to authorize the warrant, but inferred the error was nonfundamental

and did not warrant suppression. Following denial of all suppression motions, on

September 5, 2025 Appellant entered into a no contest plea. On November 7, 2025, the

court sentenced Appellant to an aggregate thirty-month prison term. Appellant

unsuccessfully filed motions seeking stay of execution of his sentence with both the trial

court and this Court.

Case No. 25CO0046 –5–

Motion to Suppress

{¶9} A motion to suppress presents mixed issues of law and fact. State v. Lake,

2003-Ohio-332 (7th Dist.), citing State v. Jedd, 146 Ohio App.3d 167, 171 (4th Dist.

2001.). If a trial court's findings of fact are supported by competent credible evidence, an

appellate court must accept them. Id. The court must then determine whether the trial

court's decision met the applicable legal standard. Id.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 1

The trial court erred in denying Appellant’s motion to suppress because the

warrant authorizing seizure of Appellant’s blood was issued in violation of

Crim.R. 41(A) and Appellant’s rights under the Fourth Amendment to the

United States Constitution and Article I, Section 14 of the Ohio Constitution,

where the issuing judge lacked lawful authority to issue the warrant and the

warrant was void as a matter of law.

{¶10} Appellant argues that the Columbiana County Municipal Court judge lacked

authority to issue the warrant for a blood draw to be executed outside of its jurisdiction.

Because the judge lacked jurisdiction to issue the warrant, Appellant claims it was invalid

and was without legal force. If the warrant was void, there was no need for the trial court

to engage in an analysis to determine if the error was fundamental or nonfundamental.

Appellant explains that Crim.R. 41(A) bases jurisdiction on the physical location where

the search is to occur, not where the investigation began. Appellant urges that not only

did the judge lack jurisdiction to issue a warrant, but Patrolman Trayes also lacked

Case No. 25CO0046 –6–

jurisdiction as a Columbiana County Patrolman to execute the warrant in Mahoning

County.

{¶11} In response, the state concedes that the judge lacked jurisdiction to issue

the warrant, but contends the warrant was not invalid, as this violation is nonfundamental

in nature. The state addresses a “split” among Ohio courts as to whether a judge’s action

in issuing a warrant outside of its jurisdiction requires suppression of the evidence

collected under such a warrant.

{¶12} Our analysis begins with a review of Crim.R. 41(A)(1), which provides the

authority to a judge to issue a warrant: “[a] search warrant authorized by this rule may be

issued by a judge of a court of record to search and seize property located within the

court's territorial jurisdiction.” By the statute’s plain language, a judge may only issue a

warrant for a search within its own jurisdiction. Thus, as the state concedes, the judge

erred in signing this warrant. The question becomes whether this error should result in

suppression of the evidence.

{¶13} The Ohio Supreme Court adopted a test arising out of federal court practice

to determine if a violation of Crim.R. 41 is considered “fundamental” or “nonfundamental.”

State v. Wilmoth, 22 Ohio St.3d 251 (1986). The test provides:

. . . Suppression is not required in all cases where the issuance of a

search warrant fails to conform to the dictates of Rule 41. Only a

‘fundamental’ violation of Rule 41 requires automatic suppression, and a

violation is ‘fundamental’ only where it, in effect, renders the search

unconstitutional under traditional fourth amendment standards. * * *

Violations of Rule 41 which do not arise to constitutional error are classified

Case No. 25CO0046 –7–

as ‘non-fundamental.’ ‘Non-fundamental’ noncompliance with Rule 41

requires suppression only where:

(1) there was ‘prejudice’ in the sense that the search might not have

occurred or would not have been so abrasive if the Rule had been followed,

or (2) there is evidence of intentional and deliberate disregard of a provision

in the Rule. United States v. Radlick [ (C.A. 9, 1978), 581 F.2d 225], supra,

at 228, quoting United States v. Burke [ (C.A. 2, 1975), 517 F.2d 377],

supra.” (Footnote omitted.)

Wilmoth at *263.

{¶14} As stated within the quote, the test was created and applied in cases

involving a warrant obtained through a deficient affidavit, not on jurisdictional failure.

Several Ohio appellate districts have addressed this issue. The early cases in Ohio held

that a judge signing a warrant for execution outside of its jurisdiction did not rise to a

Fourth Amendment violation, thus the evidence collected was not subject to suppression.

Since those cases were issued, the Third District has come to the opposite conclusion

based on its reading of federal caselaw.

{¶15} Because Appellant’s second assignment of error is dispositive in this case,

we need not delve into an exhausting review of the lengthy caselaw addressing this issue.

Nonetheless, the vast majority holds that while a municipal court judge lacks jurisdiction

to issue an out-of-county search warrant, when the warrant was acquired under all of the

processes set up to protect Fourth Amendment principles and the location of the evidence

seized does not impinge strongly on those principles, it is a nonfundamental error which

Case No. 25CO0046 –8–

does not rise to the level requiring suppression of any otherwise lawfully obtained

evidence. Because the judge in this matter reviewed the search warrant application and

found probable cause existed, the warrant itself appears valid. The trial court correctly

characterized this as a nonfundamental violation which did not rise to the level necessary

to require suppression of the blood evidence obtained. Appellant’s first assignment of

error is without merit.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 2

The trial court erred in admitting and refusing to exclude the blood

toxicology evidence because exclusion is required as the remedy for the

Crim. R. 41(A)/Fourth Amendment violation, and because the State failed

to establish admissibility under Ohio’s statutory and administrative

requirements governing blood-alcohol testing.

{¶16} In this assignment, Appellant raises a two-fold argument. He first contends

the court erred in allowing the blood evidence to be presented despite the fact that his

blood draw occurred four hours and two minutes after the accident, well over the three-

hour limit prescribed by Ohio law. He next argues that the vials containing his blood

samples were not mailed for testing until forty-seven hours after the draw, and thirty-two

hours and nineteen minutes after placement in the evidence locker.

{¶17} Addressing only the second prong of Appellant’s argument, the state

responds that there is a split among Ohio districts as to whether prolonged periods without

refrigeration will result in suppression of blood evidence. The state focuses on a case

arising out of the Eleventh District, State v. Price, 2008-Ohio-1134 (11th Dist.). In that

Case No. 25CO0046 –9–

case, the Eleventh District held that a six-hour pre-mailing period, along with an eight-day

mailing period, was not unreasonable. Hence, the blood test was not subject to

suppression. The state also cites caselaw explaining that because regular mail delivery

is unpredictable, the police cannot be held responsible for transit time. See State v.

Partin, 2011-Ohio-794 (12th Dist.). The state also cites to testimony that there was no

indication the blood analysis was unreliable.

{¶18} The timing of the blood draw will be addressed first. In relevant part, R.C.

4511.19(D)(1)(b) provides:

In any criminal prosecution or juvenile court proceeding for a violation

of division (A) or (B) of this section or for an equivalent offense that is

vehicle-related, the court may admit evidence on the presence and

concentration of alcohol, drugs of abuse, controlled substances,

metabolites of a controlled substance, or a combination of them in the

defendant's whole blood, blood serum or plasma, breath, urine, oral fluid,

or other bodily substance at the time of the alleged violation as shown by

chemical analysis of the substance withdrawn within three hours of the time

of the alleged violation.

{¶19} There appears to be no dispute that this accident occurred at 6:02 p.m.

which would mark the start of the time clock for purposes of applying this code section.

Hence, the blood draw was required to occur no later than 9:02 p.m. During Patrolman

Trayes’ testimony, he stated that Appellant’s blood was drawn at 10:04 p.m. (Tr., p. 12.)

The blood draw, then, occurred one hour and two minutes over the three-hour

Case No. 25CO0046 – 10 –

requirement of the code. The question becomes whether that one hour and two minute

period rises to the level of reversible error on review of the trial court’s decision that

suppression was unnecessary.

{¶20} As explained by the Ohio Supreme Court, a blood draw that is taken outside

of the time limits is inadmissible to prove a violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(2), (3), (4),

however:

In prosecutions for violations of such sections [R.C. 4911.19(A)(1)],

the amount of alcohol found as a result of the chemical testing of bodily

substances is only of secondary interest. See Taylor, Drunk Driving

Defense (2 Ed.1986) 394, Section 6.0.1. The defendant's ability to

perceive, make judgments, coordinate movements, and safely operate a

vehicle is at issue in the prosecution of a defendant under such section. It

is the behavior of the defendant which is the crucial issue. The accuracy of

the test is not the critical issue as it is in prosecutions for per se violations.

Furthermore, the statutory presumptions which existed at the time of

Cincinnati v. Sand, supra, no longer exist. Thus, no presumptive weight

can be given to the test results under these sections. The test results, if

probative, are merely considered in addition to all other evidence of

impaired driving in a prosecution for this offense.

City of Newark v. Lucas, 40 Ohio St.3d 100, 104 (1988).

{¶21} Here, the state nolled the per se violation charged under R.C.

4511.19(A)(1)(B) due to the admitted violation of the three-hour rule. The remaining OVI

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charge could still proceed so long as the state offered the appropriate supporting

testimony. At the suppression hearing, the lab technician did provide the relevant

testimony. Hence, Appellant’s argument that suppression was required based on the

timing of the blood draw is without merit.

{¶22} Turning to the second prong of Appellant’s assignment, we find this issue

to be dispositive in this matter. The legal requirements related to when and whether

bodily fluids, including blood, are required to be refrigerated are set forth in the Ohio

Administrative Code (“OAC”.) In order to challenge compliance with an OAC regulation,

a defendant must file a motion to suppress. State v. Burnside, 2003-Ohio-5372, ¶ 24.

Once the motion is filed, the state has the burden of demonstrating substantial

compliance with the regulation. Id. A showing of substantial compliance creates a

presumption of admissibility. Id. The burden then shifts to the defendant to demonstrate

he or she suffered prejudice by anything less than strict compliance. Id.

{¶23} The Ohio Supreme Court has held that strict compliance with OAC

regulations is not always realistic or possible. Burnside at ¶ 34, citing State v. Plummer,

22 Ohio St.3d 292 (1986). Thus, “rigid compliance with the Department of Health

regulations is not necessary for test results to be admissible.” Burnside at ¶ 34. This is

why only substantial compliance with the OAC regulations is sufficient. Id. The Burnside

Court explained that substantial compliance excuses errors that are “de minimus,”

meaning “minor procedural deviations.” Id., citing State v. Homan, 89 Ohio St.3d 421,

426 (2000).

{¶24} The issue of refrigeration of bodily fluids is governed by OAC 3701-53-06

(G), which provides: “[w]hile not in transit or under examination, all blood, urine and oral

Case No. 25CO0046 – 12 –

fluid specimens will be refrigerated.” Pursuant to OAC 3701-53-01(A)(9), “ ‘In transit’

means in the possession of an individual employed by a hospital, law enforcement

agency, courier, or other delivery entity between the point of collection and a secure

storage location or between secure storage location and a laboratory.” It is clear from the

law that the time following the sample’s collection and its placement in the storage location

and the moment it leaves that location for testing, is not considered transit time. Thus,

the time between placement in the storage facility and mailing to a laboratory requires

refrigeration of these fluids unless some de minimus delay can be deemed reasonable.

{¶25} The state concedes that the blood sample drawn from Appellant sat in an

unrefrigerated storage locker from just after midnight in the very early morning of August

13, 2023 until the vials were mailed out at 8:52 a.m. on August 14, 2023. As Appellant

calculates within his brief, the blood remained unrefrigerated for almost forty-seven hours.

It is possible that this time may actually be greater, as it does not appear that the sample

was refrigerated from the time of collection at 10:04 p.m. until the paperwork was

completed after midnight.

{¶26} When asked about the issue at the suppression hearing, Patrolman Trayes

testified on cross-examination as follows:

Q. And you collected it on 8/12 and mailed it on 8/14? Do I have

that down correctly?

A. Yes.

Q. Was it refrigerated in your possession at that --- during that time?

Case No. 25CO0046 – 13 –

A. No.

Q. So it is fair for me to say from October 12 at 10:00 until it got

mailed on October the 14th, two-and-a-half days, roughly, it was in your

evidence locked not under refrigeration; isn’t that correct?

A. That is correct.

Q. Are you aware that the Ohio Revised Code and the Administrative

Code mandates that those vials be refrigerated while not in transit and not

being examined?

A. I’m under the influ --

Q. I’m just asking a question. Do you know whether or not the Ohio

Revised Code and the Ohio Administrative Code mandate that while those

items are not in transit they need to be refrigerated? That is a yes or no

question.

Q. I can’t answer it with a yes or no. If you could let me answer that

A. Go right ahead.

Q. It is my impression there was a memo several years ago that the

State released that these collection kits no longer needed to be refrigerated.

Q. Okay. That is your understanding?

Case No. 25CO0046 – 14 –

A. Correct.

(Tr., pp. 17-18.)

{¶27} Later, Lindsie Mayfield, a criminologist from the Ohio State Highway Patrol

Crime Lab, testified about the issue.

Q. All right. And what did the evidence technician do when they

received the evidence? What kind of storage facility did they put it in?

A. It was placed into Evidence Receiving Refrigerator Prelog.

Q. Refrigerator?

A. That’s correct.

Q. Why a refrigerator?

A. The Ohio Administrative Code requires it to be refrigerated.

Q. Because you know as a scientist that if it’s not stored in a

refrigerator it can be corrupted. Fair for me to say?

A. It’s a possibility.

Q. Well, that is in the Administrative Code; right?

A. It just says it needs to be stored in refrigeration.

Case No. 25CO0046 – 15 –

(Tr., pp. 61-62.) She also testified that she was unaware of any memorandum asserting

that blood vials did not require refrigeration.

{¶28} While the state focuses its attention on the time the vials spent without

refrigeration following their mailing to the laboratory, it ignores the time the blood was

without refrigeration prior to mailing. Unlike mailing transit time, where the length of time

in transit is no longer under law enforcement’s control, during the sample’s storage in

custody prior to mailing, an officer does control whether the sample is refrigerated.

Patrolman Trayes admittedly did not refrigerate the vials. He did not provide a reasonable

explanation other than his ignorance of the law. His testimony suggests that he relied on

an alleged memorandum to the contrary. However, the laboratory technician testified that

she had never heard of such memorandum. Even so, as an officer he would likely

understand that the OAC cannot be changed by means of a “memorandum.” Any action

to amend or repeal such law can only be accomplished by the legislature. Regardless,

ignorance of the law is never a defense to a violation of Ohio law.

{¶29} Contrary to the state’s assertions, there does not appear to be a “split”

among Ohio courts on this issue. The state is correct in that mailing transit time is not to

be weighed against the state. However, the state ignores the analysis requiring a showing

as to reasonableness of the pre-mailing time. Because the law includes a

reasonableness component, Ohio courts have appropriately applied a case-by-case

analysis; there is no bright-line test on the matter.

{¶30} Because of the fact specific nature of the caselaw, the issue is best

addressed by examining the decisions where the time delay was deemed acceptable

against what has been determined to be unacceptable. Beginning with the caselaw

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finding that a delay in refrigeration during storage was unreasonable, these times range

from twelve to twenty-two hours. In these cases, where the fluid samples have remained

without refrigeration for these lengths of time, no court has found this to be a “de minimus”

violation of law.

{¶31} In the instant case, the vials were unrefrigerated for a period of thirty-two

hours and nineteen minutes after transportation to the storage facility and before mailing.

This excludes the time between the blood draw and delivery to the storage location.

{¶32} In 2012, the Ninth District found a twenty-two hour and fifteen-minute delay

was unreasonable in State v. Oliver, 2010-Ohio-6306 (9th Dist.). Similar to the instant

case, the Oliver court reviewed other violations of the code in addition to the refrigeration

issue. While the Oliver holding was largely based on another error, it is important to note

the court clearly found the delay was unreasonable, despite testimony from the expert

witness that there was no indication the failure to refrigerate affected the sample. Id. at

¶ 9.

{¶33} In State v. DeJohn, 2007-Ohio-163 (5th Dist.), while an older version of the

applicable code required temperature storage settings that are no longer part of this law,

the holding is not predicated on the temperature setting at which the sample was stored.

In DeJohn, the officer placed the blood vials in a mailer but did not mail the package until

seventeen hours after collection, while the vials remained unrefrigerated. As was the

case in Oliver, testimony was produced at the suppression hearing that “there was no

indication of fermentation and that the sample appeared normal.” Id. at ¶ 8. The DeJohn

Court held that despite this testimony, the seventeen-hour pre-transit delay was “not a

relatively slight delay or minor procedural deviation” and determined that the trial court

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erred in failing to suppress the evidence. Id. at ¶ 18. Thus, DeJohn held that failure to

refrigerate stored fluids for seventeen hours was not a de minimus violation of the code.

{¶34} In State v. Mullins, 2013-Ohio-2688 (4th Dist.), the Fourth District cited

DeJohn favorably. It found that a twelve-hour delay without refrigeration before mailing

was unreasonable, and suppressed the evidence. The Mullins Court rejected an

argument advanced by the state that the delay was reasonably caused by a shift change

and that the officer took the sample towards the end of one shift and mailed the vials at

the start of his next shift. The Court reasoned that this argument ran afoul of the law

which permits only “clearly de minimus” and “minor procedural deviation(s)” from the

refrigeration requirement. Id. at ¶ 15. As in the prior cases, the Court looked only at the

time the sample was being stored by law enforcement and excluded from its

determination the time during which the sample was in transit. Id. at ¶ 2.

{¶35} In contrast, there is only one case that sanctioned a long period of

unrefrigerated storage and that case appears to be an anomaly, having a dissent noting

its deviation from the established caselaw. In State v. Schneider, 2013-Ohio-4789 (1st

Dist.), the court expressly declined to classify DeJohn as bad law, but instead

distinguished it factually. In Schneider, part of the delay in mailing occurred as a result

of a policy which required the state trooper to return the sample from the local police

district to his assigned OSP patrol post, which was apparently several miles away. The

notations on the paperwork indicated that the trooper transported the sample “by hand.”

Id. at ¶ 17. The court found that because of this policy, the lengthy period without

refrigeration could have been due to the extra time spent hand delivering the sample

which would constitute transit time. We note that in Schneider, the OAC had not defined

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what it meant by “transit” time, causing the court to come up with its own determination

of what “transit” time meant. Thus, it appears the court considered as “transit” time both

time spent in the mail and in the journey to storage.

{¶36} The Schneider dissent questioned the majority decision, explaining that the

delay in the case was “three times greater than the longest of [prior caselaw] pre-mail

periods.” Id. at ¶ 22 (J. Hendon, dissenting). Noting the opinion was an anomaly based

on precedent, the dissent also opined the excessive delay was not a mere procedural

deviation.

{¶37} Nonetheless, the legislature has since defined “transit time” as time

“between the point of collection and a secure storage location or between secure storage

location and a laboratory.”

{¶38} In the instant case, omitting as transit time all of the time from the collection

of samples to their arrival at the pre-mailing storage site and the time in transit after being

mailed until the samples reached the lab, there were clearly thirty-two hours and nineteen

minutes during which the blood was without refrigeration in this case. Even when looking

to the Schneider opinion, where just under nineteen hours passed between the collection

time to mailing, this period is excessive. Thirty-two hours and nineteen minutes passed

in this case from placement into the storage facility to mailing, fifteen more hours than in

Schneider.

{¶39} In contrast, in 2016, the Ohio Supreme Court found a pre-mailing delay of

four hours and ten minutes was not unreasonable and remanded the matter for a

determination of whether the defendant could rebut the presumption of substantial

compliance. State v. Baker, 2016-Ohio-451. In 2023, the Sixth District held that a delay

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of six hours was not unreasonable, and so was determined to be a de minimus violation

of the code. State v. Urbanski, 2023-Ohio-3966 (6th Dist.). In a recent Second District

case, the court reviewed whether a one hour delay between collection and refrigeration

violated the OAC where the cruiser carrying the blood vials to refrigeration storage was

required to respond to an emergency call because a person had jumped into a river. State

v. Quinones, 2024-Ohio-2552, ¶ 20 (2d Dist.). After the delay for the emergency call,

where the vials remained in the cruiser, the vials were transported to the storage

refrigerator. The Court found that the delay was de minimus and the officer substantially

complied with the law. Id. at ¶ 53.

{¶40} In this case, the failure to refrigerate the blood samples was clearly

unreasonable. The instant matter involves a delay of more than fifteen hours in excess

of even the Schneider case and such delay cannot be considered a de minimus violation

of code. The trial court erred in denying Appellant’s motion to suppress the evidence on

this basis.

{¶41} Inexplicably, despite testimony the vials had been locked in an evidentiary

locker during the relevant time, the trial court issued the following: that “[t]he Court finds

the blood sample was in transit from the time it was collected on August 12, 2023 until it

arrived at the Ohio State Highway Patrol Crime Lab on August 16, 2023.” (5/13/25J.E.)

The language of the statute clearly defines “in transit” as the time “between the point of

collection and a secure storage location or between secure storage location and a

laboratory.” This language clearly applies only to the time before and after storage, and

does not include the time spent while in a secure storage facility. At all times while not

“in transit,” bodily fluid samples must be refrigerated. The violation here is not de

Case No. 25CO0046 – 20 –

minimus, and it was error for the court to rule otherwise. As the state violated the storage

requirements for Appellant’s blood samples, any blood evidence, including the resulting

laboratory report, was required to be suppressed.

{¶42} While the state points out that the definition of transit time was not added to

the code until January 23, 2023, the accident at issue occurred on August 12, 2023.

Regardless, caselaw reveals that no court has ever permitted body fluid samples to

remain unrefrigerated for a period longer than twelve hours excluding transit time even

before the revised language providing a definition of “transit” time.

{¶43} Based on the above, Appellant’s second assignment of error has merit in

part and is sustained.

Conclusion

{¶44} Appellant contends his three motions seeking suppression of the results of

laboratory testing of his blood should all have been granted. However, his contentions

that the search warrant was void because the trial court lacked jurisdiction to sign the

warrant and that his blood was drawn shortly after the period provided by law are not well

taken. Appellant’s third reason seeking suppression, that his blood samples remained

unrefrigerated for such a lengthy period while in storage in police custody that

suppression should have been granted is well-taken, however. The failure to refrigerate

for the lengthy period of storage in this case was not reasonable nor did it amount to a de

minimus violation of law. Because the blood sample was stored unrefrigerated for at least

thirty-two hours and nineteen minutes between transit periods, Appellant’s argument has

merit and the judgment of the trial court is reversed. Suppression of all blood-related

evidence must be granted and the matter is remanded in order to allow the state to

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determine if there are any grounds to proceed with prosecution absent the blood test

evidence.

Robb, concurs.

Hanni, J. concurs.

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For the reasons stated in the Opinion rendered herein, Appellant’s assignments of

error are sustained in part and it is the final judgment and order of this Court that the

judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of Columbiana County, Ohio, is reversed and

remanded. Costs to be taxed against the Appellee.

A certified copy of this opinion and judgment entry shall constitute the mandate in

this case pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. It is ordered that a

certified copy be sent by the clerk to the trial court to carry this judgment into execution.

NOTICE TO COUNSEL

This document constitutes a final judgment entry.

Case No. 25CO0046