An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. COA 24-1049
Filed 15 October 2025
Buncombe County, No. 21CRS090156-100
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v.
JOSELYNN FAYE MEAD
Appeal by defendant from judgment entered 13 December 2023 by Judge
Jacqueline D. Grant in Superior Court, Buncombe County. Heard in the Court of
Appeals 28 August 2025.
Attorney General Jeff Jackson, by Special Deputy Attorney General Laura H. McHenry, for the State.
Cooley Law Office, by Craig M. Cooley, for defendant.
ARROWOOD, Judge.
Joselynn Mead (“defendant”) appeals from a jury verdict finding her guilty of
voluntary manslaughter and subsequent sentence of imprisonment for 49 months
minimum, 71 months maximum. For the following reasons, we hold that defendant
received a fair trial free from prejudicial error.
I. Factual Background STATE V. MEAD
Opinion of the Court
In 2020, defendant met Darrin Tinsley (“Mr. Tinsley”) through their shared
work in the karaoke industry; they began a relationship and moved in together in
April 2021. Shortly after moving together, the couple began experiencing issues,
including stressful financial situations. Mr. Tinsley would also drink heavily. During
the summer of 2021, an incident occurred at a bar during which Mr. Tinsley made
threatening comments and placed his hands on defendant.
On 2 December 2021, defendant and Mr. Tinsley went to Legends Bar in
Asheville for a karaoke show. During the evening, a disagreement escalated into Mr.
Tinsley throwing his phone at defendant; a friend offered defendant a place to stay
for the night, which she declined. When they returned home, their conflict continued,
and defendant testified that Mr. Tinsley began assaulting her in their apartment.
Defendant shot him with a gun they kept by their bed, then went to her landlord’s
house for help. Police responded soon after, and defendant was brought in for an
interview. Defendant was charged with second-degree murder during the interview.
Defendant’s trial began 4 December 2023. At the close of the State’s evidence,
defendant made a motion to dismiss, while conceding there was “sufficient evidence”
for the State to proceed on the theory of voluntary manslaughter. The trial court
denied the motion. The jury ultimately found defendant guilty of voluntary
manslaughter, rather than second-degree murder; defendant made a motion to set
aside the verdict, arguing that she acted in perfect self-defense by using a gun in the
face of repeated assaults. The trial court denied this motion as well, and sentenced
-2- STATE V. MEAD
defendant in the mitigated range of 49 months minimum, 71 months maximum.
Defendant gave oral notice of appeal.
II. Discussion
Defendant raises one issue on appeal, that she received ineffective assistance
from her trial counsel for conceding that the State had sufficient evidence to proceed
on a manslaughter charge. We disagree.
A. Standard of Review
When addressing a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, we engage “in a
presumption that trial counsel’s representation is within the boundaries of acceptable
professional conduct.” State v. Roache, 358 N.C. 243, 280 (2004) (citing State v.
Fisher, 318 N.C. 512, 532 (1986)). Defendant carries a heavy burden in establishing
trial counsel’s deficient performance. Roache, 358 N.C. at 279 (quoting State v.
Fletcher, 354 N.C. 455, 482 (2001).
B. Strickland Test
The United State Supreme Court has a produced a two-part test for evaluating
these issues, both prongs of which must be satisfied to allow a defendant to succeed:
First, the defendant must show that counsel’s performance was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.
-3- STATE V. MEAD
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). The Court declined to define
with any specificity what are the obligations of counsel, instead holding that each
inquiry must consider all the circumstances of each case. Id.
In light of the circumstance-specific nature of these types of claims, we have
generally advised that ineffective assistance of counsel claims are to be “considered
through motions for appropriate relief and not on direct appeal.” State v. Stroud, 147
N.C. App. 549, 553 (2001). “To defend against ineffective assistance of counsel
allegations, the State must rely on information provided by defendant to trial counsel,
as well as defendant’s thoughts, concerns, and demeanor[,]” facts which do not appear
on the record and must ascertained through a separate hearing. See State v. Buckner,
351 N.C. 401, 412 (2000). Unless the claim can be evaluated on the basis of the cold
record, we will dismiss the appeal without prejudice.
Defendant’s argument centers on trial counsel’s arguments before the trial
court following the motion to dismiss at the close of the State’s evidence. Defense
counsel stated that his argument “really center[ed] around [the State’s] charge of
second-degree murder” while conceding “that there’s ample evidence or sufficient
evidence to proceed on voluntary manslaughter, but they really haven’t produced any
evidence that would give the jury the ability to find that my client operated with
malice and had absolutely no imperfect self-defense at all.” The trial court, following
arguments, declined to dismiss the second-degree murder charge. Then, following
-4- STATE V. MEAD
the jury verdict, trial counsel made a motion to set aside the verdict, arguing that
defendant was “operating in perfect self-defense” by using a firearm to defend herself
against someone that was repeatedly assaulting her. The court denied this motion.
Defendant argues that trial counsel failed the first prong of the Strickland test
by failing to properly preserve an appeal on the trial court’s denial of her motion to
set aside the verdict, and failed the second prong since she would have raised this
issue on appeal and would likely have been successful. However, defendant
acknowledges in her brief that “trial counsel technically preserved the motion to set
aside verdict claim . . . on the ground the State failed to present substantial evidence
Mead used excessive force.” Defendant then argues that because trial counsel
“effectively admitted” that there was sufficient evidence to support the manslaughter
charge during arguments for the motion to dismiss, this “implodes” the
“straightforward trial error.” Then, when addressing the prejudice prong, defendant
argues that had her trial counsel not made this admission she would have directly
appealed the denial of the motion to set aside the verdict, since we would review the
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An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. COA 24-1049
Filed 15 October 2025
Buncombe County, No. 21CRS090156-100
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v.
JOSELYNN FAYE MEAD
Appeal by defendant from judgment entered 13 December 2023 by Judge
Jacqueline D. Grant in Superior Court, Buncombe County. Heard in the Court of
Appeals 28 August 2025.
Attorney General Jeff Jackson, by Special Deputy Attorney General Laura H. McHenry, for the State.
Cooley Law Office, by Craig M. Cooley, for defendant.
ARROWOOD, Judge.
Joselynn Mead (“defendant”) appeals from a jury verdict finding her guilty of
voluntary manslaughter and subsequent sentence of imprisonment for 49 months
minimum, 71 months maximum. For the following reasons, we hold that defendant
received a fair trial free from prejudicial error.
I. Factual Background STATE V. MEAD
Opinion of the Court
In 2020, defendant met Darrin Tinsley (“Mr. Tinsley”) through their shared
work in the karaoke industry; they began a relationship and moved in together in
April 2021. Shortly after moving together, the couple began experiencing issues,
including stressful financial situations. Mr. Tinsley would also drink heavily. During
the summer of 2021, an incident occurred at a bar during which Mr. Tinsley made
threatening comments and placed his hands on defendant.
On 2 December 2021, defendant and Mr. Tinsley went to Legends Bar in
Asheville for a karaoke show. During the evening, a disagreement escalated into Mr.
Tinsley throwing his phone at defendant; a friend offered defendant a place to stay
for the night, which she declined. When they returned home, their conflict continued,
and defendant testified that Mr. Tinsley began assaulting her in their apartment.
Defendant shot him with a gun they kept by their bed, then went to her landlord’s
house for help. Police responded soon after, and defendant was brought in for an
interview. Defendant was charged with second-degree murder during the interview.
Defendant’s trial began 4 December 2023. At the close of the State’s evidence,
defendant made a motion to dismiss, while conceding there was “sufficient evidence”
for the State to proceed on the theory of voluntary manslaughter. The trial court
denied the motion. The jury ultimately found defendant guilty of voluntary
manslaughter, rather than second-degree murder; defendant made a motion to set
aside the verdict, arguing that she acted in perfect self-defense by using a gun in the
face of repeated assaults. The trial court denied this motion as well, and sentenced
-2- STATE V. MEAD
defendant in the mitigated range of 49 months minimum, 71 months maximum.
Defendant gave oral notice of appeal.
II. Discussion
Defendant raises one issue on appeal, that she received ineffective assistance
from her trial counsel for conceding that the State had sufficient evidence to proceed
on a manslaughter charge. We disagree.
A. Standard of Review
When addressing a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, we engage “in a
presumption that trial counsel’s representation is within the boundaries of acceptable
professional conduct.” State v. Roache, 358 N.C. 243, 280 (2004) (citing State v.
Fisher, 318 N.C. 512, 532 (1986)). Defendant carries a heavy burden in establishing
trial counsel’s deficient performance. Roache, 358 N.C. at 279 (quoting State v.
Fletcher, 354 N.C. 455, 482 (2001).
B. Strickland Test
The United State Supreme Court has a produced a two-part test for evaluating
these issues, both prongs of which must be satisfied to allow a defendant to succeed:
First, the defendant must show that counsel’s performance was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.
-3- STATE V. MEAD
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). The Court declined to define
with any specificity what are the obligations of counsel, instead holding that each
inquiry must consider all the circumstances of each case. Id.
In light of the circumstance-specific nature of these types of claims, we have
generally advised that ineffective assistance of counsel claims are to be “considered
through motions for appropriate relief and not on direct appeal.” State v. Stroud, 147
N.C. App. 549, 553 (2001). “To defend against ineffective assistance of counsel
allegations, the State must rely on information provided by defendant to trial counsel,
as well as defendant’s thoughts, concerns, and demeanor[,]” facts which do not appear
on the record and must ascertained through a separate hearing. See State v. Buckner,
351 N.C. 401, 412 (2000). Unless the claim can be evaluated on the basis of the cold
record, we will dismiss the appeal without prejudice.
Defendant’s argument centers on trial counsel’s arguments before the trial
court following the motion to dismiss at the close of the State’s evidence. Defense
counsel stated that his argument “really center[ed] around [the State’s] charge of
second-degree murder” while conceding “that there’s ample evidence or sufficient
evidence to proceed on voluntary manslaughter, but they really haven’t produced any
evidence that would give the jury the ability to find that my client operated with
malice and had absolutely no imperfect self-defense at all.” The trial court, following
arguments, declined to dismiss the second-degree murder charge. Then, following
-4- STATE V. MEAD
the jury verdict, trial counsel made a motion to set aside the verdict, arguing that
defendant was “operating in perfect self-defense” by using a firearm to defend herself
against someone that was repeatedly assaulting her. The court denied this motion.
Defendant argues that trial counsel failed the first prong of the Strickland test
by failing to properly preserve an appeal on the trial court’s denial of her motion to
set aside the verdict, and failed the second prong since she would have raised this
issue on appeal and would likely have been successful. However, defendant
acknowledges in her brief that “trial counsel technically preserved the motion to set
aside verdict claim . . . on the ground the State failed to present substantial evidence
Mead used excessive force.” Defendant then argues that because trial counsel
“effectively admitted” that there was sufficient evidence to support the manslaughter
charge during arguments for the motion to dismiss, this “implodes” the
“straightforward trial error.” Then, when addressing the prejudice prong, defendant
argues that had her trial counsel not made this admission she would have directly
appealed the denial of the motion to set aside the verdict, since we would review the
appeal de novo as a preserved claim. Defendant further argues that but for her trial
counsel’s concession, the trial court would have granted the motion to set aside the
verdict.
It is unclear what defendant is arguing. She admits that trial counsel
preserved her ability to appeal the denied motion, but then appears to argue that our
ability to review that appeal would be altered by trial counsel’s admission, which is
-5- STATE V. MEAD
why she did not raise that issue directly. Later in her argument, she appears to
consider the appeal unpreserved, since she states that “[u]ndersigned counsel
would’ve raised this claim because: (1) as a preserved claim, this Court would’ve
reviewed it de novo.” Here defendant cites to State v. Blankenship, regarding the
standard of review for a preserved claim, which is the only citation to any case or
statute on the prejudice prong of Strickland test.
Defendant has failed to explain why, under our statutes and caselaw, we would
be unable to conduct a proper review of the trial court’s denial of her motion to set
aside the verdict. Furthermore, defendant’s arguments that the motion to set aside
the verdict would have otherwise been granted are unavailing because the State
presented sufficient evidence of each element to survive the motion. Accordingly, she
has failed to demonstrate that she suffered any prejudice due to her trial counsel’s
actions, and her appeal on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel must
necessarily fail. We need not dismiss without prejudice to file a motion for
appropriate relief, as the record and the parties arguments have provided us with a
sufficient ability to evaluate the claim.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that defendant received a fair trial, free
from prejudicial error.
NO ERROR.
Judges COLLINS and FREEMAN concur.
-6- STATE V. MEAD
Report per Rule 30(e).
-7-